by Tom Clancy
JOHN D. GRESHAM
This young woman is one of the non-combatant role-players that are used on the Joint Readiness Training Center Battlefield at Fort Polk.
JOHN D. GRESHAM
All of these elements are combined with the most sophisticated telemetry and assessment system in the world to make the Fort Polk/JRTC range complete the finest schoolhouse in the world.
The schoolmaster (and commanding general) of this massive enterprise is Major General Michael Sherfield. Himself a career paratrooper, Sherfield has managed to fight the budget battles that have allowed the Fort Polk/JRTC facility to grow and conduct training in areas that previously would have been thoroughly impossible. Some of these include:• Live Fire Training Range: To the north of the main force-on-force training range at Fort Polk is an all new live-fire training complex. Here, deployed infantry can use virtually every kind of weapon in their arsenal from M16s to 155mm field howitzer firing live high-explosive shells! This is far different from the automated shooting gallery that is the NTC live-fire range. JRTC can simulate almost any kind of open-field combat that the O/C teams can imagine.
• Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) Training Facility: Several years ago, there was a large-scale firefight in Mogadishu between U.S. Rangers and the militia army of the late General Aidid. Frankly, the results stank from our point of view. Over ninety Americans were wounded or killed, along with the loss of two UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters. To help better prepare U.S. Forces for such combat, the JRTC has built a brand-new, $70-million MOUT facility that allows for both force-on-force as well as live-fire training in an urban setting. Resembling a small town, the MOUT facility uses state-of-the-art visual effects (some borrowed from Hollywood) to provide an impressive array of visual and aural feedback for the trainees. Perhaps the most impressive is that when a particular building (being used as an OPFOR armory) gets hit by certain types of munitions (like rockets or grenades), the whole building can be set to explode on command! The recognized importance of providing extensive training for infantrymen in urban settings was evidenced by the construction of a multi-million-dollar complex made up of an airfield take-down facility, a military compound, and an urban city at the JRTC. In honor of two brave and valiant infantrymen who lost their lives in Mogadishu, Somalia, the JRTC staff named the main city complex after SFC Randall D. Shughart and MSG Gary I. Gordon.
Let me tell you, this place is impressive! Beyond these things, JRTC generally does resemble the NTC in that units rotate in for several weeks at a time for the large force-on-force phase of training, as well as a week or so of preliminary live-fire training. Normally, the main deployment lasts eleven days from start to finish, with several days on both ends set aside for planning, debriefing, cleaning up the training area or “box,” and making sure that everything out in the bottomlands is safe for the critters!52
A portion of Shugart-Gordon MOUT site at Fort Polk, Louisiana. Named after two Medal of Honor winners who were killed during a firefight in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993, this facility is the most advanced MOUT Training Facility in the world.
JOHN D. GRESHAM
Normally, the Army tries to get every light infantry brigade in service through a JRTC rotation every eighteen months. In 1996 JRTC rotation, the 1st Brigade would actually conduct its deployment in two phases. The first, which would begin in early October, would have several companies going in for an extensive regimen of live-fire training. Then, starting on October 12th, 1996, the other two battalions of the brigade would drop into the force-on-force exercise area, following a nonstop deployment flight from Fort Bragg. All told, nearly 1,300 paratroops of the Devil Brigade would drop in a mass twilight jump, just before dark on the 12th. However, the O/C team and the OPFOR had a few surprises in store for Colonel Petreaus and his troopers. These folks have a special place in their hearts for airborne units, and they had heard about the brigade’s exploits in Royal Dragon. By any standard, it was going to be a challenging couple of weeks for Devil-6 and his troopers.
JRTC Live-Fire Area, Friday, October 11th, 1996
John Gresham and I decided to go down a little early to look over the live-fire training that the platoon from 1/504 was going through. We arrived in time to see the last two days of their training. You need to know that U.S. infantry likes to work at night whenever possible. The night darkness is like a stealthy cloak for them, reducing casualties and making life difficult for enemy units that don’t have the kind of third-generation night-vision goggles (NVGs) that U.S. forces are deployed with. When equipped with systems like the PVS-7B NVGs, the PAQ-4C target designator, and the other night systems that I described in the fourth chapter, our troopers are easily superior to any infantry in the world. However, all the technology in the world won’t keep you from taking casualties if you fail to apply proper infantry tactics and principles to your operations. So the live-fire operations at JRTC are designed to teach the benefits of such tactics and principles, and of keeping national casualties down (and, of course, the players safe!).
The operation scheduled for this day had actually begun the night before at about 0700 hours/7:00 AM. In this particular scenario, the infantry platoon from the 1/504 was scheduled to assault a simulated enemy trench/bunker complex at 0400/4:00 AM.
The complex, which is wired with a variety of pyrotechnic devices and pop-up/out targets, is designed to resemble the ones used by Iraq in 1991. Roughly triangular in shape, it has firing bunkers at the corners and along the trench lines, and multiple strands of defensive wire and simulated minefields defending it. Set in a dense wooded area of the Fort Polk range, this is an obstacle designed to inflict the maximum of casualties (simulated, of course!) on the assaulting infantry unit. This morning’s live-fire problem involved a long (roughly 2,000-yard/meter) hike through total darkness (no moon!), over broken terrain, then an assault on the strong point from two directions. When the platoon’s fire had reduced the strong point enough, an engineer squad would blast an opening through the minefield and wire barricades with a long string of bangalore torpedo demolitions. These are sections of metal pipe packed with explosives that can be clamped together, shoved under an obstacle or barricade, and then detonated to blow open a lane for assault troops to enter safely.
At 0330/3:30 AM, John and I arrived at the departure site in the care of Ms. Paula Schlag, the Fort Polk media relations officer assigned to help us during the coming deployment. Also escorting us would be Lieutenant Colonel Walt Wilson and Captain Mike Dominqus of the JRTC Live-Fire Division. After each of us had donned a Kevlar helmet and flak jacket (for safety, as you will see!), we fell into line behind the command section of the company, and began to grope our way forward to the assault site. This was tougher than it sounds, because there was almost no light to see the person or ground in front of us, and the terrain was quite rough. Also, there were other distractions, like two batteries of M119 105mm and M198 155mm howitzers firing live HE rounds just a few hundred yards/meters in front of us. Occasionally, an illumination round would be fired, burning slowly with an eerie light from a parachute.
By 0600 hours/6:00 AM, the platoon (with Paula, John, and myself, and our escorting officers in tow) had reached the line of departure, about 100 yards/meters from the simulated bunker complex. By this time, the artillery barrage on the objective had stopped, and the assault was just minutes away. When everyone was under cover, the left and right flank of the assault opened fire on the bunker/trench complex. As soon as the troopers opened fire, the O/Cs turned on the firing simulators in the bunker complex, and there followed a scene of absolute pandemonium. For about ten minutes, the 82nd troopers laid down a withering fire on the corner bunkers, with M203 grenade launchers firing illumination rounds to keep the view of the complex clear for everyone.
A simulated Iraqi-style bunker on the live-fire range at Fort Polk, Louisiana. This facility, along with a number of other simulated enemy targets, is used to train troops to assault such targets in combat. The damage you
see was done during a pre-dawn assault drill by a platoon of paratroops from the 1st Battalion of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division.
JOHN D. GRESHAM
Suddenly, we were all ordered facedown into a ditch, and there followed a loud “shoosh,” then a loud bang. This was a live AT-4 antitank rocket being fired into one of the bunkers. Several minutes later, a second rocket was fired from the other flank.
While all this was going on, their squad of combat engineers was placing their bangalore torpedoes under the wire. Once again, we were told to “Get Down!” and this time the whole earth rumbled and shook. The bangalores had blown open a 10-foot/3-meter-wide gap in the mines and wire, and now the assault could proceed. We could see and hear the assault troops heading up into the complex, since by this time the first pink glow of dawn was breaking. All through the trench complex, troopers were carefully clearing the ditches, shooting pop-up/out targets wherever they appeared. In less than eighteen minutes it was over, and the O/Cs had called “Cease fire” to all involved. It took a few more minutes to verify that all the weapons had been “safed” before we could go up and look over the remains of the complex.
The quiet following a “battle” like we had just seen is a bizarre sensation, almost unwelcome in its emptiness. Nevertheless, we eagerly climbed though the Bangalore breach, and began to look around. The artillery had done an impressive job, caving in several trenches and damaging the bunkers. Everywhere, razor-sharp shrapnel marked the deadly remains of the barrage. Best of all, when the assault troops had gone in, they had suffered only six estimated casualties, only two of which were KIA.53 Now, while this may not sound great, it actually is an excellent measure of the performance of the company. They had, in short, taken a heavily fortified position with maximum force and minimum casualties.
The O/Cs assessed this as something of a textbook performance (“standard setting,” in their words), though not all such exercises go quite so well. The following morning, during a simulated road march with a logistics convoy, the commander of the airborne escort, mounted in Hummers, seemed to have forgotten almost everything that he had been taught about road-march security. Vehicles hit mines regularly, and a truck bomb that had not been looked at was responsible for some valuable lessons being learned ... the kind that can save lives! With this last live-fire exercise, the activity around Fort Polk rapidly went forward to get ready for the drop of 1st Brigade the following evening. As for John and me, we got some sleep before what was going to be a couple of long days.
JRTC/Fort Polk, Saturday, October 12th, 1996
The drop of the 1 st Brigade was scheduled for 1815 hours/6:15 PM that evening, so we had some time to get briefed on the coming scenario. For this rotation, known as JRTC 97-1 (this was the first JRTC operation of FY- 97), the first five days would be devoted to what was called the “low intensity” phase with the initial action directed mostly against guerrilla forces; then the scenario would transition to a “hot war” with the brigade fighting against a more powerful and numerous motorized and armored force from a neighboring foreign country. The basic scenario had a friendly host nation, suffering from a guerrilla insurgency, asking for U.S. forces to pacify its territory. Later, the neighbor state sponsoring the insurgency would actively invade the host nation, causing a general outbreak of war. We were briefed on the specifics of the scenario by the O/C staff in what is known as the “1600 Briefing Room,” after the time of the daily situation briefing that is held in the headquarters building. Following the briefing, John and I were driven out to the exercise area in a Hummer by Major Jim Beinkemper, the head of the Fort Polk Public Affairs office. He took us east along what is known as Artillery Road, out to the drop zone and dirt airstrip where the brigade would arrive in about an hour. At the southern end there is a small control tower and fire station, where we would watch the drop.
Even as we parked our HMMWV, we could feel the eyes of men upon us. These were OPFOR forces, playing the part of the local “liberation front” of insurgency forces. The guerrillas were easily recognizable from their floppy “boonie” hats, which they are required to wear at all times. 1st Brigade was required to wear their Kevlar “Fritz” helmets at all times, and O/Cs and other non-combatants had to wear camouflaged patrol caps. Since we had a few minutes, we took the time to talk with some of the OPFOR guerrillas. They were cocky and proud, partially because they were going to be fighting on their “home” base, where they know all the hills and valleys, and their opponents would be at a serious disadvantage. Excusing ourselves, we headed up the hill to the control tower, where General Sherfield and his staff were already standing by, as he normally does to oversee and observe airborne operations. Airborne operations are a risky venture, as shown during the previous day when the body of a 82nd Airborne trooper had been discovered, dead after a failure of his parachute and impact with the ground. The paratrooper had been part of the Division long-range surveillance detachment dropped early to monitor OPFOR intentions. With this hideous reminder of how dangerous the profession can be, everyone went back to work, praying that all went well with this next jump.
These thoughts were somewhat muted by the gorgeous weather and visibility that had fallen upon the low country this October. Normally a terrible place with high temperatures and humidity, as well as killer insects and reptiles, Fort Polk was putting on its best for the troopers of the 1st Brigade.
A group of simulated “Rebel” troops from the 1st Battalion of the 509th Parachute Infantry Regiment await the Airborne Assault of the 1st Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division, just prior to the start of the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) 97-1 Deployment.
JOHN D. GRESHAM
Precisely at 1815 hours/6:15 PM, we heard the sound of C-141s in the distance, and then the transports were upon us. Eleven C-141Bs from the 437th at Charleston AFB, carrying almost 1250 troopers. The transports were lined up in formations of three (except for the last one), staggered to reduce the chances of a midair with a jumper. First out the door of the lead aircraft was General Crocker, followed by the Division Command Sergeant Major (CSM), Steve England. Right after them came Colonel Petraeus and his new CSM, David Henderson, who had replaced Vince Meyers after Royal Dragon. The air seemed full of parachutes and soldiers and the transport stream needed several runs to finish unloading the entire brigade. In the end, the jump went almost perfectly, with only a few minor back and leg injuries in the dimming twilight. In less than half an hour, the brigade was on the ground and moving out.
As soon as the first troopers hit the ground, LGOPs began to form and move off towards their objectives. Several groups of paratroops headed in our direction, beginning to engage the guerrillas that we had chatted with a few minutes earlier. Simulated firefights broke out (using blank ammunition and the laser-activated MILES gear). Things began to get exciting.
At the major’s suggestion, we left the area to those who needed the training and retired to our quarters back at Fort Polk. The next morning, though, we were out early to visit Devil-6 and his headquarters unit. Unfortunately, when we found them, it turned out that the Brigade Tactical Operations Center (TOC) had never been set up the previous night. The original site selected for the TOC had turned out to be full of guerrillas, and the headquarters would be sited in a new place later in the day. This meant that the first day’s fight would have to be directed out of the mobile TOC (loaded into Hummers), which was much less efficient. The brigade would pay for this failure to set up later, but for now, things seemed to be going well. C-130s were flying supplies into the small dirt airstrip, and the various units were already digging in with the assistance of the engineering company and their earth-moving equipment. Within twenty-four hours, the brigade command posts, artillery, and logistical sites would be dug in deep. They would need to be, because the guerrillas were getting nasty.
The airborne assault of the 82nd Airborne Division’s 1st Brigade onto the Simulated Joint Readiness Training Center Battl
efield at Fort Polk, Louisiana. About 1250 1st Brigade “Devils” parachuted into the JRTC 97-1 Rotation Exercise during October of 1996.
JOHN D. GRESHAM
By dawn of the D-Day+2 (Monday, the 14th of October), the units in the DZ were taking intermittent fire from a handful of pesky guerrilla mobile mortar teams. In addition, man-portable surface-to-air missile (SAM) teams were beginning to get shots at some of the Brigade’s helicopter force. Therefore, Colonel Petraeus ordered those teams hunted down and killed by the brigade’s force of OH-58D Kiowa Warriors and the howitzers firing in a counterbattery mode against mortar teams. By the fourth day of the operation, they had done a pretty good job, having killed something like two thirds of the enemy weapons teams. However, not all was well.
The simulated casualties had been heavy during the initial phases of the operation, and the brigade was late in getting the MEDEVAC/treatment /replacement cycle started. Part of the reason for this was the delay in setting up the TOC until D-Day+1. The result was the brigade’s strength was dropping, and would bottom out around D-Day+5 at about 70 percent of drop strength. From there, they would slowly build back up, this vital lesson learned the hard way. Other lessons would be learned as well.
Some of these were learned by folks like Major Rob Baker, the Brigade’s Operations Officer (S-3). Unusually a very sharp officer, he failed to follow the advice of CSM Henderson one day while visiting the various battalion TOCs, and very nearly became a casualty when he left his security detail behind. A sniper started popping off at him, and he wound up scampering off to safety, a vital lesson about balancing physical courage with his responsibilities to the Brigade fully impressed upon him.