The primary analogy, however, is that of a father “teaching” his sons. In modern terminology “formation” is perhaps a better word than “teaching” to convey what is intended, because it is more comprehensive. What a parent conveys to his children is not confined to the level of the intellect, as “teaching” suggests. Indeed, it includes this area, for every child acquires a great deal of information from his parents, whether correct or not, depending upon their intellectual culture. But even more significant is the less tangible sphere of attitudes, outlook, moral standards, sense of values, vision of reality. Everyone who deals with youth is aware of the decisive importance of early parental formation. Such qualities as neatness, politeness, respect for authority, sensitivity to others, honesty and reliability are instilled by good parents from earliest infancy, not by any formal instruction, but by the continuous influence they exercise simply by what they are and through the countless intimate personal encounters of everyday life. Such formation affects every aspect of human development: intellectual, volitional, emotional, physical, moral and religious. It conveys a whole vision of the meaning of life and a sense of what is valuable and to be pursued. In highly unsophisticated form, it is a kind of existential philosophy of man.
All this is the work of formation: this is what the Rule means by “teaching.” The abbot, then, is not a scholar or professor, not even of the sacred sciences. What he wants to communicate is not primarily knowledge but wisdom. What he wants to bring about in his disciples is their total personal conversion. His primary qualifications, then, are not intellectual brilliance or academic achievement but “sapientiae doctrina et vitae meritum” (64.2). These two qualities, wisdom and virtue, are closely related, for the “wise doctrine” is that of the Gospel, that “folly” which is wiser than human wisdom (1 Cor 1:18-24), and the “goodness of his life” is the actualizing of the Gospel, the existential wisdom. The Gospel is the kind of “doctrine” one acquires more by living it and reflecting on one’s experience than by studying. The abbot, like the spiritual father of the desert, is a man of proven holiness who can help others to discover God’s will and to discern the spirits at work in them because he has himself assimilated the Gospel through his own reflection and experience.
The communication of such doctrina is a very subtle process. The Rule appropriately compares it to the hidden and mysterious action of leaven in a mass of dough (2.5). The manner of its communication is twofold: by word and by example. Benedict makes much of the importance of the abbot’s teaching by means of his own life, by the way he conducts himself. The sub-theme (RB 2.12b,23-25) develops the need for the abbot’s adapting himself to the individual differences of his monks: some will be successfully influenced through verbal instruction, appeal and admonition; others will be affected but little by words and can be reached only by example. But the teaching through action is not meant only for the latter; it is specified that “he must point out to them all that is good and holy more by example than by words” (2.12). The message of his own life is more effective than what he says, even for those who understand his words. The very nature of the wisdom he presents is such that it is not genuine, is not fully itself, unless it is translated into practice. The doing of it is essential to what it is. The Gospel is not a philosophy—we do not really know it until we know it by experience.67
The other concern of the central sections of chapter 2 is that favoritism be banished. While St. Benedict retains this point, he has eliminated much of the RM’s development of it; he is much more insistent upon the need for diversity of treatment of different individuals than upon equality of treatment. However, he too affirms that the abbot must show equal charity to all (2.22). Benedict is especially insistent that social status should not influence the abbot’s attitude toward anyone, and the New Testament is invoked to show that all purely human distinctions are obliterated by our oneness in Christ (2.20). The only valid standard of judgment is the monk’s fulfillment of the religious commitment he has made. Accordingly, preference may be shown (and by “preference” Benedict understands primarily promotion in rank) only to those who show greater virtue. Equality of charity does not imply equality of treatment: the abbot must take account of individual differences and treat each monk according to his needs. But he must love each one and deal with him in a way best calculated to develop his own unique potentialities.
From all this it is clear in what sense the abbot’s teaching can rightly be compared to that of a father. The comparison is forceful and illuminating. But it is only an analogy, and it needs to be added that, as in all analogies, the two situations are comparable but not identical. There are also differences that should be recognized; if they are not, distortion inevitably results. The first difference is that a father is dealing with children and the abbot with adults. The analogy does not provide any excuse for the abbot to treat his monks like children. Indeed, they still have something to learn—as the abbot himself does—but they must learn it as adults and not as children. The Rule offers no justification for the abbot’s assuming an attitude of paternalism, in the pejorative sense of the term. Still less does it assume his infallibility; on the contrary, it stresses that he is a weak and sinful human being who must be on his guard and concerned for his own salvation. The humility that allows him to admit his own error is itself an important aspect of his teaching.
Secondly, the masculine feature of the analogy is not essential. Spiritual “fatherhood” is not a male prerogative. It involves the relationship between one human being and another, and neither sex is privileged in its exercise either by nature or by status in the Church. The Rule was written for a male community, but its provisions are equally applicable to either sex. Both the Bible and the Fathers sometimes compare God to a mother as well as to a father.68 The RM compares the abbot to both in a phrase which is meaningful in itself but which the RB has omitted.69 The Scriptures use both the metaphor of begetting and that of giving birth.70 Historically, spiritual parenthood has been exercised by both sexes, both in the Egyptian desert and in later Western abbeys.71
The abbot as administrator
The abbot’s task is defined by his essential role as father and teacher: his overriding concern is the spiritual formation and growth of his disciples. The abbot of the RB is the transposition into cenobitic terms of the spiritual father of the desert monks. The transposition, however, has brought with it factors that do not really alter the essential purpose of the office, but nevertheless modify the concrete circumstances of its exercise. When the disciples become a community, the monastery becomes an institution. While there may be almost infinite variety in the size and complexity of Benedictine monasteries, even the simplest requires some degree of government and administration. The role of the abbot is not purely in the spiritual order; he is also the administrator of all the monastery’s affairs. Throughout the RB the abbot is given ultimate responsibility for every thing that concerns the life of the community, whether in the spiritual or in the temporal order.
The chapters of the Rule that concern the ordering of the daily life—common prayer, discipline, food, sleep, work, travel, reception of guests—uniformly place the making of policy and decisions in the hands of the abbot. On the other hand, the two chapters that deal ex professo with the abbot speak primarily of his personal relationships with his monks and say almost nothing of his administrative tasks. At first sight this omission is puzzling, for in practice the burdens of administration occupy much of an abbot’s time and concern. Upon closer examination, however, we find that the silence of chapters 2 and 64 on this matter actually reveals an important aspect of Benedict’s mentality. For him, administration of the monastery’s affairs, even temporal affairs, is not a separate task—it is an integral aspect of his responsibility for the formation of his sons.
In this respect the father-analogy once again becomes illuminating. The father of a family also has to provide for every aspect of his children’s lives: he must feed, clothe and house them, provi
de medical care and recreation, see to their education and social needs, determine his family’s relationships to the larger society. This is not a separate compartment of life; it is an aspect of his responsibility for their formation. For much of the “teaching” that he imparts, the sense of values and relative priorities that he inculcates, is communicated precisely by means of the way in which he deals with these administrative problems. In this area, indeed, the parallel between the abbot and the paterfamilias of the Roman family may be conceded a certain validity. There is no relationship of dependence, but there is a similarity of function: the abbot is in charge of all the spiritual and temporal affairs of the monastery in much the same way as the paterfamilias presided over the extended family of late Roman society.
What is reflected in this concept of the abbot’s function is the holistic worldview of the Bible and early Christianity. Human life is a whole, and everything in creation is good. There is no aspect of life in this world that cannot, if rightly understood and used, contribute to leading us to our final end. Temporal reality’ and human endeavor are reflections of the perfections of God. Material things are sacramenta, symbols that reveal the goodness and beauty of the Creator. Consequently, Benedict can say that ordinary tools for work should be treated like the sacred vessels intended for liturgical use (31.10). It is only sin that has disfigured the beauty of creation and diverted things from their purpose. The monastic life is an effort to restore the lost paradise, to regain the image of God in man that has been distorted. Therefore, the temporal order cannot be despised or neglected. In the monk’s life there is no area that can be exempted from subjection to the divine precepts and the regime of grace. This is no disincarnate spirituality; conversion embraces the whole of life.
Administration, then, is not a purely profane art that can be left to anyone who is knowledgeable about business. In the New Testament, “administration” is one of the charisms mentioned together with prophecy and teaching (1 Cor 12:28; Rom 12:6), a gift the Holy Spirit confers for the good of the community. Benedict likewise supposes that what is most important for temporal administration in the monastery is not simply human skill but spiritual qualities arising from faith and a resolute commitment to a Christian vision. It is significant that the requirements for the cellarer are practically the same as for the abbot and the deans: wisdom, fear of God, humility, conducting himself “like a father” (RB 31). Indeed, the management of business affairs is an art that can be learned, and today professional training in some degree is needed to master the complexities of temporal administration. But the supernatural outlook that perceives the purpose of the process is of supreme importance. It is the abbot who sets the tone and oversees everything, for he is the father who bears ultimate responsibility, even if he may delegate much of the detail.
The choice and installation of the abbot
Since the abbot is representative of Christ in the coenobium, the selection of a person to fill the office must reflect the will of God. As God by a special call chose the prophets and kings who acted as mediators of his word and will in the Old Testament, and Christ personally selected the apostles who handed on the Gospel to the early Church, so the divine will must be operative in the choice of the doctores—bishops and abbots—who now mediate the divine precepts. The will of God, however, has to be made known through human channels in this case as in others. The early Church, therefore, recognized a number of ways in which bishops and abbots might be chosen, and believed that the will of God was manifested in their election or appointment by human agents. In modern times we are accustomed to majority vote of the community in the case of abbots and direct appointment by the Holy See in the case of bishops;72 in ancient times the situation was more complex.73
In the monastic tradition a number of different procedures were in use. Pachomius appointed his own successor, although he first consulted the elders, and Petronius did the same (Vita prima 114; 117; Vita sa5 and sa7). Honoratus likewise designated his successor at Lerins, and there are many later examples. This is also the system followed by the RM. The abbot is to choose the most virtuous monk in the community and designate him as abbot-elect. He is to encourage the monks to compete with one another for this honor by striving to be the most obedient. When the appointment has been made, the bishop and his clergy are summoned to install the new abbot by means of a liturgical rite. If the old abbot then recovers, the new one is to act as “second” until his predecessor’s death. But he may still be deposed by the old abbot if he misbehaves, and another appointed in his place. If the abbot dies suddenly, without having designated a successor, the bishop brings in an abbot, presumably from another monastery, who governs the community for thirty days. At the end of that time he chooses the most observant monk and presents him to the bishop to be installed as abbot.
St. Benedict does not mention designation by the previous abbot. He prefers to involve the community in the choice of their abbot. What he says about this, however, is subject to diverse interpretation, and there is no agreement at present about the precise meaning of the passage in RB 64.1-6. Even the definition of the terms eligere, ordinare and constituere is disputed. Benedict says that the person placed in office should be either (1) selected by the whole community acting unanimously in the fear of God; or (2) selected by some part of the community, no matter how small, that possesses “sounder judgment” (sanius consilium). Rank is to count for nothing; the sole qualifications are “goodness of life and wisdom in teaching.” If it should happen that the whole community selects an unworthy abbot, then the bishop of the diocese or neighboring abbots or lay people should intervene to depose him and put a good abbot in his place.
The differing interpretations of this passage depend upon diverse views of the author’s intention. Did he intend to give precise regulations for the procedure to be followed, so that the text is juridically accurate and its meaning can be determined by comparison with other passages of the RB and with other contemporary’ texts? Or is the Rule deliberately vague and without strict juridic intent, because the actual practice was well known to those for whom it was written and did not have to be defined? Or does it perhaps simply ignore the question of procedure entirely and address itself solely to the spiritual problem involved in the choice of an abbot? In comparison with other rules and contemporary texts, the RB is notoriously obscure, whatever be the explanation of this.74
One view holds that the community did not have the right of election, but only of postulation. The bishop was the final authority. To him the community presented the candidate whom they had unanimously chosen, or a candidate chosen by a minority, the sanior pars. The bishop would also be the arbiter who determined which monks constituted the sanior pars or electoral body. He would have the right to examine the candidate proposed to him by the electors and confirm the choice. If he felt that the candidate postulated was not worthy, he would reject him, and himself appoint an abbot; in this he might be assisted by the advice of other abbots and interested lay Christians from the vicinity. The new abbot would then be installed by the bishop, assisted by other abbots (65.3). This view supposes that the Rule legislates accurately: the term eligere means to postulate; ordinare means to appoint or to place in office; constituere means to install.75
Another opinion holds that the bishop’s function was merely to confirm and install the abbot; he had nothing to say of the choice of the candidate except in special circumstances, when an unworthy abbot had to be deposed or when the election was indecisive. The choice of the candidate was up to the monastic body: the Master, who is more authoritarian, entrusts it solely to the previous abbot (or an abbot from another monastery); St. Benedict, who is more conscious of the abbot’s fallibility, places confidence in the community to make the choice. In either case, the choice is really that of God; the human agents are merely intermediaries who try to discern his will. The abbatial office is still charismatic, as it was in its origins and in the case of the great spiritual fathers raised up by God, like Pa
chomius. It is not an “ecclesiastical” office, and the bishops have no determination of it aside from exceptional cases which require their intervention. For St. Benedict, it is the community that discerns the divine choice, and the bishop must confirm and install their candidate. The bishop’s right to intervene in the affairs of monasteries was not yet clearly defined in canon law.76
This approach, however, does not clarify the meaning of the sanius consilium nor determine what procedure was to be followed when the community could not agree with quasi-unanimity. Some argue that the Rule is obscure on this point because the practice was so well known that it was not necessary to describe it. Kassius Hallinger maintains that all the methods of choosing an abbot known from contemporary documents were “undemocratic” ones: designation by a single individual (abbot or bishop or lay founder) or election by a minority.77 He suggests that even the unanimous “election” mentioned by RB 64.1 is really only the community’s ratification of a candidate already chosen by appointment or elected by a minority’. Minority elections were provided for in the Code of Justinian in 54678 and must have been known from actual usage. If the Rule does not specify how the electors are to be chosen, it is only because this was understood by everyone: the seniores or decani, of whom the RB often speaks, constituted the electoral body, as being the monks who best possessed the spiritual qualities that enabled them to discern the divine will.79
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