ISRAELI PLANS AND THE CORRELATION OF FORCES
Following the May 1973 crisis, when some in the Israeli defense establishment (although not the head of AMAN and his analysts) thought war likely, Israeli leaders relaxed. In the wake of the June 1973 summit meeting between American President Richard Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev they believed that neither superpower wanted a war in the Middle East. Chief of Staff David Elazar felt comfortable enough to overhaul the Israeli high command, rotating in new commanders for the IAF, Southern Command (that is, the Sinai front), and lower levels as well.23 There was talk of reducing the period of obligatory military service from three years to two and a half, and an air of optimism pervaded the general staff and the ministry of defense. War might break out in 1975 or 1976, thought the head of AMAN, Major General Eliyahu Zeira, once the Arabs had acquired the ability to blunt the IAF’s threat to their rear areas with surface-to-surface missiles and long-range bombers capable of striking pre-1967 Israel.24 Until then, however, war appeared highly unlikely.
Israeli military planning before 1973 assumed that the IDF would anticipate the onset of war by two days, more or less. This would give Israel time to mobilize its reserve forces and to strike a preemptive blow with its air force, bringing the war to a favorable conclusion in four or five days—ten or twelve days if warning was very short or preemption forbidden.25 Yet—and this is a key point—even with shorter periods of warning Israeli commanders believed they could hold their defensive positions along the Canal and on the Golan Heights. In June 1972 the head of AMAN warned the deputy chief of staff, Major General Israel Tal, that warning might be as brief as thirty-six hours on the Egyptian front, and less than that on the Syrian front.26
In normal times Israel kept one armored brigade—fewer than one hundred tanks—on the Golan Heights and three brigades (nearly three hundred tanks) in Sinai. These forces would require reinforcement by Israel’s very large reserve forces, which constituted the bulk of its armed forces. In the event that Israel had to begin the war on the defensive, even with short warning, the Israelis had no intention of giving up ground. In the south, Plan Dovecote (sbovacb yonim) would take effect.27 The fortifications along the canal—known as the Bar Lev line—would be stripped of their garrison of four or five hundred reservists, who would be replaced by crack paratroops. These outposts (sixteen, down from thirty-one constructed during the War of Attrition) each held between sixteen and sixty men, and occupied the 160-kilometer length of the canal, as well as 20 kilometers of the Mediterranean coast. Just behind a ridge line some 10 to 12 kilometers east of the canal the Israelis had built a road (“Artillery Road”) on which they could deploy self-propelled artillery to cover the canal area. Near the road lay another line of eleven strong points (taozim) which were only partially occupied. Along a second and higher ridge line some 20 to 30 kilometers east of the Artillery Road the Israelis had built another road, the so-called Lateral Road. Yet another 30 kilometers to the east lay the passes to central Sinai, the Mitla and Gidi Passes that covered the large Israeli bases in central Sinai, particularly that at Refidim. “Dovecote” required the deployment of two armored brigades close to the front: twenty-four tanks in eight platoons actually on the canal along the high sand ramp and firing positions constructed by the Israelis, with eight companies (some eighty tanks) and three battalions (another ninety tanks) deployed farther back along the two roads parallel to the canal. A third armored brigade was to be deployed near the Refidim base on the eastern side of the passes, as a reserve force. The armor school brigade in the Negev served as an emergency reserve.
The Golan Heights spread over a length (some 60 kilometers) one-third that of the canal front and were defended in peacetime, as noted, by one armored brigade as well as by small infantry and artillery units. In addition, the Israelis had built some seventeen strong points, mainly in small volcanic hills along the length of the post-1967 cease-fire line; these small forts, manned by some fifteen men apiece, would normally be supported by a platoon of three tanks each, firing from prepared positions. The Golan differed from the Suez front in several ways. Where the canal served as a formidable antitank obstacle, no such major water obstacle blocked a Syrian advance; conversely, the Israeli observation posts on Mount Hermon had a far better view of Syrian positions than did their counterparts in the Sinai. Most important, the Golan had little operational depth (15 kilometers to the Golan escarpment, versus 70 kilometers from the canal to the Mitla and Gidi passes—themselves well over 100 kilometers as the crow flies from Israel proper).
In both north and south, the IDF believed that the standing forces, composed chiefly of conscripts, could hold the line with a modicum of warning until the reserves had completed their mobilization.28 What accounted for this confidence? In the view of the IDF’s leaders, after 1967 the qualitative discrepancy between the Arabs and Israel had grown, while the quantitative balance had remained stable (see Table 5–1).29
Table 5–1. The Arab-Israeli Military Balance, October 1973
Egypt
Syria
Other Arab*
Israel
Arabs: Israel
Medium tanks
2.200
1,820
820
2,000
2.4:1
Anti-tank missiles
850
350
?
280
4.3:1
Anti-tank rockets
2,500
2,800
?
650
8.2:1
Anti-tank guns
1.300
900
?
0
—
Armored personnel carriers
2,400
1,300
620
4,000
1:1(–)
Artillery (over 100 MM)
1,210
655
190
570
3.6:1
Fighter-bombers
400
282
?
358
1.9:1
SAM batteries
146
34
?
10
18:1
* Includes forces that actually participated in the Yom Kippur War.
SOURCE: Taken from Dupuy, Elusive Victory, p. 608, and Adan, “Eichut v’kamut,” p. 255. See also Anthony H. Cordesman, The Arab-Israeli Military Balance and the Art of Operations (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1987), pp. 37-53.
This table does not, of course, fully sum up the military balance. In particular, it omits additional Arab forces that had the potential to enter the war, although, on the other hand, it includes some forces (for example, the Iraqi expeditionary force) that did not enter the war until a week or so after it had begun. Moreover, it does not capture the qualitative balance, in terms either of manpower or technology. The IAF had aircraft—particularly the F-4 Phantom—with ranges and payloads far superior to their Soviet counterparts on the other side; furthermore, most Israeli artillery was self-propelled, and hence more mobile, even under fire, than the towed guns and howitzers of the Arabs. At the same time, it should be noted that the Israeli stock of APCs consisted chiefly of obsolete World War II-type half-tracks—the IDF had barely five hundred modern American M-l 13s, and even those did not have the fighting potential of the Soviet APCs in Arab hands. With respect to quantity and in some cases quality of SAMs and antitank missiles, the Israelis were grossly inferior. Moreover, the Arabs (particularly the Syrians) had a distinct edge in night-fighting equipment for their tanks.30 Finally, it should be noted that a good technical net assessment requires comparison of dissimilar weapon systems—SAMs vs. airplanes, for example, or antitank missiles vs. tanks. The Arab states had invested heavily in weapons designed to nullify Israeli advantages in air power and tanks, and not only by building up their arsenals with similar weapons.
The Egyptians dis
posed of five infantry, three mechanized, and two armored divisions; the Syrians of three mechanized and two armored divisions. Both countries had, in addition, large commando units, numbering more than thirty battalions between them.31 Israeli organizational strength remains vague, reflecting a deliberate Israeli policy of concealing such statistics. Nonetheless, it is known that the Israelis ultimately deployed a total of seven ugdot, which are more or less the equivalent of western armored or mechanized divisions, during the war. Of these, however, only five appear to have been full-strength armored divisions, the decision to form the other two having been taken the previous summer. The seventh ugda, in fact, was an improvised force assembled in the course of the war. In addition, Israel had as many as eighteen independent brigades, including some four paratroop and nine infantry brigades for use in mobile operations.
THE PREWAR CRISIS
On September 13 an air battle erupted north of Israel’s border when Syrian fighters attempted to attack an Israeli reconnaissance plane: One Israeli plane fell, as did twelve Syrian planes. The Israelis thought the Syrians might attempt some retaliation for this humiliating skirmish, possibly even a raid on the Golan Heights. It was in this light that Israel intelligence viewed the Syrian forward deployment of their forces. When similar developments appeared on the Egyptian front two explanations took hold: first, that the Egyptians were merely preparing for an exercise (Tahrir 41) that would begin on October 1; second, that the Egyptians feared that war might break out as a result of tensions in the north. Within AMAN there was little doubt about this view, at least at the level of Zeira and the head of AMAN’s research department, Brigadier General Aryeh Shalev. As early as September 25, however, Zvi Zamir, the head of the Mossad (Israel’s foreign espionage organization), may have suggested that war could erupt.32 Zamir did not, however, press this view. The Mossad had neither the responsibility nor the resources to conduct alternative analyses: Throughout the prewar crisis AMAN would provide virtually all the finished intelligence to decision makers.
The first alarm expressed outside the Israeli intelligence community came from the commander of the northern front, Major General Yitzhak Hofi (“Chaka”), who expressed concern about the possibility of war as early as September 24; as a result Minister of Defense Dayan visited the Golan Heights.33 On September 28 Hofi met with the chief of staff (Lieutenant General David Elazar), his deputy (Major General Israel Tal), the head of AMAN (Major General Eliyahu Zeira), his deputy (Brigadier General Aryeh Shalev), and the commander of the IAF (Major General Benjamin Peled) to discuss the situation in the north. Elazar decided to dispatch elements of an additional armored brigade (including twenty-five tank crews) to the north, remarking, “We’ll have one hundred tanks against eight hundred—that’s enough.”34
On the next day, Saturday, September 29, a group of Palestinian terrorists controlled by Syria hijacked a train in Austria carrying Jewish émigrés from the Soviet Union. Many in Israeli intelligence now believe that this episode was part of the Arab deception program, although they disagree about its impact. Prime Minister Golda Meir, in Europe on other business, flew to Vienna for a difficult interview with Chancellor Bruno Kreisky concerning the proposed closing of Austrian transit facilities for Soviet Jews.35 But AMAN continued to monitor the Arab buildup. By September 30 Israeli intelligence noticed developments in Egypt that could not be attributed to the exercise Tahrir 41, and the Syrians continued unprecedented activities, including the deployment of fighter aircraft to forward airfields. Hofi continued to press for reinforcement, and Tal, the deputy chief of staff, declared, “This means war,” but Zeira, the head of AMAN agreed with those of his assistants who insisted that “the probability of war is low.”36
On Monday, October 1, signs continued to accumulate of trouble building on both north and south: Egyptian officer exams had been cancelled, and a particularly good intelligence source warned of war. Nonetheless, the regular meeting of the general staff on that day dealt with the threat in 1975–76, not an impending war in 1973. Throughout this period it appears that Zeira decided to refrain until quite late from opening a special source (or sources) of intelligence, which was (or were) expected to deliver additional and perhaps unambiguous knowledge of Arab intentions. Although Israeli writings (and interview subjects) speak of this subject only guardedly, one may say the following: (1) The senior political and military leadership expected unambiguous warning of war, in part because of their knowledge of the sources of Israeli intelligence; (2) there were delays, caused by operational difficulties and by late decisions to activate a source or sources that might deliver this unambiguous warning; (3) senior Israeli leaders, including Dayan and Elazar, claim to have been misled—accidentally, perhaps—by Zeira into thinking that all collection assets were operating. In fact, as the Agranat Commission reported, they were not. By 5:00 P.M. on Friday, October 5, Zeira had substantial indications of an impending war but was awaiting confirmation from an extremely important source, which only came through in the very early hours of October 6.37
By Wednesday, October 3, doubts had spread to Moshe Dayan, the minister of defense. The Syrian buildup on the Golan had no precedent—where in May 1973 only 250 tanks had appeared on the front line, now 850 had moved into jump-off positions.38 Over the next two days much of the rest of a reinforcing Israeli armored brigade (the Seventh, a crack unit) was sent north; instead of the 70 tanks in place two weeks earlier, the total now reached 188; moreover, Hofi was authorized to continue preparing the terrain for war.39
On October 3 Golda Meir convened a meeting of her kitchen cabinet, including Dayan, several other ministers and confidantes, Elazar, and Zeira’s deputy, Aryeh Shalev (Zeira was sick). Although Shalev presented worrying information—for example, that the Syrians had concentrated their SAM batteries at the front rather than around Damascus and that live ammunition had been issued to Egyptian forces—no one drew the correct conclusion.40 All present accepted Shalev’s view that the Egyptians did not believe themselves to be ready for war. A cabinet meeting was convened for October 7, the day after Yom Kippur, to discuss the situation on the Golan Heights, where a limited Syrian operation seemed a distinct possibility.
On Thursday, October 4, however, two alarming pieces of information caused the first faint doubts among Zeira, the research branch of AMAN, and the chief of staff. First, the Israelis learned that the Soviets had begun evacuating the families of their advisers from Egypt and Syria; second, aerial photography of the canal zone—hitherto delayed several days by mechanical malfunctions of the reconnaissance planes and their equipment—revealed an unprecedented buildup of Egyptian forces. Fully 1,100 artillery pieces were poised on the canal’s west bank, as were five forward-deployed infantry divisions. At a meeting that took up the morning of Friday, October 5, Elazar, with Dayan’s support, undertook several important measures. He raised the IDF to Alert Level C; this canceled all leaves, required soldiers in front-line units to prepare for war, and readied the call-up system for instant operation. According to some, this was the first time the IDF had gone to this level of alert since 1967.41 Elazar sent the remainder of the Seventh Armored Brigade to the Golan and ordered another brigade to the Sinai. Zeira still doubted that war would break out, but he stopped using the term low probability, to which he had clung until then. Later that day Dayan received permission from the prime minister to call up the reserves without the usual cabinet meeting, if that should prove necessary.42 Yet the atmosphere was not a tense one. Golda Meir recalled later:
I was promised that we would receive adequate warning in time to deal with any real emergency, and in any case we were sending reinforcements to the fronts adequate to conduct any containing operations for which there would be a need. Everything that was required was done, and the Army stood on high alert, particularly the air force and the armored corps.43
Thus, although there was some doubt in the minds of the minister of defense, the prime minister, the chief of staff, and senior officers, no national-level
leader thought that war was imminent, or even a sufficiently large and dangerous possibility to merit a call-up. No matter what, Chief of Staff Elazar thought, he would get, at a bare minimum, twelve to twenty-four hours’ absolutely firm warning of the outbreak of war; and if a war began soon Israel would cope well.44
Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement or the Day of Judgment, is the holiest day of the Jewish calendar on which even many nonobservant Israeli Jews attend synagogue; those who do not usually stay at home. From the Israeli point of view this was a blessing: Mobilization went remarkably smoothly because there was no traffic on the street, and reservists were known to be in one of two places—at home or in the synagogue. At approximately four in the morning of Yom Kippur, Saturday, October 6, the military aide to the prime minister, as well as the chief of staff and the minister of defense, were awoken with the news that war was imminent and would break out by sunset that day. The news was regarded as definitive—a curious fact, which we will consider further below. The message was interpreted to mean that war would break out at or near sunset—at 6:00 P.M. In fact, on October 3 the Egyptians had agreed to set the attack time at 2:00 P.M., although they had preferred a later time in order to attack with the sun at their backs and in the eyes of the defending Israelis.45
Military Misfortunes Page 14