The men were as ready as they would ever be, armed, as Capt. Henry Forbes of the 7th Illinois indicated, with “ammunition and a pocket full of salt.” The troopers knew they were embarking on something quite different than the usual short raids, Forbes continued, even if they did not know all the details. The push out of La Grange with so many men and a battery of guns “meant to the Cavaliers a grand campaign, and there was no need of the bugle call on the morning of the 17th.” Forbes elaborated on the cheerful feelings coursing through the ranks as the troopers rode out of town:
As the sun rose full and fine over a beautifully irregular eastern horizon, the command, not without abundant song and jollity, took the road leading southward from the village, through a lonely waste of little pineclad, sandy hills. Blithe and gay, going no one knew where or why—no one cared. The only things they did care for was that something should happen. Of course there were toil and danger, possibly disaster and death ahead; these were regular items in their soldier’s bill of fare, and so, stretching itself slowly out, gleaming and deadly, like some huge glittering snake, the old Brigade slid off the sunlit hills into the cover of the Mississippi woods.3
***
By the time Grierson led his column southward, at least eight different components to the overall plan Grant had put in place were in motion or had just finished. Each worked in unison, different components of the same overall effort at different stages of advancement. The move closest to Vicksburg was the main effort, where Grant’s Army of the Tennessee would cross the river with, hopefully, little or no opposition. Before that could happen, the various cavalry raids planned around it needed time to develop in order to maximize their strategic impact. The result was a staggered process of diversion that would eventually impact the war in five states, sometimes by plan and sometimes by accident.
One of the major feints was already over. As noted earlier, Frederick Steele had plunged into the Mississippi delta from Greenville in early April, battled both Confederates and the terrain, and returned to Greenville by April 10. Steele’s continued presence there, as his division went into camp at Greenville, focused Confederate attention for a time on the Mississippi River and the northwestern portion of the state.4
On April 17, Generals Sherman and McClernand were gathering and repairing naval gunboats and transports damaged while passing the Vicksburg batteries the night before. At the same time, McClernand was shifting his corps south through Louisiana to position his command for the crossing that would occur in only a matter of days. McClernand’s headquarters were below Vicksburg and in New Carthage by that date, and he was pressing forward toward Grand Gulf in expectation of the navy silencing the batteries there before going over.5
While McClernand moved, Grant prepared to implement Sherman’s direct feint north of Vicksburg. He mentioned to Sherman on April 24 (one week after Grierson left La Grange) the possibility of moving on Haynes’ Bluff, and he followed up that suggestion with a formal request on April 27. Most of Sherman’s corps was already in the area at Milliken’s Bend, so it would not be difficult to get his troops in position for the feint at the climactic moment when Grant intended to cross south of Vicksburg.6
Coordinating the longer raids and their supporting casts took more effort, and because they would take time to develop, an earlier start was necessary. General Hurlbut, from his headquarters in Memphis, was in charge of creating much of the chaos Grant hoped to spread across northern Mississippi. “Grierson’s cavalry expedition started at daylight from La Grange,” he informed Grant on April 17. “I do not expect to hear from him for fifteen or twenty days, unless from Southern papers.” Even if Hurlbut learned much about Grierson’s raid, he was not apt to say much about it except through official channels. The entire affair had been organized under wraps, which an Illinois trooper left behind at La Grange made clear when he wrote home, “The direction and number of the expedition are, for the present, contraband.” Hurlbut continued: “These various movements along our length of line will, I hope, so distract their attention that Grierson’s party will get a fair start and be well down to their destination before they can be resisted by adequate force. God speed him, for he has started gallantly on a long and perilous ride. I shall anxiously await intelligence of the result.”7
The “various movements along our length of line” did not pass unnoticed. One of Grierson’s men recalled how the Federals “swarmed out from the north, suddenly and almost simultaneously.” Not long after Grierson rode south on April 17, Gen. Sooy Smith led the cavalry wing of the thrust from Grand Junction into northwestern Mississippi. Smith hoped to make it all the way south to the Tallahatchie River that day. The infantry component from Memphis under Colonel Bryant left that city the next day, April 18, marching south as well. Confederate commanders in the area quickly discovered these thrusts and scrambled to meet them.8
General Grenville Dodge at Corinth, Mississippi, meanwhile, was already two days into his advance east toward northern Alabama when Grierson moved from La Grange on April 17. Dodge was supposed to meet Abel Streight at Eastport on April 16, but Streight (whose brigade had to make the trip along the Tennessee River from Fort Henry on April 17) was delayed and would not reach the area until April 19. Once they combined, Dodge rode only far enough with Streight to get that commander and his “wretchedly mounted, mainly on mules” men headed east.9
Seven different bodies of troops in five different major operations across four different states had either just concluded, were still on the move, or were gearing up to move when Grierson led his three regiments and artillery battery south into Mississippi on April 17. What was remarkable about this far-flung complex affair was that the opening moves worked to perfection. The activity east and west of Grierson, together with movement along the Mississippi River, created a corridor of unguarded terrain deep into Mississippi along the Pontotoc Ridge. The Confederate line in north Mississippi, wrote one Federal, was “completely pulled apart and piled up at its ends.” That middle area was precisely the region Grierson intended to penetrate when he directed his troopers south from the high ground upon which La Grange sat, crossed the Wolf River, and slipped into Mississippi toward Ripley, the first significant town along the proposed route. The mounted thrust, wrote an officer, was “a nimble sword through an unguarded point, into the very vitals of the Confederate position.”10
***
Seventeen hundred troopers was a large number of cavalrymen, especially for a raid intended to last more than a few days. Grierson’s column of riders, “marching by twos,” extended well over two miles, not counting the artillery. “A most cheerful spirit prevailed throughout the entire command,” wrote Grierson, “and both officers and men had plainly observable on their manly countenances a stern and determined look which presaged devotion to duty and gave assurance of success.” Grierson even waxed poetic about the horses carrying his men, observing how “the vigor of the soldiers was conveyed to the noble animals they rode, as they felt the pressure of the thighs of their riders, as gracefully they bore themselves and adapted their motion to that of their horses.” As the Union column wound its way along the open road, “the invigorating atmosphere and the buoyant spirits of the moving force plainly indicated the strength and power of the command, as fearlessly it entered upon an important expedition, the extent and destination of which was really not fully known to myself.” A potentially significant problem arose when the leading 6th Illinois Cavalry took a wrong road and traveled part of the way on its own path. The wings rejoined soon thereafter with no harm done.11
Not long after they entered Mississippi, an Illinois trooper remembered coming across a young boy driving an ox wagon. He “looked rather seedy,” thought Richard Surby, “and, unfortunately for him, wore a very good looking hat, which one of the boys took a fancy to and relieved him of, leaving the poor fellow looking rather sad.” Grierson had ordered his troopers to leave the civilians alone, but it was impossible to control every man in the column. Colonel Prin
ce rectified the situation when he “pulled out his pocket-book and gave him a two-dollar greenback, which seemed to please him very much.”12
There was no way to keep such a large-scale movement secret for long. The Confederates and civilians in the area had seen columns of cavalry many times before, and though they may have cringed about having to endure another visit from the enemy, none would have divined the full significance of the expedition. If they gave it much thought at all, it was more likely the Federals were conducting yet another shallow raid into Mississippi, not a deep thrust into Confederate territory with important ramifications. Grierson would use these preconceived notions to his advantage.13
The Illinois colonel wanted his column to remain as inconspicuous as possible, but he also had to keep in mind how best to accomplish the goals set forth by Generals Hurlbut and Smith. Once well into Mississippi, the plan called for Grierson to send one of his three regiments east to damage the Mobile and Ohio Railroad between Tupelo and West Point and dispatch a second regiment west to damage the Mississippi Central. Both regiments would then make their way back to Tennessee as best they could, inflicting as much damage as possible while endeavoring to confuse the enemy as to their real purpose. Grierson’s remaining regiment, meanwhile, would swiftly drive south in an effort to reach and seriously damage the Southern Railroad of Mississippi.14
First, however, Grierson had to get far enough into Mississippi to implement the plan. He marched rapidly the first day, his regiments in column and mostly riding on the same road. It did not take long to realize the 1,700-man column was far too long to travel on a single thoroughfare. His options were limited, however, so he continued on, riding southeast toward Ripley along the higher Pontotoc Ridge. This route provided a much easier ride than having to negotiate deep river valleys and their even deeper watercourses.15
Only a small party of Confederates were seen the entire first day, and Union pursuers captured three of them. The ride continued “without material interruption.” In fact, it was rather pleasant, as the poetic Grierson later recalled: “The flowers of spring in all their freshness of beauty added to the fragrance and variety of the scenery which surrounded us as we went marching on into and through the domain of the South.” Beautiful it may have been, but it was still a long day.16
Northeast Mississippi was well known for being lukewarm for the Confederacy to begin with, and several of the hill counties in that part of the state had voted for cooperationist delegates to the Mississippi Secession Convention. These men maintained their opposition to secession even when many other cooperationists from other counties changed sides for the sake of unity and voted to leave the Union. Tishomingo and Itawamba Counties in the northeast were the most opposed to secession, but others along the top tier or two of counties were less so. Tippah County, where Grierson was about to go into camp near Ripley, was populated with staunch secessionists. Thus far it had not translated into any major opposition.17
Union influence in this part of the state also weakened resistance. These northern counties were not under direct Union control, but they were close to Union garrisons positioned along the railroad. In effect, these counties, Tippah included, were something of a no-man’s-land. Confederates along the Tallahatchie River to the south rarely entered the area unless they were conducting a quick raid, and they were always fearful of triggering a strong response from the Union troops along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad.18 As a result, even though it was a potentially dangerous area for Grierson, especially with railroads on either side of him the enemy could use to concentrate troops to block his path, it proved an easy first day’s ride for the brigade.19
The column made about 30 miles on April 17 before arriving in “the neighborhood of Ripley, Miss.,” where Grierson decided to make camp on Dr. James B. Ellis’s plantation along Tippah Creek near Shady Grove. Grierson liked to camp his men on large plantations or farms, and he had done so many times during other raids into the state. He often confronted the plantation owners themselves, who usually resisted his efforts to house large numbers of men and horses on their property. It was of little use to offer direct resistance, for one man was powerless against an armed Federal host, but most planters remonstrated anyway. Grierson always approached the main house the same way, riding up and demanding “the keys of the smokehouse and barns” and asking for food for his men and their horses. He intended to live off the land as much as he could, and the plantations and farms along his route provided an ideal means for refreshing his tired men and horses.20
The camping process played out at Ellis’s plantation in the usual fashion, although Ellis himself had already moved east to Booneville and was not present to offer any objection. Once on the property, Grierson scouted out the best location to bed down. According to Henry Forbes, “The best place for a cavalry bivouac is a woodland in which the forest shelter gives fuel and cover, and shrubberies, not too densely placed, afford hitching for the horses.” By the time the bugler sounded the halt, the head of the column was on the bivouac site. “The leading company forms company front,” Forbes related, “and the regiments mass in its rear in column of companies.” Staff officers issued orders to throw out pickets and camp, and the order to break ranks followed.21
Once on their own, the men, desirous of being first at whatever goods they could find, “fly from the camp in every direction like the drops of water from a swiftly whirling wheel.” Guards were posted to oversee the major sources of food, such as barns, chicken coops, or smokehouses. Once that task was completed on the Ellis plantation, the 6th Illinois Cavalry’s commissary officer, William Pollard—the only such officer on the raid—doled out the food to the various companies. There was much to enjoy on places like this, and the men soon dispersed, “never forgetting their need, though they may sometimes forget their manners.” Most looked for fodder and food “on the one case for his horse and his bed, in the other for his supper.” Even the pickets left their stations, but Captain Forbes observed there was “no need for pickets during foraging time. The whole country is picketed for some miles in every direction.”22
The first order of business after gathering food and wood was caring for the horses. A man’s horse, observed Forbes, “is first stripped, rubbed, fed and fastened for the night.” Equipment was checked and arranged so it could be utilized quickly if an emergency arose. Only after the horses were cared for did the troopers themselves eat, and by this time they were usually famished. “No prudent person,” joked Forbes, “prefers to interfere with a trooper when he is getting supper.” A trooper cooked his supper over a campfire, burning what had once been fence rails. The entire process was something of an art form: “A tin cup boils his coffee: a forked stick supported by a prop before the fire, broils his rasher of cured ham, or his steak of fresh pig, to a turn, and in the ashes he bakes the ever-to-be remembered and never-to-be-surpassed hoe-cake. Feast fit for a king!”23
Once they had finished eating, the men enjoyed some downtime around their fires before falling asleep with a rubber blanket for a mattress and a saddle for a pillow. On cold or rainy nights the troopers devised better accommodations, such as a framework of sticks and limbs covered by their rubber blankets and situated close enough to the fire to heat the structure. Forbes recounted that “if he has ridden well and foraged fairly, he sleeps luxuriously as any Dives on his couch of eiderdown, and wakes haughty as a king.”24
Sleep was cut short when the bugle sounded well before daylight, rousing the troopers from their slumber and into a “storm of busy preparation.” The men ate what they could, rekindling the fires to do so. Horses fed on the soft bedding they had slept on the night before, and then they were saddled and made ready for the long ride ahead. With their bodies renewed and minds clear, the troopers mounted and moved out. Forbes remembered it all many years later with a longing fondness. All of this, he explained, gave a “stern significance to the splendid panorama, a hint of the coming march, of the sudden onset, the splendid charge, the pos
sible death. Farewell the scene; we shall never see the like again.”25
***
The Southern Railroad of Mississippi was still more than 150 miles to the south, and Grierson would need to move quickly to reach it. Yet significant difficulties awaited him. The column was about to transition out of no-man’s-land in the upper tier of Mississippi counties into firmly held enemy territory. Scouts were already informing him that Confederate regimental-strength camps were situated somewhere to his front and on both his flanks. Just as important was the fact that the column was approaching the Tallahatchie River, the first of many serious terrain obstacles.26
The Real Horse Soldiers Page 11