Grierson also had to consider his original orders. Hurlbut and Smith expected him to send three regiments in three different directions (east, west, and south). This would potentially confuse the Confederates and perhaps disperse any pursuing bodies of enemy cavalry, making it more likely that one or two of the three regiments would successfully complete the raid. The two that peeled off to the east and west would be moving into well-guarded territory into which the Confederates could transport troops by rail. Getting back to La Grange after their circuitous routes would require them to ride into the arms of their pursuers. The hope was that any damage these regiments could inflict, coupled with the confusion they might sow, would be beneficial to Grierson’s lone regiment riding south. The aim of the branch raids was to strike vital railroad lines the Confederates had to defend. Grierson, meanwhile, would be moving into parts of the state that had not yet learned of his raid, making it easier to catch the enemy napping as he passed through.4
With these factors weighing on his mind, Grierson plunged ever farther into the Mississippi countryside.
***
Grierson’s first decision was straightforward. “I gave orders to the regimental commanders to cause a close inspection to be made,” he wrote, “with a view of selecting all men and horses [in] any way disabled or not fit for further hard marching.” The inspection at Daggett’s during the evening of April 19 made it clear that some of his men and horses could not go any farther. Grierson decided to send them back to La Grange, he explained, to “free . . . the command of any encumbrance or what might become such in our onward movements.” It was “absolutely necessary to insure celerity of movements, to reject and separate myself from all but the most serviceable material.” The decision was so important to Grierson that he “personally inspected every man as to his fitness for further active duty.” The colonel picked about 200 of his 1,700 troopers to make the return journey. The disappointed soldiers, summed up an Illinois man, “could not travel good.”5
Several of the men ordered back to Tennessee confronted Grierson. “Some of the soldiers who had first been selected to join those returning northward asked permission to speak to me and plead so as not to be sent back,” Grierson confessed. After examining them again he relented, stating, “I decided that their disability was only temporary and, satisfying myself that they were of the right kind of stuff to recuperate, consented to their request and permitted them to remain with the main column.” Major Hiram Love of the 2nd Iowa Cavalry, who was tasked with commanding the so-called Quinine Brigade back to La Grange, was not among them. According to Grierson, “Although willing to go on, [Love] was not strong or in good health, but was well suited to look closely after the safety of his command.” Many of those sent back also had to give up their horses and return north with inferior mounts that could not make the long and dangerous journey that had only just begun.6
Grierson had little choice in the matter. Those men and mounts unable to bear their share of responsibilities had to be sent back before the column traveled much deeper into Mississippi. Another few days would put the brigade too far south for the sick to return safely to Tennessee on exhausted or sick horses—especially once the enemy sorted through the intelligence, found out the direction of Grierson’s raid, and launched a real pursuit. By that point, the returning sick men would run into the pursuing Confederates. Orders were issued for “the least effective portion of the command” to leave that night. Ultimately, the decision culled some 175 troopers from the brigade.7
The departure of the sick and exhausted also solved Grierson’s prisoner dilemma, because he sent the captives with them. To help bolster its defensive abilities, Grierson detached one of the guns from Smith’s battery to accompany the convalescents and prisoners. It was hoped they would not need the firepower, but the gun might come in handy at the Tallahatchie River if the Confederates tried to block their crossing.8
The return of the Quinine Brigade also offered another chance for some chicanery. The large detachment would certainly attract the enemy’s attention and perhaps convince the Confederates the entire raiding force had turned back. Retracing the route of the brigade through Pontotoc, New Albany, and Ripley would also focus Confederate attention in that direction and perhaps convince the enemy the raid had been no more than another routine effort to disrupt Confederate camps in the northern counties. Any time the move north gained for the main column was that much more time to move farther south and put more distance between Grierson and any pursuers. Accordingly, Grierson ordered Major Love to attract all the attention he could but also cover his small number as much as possible.9
Love’s large detachment (about 10 percent of Grierson’s total force) was in the saddle early on the morning on April 20 and riding north by 3:00 a.m. toward Pontotoc. The departing men, wrote one witness, “chafed under the order, and turned back with lingering and rebellious looks until the column was out of sight.” Love hoped to get as far north as possible before the sun rose and their detection became that much more probable. He carried a note from Grierson to General Smith, informing him that he was sending the “less effective portion of the command, to return by the most direct route.” Grierson also explained to Smith that Love’s party was to distract the enemy, “marching by fours, obliterating our tracks, and producing the impression that we have all returned.” Realizing the precarious nature of his raid, Grierson added, “I may possibly find an opportunity to communicate with you again in four or five days, but do not wonder if you should not hear from me in thirty days.” As it turned out, this would be the last communication from Grierson for weeks.10
The most unhappy officer in the brigade was Colonel Hatch, who was less than pleased that most of the invalids were from his Iowa regiment, as was its leader Major Love. The reason so many of the ill and exhausted were from the 2nd Iowa regiment was because the Iowans had had but little rest prior to the launching of the raid. Hatch admitted that he left on the raid “with 250 horses, worn out, which broke down at the end of the second day.” His regiment’s mounts were so exhausted, he had to mount many on “mules from my train and borrowed mules.” Still, the detachment of so many from his regiment, lamented Hatch, cut his numbers “to about 500 men.”11
Marching loudly in columns of fours, the Quinine Brigade reached Pontotoc a little before daylight. “Sending them by night through Pontotoc was a good ruse,” Grierson later boasted. “Making all the spread they could with their led horses, mules, prisoners, and one gun of the battery, the people of that place believed and quickly reported that the whole command had gone back north.” Two days later the detachment reached La Grange. Grierson, meanwhile, plunged ever deeper into the Mississippi countryside.12
***
On a “cloudy and damp” April 20, Grierson explained, “two hours after Major Love’s departure I proceeded south with the main force on the Houston road.” The Federals left Daggett’s plantation around daylight with Hatch’s reduced 2nd Iowa Cavalry in the lead.13
Grierson was not yet finished with the detachments. His orders were to send one regiment west to break the Mississippi Central Railroad, and it was now a good time to do so. The Mississippi Central gradually angled away from Grierson’s proposed route, so every mile he moved south would only add distance between his column and the rails. A delay in making the detachment would require the regiment to ride farther to reach the railroad, and it would be that much harder for it to get safely back to La Grange.14
Grierson, however, was not in favor of launching the mini-raid against the Mississippi Central. He had earlier operated along the railroad and knew one of the bridges was still out, and there was little prospect of it being rebuilt in the near future. “I have ascertained that the bridges on the Mississippi Central Railroad, over the Yockeney, at Water Valley, have never been repaired,” he informed General Smith in the note he had sent north with Major Love. In his view, it was foolish to waste the effort of an entire regiment on the prospect of damaging an already usel
ess railroad, especially when he might need the men later on his own raid. “I thought the forces could be used to better advantage than by sending a regiment to Oxford, as they would be obliged to return to New Albany to recross the Tallahatchie,” he freely admitted, even though the statement contradicted his standing orders. Any advantage that might be gained by detaching the regiment, and perhaps further confusing the enemy as to his ultimate direction and goal, was less important at this point than the need to maintain a powerful column. If necessary, he could always detach the regiment later in the raid, although doing so would make it less likely the troopers would reach the railroad and then get back safely to La Grange.15
Regardless, Grierson had orders to break the railroad and the telegraph wires running alongside it. The rail line was broken, but the telegraph was not. Since a substantially smaller force could accomplish that task, Grierson opted to send the smallest force possible. As he informed Smith in his letter, “I have ordered a single scout . . . to go from Pontotoc toward Oxford, strike the railroad, and destroy the wires.” Grierson was so confident this man could ride the roughly 35 miles west to the telegraph lines and then north to Tennessee that he penned a quick note to Alice for the scout to mail to Jacksonville once he reached La Grange.16
With 10 percent of his force heading north and one man moving west, Grierson and the balance of the brigade continued south. “I start at 4 o’clock in the morning,” he wrote Smith, “and on the night of the 20th shall be 50 miles below here. Everything looks exceedingly favorable. Rest assured that I shall spare no exertion to make the expedition as effective as possible.” Once on the road, the column trudged south toward Houston, which it reached that afternoon. To further confuse the enemy, Grierson moved east around the little town and was beyond it by 4:00 p.m. The move puzzled his troopers. “It was not until I had discovered that we had left the main road,” admitted one rider, “and was making a new one through a wheat field of some extent . . . [that] the question arose, what does this mean, and various were the conjectures.” There was method to the madness. “The passing around the town of Houston with the main column was for a similar purpose,” Grierson explained, “to avoid having our numbers counted. By going through fields and making a wide track, our force was greatly overestimated. And that gave us more time.” Later, Grierson claimed his wide sweep created a situation in which “the rebels, before following when they found out the direction we were traveling, waited to amass larger numbers.” Little was seen of the small town itself. According to one Illinois trooper, he and his comrades spotted “the house tops and church steeples [which] presented a picturesque appearance to us.” After bypassing Houston, the brigade moved southeast down the Pontotoc Ridge toward Starkville, making another 11 or 12 miles before stopping near Clear Springs.17
The bypassing of Houston had an ironic result. The people of Chickasaw County had heard of the enemy’s pending arrival and many had fled. Some believed the Federals would burn the courthouse, so the county records (including county board of police, deed, and marriage record books) were piled into a wagon and sent southeast of town. Grierson’s cavalry, of course, skirted the town and left the courthouse perfectly safe. When the riders spotted the wagon and rode toward it, the men guarding the valuable documents dumped the books on the side of the road and set fire to them to keep them out of enemy hands. The county records, which would have been perfectly safe in their original building in Houston, went up in smoke on the road outside town. Even more ironic was that the Federal troopers were not interested in the Chickasaw County civil records and probably would not have damaged them had they seized the wagon, much less the courthouse. The Federals were more interested in finding a lush plantation, and they discovered just what they were looking for near Clear Springs.18
Houston-Starkville Road. This section of the old Houston-Starkville Road is not much different than when Grierson passed through back in 1863. Author
Benjamin Kilgore Grave. Grierson’s column spent the fourth night of the raid on Benjamin Kilgore’s plantation. While his plantation house is no longer standing, its location is known. Kilgore is buried just across the ridge from his house. Author
Dr. Benjamin Kilgore was something of a legend around Chickasaw County. He was 70 years old in 1863, a well-known plantation owner, postmaster, physician, and politician. Kilgore had served in the War of 1812 in his native South Carolina’s militia and later as a member of the Mississippi legislature. His substantial plantation—exclusive of his 32 slaves—was valued in 1860 at more than $6,000. It was situated on the main road running southeast to Starkville and Columbus near the small hamlet of Clear Springs, directly in the path of the Federal raiders.19
Other civilians also faced the swarm of arriving Federals, including Sterling G. Ivy, who lived in the nearby Kilgore Hills. When Ivy learned the enemy was at hand, he sent his slaves into the swamps with his food and livestock, but he acted too late and Grierson’s troopers captured the entire lot. Ivy, who had a substantial sum of money with him, nonchalantly tossed his purse under a log and sat on it. Feigning surprise at the approach of the Federals, he tried to run and was quickly caught. His captors put the man on a slow mule, but he jumped off the animal and hid under a bridge. When his guards asked about Ivy’s whereabouts, a slave replied, “Dat man runned away off yander.” The Federals crossed the bridge under which Ivy was hiding but did not search beneath it. The fugitive waited until the raiders left before returning home—and retrieving his money in the process.20
Riding more than 13 hours from before sunup to sundown made for a long day. In addition to sending Major Love’s detachment north and the lone scout to the west, Grierson had guided his brigade another 35 miles into Mississippi. It was not the full 50 miles he had hoped to achieve, but there were no pursuing Confederates in sight. “We have yet encountered no force except the unorganized cavalry scattered through the country,” Grierson informed Smith in his note earlier that day. The intelligence was still true at the end of the long day. But now more than ever, Grierson was in a race against time. The lack of an organized pursuit or mounted interception of the Federal expedition was bound to change, especially behind him. News of his presence was spreading. Still, the less fuss and noise he made as he quietly entered towns and plantations as he picked his way south, the better his chances were of success. Whatever he did, Grierson would have to keep in front of any Confederate pursuit and any news of his daring ride through the heart of Mississippi.21
***
Grierson had no idea what Confederate forces, if any, were gathering in his front, but he knew with certainty some were concentrating behind him. His scouts had picked up enough information to know that the weak outer shell of Confederate resistance around New Albany was not all there was to worry about. The Federal brigade was approaching central Mississippi and the heart of the First Military District commanded by Gen. Daniel Ruggles of Shiloh artillery fame. The Confederate concentration feared by every Federal was beginning to take form.22
Ruggles, a native of Massachusetts and an 1833 graduate of West Point, gained extensive prewar experience, including frontier duty and combat against the Seminoles and Mexicans. Unlike state militia leaders, he knew something about the craft of war. The 53-year-old general digested incoming news about the enemy movements from his commanders and subordinates at his headquarters in Columbus in east-central Mississippi. Notice reached him as early as April 20 that a Union column was approaching his district and that it numbered 2,000 to 3,000 men. Its destination was unknown, although Ruggles’s scouts passed along that “negroes report hearing them say they were going to the Southern [rail]road or Grenada.” The concerned general rode north by rail on April 20 to see firsthand what was transpiring, only to learn of yet another enemy movement. This force, which was estimated to number between 8,000 and 10,000, was reported to be moving east from the Corinth area—a reference to Grenville Dodge’s move to support Abel Streight’s raid. Ruggles passed the news on to General Pemberton
that “there is evidently some formidable movement in that direction.” Still, there was little he thought he could do in the way of sending troops, because there were “none to send [to] Colonel [P. D.] Roddey.” General Hurlbut had hoped to take some pressure off Grierson by coordinating with General Rosecrans and Streight, and the ruse worked to a point, but not enough to peel away any men or guns from central Mississippi. Ruggles, meanwhile, concentrated his forces in the Tupelo area to combat what he and others guessed was a raid to break the Mobile and Ohio Railroad somewhere near that point. Why else would large bodies of Federals be moving southeast into Mississippi?23
The task of running down the Federals fell to Clark R. Barteau of the 2nd Tennessee Cavalry, a lieutenant colonel who had been born in Ohio. At one time, early in their lives, Grierson and Barteau lived within 100 miles of one another (Barteau was from the Cleveland area while Grierson was still in Youngstown). The Buckeye moved south to have a look at slavery in the 1850s and never left, becoming what one historian termed an “ultrasecessionist.” Barteau was quick to join the Confederacy when war broke out, even though much of his family remained in Ohio. His brother fought in the Union ranks.24
Clark R. Barteau. As the ranking field commander in north Mississippi, Lieutenant Colonel Clark R. Barteau chased Grierson until he was led astray by Hatch’s diversion. Old Guard in Gray
The Real Horse Soldiers Page 14