by RVS Mani
Even while the terrorists had occupied the target buildings and the security forces were engaging them, the terrorists were in contact with their controllers/handlers over mobile telephones. They also used mobile telephones belonging to hostages/victims.
Shortly after the attack on Taj Mahal Hotel, Indian agencies were able to intercept mobile telephone calls made from and to the hotel. The controllers/handlers used the virtual number to contact a mobile telephone with one of the terrorists. This conversation was intercepted and, thereafter, all calls made through the virtual number were also intercepted and recorded. The interceptions revealed three Austrian numbers, which were given to the terrorists by the controllers/handlers and conversations with these numbers by the terrorists were also intercepted and recorded. The Austrian numbers correspond to the DID numbers referred to as seen from the records. A sample of the transcripts of the intercepted conversations is in Annexure-VII of the Indo-Pak Dossier. The transcripts show that the terrorists were being instructed and guided by their controllers/handlers.
The interrogation of the captured terrorist revealed a wealth of information. Mohammed Ajmal Amir Kasab claimed that he had met some important LeT leaders. When shown a photograph taken from the passport of the person concerned, he identified the person as the one who had briefed the terrorists in the LeT camps near Muzaffarabad and in Azizabad. He described the person as the most important person in the LeT and the mastermind behind the operations in Mumbai. The photograph shown to him was that of Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi.
The evidence gathered so far unmistakably pointed to the territory of Pakistan as a source of the terrorist attacks in Mumbai between 26-29 November 2008. It is also abundantly clear that senior functionaries of the LeT were the controllers/handlers of the ten terrorists. The evidence unmistakably established that the ten terrorists were chosen, trained, despatched, controlled and guided by the LeT which is the organisation responsible for the attack.
Intercepts of telephonic conversations:9
A O A KIA HAL HY.
GUR LGA KNHI.
HUM KHETI BNDR PR HEIN.
SAAD
352384000236350
8821655526412
23.11.08
09:06
‘MUJH SY IS NUMBER
PER RABTA RAKHNA
HY. WASI’
9 Audio-transcripts transferred to text form
Log of Kuber
24 hours Poori Safar (24 hours’ Complete Journey) Machli lag rahi hai (Fish is being caught)
Haalat theek hain (Things are OK)
Bhai log (brothers)
Civil Boat
Yaar log (friends)
Navy Boat
Yaar logon ka group (friends’group)
Navy Ship
Machine
Uljhan (problem)
Maal (goods)
Madad (help)
Baraf (Ice)
Safar (journey)
‘GUR dene wala (3) jama karega aur lene wala khud (3) nakki Karega’ (GR providers (3) will deposit and receivers (3) themselves will finalise)
Satellite khula rakha hai (10pm - 10am)
(Satellite is on (10pm - 10am)
These are excerpts from Annexure V of the Indo-Pak Dossier
1. Yahan ka phone number (Phone number of this place)
2. Yahan ka satellite number (Satellite number of this place)
3. Naksha ki photograp hian (Photocopies of maps)
4. Hoyal seton ki simen (SIMs of Hoyal sets)
5. *TT pistol 2 ( 2 TT pistols)
6. Mineral Water Aqua fina
7. Khajoor Achhi 10 kg (good quality dates 10 kg)
8. Current Store Charger
9. GPS ya Navigator (GPS or Navigator)
10. Satellite + phone card
The dinghy list:
1. Biscuit (Candy + bakery)
2. Suiyan (bareek) (thin needles)
3. *Aata tal (red flour)
4. Drum (saman ke liye mai tala) (drum with lock to keep things)
Gun 1 piece
Magazine 8 pieces
Grenade 8 pieces
GPS group 1 piece
Chain 1 piece
Itkafi bullets as per requirement
Mobile + Batteries
23270972879217
Colaba, Cuffe Parade, Machlimar Nagar, Raja Bhai Tower, Regal Chowk, Nathalal Marg, Nariman Point, WTC, Regal Cinema
18.56200
This list is from Annexure V of Indo Pak Dossier
18-56-000
72-67-560
18-55-600
72-48-900
18-5500-300
72-49-56
18-55-190
72-49-500
18-55-180
72-49-535
21° 55' 470"
68° 17' 070"
20° 13' 460"
70° 16' 370"
18° 56' 200"
12° 44' 260”
18° 55' 100"
72° 49' 310"
72-47-000
75-47-00
37
Mb
2k
The Conversations
a. Hotel Taj
i) Shuaib
ii) AH
iii) Abdur Rehman
iv) Umer
v) Ismail (not present at Taj, killed at Girgaum Choupati) b. Hotel Trident
i) Abdul Rehman @ Saquib
ii) Fahadullah @ Fahad
c. Nariman House
i) Imran Babbar @ Imran @ Kasha
ii) Umar
Names of Pak-based handlers figuring in the conversations (phonetic)
a. Nariman House
i) Wassi
ii) Zarar
iii) Jundal
iv) Buzurg
v) Major General
b. Hotel Oberoi
i) Kafa
ii) Wassi
c. Hotel Taj
i) Wassi
From Annexure-VII of Indo-Pak Dossier
[Some selected intercepted Conversation (locations and name etc. have been indicated on the basis of internal evidence of conversations)]
Hotel Taj Mahal 27.11.2009
Greetings. There are three Ministers and one Secretary of the Cabinet in your hotel….
Nariman House: 27.ll.2008: 1945 hrs
Caller: Greetings. What did the Major General say?
Receiver: Greetings. The Major General directed us to do what we like. We should not worry. The operation has to be concluded tomorrow morning. Pray to God. Keep two magazines and three grenades aside, and expend the rest of your ammunition.
Are you setting the fire or not ?
The days following 26/11
AS EXPECTED, THE next two to three days were really hectic, with me running from one meeting to another with different sets of senior management from the Security establishment. Notices for different types of discussions in both Houses of Parliament were pouring in, in sheaves so that it was difficult to keep count of them. We started preparing to enable the Home Minister to calibrate his responses in both Houses of Parliament as per the laid-down procedure.
However, one thing which repeatedly came up, which could not be ignored was that we had the intelligence inputs on a possible attack from the coastal route. Several coastal security establishments had sensed the threat and were in preparation for meeting the challenges. But it became clear during the series of meetings happening in the MHA that there had been apparently some intervention from the top most political office, instructing ‘restraint’ in the counter-initiatives to avert such attacks.
This was on account of the oft-repeated statements of the intelligence and security establishment managers.
We soon realised that while the top brass intervening in the regular security procedures would never be exposed before the public, the intelligence and security establishments would be blamed for abject failure although they had done their professional work in an exemplary and outstanding manner. We all knew it. We all knew that these establishments have actua
lly prevented many an evil design; many a potential terror attack has been averted by their sheer diligence and professionalism, a matter not in the public domain.
We had seen it before. We also saw the same thing happening again, when a similar attack by an ISI-sponsored group was foiled by the Indian Coast Guard few years later when the ruling dispensation had changed. Little wonder, the entire security establishment has been angry for the past ten years. They have been branded ‘a failure’ for political reasons. It is not that I am stating this for the first time, I said this long before many others suspected and said this.
A press clipping https://www.dawn.com/news/443698/ mumbai-attackers-got-internal-help-modi will support this:
Mumbai attackers got internal help: Modi
Jawed Naqvi
February 09, 2009, The Dawn, a Pakistani Daily Newspaper: NEW DELHI, Feb 8: Indian politics was stranded between a hawk and a turncoat on Sunday, when its chief ideologue for military solutions against terrorism, which mostly also includes Islamabad, suddenly blamed ‘internal help’ for Mumbai’s November nightmare. The ruling Congress party, missing the message, found itself unable to row back from its politically risky standoff with Pakistan.
As senior Congress leaders continued to chart a hawkish course against Pakistan for the 26 November attacks, Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Singh Modi, a mentor of national jingoism, hinted at an internal hand in the terror strikes. ‘If we single out that one incident (of the Mumbai attacks) and ask any person in this country, even with basic information and knowledge, they will say that such a big terror attack on India cannot take place without any internal help from the nation itself ’, Mr Modi told a national meeting of the main opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in Nagpur. ‘I want to know who is stopping them from taking action.... This is because of vote bank politics’, Mr Modi told BJP’s National Council meeting alleging that all policies of the ruling coalition are driven by the appeasement of Indian Muslims.
The communal barb notwithstanding, Mr Modi’s claim is expected to considerably ease the pressure on Pakistan. Some analysts felt his comments were similar to the leaked findings into the Mumbai incident which Pakistan has concluded and may make public any time.
Mr Modi’s comments came three weeks after he attacked the Congress party-led coalition government for asking Pakistan to accept the statement of Ajmal Amir Kasab, lone terrorist caught alive for Mumbai attacks, as proof of what happened and how India itself ‘does not have a similar provision under its laws’ to accept a confession made to police.
Talking of zero tolerance to terrorism, he regretted that the last few years had witnessed a series of such incidents. Analysts said Mr Modi’s new theory on the November attacks contradicts India’s official position. India has maintained that the conspiracy was entirely plotted in Pakistan. In fact, India has supplied a dossier of ‘proof ’ to Pakistan making the same point.
‘Mr Modi’s remarks, though an attempt to politicise the attacks along communal lines, is poorly timed as they have been made just 24 hours ahead of Pakistan’s reply to the 26/11 dossier of proof ’, said one Indian report.
‘The Pakistani establishment will look at Modi’s statement very carefully as it provides them the necessary room to evade taking direct responsibility for the 26/11 attacks.’ In New Delhi, Congress president Sonia Gandhi issued a veiled warning to Pakistan, saying those abetting terrorism in India from across the borders will be given a ‘befitting reply’ and they should not construe New Delhi’s ‘restraint’ as weakness.
Describing terrorism as one of the major challenges, Ms Gandhi said:
‘The recent barbaric terror attacks of Mumbai and Assam remind us of the pain we are going through. But we have no doubt that we will overcome this difficult situation.’ Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee, who is due to hold discussions in Dhaka on Monday with the new Bangladeshi government, was expected to raise the issue of terrorism allegedly emanating from there. India has not publicly accepted Pakistani reports that a Bangladesh-based group could be involved in the Mumbai attacks.
Speaking at a conclave of Congress district and block level office-bearers in New Delhi, and evidently unmindful of Mr Modi’s latest views on Mumbai, Mr Mukherjee warned that India had kept all options open to deal with terrorism he believes emanates from Pakistan.
‘Perpetrators of (Mumbai) terror attacks must be punished. Nobody should think that this country is helpless and cannot tackle the situation arising out of terrorism’, Mr Mukherjee said.
‘I repeat all options are open’, he said and asserted that terrorism would be fought with ‘courage and fortitude’. ‘This menace has to be confronted and we are exactly doing that.’
He said India had asked Pakistan to fulfil its own commitments that terrorists would not use its land.
‘Don’t try to divert the attention of the international community. Take corrective measures and don’t think that you can simply shirk this responsibility’, he told Pakistan.
In fact, I was a henchman for the Ministry of Home Affairs, Internal Security Division at that time. It is in my knowledge that many terror attacks had been averted due to the professionalism of the Indian security agencies. I had, in fact, said so in the Allahabad High Court on 4/5 January 2008 in response to a suo moto cognisance by the Court seeking response of the Union of India, MHA on the attacks on District Court premises in three places in UP that occurred in November 2007. I would like to quote from this affidavit:
There exists an effective coordination mechanism for sharing of information about terrorist attacks and other challenges to internal security. Any available information about plans of terrorist groups to carry out attacks is shared by the Central security and intelligence agencies with the State Police authorities from time to time. The State Police on account of their spread on the ground is to develop on such information and take appropriate counter measures including preventive action, against such possible terrorist strikes. There is a continuous process and channel of communication between the Central and State agencies, and advisories on the possible threats, reinforcement of security arrangements etc. are issued by the central security agencies from time to time.
I have filed it on affirmation. I know the capacity of our security agencies. Only if they are allowed to function freely, they can work wonders. But autonomy is what they lack. We should trust them.
The intervention from some top office in the country had rendered the security forces ineffective in spite of their proven capabilities. An excellent bunch of resource had to take the flak, look like an incompetent bunch of failed personnel. Their seething anger was legitimate. They knew they could have prevented the Mumbai attacks. Their hands were tied.
In fact, such frenzy was seen in the MHA that on 30.11.2008, when I was at a wedding at the Uttara Guruvayoorappan temple in Mayur Vihar, I received a call from the office to report immediately. As soon as I reached the MHA conference room in North Block, I found a huge posse of senior officers gathered there and we were informed that the Home Minister had resigned and we would have a new Union Home Minister.
But certain questions that keep agitating me and I am still seeking answers to are:
How did the 10 terrorist who got dropped few kms off the Colaba coastline manage to find their way and come to Badhwar Park?
How did the terrorists find their way to Leopold café, CST, Taj Mahal Hotel, or Trident or wherever, without any local guide?
We all know how difficult it is to find our way through our metros, traffic, encroachments and reach our destinations without local support, it is a miracle despite all the electronic support at one’s command.
There had been repeated sharing of intelligence with the Chief Secretary, Maharashtra and his next in command, Additional Chief Secretary (Home), who was at the Taj hotel. What was she doing that day at Taj Mahal Hotel when she had access to overwhelming actionable intelligence on the possibility of attacks at such places?
In context of th
is case, I would like to share a confession by an intelligence officer after such incidents as Ishrat Jahan, Sohrabuddin Sheikh etc took place—those in the know of intelligence simply pass on the information to operational units and also ensure that they and their families do not go near the targeted spots, lest they suffer undesirable consequences like Rajinder Kumar and others. But Zutshi was there in spite of being privy to overwhelming inputs. Was she there at some political master’s behest?
Moreover, she escaped unscathed. The communication records show that more important the target—like any cabinet minister of high rank—s/he was destined to be the terrorists’ leverage point. How did Zutshi come out unscathed? Who was with her, who too must have escaped? Could they be ministers/a minster (the transcripts say there were three wazirs/ministers in the premises)?
On balance of considerations of the above, my friend Peter was not off the mark when he said, inaugurate karne gayee thi kya, madam?
Ajmal Kasab had been caught alive. The investigations subsequently was leading to a Pakistani involvement. At this juncture, the then Minister of Minorities Affairs in the Union Cabinet and a senior politician, A R Antulay gives an interview to India Today, which talks of the conspiracy to kill his favourite police officer, trying to digress, and undermine the whole investigative process. What was the agenda he was pursuing?
PC as Home Minister
ON 1 DECEMBER 2008, P Chidambaram took office as the new Home Minister. He had the tenacity to hype whatever steps he would take. He did join with a bang. He was rated as efficient, progressive, result-oriented, media savvy and eminent as a lawyer and all the precious adjectives in the dictionary were applied to describe him by the media and others while welcoming him.