Nevertheless, the presumed success of the Soviets was soon overturned by the journalists who attended the demonstration, as they could not help but highlight the technical feats achieved by the British and Americans, especially as no lives had been lost during the whole operation. The entrances to the tunnel were continuously monitored and as soon as any unusual activity was reported above the tunnel, they raised the alarm and helped evacuate those working inside. But if the Soviets knew about the tunnel, why did they not reveal it sooner?
One explanation is that the KGB had ‘neglected' to inform its military counterparts, the GRU. Many western analysts have given credence to this hypothesis, which worked in favour of the western secret services. Indeed, the Americans especially have always claimed that their information on Soviet forces had greatly increased from information gained through Operation Gold, in particular regarding staffing, weapons and strategies. But to make it all believable, an explanation is needed as to how they were able to gain so much important information, especially when Blake's betrayal was only revealed years later. Only the rivalry between East and West could support such a theory, particularly when it is always difficult to admit that one has been deceived.
It is therefore likely that the Soviets used the tunnel to provide misinformation from the start. However, the Russians knew they were playing with fire and one has to ask how far they were willing to go in this deception. The game was enticing, but not without risk: if the British or Americans suspected that they had been discovered, they could always remove Blake. It was rare for an intelligence agency to have an undercover agent within the enemy's citadel, so it was vital that Blake was never suspected. This is why the discovery of the tunnel had to appear accidental.
George Blake36
For my part, I naturally followed the developments that I knew would occur, with some anxiety. I watched for any indication from the SIS or CIA that they suspected the Soviets might have been informed. But the ‘discovery’ was staged with such skill that a joint investigation conducted shortly after the end of the operation by the SIS and CIA, led to the conclusion that it had been a purely technical fault, and there was no question of any ‘leakage’ of information. The KGB had waited for there to be a genuine technical failure. This meant that an inspection was required and so provided the perfect opportunity to discover the wiretapping. As the Americans were listening, they were also aware of the technical fault and so regarded the Soviet intervention as being perfectly logical.
George Blake slipped through the cracks and after the tunnel episode, continued to work as a double agent. He was eventually unmasked by a Polish defector who passed information to the CIA in 1961.
Blake was arrested and during his trial, made no secret of his life a double agent. On the contrary, as a dedicated Marxist, he said he had welcomed the opportunity to help the USSR. He was sentenced to forty-two years in prison and was to be held at Wormwood Scrubs, one of the most high-security prisons in Britain. However, it was often said that Blake had never been an ordinary man, and he managed to escape in 1967.He had apparently been assisted by former detainees who had allegedly belonged to the IRA. Nevertheless, it is possible to harbour doubts about this explanation. A convicted spy is often used as a bargaining chip to release other agents held by the enemy and Blake would therefore have escaped in favour of such a proposition.
Whatever the case, the double agent now quietly joined the USSR. He was protected by the secret service that had taken over from the KGB and taught aspiring Russian agents, although the regime itself was no longer communist. Even though he kept his British nationality, Blake did perhaps become a genuine Russian patriot, even abandoning his communist faith and converting to Orthodoxy. In his quiet but comfortable dacha in Voronezh, he has remained a hero for the Russians. He was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, a distinction awarded to only the most valiant combatants. Better yet, he later received the Order of Friendship medal from Vladimir Putin, the highest honour that can be given to a non-Russian. This is further evidence that Blake was one of the most important Soviet spies of the twentieth century.
As a true spy, Blake was also behind the arrests of dozens of Eastern agents who worked for the British or Americans.
Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky37
In the four years he spent in Berlin, Blake ‘gave up' several British and American officers, including Major General Robert Bialek, a former agent of the state security service of the GDR. Bialek had defected in 1953 and was now living in West Berlin under an assumed identity. While walking his dog one evening in February 1956, he was brutally thrown into a car and taken to the Soviet intelligence headquarters in East Berlin and executed. Blake also betrayed Piotr Popov, a Lieutenant Colonel in the GRU (the secret service of the Soviet Army), who in 1953 had become the largest CIA plant in the Soviet intelligence service. In 1959, a few months after Blake had returned to London, Popov was arrested by the KGB. His secret trial took place in 1963 in the great hall of the KGB's officers' mess. All the depositions, including Popov's, were read out before the opening of the trial and the procedure lasted less than two hours. Popov was sentenced to execution by firing squad.
Although Blake did not deny such accusations, which totalled around 400, he claimed that none of them had resulted in death sentences. He had apparently asked the KGB to ensure this, but the Soviets were naturally under no obligation to respect their agreement. In 1990, Blake published his autobiography in English. The British government tried to prevent his copyright on the grounds that the book would betray classified information, but the judge declared that Blake, who had already admitted his betrayal, could not remain silent forever. The government's case was therefore dismissed - one last victory for the spy!
Chapter 7
Penkovsky: Luring Cuban Missiles
The Cuban Missile Crisis took place fifty-four years ago. For one week in 1962, atomic war was nearly a reality and the world appeared on the brink of nuclear annihilation. However, the game played by the world's two superpowers at the time was largely a game of bluff: neither of two ‘Ks', Kennedy and Khrushchev, were particularly eager to push the red button.
Yet this same dramatic week in which the whole world trembled also conceals an extraordinary spy story. In reality, the cards were already marked from the beginning, and each player in this game of poker knew much more than he was letting on.
The key man in the affair was Oleg Vladimirovitch Penkovsky, a colonel in the Soviet Army's intelligence agency. But firstly, let us consider a brief review of the crisis itself.
On 22 October 1962, President Kennedy made an appearance on US television. He was unusually stern; telling his compatriots that he had evidence of the Soviets installing ballistic missile bases in Cuba. These rockets were equipped with nuclear warheads and once operational, could be a threat to American territory. As far as Kennedy was concerned, this was unacceptable. America, he said, would fight back! He announced the immediate establishment of a blockade around Cuba that would prevent anymore weapons from being delivered and that this blockade would remain in place until the weapons had been removed. He held the USSR responsible and declared that should anything untoward happen, then US rockets would be launched in the direction of Russia.
The world was stunned by what was happening: if the Soviet leaders did not comply with America's demands, then nuclear war would no doubt follow. While Kennedy received the full support of the western allies - de Gaulle was the first to offer his backing - it is interesting to note that US forces were put on high alert all over the globe. Meanwhile, it was reported that Soviet warships were heading for Cuba. While in Moscow, Khrushchev denounced what he saw as US piracy and the unyielding madness of imperialism, even declaring that there was no crisis in Cuba.What would happen now if the US Navy boarded a Soviet ship? The world held its breath as the crisis dragged on for a week. The longest week of the entire Cold War.
De Gaulle proved himself a particularly loyal friend to France's Americ
an and British allies during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Yet they often kept Paris in the dark from what the secret services were actually doing during the crisis. This was in spite of the fact that France had shown itself willing to collaborate with other intelligence agencies when the fate of western democracy was on the line. The Farewell dossier was a clear example of this: thanks to this incomparable spy, controlled by French agencies, hundreds of Soviet agents had been unmasked throughout the world during the early 1980s.
The consequence of this sidelining of the French secret services meant that once the crisis had ended, they were able to rebuild the hidden side of the affair without anyone knowing. But what evidence is there to suggest that the Cuban Missile Crisis actually conceals a spy story?
We must first remember that after Kennedy's dramatic announcement on television, the Pentagon released a series of documents. These included photographs taken over Cuba by a U2 spy plane, similar to the one flown by Francis Gary Power that had been shot down over the USSR a short time before. It was these photographs that allowed America to claim that the Russians were in the process of installing rocket sites on Cuba. The photographs showed storage buildings, launch pads and even two long tubes, which naturally, had to be missiles. US intelligence agencies seemed to know everything about Soviet rocket technology. For reasons that shall be discussed later, the Russians wanted to install rockets pointing towards some 300kms of the US coastline. The place chosen for the rocket base was in the jungle. This afforded them greater camouflage, especially as they were fully aware of the U2 spy rocket's capabilities. However, they took no other particular precautions: it was almost as if the Kremlin wanted the Americans to discover the facilities and the nuclear warheads that were trained on their territory. It remains to be seen why this was the case.
Before we discuss that, however, let us look at a man who was probably one of the most important spies of the second half of the twentieth century: Oleg Penkovsky, a textbook product of the Soviet system. He served as an officer during the Second World War and was decorated several times. An intelligent man, he was introduced into the circles of power and became a missiles expert. He also gained access to the highest levels of the GRU, the intelligence agency of the Soviet Army and a rival to the KGB. Colonel Penkovsky was charged with gathering intelligence from the western world, particularly regarding scientific espionage and technology. Under diplomatic and commercial pretexts, he made many contacts in the West and when any such delegates came to Moscow, Penkovsky made sure to meet them.
Everybody who knew him agreed that Penkovsky was a bon viveur, and a man who never turned down vodka. At that time, the Soviet nomenklatura38 drank heavily in the evenings, and Penkovsky was no exception. His drinking buddies included Serov, the head of the GRU, and Marshal Varentsov. This world of beautiful people must also include members of the government. But Penkovsky did show some restraint during these drinking sessions. Unlike his peers, he was a relatively secretive man who enjoyed his solitude, despite his friendships with those in high places. Although he held a high-ranking post, he lived in a modest two-roomed apartment on Gorky Street, with his wife, daughter and mother. The fact that there were four people living in a two-roomed apartment is of some importance.
From the beginning, Colonel Penkovsky viewed Soviet society with a very clear head. In his position he was well aware of the official corruption, general nepotism and the cynicism of the Kremlin masters. Moreover, he knew that the standard of living in the West was much better than that experienced by the Russian population, despite what the USSR tried to tell them. However, even if he was under no illusions as to his situation, he nevertheless benefitted from the system and the advantages reserved for the privileged within the regime.
Unfortunately for him, a zealous KGB agent discovered that Penkovsky's father had fought for the Whites against the Red Army after the Revolution, which posed a serious threat to his career. Was this an accidental discovery? It is hard to believe so. The police system installed in the USSR at the time meant that there was no way the KGB would have been unaware of this information. So, if they did already know, then the time had clearly come for them to use it against Penkovsky.
Two explanations are possible here: either Penkovsky was overshadowing somebody, or the KGB were keen to show this brilliant GRU officer that he did not know everything. Either way, the sudden revelation came as a shock to Penkovsky. All the hatred for the regime that he had with-held for so long, but had been afraid to express, was now unleashed and his bitterness is reflected in his overwhelming desire for revenge.
Oleg Penkovsky:39
In my early life I strongly believed in the Soviet system. During the last war, I began to understand that this was no longer the Communist Party that had inspired us as we travelled along the road from Stalingrad to Berlin. There was something we had left behind: Russia! Yet more than the war, it was my work in recent years that opened my eyes. I have lived among the high society and the officers of the Red Army. As fate would have it, I married a general’s daughter and found myself and became a privileged member of the Soviet upper-classes. I began to see that the commitment of these people to the Party and to communism was purely a facade. In their private lives, they would lie, cheat, conspire, complain and stab each other in the back. They would denounce their friends and colleagues to the secret police in exchange for money or social advancement. Their children hated all things Soviet, were only interested in foreign films, and despised their ordinary fellow citizens.
Despite his disgrace, Penkovsky's role allowed him to easily contact the West without attracting much attention. On day in Moscow, in 1960, he met with a British businessman called Greville Wynne. Penkovsky was cautious: in his position he knew that Russian trade missions abroad were full of Soviet spies. He imagined that the same must have been true for western trade delegations, and that Wynne was a secret agent. In this instance, he was right! Wynne occasionally provided information for MI6, proving that even the Soviets had legitimate reasons to be cautious.
During the meeting, the Russian suggested that he had lost faith in his country and hated the Soviet system.Wynne, who was unsure of how to deal with such a controversial confession, let him talk. However, he could not have failed to be interested. After all, he knew that Penkovsky was a big catch. So when the colonel asked him to inform the western authorities about what was really happening in the USSR, Wynne was all ears.
The two men met again in London during a Soviet trade mission in spring 1961. During his two-week stay in London, Penkovsky was subjected to several interrogations by MI6, as well as the CIA. The two secret service agencies had little to hide from each other, especially as the British, when faced with such an important decision, preferred to have the collaboration of their big brother on the other side of the Atlantic.
Penkovsky was clearly not the only member on the Soviet trade mission and therefore had to hide these meeting from his fellow delegates. During the day he would fulfil the mission he was supposed to be undertaking: collecting commercial and scientific information for Soviets. In short, fulfilling the role of a spy. Then every evening at his hotel, he would discretely leave his room and visit those of his British and American counterparts.
The western authorities were quickly convinced of Penkovsky's sincerity. They analysed the information he gave to them and after comparing it with their own findings, realised that he was telling the truth. This meant that a fantastic opportunity was now open to them: if they were able to maintain contact with the Russian spy after his return to Moscow, they would have an agent in the Soviet secret service for the very first time. When other Soviet agents had defected to the West in the past and revealed their secrets, they were no longer of any use. In Penkovsky's case, however, the British and Americans were hoping they had found a permanent source of information. It was almost a ‘Philby' in reverse.
Yet the information still needed to be collected, which meant that contact with Penkovsky had to be maintained. This
was obviously going to be much harder after Penkovsky had gone back to Moscow. In this respect, Greville Wynne would be available to help as he was able to meet Penkovsky in Moscow without arousing suspicion. However, he was only able to get to Moscow every four days, which meant that as well as using dead-letterboxes, they had to think up even more complicated and risky procedures that would enable them to exchange the documents that Penkovsky had copied.
These furtive encounters in the street had to be carefully planned, but what did they involve? One way was for two people to brush past each other and without stopping, discretely pass an envelope from one hand to another. However, this method would not work if it was always the same two people as one or both of them could already be under surveillance. This was one of the reasons why the secret service had to have a large staff, which was luckily the case for the western authorities in Moscow. For several months, Penkovsky worked hard delivering his information. According to some estimates, by the end of the operation he had passed over more than 5000 documents to the West.
In September 1961, Penkovsky once more went on an ‘official' trade mission, but this time to Paris. Once more, his friend Greville Wynne was waiting for him. Penkovsky handed over numerous documents but informed him that he believed he was being watched in Moscow. The English businessman wisely advised him to remain in the West. However, the colonel was concerned about his family: if he defected, the KGB would likely arrest his wife or mother. So in spite of the danger, he returned to the USSR.
His suspicions were justified: Penkovsky was under surveillance. Thanks to their own agents who had infiltrated the British secret service, the KGB now knew that the intelligence agency had a highly-placed informant. However, their identity remained a mystery. Consequently, all senior intelligence officers who might have had contact with westerners were put under surveillance. They also increased their surveillance on all western diplomats, as they were convinced that the traitor must have a case officer who was working under cover within the diplomatic corps.
Great Spies of the 20th Century Page 8