by Norman Lowe
FURTHER READING
Aburish, S. K., Arafat: From Defender to Dictator (Bloomsbury, 1999).
Aburish, S. K., Nasser: The Last Arab (Duckworth, 2005 edition).
Chomsky, N. and Pappe, I., Gaza in Crisis: Reflections on Israel’s War against the Palestinians (Penguin, 2011).
Cohn-Sherbok, D. and El-Alami, D. S., The Palestinian–Israeli Conflict: A Beginner’s Guide (One World, 3rd edition, 2008).
Dawisha, A., Arab Nationalism in the 20th Century: From Triumph to Despair (Princeton University Press, new edition, 2005).
Hirst, D., Beware of Small States: Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East (Faber, 2010).
Kyle, K., Suez: Britain’s End of Empire in the Middle East (Tauris, Reprint edition, 2011).
Milton-Edwards, B. & Farrell, S., Hamas: The Islamic Resistance Movement (Polity, 2010).
Osman, T., Egypt on the Brink: from Nasser to Mubarak (Yale University Press, revised edition, 2011).
Roy, S., Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza (Princeton University Press, 2011).
Schlaim, A., Israel and Palestine: Reappraisals, Revisions, Refutations (Verso, 2010).
Siegman, H., ‘Israel’s Lies’ in London Review of Books (29 January 2009.),
Tripp, C., A History of Iraq (Cambridge University Press, 3rd edition, 2007).
QUESTIONS
Why and with what results did the Arabs and Israelis fight the wars of 1967 and 1973?
‘Terrorism and violence rather than peaceful diplomacy.’ How far would you agree with this view of the activities of the PLO in the Middle East in the period 1973 to 1995?
How successful was President Nasser as leader of Egypt?
‘The USA and the USSR intervened in the Middle East in the period 1956 to 1979 purely to preserve political and economic stability in the region.’ How valid do you think this view is?
Assess the reasons why the Six-Day War of 1967 was followed by the Yom Kippur War only three years later.
To what extent have the violent actions of some Palestinians been the main obstacle to the establishment of a Palestinian state?
There is a document question about the USA and the 1990–1 Gulf War on the website.
Chapter 12
The new world order and the war against global terrorism
SUMMARY OF EVENTS
When communism collapsed in eastern Europe and the USSR broke up in 1991, the Cold War came to an end. The USA was left as the world’s only superpower. Following its victory over communism, the USA was full of confidence and pride in the superiority of its way of life and its institutions. Optimists thought that the world could now look forward to a period of peace and harmony, during which the USA, which saw itself as the land of freedom and benevolence, would lead the rest of the world forward, wherever necessary, into democracy and prosperity. In addition, wherever necessary, the USA would act as the world’s policeman, keeping ‘rogue states’ under control and making them toe the line. Francis Fukuyama, professor of political economy at Johns Hopkins University, even argued that the world had reached ‘the end of history’, in the sense that History, seen as the development of human societies through various forms of government, had reached its climax in modern liberal democracy and market-oriented capitalism.
However, the new world order turned out to be quite different. Much of the rest of the world did not wish to be led anywhere by the USA, and disagreed with the USA’s world-view. Since it was so powerful both militarily and economically, it was difficult for small countries to challenge the USA in conventional ways. To the extremists, it seemed that terrorism was the only way to strike at the USA and its allies.
Terrorism was nothing new – anarchists were responsible for many assassinations around the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; during the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries there had been many terrorist organizations, but these were mostly localized, carrying out their campaigns in their own areas. There were, for example, ETA, which wanted a Basque state completely independent of Spain; and the IRA, which wanted Northern Ireland united with the Irish Republic.
It was in the 1970s that terrorists began to act outside their own territories. For example, in 1972 Arab terrorists killed 11 Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics; and there was a series of bomb explosions on aircraft. In the 1980s it became clear that the USA was the chief target:
there was an attack on the American embassy in Beirut (Lebanon) in 1983;
an American airliner flying from Frankfurt to New York crashed onto the Scottish town of Lockerbie after a bomb had exploded on board (1988);
a bomb exploded in the World Trade Center in New York in February 1993;
US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were attacked in 1998;
there was an attack on the American battleship Cole in port at Aden in the Yemen (2000).
The culmination of this campaign was the terrible events of 11 September 2001 when the World Trade Center in New York was completely destroyed (see Illus. 12.1). The blame for this attack was placed on al-Qaeda (meaning ‘the Base’), an Arab organization led by Osama bin Laden, which was campaigning against Western or anti-Islamic interests. US president George W. Bush immediately announced ‘a declaration of war on terrorism’. His aims were to overthrow the Taliban (students) regime in Afghanistan, which was thought to be aiding and abetting al-Qaeda, to capture Osama bin Laden and to destroy al-Qaeda. Bush also threatened to attack and overthrow any regime that encouraged or harboured terrorists. First on the list was to be Saddam Hussein of Iraq, and action was also threatened against Iran and North Korea – three states which, according to Bush, formed an ‘axis of evil’.
Illustration 12.1 New York, 11 September 2001: a fiery blast rocks the south tower of the World Trade Center as the hijacked United Airlines flight 175 from Boston crashes into the building
The Taliban regime in Afghanistan was quickly overthrown (October 2001) and a national government led by Hamid Kharzai was put in place, supported by NATO troops. The USA, with British help, then moved on to deal with Iraq, where Saddam Hussein was also overthrown (April–May 2003) and later captured. Although these regimes were removed relatively easily, it proved much more difficult to replace them with viable, stable administrations which could bring peace and prosperity to their troubled countries. In Afghanistan the Taliban soon regrouped and in 2003 they began a new insurgency. NATO troops and the native Afghan army struggled to control the insurgency, but the violence continued and in 2012 Afghanistan was still in a state of civil war. And so the ‘war on terror’ continued.
At the same time there was increasing tension between the Islamic republic of Iran and the West. Since 1979 when the American-backed regime of the Shah Reza Pahlevi was overthrown in the Islamic revolution, Iran had been viewed with suspicion, partly because they were pursuing a nuclear programme. Although the Iranians insisted that their nuclear power was intended only for peaceful purposes – mainly to produce electricity – the West was convinced that they were planning to manufacture nuclear weapons. By early 2012 there was talk of American and Israeli pre-emptive strikes to destroy Iran’s nuclear plants.
Meanwhile sensational events were taking place in other part of the Middle East and across North Africa. Beginning in Tunisia in December 2010, a series of anti-government protests and demonstrations quickly spread through the entire region. In little over a year the governments of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen were overthrown and several other countries were forced to introduce important reforms and improvements, in a movement that became known as the ‘Arab Spring’.
12.1 THE NEW WORLD ORDER
Soon after the US ‘victory’ in the Cold War, various American spokesmen announced that the USA was looking forward to a new era of peace and international co-operation. They implied that the USA, the world’s only superpower – all-powerful and unchallengeable – was now committed to good works; support for international justice, liberty and human rights; the eradication of poverty; and the spread
of education, health and democracy throughout the world. Understandably, Americans were full of pride in their country’s achievements; in 1997 David Rothkopf, a minister in the Clinton administration, wrote: ‘The Americans should not deny the fact that of all the nations in the history of the world, theirs is the most just, the most tolerant and the best model for the future.’
And yet, instead of being universally loved and admired, the USA, or rather US governments, ended up being hated so violently in certain quarters that people were driven to commit the most terrible acts of terrorism in protest against the USA and its system. How did this happen? How did the post-Cold War era, which seemed so full of hope, turn out to be so full of hatred and horror? In simple terms, there were millions of people in many countries of the world who did not share the advantages of the prosperous American lifestyle; nor did they see much evidence that the USA was genuinely trying to do anything to narrow the gap between the poor and the wealthy, or to fight for justice and human rights.
Many American writers were aware of the dangers of this situation. Nicholas Guyatt, in his book Another American Century, published in 2000, pointed out that
many people around the world are frustrated by the complacency and impenetrability of the US, and by the fact that the apparent absence of political solutions to this (such as a genuinely multilateral and independent United Nations) is likely to drive many towards radical and extreme measures … [there are] large and dangerous pockets of resentment towards the US around the world, grounded not in fundamentalism or insanity but in a real perception of the imbalance of power, and a real frustration at the impotence of political means of change.
‘As long as the US remains insulated from the effects of its actions’, he concluded, ‘it will have little sense of the true desperation they produce in others.’
What were these actions of the USA that caused such desperation in others? Clearly there was a complex combination of actions and policies which led to such extreme reactions.
US foreign policy continued along the same interventionist course as during the Cold War. For example, in December 1989 at least 2000 civilians were killed when US forces invaded and bombed Panama. This was an operation designed to arrest Manuel Noriega, the Panamanian military leader who was the power behind the presidents of Panama during the 1980s. He had worked for the CIA and had been backed by the US government until 1987, when he was accused of drug trafficking and money laundering. The heavy-handed US operation resulted in his capture and removal to the USA to stand trial. The Organization of American States proposed a resolution ‘to deeply regret the military intervention in Panama’. The resolution was approved by a vote of 20 to1, the one being the USA.
During the 1990s the Americans helped to suppress left-wing movements in Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. In 1999 they took part in the controversial bombing of Serbia. Twice – in 1989 and 2001 – American agents intervened in the Nicaraguan elections, the first time to defeat the left-wing government, the second time to prevent the left returning to power. This sort of policy was bound to cause resentment, especially now that it could not be justified as part of the campaign against the advance of global communism. In the words of William Blum (in Rogue State): ‘The enemy was, and remains, any government or movement, or even individual, that stands in the way of the expansion of the American Empire.’
At other times the USA failed to intervene in situations where international opinion hoped for a decisive US role. In Rwanda in 1994 the USA was reluctant to play a full part, since no direct US interests were involved and intervention on a sufficiently large scale would have been expensive. Because of the delays, some half a million people were massacred. As Nicholas Guyatt puts it: ‘Reluctant to give up its central role in world affairs but unwilling to commit troops and money for UN operations, the USA atrophied the cause of peacekeeping just as the situation in Rwanda required a flexible and dynamic response.’ The other main example of US failure was the Arab–Israeli conflict: although the USA became involved in trying to bring peace, they were clearly on the side of Israel. George W. Bush refused to deal with Yasser Arafat, regarding him as nothing but a terrorist. This US failure to bring about a just settlement of the conflict is probably the main reason for the bitter Arab and Muslim hostility.
The USA often failed to support the United Nations. In 1984 for example, President Ronald Reagan talked about the importance of international law and order: ‘without law’, he said, ‘there can only be chaos and disorder’. However, the previous day he had rejected the verdict of the International Court of Justice which condemned the USA for its unlawful use of force by its mining of harbours in Nicaragua. Later the court ordered the USA to pay compensation to Nicaragua, but the government refused and increased its financial support to the mercenaries who were trying to destabilize the democratically elected Nicaraguan government. The UN was unable to enforce its decision.
The USA had a long history of vetoing Security Council resolutions and opposing General Assembly resolutions. A few examples demonstrate the US attitude. In 1985 the USA was the only country to vote against a resolution proposing new policies for improving the safeguarding of human rights (voting was 130 for, 1 against). Similarly in 1987, the USA was the only member to vote against a resolution aimed at strengthening communication services in the Third World (voting was 140 for, 1 against). In 1996, at a World Food Summit organized by the UN, the USA refused to endorse a general view that it was everyone’s right ‘to have access to safe and nutritious food’. As Noam Chomsky succinctly puts it (in Hegemony or Survival): ‘When the UN fails to serve as an instrument of American unilateralism on issues of elite concern, it is dismissed.’ The USA even voted against UN proposals on the control of terrorism, presumably because it wanted to fight terrorism in its own way. All this – before 11 September – could only result in a weakening of the UN and of international law. In the words of Michael Byers, ‘international law as applied by the US increasingly bears little relationship to international law as understood anywhere else … It is possible that … the US is in fact attempting to create new, exceptional rules for itself alone.’
President George W. Bush was less than enthusiastic about some of the agreements entered into by previous administrations. During his first year in office – and before 11 September – he rejected the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, withdrew from the 1997 Kyoto Protocols on climate change, halted the new diplomatic contacts with North Korea and refused to co-operate in discussions about the control of chemical weapons.
The US economy was so powerful that decisions taken in Washington and New York had worldwide repercussions. With the increasing globalization of the world’s economy, American companies had interests all over the world. The Americans kept firm control over the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, so that states applying for loans had to make sure that their internal policies were acceptable to the USA. In 1995 the new president of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, announced that he wanted the Bank to do more to promote debt relief, good government, education and health in the Third World. But Washington opposed this, arguing for strict austerity. In fact, according to Will Hutton, ‘the international financial system has been shaped to extend US financial and political power, not to promote the world public good’. By the end of 2002 it was clear that the USA was pursuing what some observers described as ‘an imperial grand strategy’ leading to a new world order in which it ‘runs the show’.
12.2 THE RISE OF GLOBAL TERRORISM
(a) How do we define ‘terrorism’?
Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, in their recent book Worlds in Collision, offer this definition:
Terrorism is a method of political action that uses violence (or deliberately produces fear) against civilians and against civilian infrastructure in order to influence behaviour, to inflict punishment or to exact revenge. For the perpetrators, the point is to make the target group afraid of today, afraid of tomorrow and afraid of each other. Terroris
m is an act, not an ideology. Its instruments are assassination, mass murder, hijacking, bombing, kidnapping and intimidation. Such acts can be committed by states as well as private groups.
There are problems with any definition of terrorism. For example, are people engaged in a legitimate struggle for independence, like the Mau Mau in Kenya (see Section 24.4(b)) and the African National Congress in South Africa (see Section 25.8), terrorists or revolutionaries and freedom fighters? In the 1960s Nelson Mandela was regarded as a terrorist by the white governments of South Africa and kept in jail for 27 years; now he is respected and revered by both blacks and whites all over the world. What about Yasser Arafat, the Palestinian leader? President Bush refused to meet him because, according to the Americans, he was nothing but a terrorist. Yet when the Israeli government carried out similar attacks to those perpetrated by the Palestinians, this was classified not as terrorism, but as legitimate actions of a government against terrorism. Clearly it depends which side you are on, and which side wins in the end.
(b) Terrorist groups
Some of the best-known terrorist organizations were based in the Middle East:
The Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) was one of the earliest groups to make itself felt. Formed in 1974, it was an offshoot of Yasser Arafat’s Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which was thought not to be sufficiently aggressive. The ANO was committed to a completely independent Palestinian state; it had bases in Lebanon and Palestine (in some of the refugee camps) and it drew support from Syria, Sudan, and at first from Libya. It was responsible for operations in about 20 different countries, including attacks on airports in Rome and Vienna (1985), and a number of aircraft hijackings. Since the early 1990s the ANO has been less active.