“The capture by surprise of this key position which dominated a large portion of the left flank and the importance of which had been so frequently stressed beforehand, directly and gravely affected subsequent events and prejudiced Naval, Military and Civil defence arrangements,” wrote General Maltby. “The possibility of mounting an immediate counter attack that night was considered but was ruled out as the nearest troops were a mile away, the ground precipitous and broken, and the redoubt very obscure.”
The collapse of the Redoubt, which Maltby had hoped would be held for seven days, was one of the major disasters of the campaign, and “really caused chaos in Fortress HQ. I have never seen General Maltby more shocked or angry,” recalled one of his staff officers.
So, where does the blame lie – with Captain Jones, inadvertently locked in the artillery post? With the Royal Scots platoon of 27 men facing three battalions of highly experienced Japanese soldiers? Or with Brigadier Wallis who had first-hand knowledge of the extreme vulnerability of the position and no reserves, yet expected a handful of men to achieve the impossible?
Notes
1. Manchester, William, American Caesar, New York: Dell, 1978, p. 238.
2. Interview Hewitt with author.
3. Colonel Doi’s progress report in National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) Directorate of History, Ottawa.
4. Paterson, R H, Pontius Pilate’s Bodyguard, Vol. 2, The Royal Scots History Committee, 2000, p. 107.
CHAPTER 9
Nothing but Darkness Ahead
10th–13th December 1941
Following the collapse of the Shingmun Redoubt, the Royal Scots were ordered to withdraw to a new line farther to the rear between Golden Hill and Lai Chi Kok. (See Map on page 37.)
Paradoxically, having punched a gaping hole in the Gin Drinkers’ Line, Colonel Doi, to his astonishment and dismay, was ordered that same morning of 10th December to withdraw from it immediately. His Divisional Commander told him that he had flouted the orders given to him by entering 230 Regiment’s sector. Doi refused to obey two specific orders to abandon the position. His initiative was later censured. The Divisional staff officer, Oyadomani, was “sharply rebuked” for not curbing Doi’s enthusiasm. By midday, however, Doi’s achievement was recognised and he was permitted to remain on the Redoubt.
The Japanese were suffering casualties: their advance south of the Gin Drinkers’ Line was stopped by artillery fire and the vigorous action taken by Captain Newton’s Rajputs. One enemy company attacked and was driven back into the redoubt, which was then shelled by 6-inch Howitzers. The gunboat, HMS Cicala, built in 1916 and of 616 tons, had been covering the left flank of the Royal Scots during the last three days, and discovered a Japanese working party clearing demolitions. Fire was opened with 6-inch guns and direct hits obtained.
That afternoon the last of the Eastern Telegraph Company cables between Hong Kong and the outside world were cut by enemy action.
During 10th December Japanese torpedo boats, minesweepers, one cruiser and four destroyers were observed. This increased Maltby’s uncertainty as to whether he should concentrate his forces to face further attacks from the Mainland in the north, or leave the two Canadian battalions, and the Middlesex in their pill-boxes, all spread around the Island. Meanwhile the battle for the Mainland continued, with the Japanese attacks falling again only on the Royal Scots. 2nd Lieutenant J A Ford in D Company was ordered to establish his platoon on the highest point of Golden Hill. The appalling strain of that climb in the dark was never forgotten. The soldiers, burdened by equipment and ammunition, and weak as some of them were with malaria, were in a state of exhaustion as they crawled on hands and knees over rocks and scrub to the bare hilltop. There they found a few shallow weapon pits dug over three years previously. There were no mines and the broken, rusted wire was valueless.1 Yet this position was to be referred to as “the strong Golden Hill Line” in Maltby’s despatches. Sentries were posted, while others tried to rest despite the bitter cold. No food could be carried up to them. Each man received a tot of rum for breakfast, while they stood to awaiting the next Japanese attack.
Captain D Pinkerton commanded D Company. Ford had nothing but praise for him: “It was his courage, his cool insistence on standing fast under merciless Japanese mortaring that gave D Company the reputation they won on Golden Hill. Pinkerton was a tall, unbending man, sparing of words and unsparing of our energies as well as his own… We were proud of him, perhaps partly because he made us proud of ourselves.”
The remainder of the Battalion was to the west of Ford’s platoon, on lower ground. At 7.30 a.m. on 11th December, the Japanese 230 Regiment attacked in great strength the whole Battalion front. “I saw Captain Pinkerton lead a bayonet charge to clear the top of Golden Hill ridge. From then on throughout the day we were heavily mortared,” Ford continues. “There could be no fighting back. And the mortaring was carried out with deadly accuracy.”
The Companies had been unable to establish field cable communications. The Official Report, published over seven years later as a supplement to The London Gazette, deals inadequately with what happened: “11th December – On the mainland at dawn the enemy opened up mortar fire and then attacked the left flank of the 2 Royal Scots, driving them back in disorder and exposing the junction of the Castle Peak and Taipo Road, thus seriously endangering the withdrawal of all the troops based on the Taipo Road… The situation was critical but the company of the 1 Winnipeg Grenadiers and the Bren carriers from Kai Tak aerodrome defences were moved into position covering the gap.” As an afterthought, probably prompted by someone else, a note was added that both Royal Scots Company Commanders were killed. They were Captains W R T Rose and F S Richardson.
During this action, the Battalion Signals Officer, Captain Douglas Ford, went forward to a southern spur on Golden Hill because he knew that the supporting artillery had misjudged the range: British shells were falling amidst the Royal Scots. He found a field telephone and through Colonel White had the range increased. At 7.30 a.m. C Company had been 35 strong. Within three hours it had received 25 more casualties.
At 10.00 a.m. Brigadier Wallis told Colonel White that “the good name of the Battalion was at stake. It was emphatically stressed that further withdrawals must stop or all troops based on the Tai Po road to the east would be cut off.”2
At this critical moment, one can but wonder why Wallis, less than three miles away from Colonel White’s Battalion Headquarters, with the good Castle Peak Road between them, could not have visited him to discuss the rapidly deteriorating situation. This also applies to General Maltby in his ‘battlebox’ in Victoria. Should Maltby have gone forward, as some other generals in different circumstances certainly would have done? He could have discovered what was going on, with a view to planning accordingly. A Motor Torpedo Boat would have carried him across the harbour to the Mainland very quickly. Wallis’s headquarters was three miles beyond, so the entire journey would have taken less than half an hour.
Throughout the day 2nd Lieutenant Ford had commanded the troops defending the summit of Golden Hill. “In the end he was literally blown off the hill by Japanese mortar fire. When he withdrew, under orders, he found that both his Company Commander and Second in Command had been wounded and that his two fellow platoon commanders had been killed,” continues the Royal Scots’ history. “When he reached Battalion Headquarters with the remnants of the Company he was given a large whisky by the Commanding Officer and, not surprisingly in his famished and semi-exhausted condition, he immediately fell asleep.”
The Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel S E H E White MC, was a bluff Irishman, known to his officers as ‘Scram’, his favourite order of dismissal. He was a tallish man, dark-skinned from years of exposure to the sun. During the 18 days of war in Hong Kong he was to see his Battalion almost literally blown to bits.
When the news reached him of the virtual disintegration of B and C Companies, he went forward to meet the survivors of D Company, upon which the ful
l Japanese attacks had now fallen; the Company was ordered to fall back to less exposed ground closer to Kowloon.
The Royal Scots had already received casualties amounting to about one sixth of their effective strength. The ratio of officer casualties was significantly greater.
At 11.00 a.m. the Royal Scots, with the supporting Company of the Winnipeg Grenadiers, were ordered to withdraw to a line extending obliquely back almost to Shamshuipo in Kowloon. On their far right, the two Indian battalions were still relatively unscathed on the Gin Drinkers’ Line.
Alarming reports reached Fortress HQ of a possible invasion by sea. The enemy had landed on Lantau Island, to the southwest of Hong Kong. They were fired on by the heavy guns at Aberdeen. An enemy party in sampans attempted a surprise landing at Aberdeen Island within 300 yards of the Naval Base. They were driven off by machine-gun fire from a platoon of the Winnipeg Grenadiers and by 3 Battery of the Volunteers. Orders were given to the Royal Engineers to lay anti-personnel mines on the beaches on the southern shores. After the surrender some of these mines were to be defused by Jimmy Wakefield, by order of the Japanese.
At midday on 11th December, General Maltby made the momentous decision to withdraw all his troops from the Mainland that night, except for 5/7 Rajputs which would remain on the isolated but commanding position on the Devil’s Peak Peninsula indefinitely, in accordance with previous orders.
The Kowloon denial plan was being implemented as quickly as possible. The cement works, power station and dockyards were all destroyed. Merchant ships, including a Swedish vessel, were sunk.
In Kowloon an unpleasant stench filled the air since the bodies of the dead, following the Japanese bombing and shelling, were rotting in the bright sun. Sewage seeped into the streets from broken mains. The refrigeration system had broken down in the godowns: the goods stored there began to rot. Exhausted soldiers buried their faces in their arms to keep out the stench of death, excreta and putrefaction.
Doctor Isaac Newton in Kowloon noted in his diary: “11/12 December. Unfortunately much valuable time that was spent collecting stores, food and drugs was frittered away by an order from Hong Kong to prepare a camp for 10,000 evacuees from the Island. 60 to 70 casualties admitted and two operating theatres in continuous use for 12 hours. All lights have gone except for emergency installations in the hospital.
“Terrible riots have broken out in Kowloon and it is most dangerous to go out. As I stood in the compound this evening, I could hear the roar of the looting in the Nathan Road. It was a very nasty sound. No sooner was the camp for the evacuees stacked with food, when rioters broke in.”
A few looters were shot, their crumpled bodies being left on the ground as an example to others. But law and order was disintegrating and, as the fighting drew nearer, less attempt was made to control the chaos.
The withdrawal of the Mainland Brigade went ahead as planned with little interference from the enemy, who failed to follow up. The Royal Scots began to embark at Kowloon City pier at 7.30 p.m. and, by 10.00 p.m., it was back on the Island. “A strange journey,” wrote 2nd Lieutenant Ford. “After all the Battalion had been through, we left the battlefield in buses, as if we were going back to barracks after an exercise in the hills. The ferry boats were waiting for us at the pier. We looked across the water, usually ablaze with the lights of the Island. That night there was nothing but darkness ahead.”
D Company Winnipeg Grenadiers crossed over to the Island after midnight. All armoured cars, some trucks and nearly all the Bren carriers were successfully evacuated.
The difficult withdrawal of the Rajputs and Punjabis the same night, with all their equipment, towards the Devil’s Peak in the southeast was also successful despite a strong Japanese blocking position on Tate’s Cairn. One group of Punjabis became lost and found themselves on the outskirts of Kowloon fighting Japanese patrols and fifth columnists. Fortunately RAF launches picked them up from the wharf just as the Japanese were closing in.
By dawn on 12th December, the Rajput Battalion was holding the Ma Lau Tong defensive line, last fortified in 1941; it was an extension of the Gin Drinkers’ Line. Behind them Brigadier Wallis had his small headquarters. Fresh rations and ammunition were ferried forward to them all. The Punjabis meanwhile were gradually evacuated to the Island.
At 5.45 p.m. the Japanese launched a battalion attack on the Rajputs but failed to break through and received heavy casualties due to machine-gun and artillery fire supported by the 6-inch battery of howitzers.
At 4.30 a.m. on 13th December, General Maltby decided that the Devil’s Peak Peninsula would not be held after all. He asked the Rajput Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel R C Rawlinson, if he could withdraw his entire Battalion during the next two hours of darkness. Rawlinson replied that it would be difficult, but fortunately the enemy had taken a nasty knock.
The evacuation presented additional problems because the reliability of the Chinese boats’ crews was such that they had to be under guard to prevent them from deserting. Chinese engineers had already run away; staff officers from Fortress HQ went forward to operate the boats in their absence. The withdrawal fell behind schedule, despite the efforts of four Motor Torpedo Boats.
At 8.30 a.m. the last covering troops were withdrawn in broad daylight in MTBs. The 120 mules which had carried heavy equipment had to be left on the Mainland because of the desertion of the crews of the ship to carry them. There had been no Japanese air activity or any attempt to follow up the withdrawal; the evacuation had been completed without casualties.
Brigadier Wallis was the last to leave the Mainland. He deserves credit for planning the successful withdrawal following the defeat at the Shingmun Redoubt.
When Brigadier Wallis took over from his predecessor, Brigadier Reeve, a little over a month earlier, he had asked him his views of the Royal Scots. Reeve had replied that Lieutenant Colonel White “would be a good average Commanding Officer and one the men knew and trusted”. Wallis replied that he was “none too happy with the discipline of the Battalion as exemplified by the number of courts martial, some of them officers; the high rate of venereal disease and the high percentage of malaria.” Brigadier Reeve replied that “he thought in the event the Battalion would fight well – after all they are Jocks”.
Wallis wrote in the War Diary of the Mainland Brigade that he attributed the weaknesses in the Royal Scots to be due first to too many inexperienced officers – “perhaps ‘milking’ had been too great?” he wondered. “Secondly the Battalion had been left too long overseas without relief – 12 years in all.” Third that the previous Commanding Officer, “Lieutenant Colonel D J McDougall, was a bad CO. He drank heavily himself and did not control his Battalion. It caused great astonishment in Hong Kong when it was learned that on vacation of command this officer was to command an officers’ school in Burma.”3
In short, Brigadier Wallis blamed the Royal Scots for the failure to hold the Gin Drinkers’ Line and positions to the south. Even if the Japanese had been a third rate force and unable to fight at night, as Air Chief Marshal Brooke-Popham and others had earlier claimed, there would still have been no justification for Brigadier Wallis to expect that one platoon could defend the Shingmun Redoubt. This is because the advantage and initiative invariably lies with the attacker. The defenders, too few in numbers and too thinly spread, have no knowledge where the weight of the attack is to be anticipated. So it can only be expected that an assault, with the advantage of surprise, pressed forward in great strength at a few points, will succeed in breaking through. The Japanese 38th Division consisted of highly trained troops with a wealth of battle experience from years of fighting in China. Their artillery was greatly reinforced beyond the normal establishment.
Brooke-Popham stated in his despatch that at least two divisions – some nine brigades – would have been required to hold the Gin Drinkers’ Line. In fact only one brigade was available. The Shingmun Redoubt was insufficiently supported by fire and was located with an open flank.
> The Royal Scots had been asked to achieve the impossible. The Battalion received over 100 casualties on the Mainland. To anticipate events, the Royal Scots had well over 200 more casualties in the battle for the Island. Thereafter, three officers and 59 soldiers died in captivity and, as will be related, a horrifying total of three officers and 178 soldiers died at sea when the ship taking the POWs to Japan was sunk by an American submarine.
Many officers and soldiers of the Royal Scots gave of their best. For that, and for their conduct during nearly four years of dreadful captivity, the 2nd Battalion Royal Scots occupies a special place in the long history of the Regiment.
Notes
1. Interview Ford with author.
2. War Diary and Narrative, Mainland Infantry Brigade and attached troops, p. 37.
3. Mainland War Diary, p. 88.
CHAPTER 10
“Clay Pigeons in a Shooting Range”
13th–17th December 1941
The speed of the Japanese thrusts in Hong Kong and Malaya, and the success of their operations against Pearl Harbor, were being studied by Hitler at Berchtesgaden. He followed with jubilation every development in the war in Asia and congratulated himself on declaring war on America following the Pearl Harbor fiasco. Hitler eagerly awaited his share of the plunder of tin, rubber and oil to be captured in Malaya, Burma and the Dutch East Indies. Possibly the key positions of Ceylon and Port Darwin would eventually fall too. The glittering prizes were endless. As Churchill put it in a different context: “All sorts of greedy appetites have been excited, and many itching fingers are stretching and scratching at the vast pillage of a derelict Empire.”
“We are watching day by day and hour by hour your stubborn defence of the port and fortress of Hong Kong,” signalled Churchill to Sir Mark Young. “You guard a vital link long famous in world civilization between the Far East and Europe. All our hearts are with you in your ordeal. Every day your resistance brings nearer our certain victory.”
The Battle for Hong Kong 1941-1945 Page 9