by RVS Mani
These are information available in public domain, in the court records of the Special CBI Judge at Hyderabad. Certain similarities between the Samjhauta Express blasts and the Mecca Masjid blast were noticed in so far as both used batteries of 6 volts and cast iron pipes etc.
6 Five accused, including former Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) member Aseemanand, were acquitted by a special NIA court in Hyderabad on 16 April 2018. Nine persons were killed in the blast that was carried out using an improvised explosive device.
Lumbini Park at Hyderabad on 25.8.2007
Initial details obtained:
Two blasts occurred in quick succession around 8 pm on 25.8.2007, one at Lumbini Park and the other at Gokul Chat Bhandar in Hyderabad. A total of 43 persons were killed and 69 were injured (Lumbini Park – 12 dead, 18 injured. Gokul Chat Bhandar 31 killed, 51 injured).The case is being investigated by Hyderabad Police. Mohammad Shahid @ Bilal is believed to be behind these blasts also. As per the reports of the Hyderabad Police, the investigation is being conducted by the Special Investigation Team, Hyderabad. There is strong suspicion of involvement of HUJI cadres of Bangladesh along with local modules. Elaborate efforts have been made by Hyderabad Police to identify and examine the local suspects. In this process, 70 persons have been examined. This includes 22 Bangladeshis residing in Hyderabad. During the process of examination of the suspects, while evidence of their complicity in the twin blasts could not be gathered, evidence against 26 persons has been found regarding their involvement in other offences like obtaining multiple SIM Cards under fake identity for carrying on subversive activities, trying to procure passports on fake identity, possessing Jehadi literature, entering into conspiracy to wage a war against the State and bringing RDX etc. For these offences, five separate cases were booked. In these five cases, 26 persons have been arrested. The investigation was done by using scientific methods and tests like lie detector, brain mapping and NARCO analysis. Further investigation is being carried out in coordination with investigating agencies of other States like Maharashtra and Rajasthan as well as the central intelligence agencies.
These are again information available on public domain, in the court records of the Special CBI Judge at Hyderabad.
Ajmer Sharif
Details of the incident are as follows:
On 11.10.2007 evening, a blast occurred in the premises of Ajmer Sharif at Ajmer. In this blast 3 civilians were killed and 14 others injured. The triggering of IED containing low intensity explosive and iron pieces, apparently done by a cellphone. One of the deceased by name Sayeed Salim reportedly from Hyderabad who came to Ajmer about 7-8 years ago, who used to be a passport agent, is said to be a suspect. There are a lot of similarities between this blast and the blast at Mecca Masjid in Hyderabad that occurred on 18.5.2007, in terms of the device/cell-phone and explosives used, the piece of the newspaper in which the device was wrapped, the unexploded device etc. So far, no arrests have been made in the case. No arrests have also been made so far in the investigation of the Mecca Masjid blast, which is now with CBI. Indications are that in both these blasts, Shahid Bilal, an LeT/HUJI activist who is from Hyderabad and is presently supposed to be in Karachi and the combination of cadres of LeT and HUJI-BD seem to be involved.7
The shared dossier
I have placed portions of the dossier shared by the Indian Foreign Office with Pakistan in January 2009 after the Mumbai attack before my readers. I have also recalled reference to the previous documents so shared in different bilateral mechanism like Home Secretary Level Talks, Joint Anti-Terror Mechanisms etc. The dossier/s has been accessed from the internet. The dossier excerpts are quoted on the as-is-where-is basis in the chapter on 26/11. Mohammad Bilal alias Shahid Bilal’s name appears repeatedly in all the dossiers shared in different bilateral mechanisms with Pakistan.
7 A special court in Jaipur on 8 March 2017 acquitted Aseemanand and six others in the case of the 2007 Ajmer Dargah blast that killed three persons and injured 17. Three others were convicted by the court. The NIA did not contest the finding.
District court premises at Jaunpur, Faizabad and Varanasi This is an interesting case. MHA had forewarned the State government through an advisory regarding the possibility of blasts in many court premises in Uttar Pradesh, based on intelligence inputs in mid-October 2007. Later, this advisory was reiterated in a second advisory in the first week of November 2007. I do not know whether the State government took any necessary preventive steps. But the blasts occurred in three places on 21.11.2007.
I had filed a detailed affidavit in the Allahabad High Court on 4-5 January 2008, when the High Court had taken suo moto cognisance of the security of court premises and asked the Union of India to file their response. Specific and actionable intelligence had been shared over many months with the government of Uttar Pradesh. In this context, another relevant extract which I recall from the Affidavit filed in Allahabad High Court in the court security case is:
The Ministry of Home Affairs vide its communication dated 4.6.2007 forwarded a copy of the guidelines for the security of High Courts and District/Subordinate Courts to all State governments and Union Territory Administrations with the request to urgently review the security arrangements of the High Courts and District/Subordinate Courts and adequately strengthen them to avoid any untoward incident.
i) An advisory was issued to all the State Governments on 4th June 2007 inter-alia mentioning that terrorist elements remained quite active and had used sleeper cells in the hinterland of the country. In the alert, while reiterating the Central government’s commitment to extend all possible assistance through real-time sharing of intelligence and coordination, the State governments were advised to maintain utmost vigilance on all vulnerable targets and to activate local police and intelligence agencies for gathering information on suspect groups and take effective counter measures.
ii) Further, another advisory was issued on 18.7.2007 to all States and UTs about the possibility of retaliatory strikes in view of continuing relationship between the underworld and terrorist groups. The State governments were advised to consider adequate security arrangements against attacks in busy crowded places including trains/buses, institutes of iconic fame etc.
iii) More recently, two advisories were issued to State authorities in October 2007, alerting the State authorities about plans of terrorist groups to carry out attacks during important religious festivals and congregations. It was also mentioned that adequate access control measures should be put in place to thwart such plans.
iv) During recent meetings held between the agencies of UP and the Central government to review the security arrangements at Mathura on 16.10.2007, Taj Mahal on 17.10.2007, Ayodhya on 15.11.2007 and Varanasi on 16.11.2007, the State government was sensitised on the linkages of certain terrorist groups in UP and possibility of targeting of crowded areas by terrorist groups. However, there was no specific prior input regarding the serial blasts in Court premises in UP that happened on 23 November 2007.
A sleeper cell, headed by one Haji sahib—I do not exactly recollect the name—from Phulpur or Pratapgarh near Allahabad was alleged to be behind the blasts. The case was investigated by the STF, located in Lucknow. The chargesheet was filed by UP Police STF in the relevant Lucknow court.
CRPF Camp Rampur
The dawn of 2008
On 1.1.2008, at about 0230 hrs. 3-4 terrorists attacked CRPF Group Centre at Rampur with automatic rifles and hand grenades. As a result, 08 persons (07 personnel and 01 civilian) were killed while 05 persons (03 CRPF personnel, 01 local police-man and 01 Home Guard ) were injured. Seven persons were arrested in this case. The primary reasons for [this was] some encroachments inside the CRPF campus that the force had been taking up with the State authorities but to no avail.
7 persons Imran Shahzad @ Abu Shama of Lashkar-e-Tayabba, Muhammad Farooq Bhatti @ Abu Zaar of Lashkar-e-Tayabba, Sabahuddin Ahmad @ Farhan of Lashkar-e-Tayabba. Muhammad Sharief @ Suhail of Lashkar-e-Tayabba involved in the at
tack on CRPF camp at Rampur- on January 01, 2008.
This incident is also mentioned in the Indo-Pak dossier.
Modasa
Tauseef Khan alias Mohammad Atiq, an Indian Mujahideen, was found to be the perpetrator. He was from a sleeper cell operating in Bihar. He had the support of SIMI volunteers including someone called Ghulam Khan or Saravar Khan. These persons, as per my latest information, have been convicted.
Delhi blasts and Batla House
Blasts occurred in Delhi in three places in September 2008. They were traced to the doors of some Azamagarh-based radicalised groups that were reportedly involved in these blasts. It is well reported that when the police went to investigate the same in Batla House in Shaheen Bagh, Jamia Nagar, New Delhi, these terrorists killed one of the best special cell personnel. This Inspector, Mohan Chand Sharma, had an illustrious record to his credit of neutralising sleeper cells/ fake networks etc.
The encounter was investigated by the then Joint Commissioner (Crime), Amulya Patnaik who later on went on to become the Commissioner of Police. He had also found after inquiry that it was a cross-fire that had killed Sharma, the special cells police inspector.
Shivraj Patil, the Union Home Minister, was present in Delhi Police Headquarters to inaugurate a facility on 19th September 2008, when the Batla House encounter was happening. He was briefed on a concurrent basis. He would have also been privy to wireless messages coming to and fro. But he chose to keep quiet when his colleagues questioned the encounter as ‘fake’. Especially the prominent politician Digvijay Singh, whom I had met in the Home Minister’s chamber two years ago, the one who was pioneering this theory of fake encounters. It was not without reason. It is a different matter that in spite of the court also upholding the cross-fire evidence, this politician continues to harp that Batla House was a ‘fake encounter’. The Order of the court is also in public domain.
The Mumbai ATS
Surely the ‘fake encounter’ theorists got the much-needed oxygen from both, the Union and the State governments, when the investigation got a twist to suit the ‘Hindu terror’ narrative.
By mid 2008, the Anti-Terror Squad of the Maharashtra police began to take over the Malegaon and other investigations within Maharashtra, almost two years after the incidents. Law and Public Order are State subjects under Schedule VII of the Indian Constitution. Hence, the State government is well within its power to assign the investigations to any agency, whether crime branch or ATS as they deem fit.
At the same time, assignment from the investigating agency with natural jurisdiction to another specialised agency is carried out after an elaborate laid-down procedure of approvals. There was a speed and alacrity with which the Malegaon case was taken out of the local police jurisdiction and assigned to the ATS. No one questioned that move. The Union of India could not question the decision.
When I had marked and paged the time line in the case of the Mumbai local train attacks earlier, I had deliberately highlighted that the ATS, Mumbai had taken five months to identify the perpetrators of the attack. Generally, that is the benchmark. Such complicated cases do require the de rigour to be gone through so that the right persons are arrested.
The ATS was headed by Hemant Karkare whom I had seen in the Home Minister’s room two years ago, conceiving in collusion with a political leader, a strategic narrative counter to Islamic terror by authoring a ‘Hindu terror’ narrative.
Immediately after the taking over of the Malegaon probe by the ATS, the narrative changed.
The involvement of Ahl-e-Hadith/Hadees in the incident was trashed. Again, it may be iterated that law and public order are State subjects. Hence the Ministry of Home Affairs can only accept the status as provided by the State police or its relevant branch. We can sit on judgment over its conclusions and deductions but we can do little else. Reports were received from Mumbai about involvement of certain Hindu organisations in the attack. I do not know what the ground realities were and whether the motor cycle (the so-called evidence in the case) was planted etc in the Malegaon evidence record. Some Sadhvi Pragya, Shivnarayan Kalsangra etc were reported to be the brains behind the attack. Surprisingly, everyone lapped up the story as ‘gospel truth’ without examining the evidence and the records of the other events.
It is a matter of record that in the Mumbai 11.7.2006 cases, it took almost five to six months when the investigation was in a straight line for the ATS to arrest the suspects. In Malegaon, it took just 35 days for the same ATS from the date of occurrence to arrest a serving Indian Army Officer, Lt Col Shrikant Prasad Purohit. In these 35 days, some time would have also been lost in the procedural work involved in transfer of the case to ATS. More time would also have been lost in getting the required clearances from the Defence Headquarters for imputing the charges on a serving defence officer. Hence, it is hard to digest that in less than a month, wisdom dawned on the ATS that Malegaon was the handiwork of Hindu terror groups, although the field-level police personnel of the range continued to report that Ahl-e-Hadith/ Hadees was involved.
I would always suggest that interested readers speak to some of the local police personnel of the time who have by now retired. Many of those retired policemen have settled in Malegaon or Nashik city. Once, on a visit to Nashik, I did stroll through the road from Dwarika Hotel Chowk towards the west of the city which leads to certain congested parts. I spoke to some fellows in a chai shop where some of these retired persons generally come for a evening chat. While I did not identify myself, my inquisitiveness made people feel I might be from the media, so I had to settle my chai bill quickly and hurry back to the hotel.
At a time when we had the best team in the IS Division of the MHA, the attitude of the government in power and intent to colour every terror incident as ‘saffron’ and their ambivalence in acting against the real perpetrators of the terror attacks was making this country a cannon fodder for those with evil designs against India.
The 2008 HSLT
It was also about that time that the next edition of the Home Secretary-level Talks with Pakistan were to be held. The mutually convenient date had been fixed for 25th November 2008. Home Secretary Madhukar Gupta had asked us to identify the items to be put on the table. Accordingly, we had commenced our consultation process with the security agencies and other Divisions of the MHA and other Ministries like the MEA. The composition of the delegation was being finalised. Like every edition, this time also the composition was the same.
The delegation was to leave by a BSF aircraft while the Home Secretary was to be accompanied by the then Deputy Secretary (Pakistan). They were to travel by road from Amritsar to Attari on 23rdNovember to oversee the Immigration establishment, and from there to Lahore and on to Islamabad.
The delegation was constituted as per convention, which included apart from different agency representations, the Home Secretary as leader, officers in charge of Internal Security, Foreigners etc. Anwar Ehsan Ahmad, Additional Secretary (Border Management), was included. In this context, I would like the readers to recall the composition of delegation in the 2006 edition. Inclusion of this Additional Secretary (Border Management) was unconventional and unprecedented in the HSLT with Pakistan.
At the same time, there was a notice for contempt of court received by the Union Home Secretary. It related to some UP sugar scam and the petitioner was one Vishwanath Chaturvedi. This was in no way the concern of the Ministry of Home Affairs. However, since a notice had been received, it had to be replied to. The date fixed was 25.11.2007 at the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court.
The Additional Secretary (Border Management) advised the Union Home Secretary to depute me to attend the court hearing of this scam. Ahmad had stated that he had supervised my work in the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion and was aware that I had handled a lot of court cases there. Hence, while the delegation went to Islamabad, I went to Lucknow.
I had got an Affidavit prepared and got it signed by the Home Secretary before his departure, which
was filed in the High Court of Allahabad in its Lucknow Bench. The then Assistant Solicitor General, R Dwivedi, attended the court with me and got the complaint discharged on the same day, ie. 25th November 2008. So, I decided to return to Delhi on the same evening.
I was waiting to take the flight back to Delhi at the Lucknow Airport when I received a call from a +92 number. I disconnected. The phone rang again. This time I picked up the call… it was Director (IS) from Islamabad. He said that since the agenda could not be completed, the delegation’s stay in Pakistan had been extended by one more day. I was to get the paper formalities completed for the extension the next day.
On 26.11.2008, I had got the stay extension formalities completed and emailed the formal orders to the High Commission of India, Islamabad.
It later came to my knowledge that actually, the delegates were reluctant to extend their stay. But the Additional Secretary (Border Management), who was the senior-most after the Home Secretary in the delegation, advised the Home Secretary in favour of a one-day stay over. Since all other officers were junior to him, no one countered him. The stay got extended on the pretext of a meeting with Interior Minister Rehman Malik on 26.11.2008 afternoon.
The meeting with Rehman Malik is reported to have taken place in the afternoon of 26th November.
Thereafter, the delegation was taken to Murree. Everything about it is already in the public domain. The information has all been obtained by RTI by my media friend Geeta Mohan, then with NewsX and now with India Today TV. Subsequently, several news channels have telecast the vivid details of how the Indian security establishment got stuck in Murree when there was a terror attack on in Mumbai. The design of the Pakistani establishment in extending the stay by one day, then taking the delegation to Murree where the communication systems are feeble, became evident.