by Norman Lowe
13.5 OPPOSITION AND DOWNFALL
The conclusion has to be that after the first flush of enthusiasm for Mussolini and his new system, the average Italian can have felt little lasting benefit from the regime, and disenchantment had probably set in long before the Second World War started. And yet there was not a great deal of overt opposition to him. This was partly because it was difficult to conduct an organized opposition in parliament, and there were heavy punishments for opponents and critics; fear of the political police tended to drive serious opposition underground, though they were much less repressive and brutal than Hitler’s Gestapo. Also the Italians had a tradition of accepting whatever happened politically with a minimum of fuss and lots of resignation. In spite of all the problems, Mussolini could usually rely on the support of the traditional elites – the king and aristocracy, and wealthy landlords and industrialists, because he was their best insurance against the communists. The government continued to control the media, which kept on telling people that Mussolini was a hero.
(a) Why was Mussolini eventually overthrown?
Entry into the Second World War on Germany’s side was a disastrous mistake. The majority of Italians were against it; they already disapproved when Mussolini began to sack Jews from important jobs (1938), and they felt that Italy was becoming a German satellite. The Italian takeover of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) was popular with the public, though they had made heavy weather of that (see Section 5.2(b)). But the Second World War was a different matter altogether. Mussolini had failed to modernize the economy sufficiently to support a prolonged war; in fact, Italy was incapable of waging a major war; the army was equipped with obsolete rifles and artillery; there were only a thousand planes and no heavy tanks. The declaration of war on the USA (December 1941) horrified many of Mussolini’s right-wing supporters (such as industrialists and bankers), who resented the closer economic controls which wartime brought. As for the general public, Mussolini had failed to convert them to his aims of European war and conquest. All the propaganda about reviving the glories of ancient Rome had failed to arouse any fighting spirit or military enthusiasm.
The general public suffered hardships. Taxes were increased to pay for the war, there was food rationing, massive inflation and a 30 per cent fall in real wages. After November 1942 there were British bombing raids on major cities. By March 1943, unrest showed itself in strikes in Milan and Turin, the first since 1922.
After a few early successes, the Italians suffered a string of defeats culminating in the surrender of all Italian troops in North Africa (May 1943) (see Section 6.4, 5 and 6).
Mussolini seemed to have lost his touch. He was suffering from a stomach ulcer and nervous strain. All he could think of was to sack some of the ministers who had criticized him. Breaking point came with the Allied capture of Sicily (July 1943). Many of the fascist leaders themselves realized the lunacy of trying to continue the war, but Mussolini refused to make peace because that would have meant deserting Hitler. The Fascist Grand Council turned against Mussolini, and the king dismissed him. Nobody lifted a finger to save him, and fascism disappeared.
(b) Verdict on Italian fascism
This is still a very controversial topic in Italy, where memories of personal experiences are strong. Broadly speaking there are two interpretations of the fascist era.
It was a temporary aberration (a departure from normal development) in Italian history, the work solely of Mussolini; historian A. Cassels calls it ‘a gigantic confidence trick perpetrated on the Italian nation by Benito Mussolini – an artificial creation of Mussolini’.
Fascism grew naturally from Italian history; the environment and the circumstances shaped the rise and success of fascism, not the reverse.
Most historians now accept the second theory, that the roots of fascism lay in traditional Italian society and that the movement grew to fruition in the circumstances after the First World War. The Italian historian Renzo de Felice argued that fascism was primarily a movement of ‘an emerging middle class’, which was keen to challenge the traditional, liberal, ruling class for power. He claimed that the movement achieved a great deal – especially the modernizing of Italy’s economy, which was very backward in 1918. On the other hand, British historian Martin Blinkhorn does not accept this claim about the economy and argues that de Felice has not paid enough attention to ‘the negative and brutal side of Fascism’.
The most recent revisionist trend among Italian historians is to portray Mussolini once more as an inspirational leader who could do nothing wrong until he made the fatal mistake of entering the Second World War. There is a tendency to gloss over all the outrages of Italian fascism, with an element of nostalgia. A new biography by British writer Nicholas Farrell, published in 2003, takes the same line, arguing that Mussolini deserves to be remembered as a great man. He claims that not only did Mussolini save Italy from anarchy and communist subversion, but his domestic policies brought great benefits to the Italian people and improved their living standards. Other genuine successes were the ending of the historic quarrel between the Roman Catholic Church and the state and the popular Dopolavoro, which continued after the war under another name. Farrell also suggests that if Britain and France had handled Mussolini with more care in the years 1935 to 1940, he might well have been persuaded to join the allied side during the Second World War. After all, in 1934 when Hitler made his first attempt to take over Austria, Mussolini was the only European leader to stand up to Hitler. There is no knowing how much bloodshed might have been avoided if this had happened. Farrell even suggests that if Anthony Eden, the British foreign secretary, had not shown such anti-Italian prejudice, the Second World War might have been avoided.
This interpretation provoked mixed reviews. Some welcomed it as a long overdue revision of the dictator’s career, though the majority were critical, finding Farrell’s arguments unconvincing. Most were more likely to go along with the verdict of the great Italian historian Benedetto Croce, who dismissed fascism as ‘a short-term moral infection’.
FURTHER READING
Blinkhorn, M., Mussolini and Fascist Italy (Routledge, 3rd edition, 2006).
Bosworth, R. J. B., Mussolini (Bloomsbury, 2011).
De Felice, R., Interpretations of Fascism (Harvard University Press, 1977).
Farrell, N., Mussolini: A New Life (Phoenix, 2005).
Mack Smith, D., Mussolini (Phoenix, 2002).
QUESTIONS
‘It was the fear of communism that was mainly responsible for Mussolini coming to power in Italy in 1922, and for staying there so long.’ Explain whether you agree or disagree with this view.
In what ways and with what success did Mussolini try to introduce a totalitarian form of government in Italy?
How successful were Mussolini’s domestic policies up to 1940?
Explain why Mussolini launched the ‘Battle for Wheat’ in 1925.
Explain why you agree or disagree with the view that between 1925 and 1939 Mussolini’s economic policies were very successful.
How important was the appeal of fascist ideology to so many Italians in explaining why Mussolini was made prime minister in October 1922?
Explain why racism became a more important part of Italian fascism in the 1930s.
How successful was Mussolini’s regime in crushing cultural diversity in Italy in the years 1923 to 1940?
Explain why Mussolini launched the ‘Battle for Births’ in 1927.
‘Fascist social policies gained widespread support for Mussolini in the 1920s and 1930s’. Explain why you agree or disagree with this view.
There is a document question about the differing interpretations of fascism on the website.
Chapter 14
Germany, 1918–45: the Weimar Republic and Hitler
SUMMARY OF EVENTS
As Germany moved towards defeat in 1918, public opinion turned against the government, and in October, the Kaiser, in a desperate bid to hang on to power, appointed Prince Max of Baden as Chancellor. H
e was known to be in favour of a more democratic form of government in which parliament had more power. But it was too late: in November revolution broke out, the Kaiser escaped to Holland and abdicated, and Prince Max resigned. Friedrich Ebert, leader of the left-wing Social Democrat Party (SPD), became head of the government. In January 1919 a general election was held, the first completely democratic one ever to take place in Germany. The Social Democrats emerged as the largest single party and Ebert became the first president of the republic. They had some Marxist ideas but believed that the way to achieve socialism was through parliamentary democracy.
The new government was by no means popular with all Germans: even before the elections the communists had attempted to seize power in the Spartacist Rising (January 1919). In 1920, right-wing enemies of the republic occupied Berlin (the Kapp Putsch). The government managed to survive these threats and several later ones, including Hitler’s Munich Beer-Hall Putsch (1923).
By the end of 1919 a new constitution had been agreed by the National Assembly (parliament), which was meeting in Weimar because Berlin was still torn by political unrest. This Weimar constitution (sometimes called the most perfect democratic constitution of modern times, at least on paper) gave its name to the Weimar Republic, and lasted until 1933, when it was destroyed by Hitler. It passed through three phases:
1919 to the end of 1923 A period of instability and crisis during which the republic was struggling to survive.
From the end of 1923 to the end of 1929 A period of stability in which Gustav Stresemann was the leading politician. Thanks to the Dawes Plan of 1924, by which the USA provided huge loans, Germany seemed to be recovering from her defeat and was enjoying an industrial boom.
October 1929 to January 1933 Instability again; the world economic crisis, beginning with the Wall Street Crash in October 1929, soon had disastrous effects on Germany, producing six and a half million unemployed. The government was unable to cope with the situation and by the end of 1932 the Weimar Republic seemed on the verge of collapse.
Meanwhile Adolf Hitler and his National Socialist German Workers’ Party (Nazis – NSDAP) had been carrying out a great propaganda campaign blaming the government for all the ills of Germany, and setting out Nazi solutions to the problems. In January 1933, President Hindenburg appointed Hitler as Chancellor, and soon afterwards Hitler saw to it that democracy ceased to exist; the Weimar Republic was at an end, and from then until April 1945, Hitler was the dictator of Germany. Only defeat in the Second World War and the death of Hitler (30 April 1945) freed the German people from the Nazi tyranny.
14.1 WHY DID THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC FAIL?
(a) It began with serious disadvantages
It had accepted the humiliating and unpopular Versailles Treaty (see Section 2.8), with its arms limitations, reparations and war-guilt clause, and was therefore always associated with defeat and dishonour. German nationalists could never forgive it for that.
There was a traditional lack of respect for democratic government and a great admiration for the army and the ‘officer class’ as the rightful leaders of Germany. In 1919 the view was widespread that the army had not been defeated: it had been betrayed – ‘stabbed in the back’ – by the democrats, who had needlessly agreed to the Versailles Treaty. What most Germans did not realize was that it was General Ludendorff who had asked for an armistice while the Kaiser was still in power (see Section 2.6(b)). However, the ‘stab in the back’ legend was eagerly fostered by all enemies of the republic.
The parliamentary system introduced in the new Weimar constitution had weaknesses, the most serious of which was that it was based on a system of proportional representation, so that all political groups would be fairly represented. Unfortunately there were so many different groups that no party could ever win an overall majority. For example, in 1928 the Reichstag (lower house of parliament) contained at least eight groups, of which the largest were the Social Democrats with 153 seats, the German National Party (DNVP) with 73, and the Catholic Centre Party (Zentrum) with 62. The German Communist Party (KPD) had 54 seats, while the German People’s party (DVP – Stresemann’s liberal party) had 45. The smallest groups were the Bavarian People’s Party with 16, and the National Socialists, who only had 12 seats. A succession of coalition governments was inevitable, with the Social Democrats having to rely on co-operation from left-wing liberals and the Catholic Centre. No party was able to carry out its programme.
The political parties had very little experience of how to operate a democratic parliamentary system, because before 1919 the Reichstag had not controlled policy; the Chancellor had the final authority and was the one who really ruled the country. Under the Weimar constitution it was the other way round – the Chancellor was responsible to the Reichstag, which had the final say. However, the Reichstag usually failed to give a clear lead because the parties had not learned the art of compromise. The communists and nationalists did not believe in democracy anyway, and refused to support the Social Democrats. The communist refusal to work with the SPD meant that no strong government of the left was possible. Disagreements became so bitter that some of the parties organized their own private armies, for self-defence to begin with, but this increased the threat of civil war. The combination of these weaknesses led to more outbreaks of violence and attempts to overthrow the republic.
(b) Outbreaks of violence
1 The Spartacist Rising
In January 1919 the communists tried to seize power in what became known as the Spartacist Rising (Spartacus was a Roman who led a revolt of slaves in 71 BC). Inspired by the recent success of the Russian Revolution, and led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, they occupied almost every major city in Germany. In Berlin, President Ebert found himself besieged in the Chancellery. The government managed to defeat the communists only because it accepted the help of the Freikorps These were independent volunteer regiments raised by anti-communist ex-army officers. It was a sign of the government’s weakness that it had to depend on private forces, which it did not itself control. The two communist leaders did not receive a fair trial – they were simply clubbed to death by Freikorps members.
2 The Kapp Putsch (March 1920)
This was an attempt by right-wing groups to seize power. It was sparked off when the government tried to disband the Freikorps private armies. They refused to disband and declared Dr Wolfgang Kapp as Chancellor. Berlin was occupied by a Freikorps regiment and the cabinet fled to Dresden. The German army (Reichswehr) took no action against the Putsch (coup, or rising) because the generals were in sympathy with the political right. In the end the workers of Berlin came to the aid of the Social Democrat government by calling a general strike, which paralysed the capital. Kapp resigned and the government regained control. However, it was so weak that nobody was punished except Kapp, who was imprisoned, and it took two months to get the Freikorps disbanded. Even then the ex-members remained hostile to the republic and many later joined Hitler’s private armies.
3 A series of political assassinations took place
These were mainly carried out by ex-Freikorps members. Victims included Walter Rathenau (the Jewish Foreign Minister) and Gustav Erzberger (leader of the armistice delegation). When the government sought strong measures against such acts of terrorism, there was great opposition from the right-wing parties, who sympathized with the criminals. Whereas the communist leaders had been brutally murdered, the courts let right-wing offenders off lightly and the government was unable to intervene. In fact, throughout Germany, the legal and teaching professions, the civil service and the Reichswehr tended to be anti-Weimar, which was a crippling handicap for the republic.
4 Hitler’s Beer-Hall Putsch
Another threat to the government occurred in November 1923 in Bavaria, at a time when there was much public annoyance at the French occupation of the Ruhr (see Section 4.2(c)) and the disastrous fall in the value of the mark (see below). Hitler, helped by General Ludendorff, aimed to take control of the Bavarian state g
overnment in Munich, and then lead a national revolution to overthrow the government in Berlin. However, the police easily broke up Hitler’s march, and the ‘Beer-Hall Putsch’ (so-called because the march set out from the Munich beer hall in which Hitler had announced his ‘national revolution’ the previous evening) soon fizzled out. Hitler was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment but served only nine months (because the Bavarian authorities had some sympathy with his aims).
5 Private armies expand
The violence died down during the years 1924 to 1929 as the republic became more stable, but when unemployment grew in the early 1930s, the private armies expanded and regular street fights occurred, usually between Nazis and communists. All parties had their meetings broken up by rival armies and the police seemed powerless to prevent it happening.
All this showed that the government was incapable of keeping law and order, and respect for it dwindled. An increasing number of people began to favour a return to strong, authoritarian government, which would maintain strict public order.