CHAPTER VI.
ARGINUSAE.
At Athens, meanwhile, the relieving fleet was being fitted out with afeverish energy such as had never been witnessed within the memory ofman. Nine years before, indeed, preparations on a larger scale, if costand magnificence are to be taken into account, had been made for thedisastrous expedition against Syracuse; but there was all the differencein the world between the temper of the city at the one time and at theother. Athens was at the height of her strength and her wealth when shesent out her armament, splendid, so to speak, with silver and gold,against Syracuse. It was a mighty effort, but she did it, one may almostsay, out of the superfluity of her strength. Now she was sadly reducedin population and in revenue; she was struggling not for conquest butfor life; she was making her last effort, and spending on it her lasttalent, her last man. To find a juster parallel it would have beennecessary to go back a life-time, to the day when the Athenians gave uptheir homes and the temples of their gods to the Persian invaders,falling back on their last defences, the "wooden walls" of their ships.Many men had heard from father or grandfather, it was just possible thatone or two tottering veterans may have seen with their own eyes, how onthat day a band of youths, the very flower of the Athenian aristocracy,headed by Cimon, the son of Miltiades, had marched with a gay alacritythrough the weeping multitude, to hang up their bridles in the temple ofAthene. For the time the goddess needed not horsemen but seamen, andthey gave her the service that she asked for. Now the same sight wasseen again. Again the knights, the well-born and wealthy citizens ofAthens, dedicated their bridles to the patron goddess, and went to serveas mariners on board the fleet. Every ship that could float was hastilyrepaired and equipped. Old hulks that had been lying in dock since thepalmy days when the veteran Phormion[20] led the fleet of Athens tocertain victory, were launched again and manned. In this way the almostunprecedented number[21] of one hundred and ten triremes were got ready.To man these a general levy of the population was made. Every one withinthe age of service not actually disabled by sickness, was taken to formthe crews, and not a few who had passed the limit volunteered. Even thenthe quota had to be made up by slaves, who were promised their freedomin return for their services. It was a stupendous effort, and one whichAthens made with her own strength. These were not mercenaries, but herown sons whom she was sending out to make their last struggle for life.Night and day the preparations were carried on, and before a month wasout from the day on which the tidings of the disaster at Mitylenereached the city, the fleet was ready to sail. Its destination wasSamos, an island that had remained faithful to Athens even after thedisastrous end of the war in Sicily. Here it was joined by a contingentof forty ships, made up of the same squadron scattered about the AEgean,the two triremes of Diomedon[22] being among them. Diomedon was relatedto Callias, and the young man asked and obtained leave from the captainwith whom he had sailed from Athens to transfer himself to his ship.
A battle was imminent. The Spartan admiral had left fifty ships tomaintain the blockade of Mitylene, and sailed to meet the relievingforce. His numbers were inferior, but pride, and perhaps policy, forbadehim to decline the combat. He had made a haughty boast to Conon, and hehad to make it good. "The sea is Sparta's bride," he had said. "I willstop your insults to her." His fleet was now off Cape Malta, thesouth-eastern promontory of Lesbos. The Athenians had taken up theirposition at some little islands between it and the mainland, theArginusae, or White Cliffs, as the name may be translated, a namedestined to become notable as the scene of the great city's lastvictory.
Callicratidas had watched the arrival of the Athenians, and hadconcluded that, according to the usual custom of Greek sailors, theywould take their evening meal on shore. Before long the fires lightedover all the group of islets showed that he was right. His own men hadsupped, and they were ordered to embark in all haste and make an attackwhich would probably be a surprise. What success his bold and energeticaction would have had we can only guess. The stars in their coursesfought against him. A violent thunderstorm with heavy rain came on, andprevented him from putting to sea.
The next day was fine and calm and the two fleets were early afloat.Their arrangement and plan of action showed a curious contrast, acontrast such as was almost enough to make one of the great Athenianseamen of the past turn in his grave. The Athenian ships were massedtogether; the Spartans and their allies were formed in a single line.Callias, who had never before been present at a great sea-fight, but whohad taken pains to acquire as much professional knowledge as he could,expressed his surprise to Diomedon. "How is this, sir?" he said, "howcan our ships maneuver when they are packed together in this fashion?"
Diomedon, an old sailor who had been afloat for nearly forty years,smiled somewhat bitterly as he answered.
"Maneuver, my dear boy! That is exactly what we want to avoid. We can'tdo it ourselves, and we don't mean to let our enemies do it, if it canbe helped. The generation that could manoeuver is gone. Five andtwenty years of fighting have used it up. But, happily, we can stillfight, at least such a fleet as we have got to-day, the real Atheniangrit, can fight. If the weather holds fine, and I think it will for theday, though I don't quite like the looks of the sky, we shall do well,because we shall be able to keep together."
The arrangement of the Athenian line may be very briefly described. Ithad two strong wings, each consisting of sixty ships, formed in foursquadrons of fifteen. These wings consisted wholly of Athenian galleys;the contingents of the allies were posted in the centre, and were insingle line, either because they were better sailors, or because, asbeing directly in front of the group of islets, they were protected bytheir position.
The policy of the Athenian commander was successful. Arginusae was not abattle of skillful maneuvers, but of hard fighting. Such battles areoften determined by the fate of the general, and so it was that day.Callicratidas, had that pride of valor which had often done such greatthings for Sparta and for Greece, but which some times resulted inimmediate disaster. His sailing master, a man of Megara, had advised himto decline a battle. A rapid survey of the position, of the numbers ofthe enemy and of the tactics which they were evidently intending topursue, had convinced this skillful, experienced seaman, that thechances were against him. Callicratidas would not listen to him. "If Iperish," he said, "Sparta will not be one whit the worse off." It wasthe answer of a man who was as modest as he was brave; but it was not tothe point. Sparta would be a great deal worse off if she lost not onlyhim--and he was worth considering--but, as actually happened, nearly thehalf of her fleet.
The signal to advance was passed along the line, and the admiral himselftook up his place in the foremost ship. The whole fleet could see him ashe stood a conspicuous figure in the lead. His stately and chivalrouspresence, the feeling that a man whom it was a privilege to followanywhere, gave, for a time, an effective encouragement. But the loss wasproportionately great when that presence was removed. Early in the dayhis ship endeavored to ram that which carried the Athenian admiralDiomedon, itself in the van of the opposing force. Diomedon himself wasat the rudder and managed his galley with remarkable skill. He avoidedor rather half avoided the blow of the enemy's boat, and this in such away that the Spartan admiral lost his balance, and fell into the water.Callias, who was standing on the rear of the Athenian galley, at thehead of a detachment of men ready either to board or to repel boarders,endeavored to save him; but the weight of his armor was fatal. He sankalmost instantaneously. His death, it is easy to believe, cost Athenseven more than it cost Sparta. It would have been infinitely better forher to fall into his hands than to have to sue for terms, as she did notmany months afterwards, to the less generous Lysander.
The battle lasted for several hours. About noon the weather becamethreatening. The wind changed to the south-west and the sea began torise. By general consent the struggle was suspended. Both sides hadfought with conspicuous valor, but there could be no doubt that thevictory remained with the Athenians. Their losses were serious, nearly afifth o
f their force, or to give the numbers exactly, twenty-nine shipsout of one hundred and fifty. But they had inflicted much more damagethan they had suffered. Out of the small squadron of Spartan ships, tenin number, nine had been destroyed; and more than sixty belonging to thevarious allied contingents were either sunk or taken. The fifty thatremained--and there were barely fifty of them--made the best of theirway either to the friendly island of Chios, or to Phocaea on themainland. Without doubt the Athenians had won a great victory. Whetherthe opportunity could have been used to restore permanently the fortunesof the city, is doubtful; but it is certain that it was lamentablywasted.
FOOTNOTES:
[20] Phormion won some brilliant victories in the Corinthian gulf in theearly years of the war. He died prematurely, it would seem about 429 B.C.
[21] The number of triremes contributed by Athens to the Greek fleet ofSalamis was one hundred and eighty, but this comprised, of course,literally every ship that they possessed. In the expedition againstSyracuse, the triremes numbered one hundred and thirty-four.
[22] Diomedon was the officer in command of Samos, and had alreadyattempted with the twelve ships that composed his squadron, to relieveConon. His force was so inferior to that of the Spartans that he couldonly have hoped to succeed by eluding their observations. Accordingly hehad avoided the harbors and endeavored to make his way up a narrowchannel, known by the common name of "Euripus" (a channel with a swiftcurrent) by which Mitylene could be approached. Callicratidas, however,had discovered the maneuver and captured ten out of the twelve ships.
Callias: A Tale of the Fall of Athens Page 6