Despite Sherman’s lobbying on Grierson’s behalf, no promotion arrived. Homesick and upset and with the planning for the raid having stalled, Grierson took the opportunity in early April to leave on a furlough and traveled back to Jacksonville to see Alice and the boys. General Hurlbut realized the cavalryman needed rest and sent him with orders to Springfield as a “bearer of dispatches.” As Grierson later wrote, “Of course it did not take long to get ready for my departure on such a welcome mission.” He first traveled to Memphis by train to pay his respects to Hurlbut, who sprang from his desk chair and clasped both of Grierson’s hands while whispering, “God Bless, Grierson. Go home at once. I’ll give you all the time possible and telegraph you when to return.” Unable to speak, the emotional colonel encircled his arms around the general’s waist “and gave him in return a genuine hug, which I dare say he never forgot,” adding, “There were two pair of moist eyes in that room before I left on my mission of love.”36
Grierson arrived in Jacksonville on April 6 to the delight of his family. “That visit home was one of the most enjoyable experiences of my life,” he confessed long after the war. “It was an oasis of love in the midst of a desert of doubt, darkness, and uncertainty.” It was also an opportunity to inform Alice of the dangerous mission upon which he would soon embark.37
***
Grierson arrived on the national scene at a time when cavalry doctrine was undergoing great change. In some ways, his unorthodoxy as a commander was less a product of that change and more a cause of it. The changing role of cavalry would become evident in the American Civil War, and Grierson would play a significant role in bringing it about.38
Through much of history, cavalry had been used as offensive shock troops, riding into battle at the critical moment when the infantry and artillery had the enemy on the run. The thought of thundering horses and shooting or slashing riders was disconcerting to fleeing soldiers already in a state of fright and confusion. Napoleon was a master of this tactic and used mounted troops to finish off a nearly beaten enemy, spread chaos among the routed soldiers, and help bring about final victory on the battlefield—Field Marshal Jaochim Murat’s timely attack at Jena in 1806 being a prime example.39
American cavalry theory and tactics, however, little resembled those glorious days of Napoleon. The United States military opted for a hybrid formation of dragoons or mounted cavalry rather than pure infantry or cavalry. Moreover, the tactics taught by Denis Hart Mahan at West Point did not emphasize the saber attack. Instead, American theory called for cavalry to screen the army, escort general officers, perform scouting and reconnaissance, and deliver messages. Before the Civil War and during its early months, cavalry rarely engaged in pitched battle, which led to the common slogan, “Who ever saw a dead cavalryman?”40
When cavalry did engage in combat during the early years of the Civil War, it was usually in ways Napoleon would not have recognized. Cavalry charges, for example, were uncommon during the war, especially against infantry and artillery. More often, horse soldiers were employed on an army’s flanks or as army-wide file closers to keep stragglers from melting away to the rear. Only rarely were cavalry units turned loose at the critical moment in a pitched battle to turn an enemy retreat into a rout. The use of large numbers of cavalry in battle came later, during the latter part of the war when cavalry doctrine had advanced and mounted troopers moved quickly to a particular part of a battlefield to fight dismounted as infantry. Under this circumstance, one of every four troopers remained in the rear to hold the horses, leaving only three of his companions to fight on the battle line. As a result, this tactic reduced the effective fighting strength by one-fourth.41
One reason cavalry was used rarely as shock troops early in the war was that cavalry doctrine divided the mounted troops among infantry components, either on the brigade or division level. It was not until early 1862 that the Union military devised a system of brigades for cavalry; the development of divisions and corps took even longer to implement. (Confederates arrived at this organizational structure before the Federals.) The net effect dispersed cavalry to the brigade or division level and spread it across the battlefield, especially on the flanks. Likewise, the chain of command within which these units operated was similarly divided, leaving each brigade or division commander with authority over his own specific body of cavalry. This made it nearly impossible to mass horsemen and send them into action at a critical time of a battle because there was no one with the authority or ability to implement its use in that manner.42
As a result, the U.S. Army used cavalry to perform other tasks. When an army was in camp (which was the majority of the time, as battles were infrequent affairs), cavalry screened its front, scouted, and garrisoned nearby locales. However, another major development was emerging, and it was in this arena Benjamin Grierson would make his most solid contribution to the evolving cavalry doctrine.43
Early in the Civil War, commanders on both sides began to realize that mounted troops under effective leaders could operate far behind enemy lines to disrupt supply lines, communications, and even the nerves of opposing commanders. The Civil War is full of examples, from Jeb Stuart’s rides around the Union Army of the Potomac to Earl Van Dorn’s and Nathan Bedford Forrest’s successful raids on Grant’s supply lines during the Mississippi Central campaign. As the war moved on, larger raids took place, some successful and others not. It became obvious, however, that raiding was now a key element of the cavalry’s work, and Grierson stood on the cusp of broad change as he prepared to conduct his raid through much of Mississippi in April 1863—an especially ironic situation for a music teacher some historians have described as being afraid of horses.44
***
Despite all the detailed planning for the major cavalry raid into Mississippi, a major sticking point remained. The general layout of the route was clear, the identity of the units that would participate was confirmed, and the hoped-for effect of the raid and related operations envisioned. The man Hurlbut, Smith, and Grant tapped to lead the raid, however, was at home in Illinois. If Grierson was going to command it, he would have to get back to Tennessee by the time the cavalry moved out on April 17, the morning Hurlbut had confirmed the raid would begin.45
Grierson needed the rest his furlough provided and he enjoyed it. He spent quality time with Alice and did not want to leave, basking as he did in the light of family and fatherhood in his familiar and comfortable surroundings in Illinois. Still, duty called. The thought of his departure was even less appealing with the knowledge that, when he returned to Tennessee, he would leave on a more dangerous mission than any he had thus far experienced. Exactly what crossed his mind we shall never know, but he likely tossed about the various scenarios that could happen to him and how they would affect his family. Would he make it back or would he be captured in the enemy’s heartland? Worse would be an injury or wound that altered his lifestyle forever or an amputation that would end his musical passion. Almost unthinkable was the possibility of death and its implications for Alice and the children.46
When Grierson left on his furlough, he had no idea whether or when he might be called back to Tennessee. Hurlbut was steadily working at his Memphis headquarters, making plans and coordinating the effort with not only Grant at Vicksburg but with Rosecrans in Middle Tennessee. Any chance of success required the components to work in unison. By mid-April, Grant was moving his army south through Louisiana on his seventh attempt to reach Vicksburg. It was a major and risky undertaking and there was no going back. Similarly, Rosecrans and his subordinates had worked out the Streight mule raid, which would leave Nashville, circle south into northern Alabama, and work its way east toward Georgia. The only missing piece was Grierson’s presence.47
On April 13, just four days before the main Mississippi raid was set to begin, Hurlbut sent a short message to Jacksonville, Illinois, by telegraph: “Return immediately. By command of General Hurlbut.” Grierson recalled, “While I was romping helter-skelter about the hall
, like a big boy, with Charlie and Robert, all in high glee, their mother looking on approvingly, there came a rap on the front door, which was opened by Mrs. Grierson as a boy handed her a telegram.” Alice turned and handed the note to her husband, saying, “Ben, here are your orders.” The clear meaning of the seven-word order was not lost on Grierson. He had already informed Alice of the danger, which was “so desperate that it was not ordered, but only accepted as a volunteer service.” He later mused wistfully, “Our parting may be imagined but cannot be fully realized by any person not placed in a similar situation.”48
Grierson left Jacksonville by train and made his way to St. Louis. Once at the Mississippi River, he hopped a steamboat and by the afternoon of April 16 was in Memphis, where he met with a now considerably more nervous Hurlbut. Grierson did not have time to visit Governor Yates, who was in town, because Hurlbut had a special train waiting to take him to La Grange. The colonel took a brief moment to write a note to Alice, letting her know he was leaving on “the expedition I spoke to you about” and not to worry as he would “be gone probably three weeks & perhaps longer—possibly not so long. . . . But you must not be alarmed should you not hear from me inside of a month.” Then, either to calm her nerves or in a piece of writing that revealed his own fear, he added, “I have a faith and hope that I will return O.K. and you must pray for my safe return and the success of the expedition. I will endeavor to do so myself and will not neglect to use all due caution.”49
With his brigade already prepared for the movement scheduled to begin the next morning, Grierson grilled Hurlbut about the route he was to take, Grant’s location, the intentions of his superiors, and numerous other details. “I learned as nearly as possible the condition of affairs as to the whereabouts of General Grant and his army, the probable operations of our troops for the future, and all that could be given me as to the whereabouts and movements of the rebel forces,” he confirmed. Hurlbut also relayed Grant’s best wishes and emphasized again that, because of its extremely hazardous nature, the mission was voluntary. The meeting ended with Hurlbut wishing him well. “I parted with General Hurlbut with much feeling, but a most determined will to do my whole duty to accomplish the desired object.”50
Grierson traveled east by train to La Grange, where he arrived around sundown on April 16 and went straight into a meeting with Sooy Smith, whom, Grierson recalled, was “very glad to see me.” Smith passed along the latest information as well as “every possible aid and some additional verbal instructions, together with some important papers covering information in regard to movements of the enemy.” By this time the sun had set, but Grierson still had much to do. The home he had just left, however, was still very much on his mind. He took a moment to write once more to Alice, telling her to “be cheerful and happy and may God in his goodness bless and care for you and all at home and guard and protect me while away and bring me safely back to you . . . kiss and hug the boys for me.”51
The raid was set to begin in just a few hours.
1T. W. Lippincott, “Genl. B. H. Grierson, Biography and Sketch of the Famous Raid,” n.d., in Stephen A. Forbes Papers, UI. For Grierson himself, see Dinges, “The Making of a Cavalryman.”
2Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 11-12; Leckie and Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 3-4.
3Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 13; William H Leckie and Shirley A. Leckie, Unlikely Warriors: General Benjamin Grierson and His Family (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984), 6-7.
4Leckie and Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 6-7.
5Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 15, 23; Leckie and Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 8, 10.
6Brown, Grierson’s Raid, 23; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 16-17, 374n1; Leckie and Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 10-11.
7Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 25; Leckie and Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 16.
8Leckie and Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 17.
9Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 28; Leckie and Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 18-20, 25, 27.
10Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 28; Leckie and Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 28.
11Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 30; Leckie and Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 30, 36, 39, 43.
12Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 30; Leckie and Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 38, 45-46.
13Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 31-32; Leckie and Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 35, 42.
14Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 19-20; Leckie and Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 8, 12.
15Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 17; Leckie and Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 11, 34.
16Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 20-21, 25; Leckie and Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 12, 16, 21, 24, 29-30, 41. For Grierson’s compositions, see his papers in ALPL and Benjamin Henry Grierson Vertical File, Gettysburg College.
17Leckie and Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 46.
18For Lincoln, see David Herbert Donald, Lincoln (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1995). For Grant, Ronald C. White, American Ulysses: A Life of Ulysses S. Grant (New York: Random House, 2016).
19Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 33.
20Ibid., 37-38; Leckie and Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 17. Some claim Grierson received an appointment to West Point but turned it down. See Brown, Grierson’s Raid, 25. Grierson’s biographer, Bruce Dinges, researched the question and found no evidence of such an appointment. See Dinges, “The Making of a Cavalryman,” 54-55n32.
21Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 36, 38; Leckie and Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 47-48.
22Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 37; Leckie and Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 48.
23Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 38, 41, 52, 54-56; Leckie and Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 50, 52, 54, 56.
24Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 38, 41, 52, 54-56; Leckie and Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 50, 52, 54, 56.
25Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 57; Leckie and Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 57, 59, 61; Benjamin H. Grierson, Compiled Service Record, NARA.
26Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 62-65, 67; Leckie and Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 60-61.
27Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 62-65, 67; Leckie and Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 60-61.
28Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 65-67.
29Ibid., 72-73, 75, 80; Leckie and Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 66-67.
30Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 68; Leckie and Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 67-69, 71-72, 77, 79.
31Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 62, 68, 82; Leckie and Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 67-69, 71-72, 77.
32Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 62, 68, 82; Leckie and Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 67-69, 71-72, 77.
33Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 102, 107-8, 118; Leckie and Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 71-76.
34Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause; Leckie and Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 83; Simon, PUSG, vol. 7, 301-2.
35William T. Sherman to B. H. Grierson, February 9, 1863, in William T. Sherman Letters, MDAH; Simon, PUSG, vol. 6, 409.
36William T. Sherman to B. H. Grierson, February 9, 1863; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 109, 112-13; Leckie and Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 83; S. A. Hurlbut to B. H. Grierson, April 3, 1863, Benjamin H. Grierson Papers, ALPL.
37Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 144.
38For Union cavalry in the Civil War, see Albert G. Brackett, History of the United States Cavalry, From the Formation of the Federal Government to the 1st of June, 1863. To Which Is Added a List of All of the Cavalry Regiments, with the Names of Their Commanders, Which Have Been in the United States Service Since the Breaking Out of the Rebellion (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1865) and Stephen Z. Starr, The Union Cavalry in the Civil War, 3 vols. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979-85).
39David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon: The Mind and Method of History’s Greatest Soldier (New York: Scribner, 1966) 486; Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War (New Haven: Yale University P
ress, 1987), 180; Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson, Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1982), 126.
40Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War, 181; McWhiney and Jamieson, Attack and Die, 133.
41McWhiney and Jamieson, Attack and Die, 126, 133, 135.
42Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War, 182; Jack Coggins, Arms and Equipment of the Civil War (New York: Fairfax Press, 1983), 48.
43Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War, 183; McWhiney and Jamieson, Attack and Die, 139.
44For more on raiding, see Longacre, Mounted Raids of the Civil War, and Robert B. Mackey, The Uncivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861-1865 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004). Not all historians have viewed this major development in the use of cavalry as a positive one. One writer charged that this duty often “became little more than a license to roam off into the enemy’s rear areas searching for plunder and glory.” The example of Stuart’s rides around the Union army and the command confusion another attempt produced during the Gettysburg campaign are often cited as proof. See, for example, Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War, 183-84.
45OR 24, pt. 3, 196.
46Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 144.
47OR 24, pt. 3, 196.
48S. A. Hurlbut to B. H. Grierson, April 13, 1863; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 144-45.
49B. H. Grierson to Alice, April 1863, in Benjamin H. Grierson Papers, ALPL.
50Ibid.; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 144-45.
51B. H. Grierson to Alice, April 1863; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 145; John Grierson to Alice, April 17, 1863.
CHAPTER THREE
The Real Horse Soldiers Page 7