Meanwhile Force R had arrived at a position north of the Kola inlet and had turned to pass astern of JW-51B. Burnett cunningly intended to station himself to the north of the convoy where he would be further away from the German airbases, and yet still able to run down to intercept any surface force. Because of the low position of the sun in these northern latitudes Force R would also be able to see any ships to the south long before they could be seen themselves. Unfortunately, due to the need to keep radio silence, Burnett was still unaware that the convoy was thirty miles south and sixty miles west of where he thought it was.
The Admiral Hipper, flagship of the German flotilla at the Battle of the Barents Sea, rests at anchor in Altenfjord before the sortie against convoy JW-51B.
Photo courtesy Imperial War Museum.
The day of the Battle.
By 31st December the storm had completely broken but there were still occasional snow squalls and the sky was completely overcast. Visibility was ten miles looking south, but only seven looking north. Moreover the temperature was dropping rapidly. Both Burnett and Sherbrooke had plenty to think about. During the night a British radio monitoring station had detected a German destroyer off North Cape, and two submarines, one ahead of the convoy and one to the south.
At 0715 Hipper was still steaming north-east at high speed when her lookouts spotted two silhouettes sixty degrees ahead. Kummetz immediately turned towards them to reduce the silhouette of his own ships, and ordered the destroyer Eckholdt to investigate. At this point, although he didn’t know it, he was about twenty miles astern of the convoy.
Half an hour passed without word, so Kummetz ordered Hipper to slow to ten knots and turn east. By now he could make out more and larger vessels in the gloom, and it must have come as no surprise when at 0753 German destroyers finally signalled that they had positively identified the convoy, and that they were now shadowing.
The convoy was further south than he had anticipated, but nonetheless Kummetz decided to continue with his original plan. At 0800 he ordered Hipper to increase speed to twenty knots and turn north again, in order to catch up with JW-51B by first light. By doing this however he lost touch with his destroyers. These appear to have split into their assigned groups, although the order to do so had not yet been given. This early dispersal of force was to cause problems for the Germans later on.
Movements of the opposing sides up to 0830.
By 0830 the situation was this. JW-51B was over two hundred miles north-west of the Kola Inlet and was steering east at eight knots. Burnett’s Force R was thirty miles further north but was heading north-west away from the convoy. Vizalma and Chester Valley were about fifteen miles north of Force R and heading east. Bramble was about fifteen miles of the convoy’s port quarter and was also heading east. Hipper was off the convoy’s port quarter, and the Lutzow group was now off of its starboard beam. None of these groups were completely sure of the position of any of the others, or in some cases of their very existence.
The battle begins.
At around 0845 the convoy's lead ship, Hyderabad, spotted two destroyers to the south moving on a reverse parallel course. An earlier signal to the effect that Russian aircraft might be joining the convoy had been misread by the corvette as Russian destroyers. Hyderabad therefore sent no signal to Sherbrooke on the dubious grounds that the vessels were probably Russian. Fortunately a few minutes later Obdurate sighted these same ships turning north and upon signalling their presence to Sherbrooke was ordered to investigate. The targets, now three in number, immediately turned away and it was some time before Obdurate could get into position to send a challenge.
At the same time, Force R picked up two targets on radar, one large and one small, just over seven miles ahead. Suspecting they might be German surface units, Burnett increased speed and tracked them. The two were in fact Vizatma and Chester Valley. This was a very dangerous development for the British, as Force R was effectively being drawn even further north of the convoy.
At 0915 Obdurate finally drew to within four miles of the three unidentified targets, close enough for a challenge to be visible. There was no reply, although this would not have been unusual if the targets had been Russian. However one of the three (actually Hipper's destroyer group) then opened fire on Obdurate, revealing her identity. The reflections from the gun flashes were seen by Force R, causing much confusion. If the ships they were tracking were German, why was there firing to the south? Unaware of Force R's initial contacts, Sherbrooke had no such reservations. He flashed an enemy contact on fleet waves, and the convoy's close escort group moved smoothly into their positions for repelling surface attacks. The “O” class destroyers placed themselves between the convoy and the surface threat, and the other escorts closed up. Achates started laying a smoke screen to obscure the merchant ships.
Kummetz now paid the price for losing contact with his destroyers earlier. Not being sure where they were, he was unable to tell which of the many ships he could see was hostile, even though the light was improving. It was only when Achates began laying smoke that he could definitely identify her as a target, as he knew no German destroyer would lay smoke in this situation. Accordingly Kummetz gave permission to open fire on her, at the same time signalling Lutzow that he was in action with the convoy escort. The German cruiser turned to unmask her rear turrets and thus increase her firepower, but this presented her large beam silhouette to the approaching British destroyers and allowed them to make a positive identification. They immediately attacked. Hipper had fired several salvoes before German lookouts spotted a destroyer (Onslow) approaching, then soon after another (Orwell).
Remembering his orders, and fearful of torpedoes, Kummetz promptly turned Hipper about so that her stern (the smallest target) was facing the approaching destroyers, and then fired on Onslow, using radar. Sherbrooke had previously told his captains that German capital ships could probably be frightened off by threatening a torpedo attack, even though scoring a hit would be extremely unlikely in these conditions, except at suicidally short ranges. This was especially true of Kummetz, who being a torpedo specialist was particularly aware of the threat they posed. In this case his obsession was further fed by a faulty lookout report that Onslow had actually launched torpedoes, when she had not. In any event, Hipper's defensive action also turned her away from the convoy, which was all that Sherbrooke had intended.
Meanwhile the firing of the big eight inch guns threw an even bigger reflection to Force R, and Burnett slowly began to realise the true situation. However the two contacts to the north were still worrying him, and it was some time before he came to the decision that the shooting to the south was too heavy to be ignored. Once he had decided to sail "to the sound of the guns", Burnett quickly worked Force R up to thirty-one knots.
By 0955 Obedient caught up with Orwell and Onslow. Hipper was starting to head back towards the convoy, firing at the destroyers blocking the way. The British ships gamely fired back, but it was fear of torpedoes that caused Kumrnetz to turn away again at 1000.
At 1004 Hipper made a third advance and turn away, continuing with the plan to attempt to attract more of the escorts so that Lutzow could get a free run at the convoy. By this time the German destroyers had disappeared out of sight of Sherbrooke, and fearing that they might be working around him, the escort commander ordered Obedient and Obdurate to rejoin the convoy. This was the first inkling the British had of the German battle plan to lure the escorts away. Sherbrooke's suspicions were further aroused when he received a signal from Burnett - "Am approaching you on a course of 170" - which made it clear that Force R was to his north, and not to the south as he had believed. What if another German force was waiting to the south instead?
And of course there was. At the very moment Sherbrooke was deliberating, the Lutzow was crossing the path of the now virtually defenceless convoy, having steered slowly north-east for the last hour. Obedient and Obdurate had had no time to get into position to interfere. Kummetz's plan had worked.
But visibility was still extremely poor. Although Lutzow spotted several targets through the snow squalls, some of them as little as three miles away, Kapitan Stange refused to engage any of them because he felt it was impossible to make positive identifications. Thus the Germans missed their best chance to inflict heavy damage on the convoy.
Hipper strikes the first blows.
Unaware of Stange's vacillation, Kummetz continued his efforts to draw off the escort. Hipper's destroyers had now rejoined and at 1014 the four ships together made a concerted attack. At 1019 an eight inch shell landed abaft Onslow's bridge, ripped open the funnel and knocked out the radar and most of the radio aerials. Sherbrooke himself was hit by a splinter which smashed the left side of his face and his nose, leaving his left eye dangling down his cheek. In spite of the injury he continued to give orders calmly without a change in the tone of his voice, and it was some minutes before another officer, finding blood on his uniform, turned and realised that the captain was badly wounded.
Almost immediately afterwards, two more eight inch shells landed on Onslow's foredeck, wrecking both of the forward guns. Sherbrooke was forced to cut speed in order to control the resultant cordite fires. Realising that his ship was now incapable of continuing the fight, he turned her away behind a smokescreen and headed back to the convoy. It was only then that the captain agreed to have his wound treated.
With Sherbrooke badly injured and Onslow damaged, command of the convoy escort passed to Captain Kinloch in Obedient. Hipper had turned her attention to the Orwell, whose captain was in two minds as to whether to cover Onslow or attack Hipper independently. Before he could make the decision, Kinloch gathered up Obdurate and moved to reinforce the threatened flank. Kummetz, unaware of the crippling blows he had struck, turned away again into a snow squall at 31 knots, convinced that the convoy must now run onto the Lutzow group. The weather was worsening. Visibility was now down to only two miles.
At 1030 Sheffield's radar picked up a large ship about twelve miles ahead (Hipper) and a few minutes later another fifteen miles away on the port bow (Lutzow). Burnett was now convinced that these were German heavy units and decided to attack the nearer vessel. He set off in pursuit at once, but he had no speed advantage over Hipper. It would be some time yet before his cruisers could intervene.
His intended target, Hipper, was steering east-north-east at high speed target an attempt to cut across the convoy and make another attack. As the cruiser manoeuvred, a single ship emerged from the gloom ahead of her. It was the hapless Bramble, which had been searching for the merchant vessels scattered during the storm. The big German cruiser quickly disabled her with a few well placed shots. Ordering Eckholdt to finish the luckless minesweeper off, Hipper then turned again towards the convoy.
At 1045 Sheffield glimpsed Hipper in the gloom about ten miles off. By now the entire convoy had turned south and was heading straight toward Lutzow. Obedient and Obdurate were astern keeping between the convoy and Hipper. Orwell was somewhat off to the east and was desperately trying to join them. Achates was still faithfully laying a smoke screen, and Onslow was trying to reach the head of the convoy to home Force R by radio. Thus the Lutzow group were now only two to three miles from the convoy, and there were no escorts in between other than two small corvettes. Instead of engaging however, Kapitan Stange slowed Lutzow down and steamed ahead of the convoy, refusing to open fire because of the poor visibility. When firing was heard to the north Lutzow did turn west to investigate, but even when two British destroyers were sighted off the port bow, Stange refused to engage them. Instead he increased speed to 24 knots and drew off, again blaming the terrible weather conditions.
Hipper was now pursuing the convoy and concentrating her fire on Achates, which was soon heavily damaged. Struck by several eight inch shells which killed or wounded all the bridge crew and badly holed the ship forward, Achates lost speed and began to founder. Obedient, Orwell and Obdurate intervened, and Hipper switched fire to them, wrecking Obedient's radios. Fear of torpedo attack soon forced Hipper away to the north again however, and in so doing she ran straight into Force R.
Movements of the opposing sides up to 1130
Force R intervenes.
At 1136 Hipper signalled Lutzow - "In action with escorting forces. No cruiser with convoy". Almost immediately twenty-four six inch shells landed around her. At eight miles Hipper was fully visible to Jamaica and Sheffield, which being further to the north were themselves still hidden in the darkness.
Achieving complete surprise, Burnett's cruisers managed to get off four salvoes before Hipper could even return the fire. Such was the unexpected fury of the attack that Kummetz immediately made a general signal to break off the action and to retire to the west. The Germans were not to escape unscathed however.
A shell from Jamaica's fourth salvo hit Hipper on the port bow, knocking out her number three boiler and reducing her speed to 23 knots. Both British cruisers scored a hit with their fifth salvoes, setting fire to Hipper's aircraft hanger. The hapless German cruiser turned a full circle to starboard obscuring herself in smoke, some of it laid by her own destroyers. Jamaica and Sheffield closed in and by 1143 both sides were heading south.
Suddenly, two German destroyers appeared out of the gloom on Sheffield's port bow. Thinking they were about to launch a torpedo attack, Sheffield quickly swung beam on to them in order to make herself a more difficult target. She needn't have worried. In the confusion Eckholdt had mistook Sheffield for Hipper and had steered straight for her, followed by the Beitzen. Sheffield cut loose at the destroyer with every gun she had at point blank range. Hit by some seven salvoes Eckholdt capsized and sank. Jamaica engaged the Beitzen, which managed to escape.
This tragic diversion allowed Hipper to pull ahead of her pursuers and turn west at full speed. Force R resumed the chase, but when Beitzen and Z-29 were spotted four miles away they were engaged instead. Then the Lutzow appeared, and the guns of the British cruisers again shifted target.
The big pocket-battleship had all this time been prowling to the cast of the convoy. She had fired briefly at a merchantmen, the Calobre, damaging her slightly. The British destroyers had promptly hurried to the east of the convoy and begun laying smoke. Lutzow had then switched her fire to the destroyers, damaging Obdurate with a near-miss. Now she and Force R traded shots. The advantage that the German ships heavier calibre guns gave was largely nullified by some very scrappy shooting, but then Hipper came into sight. With both her and Lutzow shooting at Force R, Burnett found himself caught between two fires and was obliged to disengage to the north.
By 1236 all firing had ceased, although Force R pursued the Germans towards Altenfjord until 1400 when Burnett turned to rejoin the convoy. The last sighting was by the British submarine Graph, which spotted Hipper at 1300 on Jan 1st just north of Altenfjord. The cruiser was too far away to be engaged, but the Graph, a captured German U-boat commissioned into the Royal Navy, hung on. Three hours later her patience was rewarded when she spotted two of the German destroyers, one towing the other. She made an attack, but without any result.
Aftermath.
Kummetz’s plan had actually worked quite well, in spite of several tactical errors. The indecisiveness of Stange however, robbed the Germans of the fruits of their endeavours. Behind it all was the stultifying reluctance to take risks.
The outcome of the battle of the Barents Sea had considerable political repercussions, including a major shake-up in the German naval hierarchy. Hitler was furious when he heard of the defeat, particularly as the need to maintain radio silence meant that an accurate report from Norway arrived 24 hours after a Reuters press statement. In a fit of rage he actually gave the order to pay off all warships bigger than a destroyer. The Fuhrer's main complaint was that the capital ships lacked fighting spirit, that the navy was too careful in husbanding them, and overanalysed the odds of engagement.
It was a curious attitude to take, as the main reason for the defeat was Hitler's ow
n insistence that the big ships should not be risked. The Commander in Chief of the Kriegsmarine, Admiral Raeder, felt compelled to tender his resignation in protest. Hitler attempted to mollify him but the Admiral was adamant. It is probable that Raedar was finding the task of running the Kriegsmarine in the face of the Fuhrer's ignorance of naval strategy beyond his powers anyway.
His successor was Admiral Donitz, CinC U-boats. Donitz was a major proponent of light forces (especially U-boats) as being the premier naval weapon for Germany against the might of the Royal navy. Even he balked at the decision to scrap the main surface combatants however, and eventually talked Hitler round to giving some of them a reprieve. Even so, Hipper was quite badly damaged in the action, and although repaired, was never used in an operational capacity again.
On the British side, all of the merchant vessels safely docked at the Kola inlet on January 3rd, delivering nearly 100,000 tons of supplies, including 120 aircraft, 200 tanks, 2000 other vehicles and 24,000 tons of oil. The battered Achates did finally sink, although all the surviving crew were safely transferred to Northern Gem. There were no survivors from the unlucky minesweeper Bramble.
The Battle of the Barents Sea Page 2