by Deepak Sarma
rise to direct knowledge.6 I will first examine the components of kevala-pramâõa and then the three components of anu-pramâõa, namely
pratyakùa, perception, anumâna, reasoning, and âgama, scriptural authority and verbal testimony.
Kevala-pramâõa, direct knowledge of an object as it is
For Madhvâcârya, all aspects of the universe, including knowledge,
are qualitatively and hierarchically arranged. Consequently, kevala-
pramâõa, direct knowledge, must have distinct components that can be
arranged hierarchically. Kevala-pramâõa is an innate self-reflective
knowledge and immediate intuition of objects that is possessed by
all sentient beings, including Lord Viùõu. The intuitive knowledge of
Viùõu, though, must be qualitatively better than any other sentient being.
Hence Madhvâcârya divides the kevala-pramâõas into four types,
namely Îúa (Lord Viùõu), Lakùmî, yogi, and ayogi (see Fig. 2.1).7
Kevala-pramâõa
Îúa
Lakùmî
yogi
ayogi
2.1 Kevala-pramâõa
According to Madhvâcârya, the difference between them consists of a
difference in clarity, where Lord Viùõu’s knowledge has the greatest
clarity and the knowledge of the ayogi has the least. 8
5 tad dvividham | kevalam anupramâõaü ca | PL.
6 yathârthajñânaü kevalam | tatsâdhanam anupramâõam | PL.
7 kevalaü caturvidham | îúalakùmîyogyayogibhedena | PL.
8 spaùñþatve bhedaþ | PL.
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In his PP, Jayatîrtha further separates the intuitive knowledge of Lord
Viùõu, Lakùmî, yogi, and ayogi into two types: svarûpa-jñâna and manovçtti-jñâna.9 Madhvâcârya defines svarûpa-jñâna in his VTV as knowledge that is inherent to, or part of, the very nature of the cognizer.10
Manovçtti-jñâna, on the other hand, refers to experiential knowledge, an
external knowledge dependent on the vçtti, modifications, or operations
of the manas, mind.11 Such knowledge, as I will explain below, can only be experiential knowledge obtained via the physical sense organs, via
the anu-pramâõa such as pratyakùa, perception. Svarûpa-jñâna is more valid than manovçtti-jñâna, since it is never linked to the imperfect,
external sense organs.
Already the way in which difference and hierarchy is an intrinsic
part of Mâdhva Vedânta, even in its epistemic categories, emerges.
True knowledge can be categorized in terms of degrees. Lord Viùõu
is omniscient and has knowledge that is comprehensive, without
beginning or end, eternal and independent. His knowledge has all
things everywhere as its scope and is part of His own nature.12
Lakùmî’s knowledge is like Viùõu’s and is dependent on Viùõu and His
knowledge. Its scope is everything except for Lord Viùõu, so its clarity
is less distinct than His.13 For this reason, Lakùmî’s knowledge must be inferior. Neither Lord Viùõu nor Lakùmî need to rely on manovçtti-jñâna, external knowledge. After all, their knowledge is entirely
svarûpa-jñâna, part of their nature, and is not linked to flawed
pratyakùa, perception.
Madhvâcârya holds that yogi-jñâna is the knowledge obtained by
yogis, contemplative ascetics, after meditating on Viùõu. There are three
types of yogic knowledge obtained via meditation and contemplative
practices. These are çjuyogins, yogins whose knowledge is straight-
forward, tattvika-yogins, yogins whose knowledge is true, and ayogins, the knowledge of those who are not yogins (see Fig. 2.2). 14
9 tad [ îúalakùmîjñânaca] dvividham | svarûpa§ manovçttirûpaü ceti | PP 18.
10 akùâõi ca svarûpâõi nityajñânâtmakâni ca | viùõoþ úrîyastathaivaoktânyany eùâü dvividhâni tu | svarûpâõi ca bhinnâni bhinnâni trividhâni ca | VTV.
11 Rao, Epistemology of Dvaita Vedânta, 22.
12 svâtantryapâratantryâbhyâü tadviúeùaþ | pûrvaü svaparagatâkhilaviúeùaviùayam |
PL. I will hereafter capitalize the pronoun ‘his’ when it is in reference to Viùõu.
13 dvitîyam îúo ‘nyebhyo ‘dhikam | asârvatrikam | anyatra sarvaviùayam | PL.
14 yogijñânam çjûnâm anâdinityam | îúo jîvebhyo ‘dhikamanyatrâlocane sarvaviùayam | PL.
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Mâdhva Epistemology
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yogi
çju
tattvika
ayogins
2.2 Types of yogic knowledge
The çjuyogins have knowledge that is eternal and without beginning
but increases with their meditative effort. This knowledge becomes
static after the knower obtains mokùa, liberation.15 The tattvika-yogins have incomplete knowledge of both Îúvara and other objects but still
have self-conscious knowledge of reality. 16 Jayatîrtha states that there are also atattvika-yogins who are the other deities.17 The knowledge of the atattvika-yogins is partial. Those remaining are the ayogins
who have partial knowledge of both Îúvara and objects other than the
Lord. Jayatîrtha correlates the knowledge of the ayogins with Mâdhva
soteriology, separating them into three types: the mukti-yogyas, those
fit for release, the nitya-saüsârins, those bound to the cycle of birth
and rebirth, and tamo-yogyas, those who are fit only for darkness.18
The svarûpa-jñâna of the mukti-yogyas is valid, while that of the
nitya-saüsârins is comprised of both invalid and valid knowledge.
Though the svarûpa-jñâna of the tamo-yogyas is entirely invalid, the manovçtti-jñâna of all three is only occasionally invalid.19
These different categories of kevala-pramâõa correlate with the
hierarchical world that Madhvâcârya envisioned. In the realm of
epistemology, this vision becomes apparent in terms of distinctions in
clarity and scope of knowledge. As one proceeds down the category
system, one moves further and further away from complete and
unsurpassable knowledge, which only Viùõu has. Though it is possible
to advance in knowledge, one can only asymptotically approach the
level of complete knowledge held by Viùõu. As one advances in the
epistemic hierarchy, one becomes more aware of the nature of brahman
15 krameõa vardhamânam | âmukteþ tato ‘vyayam | PL.
16 Nagaraja Rao states that these beings are actually deities who govern the twenty-five tattvas, categories described in Madhvâcârya’s Tantrasârasaügraha. Rao, 24–25.
17 tadvyatiriktâþ devâdayaþ yoginaþ atattvikâþ | PP 18.
18 ayoginaþ api trividhâþ | muktiyogyâþ nityasaüsâriõâþ tamoyogyâú ca iti | PP 19.
More on the doctrine of predestination, svarûpatraividhya, in Chapters 3 and 4.
19 tatra muktiyogyânâü svarûpajñânaü yathârtham eva | nityasaüsâriõâm tu miúram | anyeùâm ayathârtham eva | PP 19.
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and the universe and its components. I will address the ways to ascend
in the hierarchy, in order to gain more complete knowledge of Viùõu, in
Chapter 4.
Anu-pramâõa, indirect knowledge
Kevala-pramâõa, direct knowledge, stands in contrast to anu-pramâõa, indirect knowledge, which is the instruments of valid knowledge. There
are three instruments. These are via pratyakùa, perception, anumâna, logical inference and reasoning, and âgama, scriptur
al authority and
verbal testimony (see Fig. 2.3). They are all defined as being without defects. Pratyakùa, perception, is defined as defectless contact of the
sense organ with an object. Anumâna is defined as defectless inference,
and âgama as defectless sentences and/or texts.20
Anu-pramâõa
pratyakùa anumâna
âgama
2.3 Components of anu-pramâõa
These three instruments are loci for error. What are these defects and
how are they to be avoided? What mistakes make anumâna, inference,
unreasonable? What causes error? What are the components of
cognition?
Anu-pramâõas: pratyakùa , perception
Madhvâcârya states that pratyakùa, perception, is comprised of two
types of cognitive apparatus: the indriyas, six physical sense organs,
and the sâkùî, the internal witness.21 The six physical sense organs are manas, mind, ghrâõa, smell, rasana, taste, cakùus, sight, úrotra,
20 anupramâõaü trividham | pratyakùam anumânam âgama iti | nirdoùo ‘rthendriya sannikarùaþ pratyakùam | nirdoùopapattir anumâ | nirdoùaþ úabda âgamaþ | PL.
21 pratyakùaü saptavidham | sâkùiùaóindriyabhedena | PL.
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25
hearing, and tvak, touch.22 This list is not unusual in the history of South Asian thought and has its origins in the Sâükhya tradition which
preceded Mâdhva Vedânta.23 The objects of the five sense organs are gandha, smell , rasa, taste, rûpa, color, úabda, sound, and sparúa, feeling (see Fig. 2.4).24 These five sense organs are the primary loci for error. If one’s eyes are defective then they can give rise to defective knowledge.
Jayatîrtha characterizes these errors as those produced by a cataract,
jaundice and the like.25 Similarly, if one’s ears are filled with wax or damaged, then sounds, which ought to be audible, may not be heard
or are heard in a distorted way. When addressing visual error in his PP
Jayatîrtha states that if an object is too far away, too near, too small,
obstructed, or even mixed with similar things, then it will give rise to
incorrect knowledge.26
Pratyakùa
sâkùî
manas ghrâõa rasana cakùus úrotra
tvak
gandha
rasa
rûpa
úabda sparúa
2.4 Components of pratyakùa
The five sense organs send their data (corrupt or otherwise) to the
manas, mind, which serves to organize them. Though the manas is a
sense organ, it gets and coordinates information from the other five.
The manas lies in the middle of the cognitive hierarchy and in turn,
the knowledge it generates is the object of the sâkùî, internal witness .
The end result of the observation of the knowledge deriving from the
physical sense organs by the sâkùî via the manas is pratyakùa, perceptual cognition as is illustrated in Fig. 2.5.
22 prâkçtam ùaóvidham | ghrâõarasanacakùustvakúrotramanobhedât | PP 25.
23 See Larson’s Classical Sâükhya: An Interpretation of its History and Meaning.
24 PP 25. More on the ontology of these components in Chapter 3.
25 eteùâü pañcânâü mano ‘nadhiùñitvaü kâcakâmalâdayaú ca doùâþ | PP 25.
26 teùâm
doùâþ
atidûratvam
atisâmîpyaü
saukùmyaü
vyavadhânaü
samândravyâbhighâtaþ | PP 23.
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indriyas
manas
sâkùî
2.5 Perceptual cognition
The manas, mind, is as an intermediary between the senses and the
sâkùî. The manas is not unlike a processor chip in a computer whose purpose is to organize all of the incoming data before relaying it via the
monitor to the user, which, as I will explain below, can be likened to the
sâkùî.
Given that the manas is a sense organ, it too cannot be expected to be
perfect and can sometimes convey defective knowledge to the sâkùî.
Defects of the manas include anger, passions and the like.27 When these doùas, fallacies, afflict the manas, then the data deriving from the inaccurate senses are further contaminated.
These components of pratyakùa, presented in Madhvâcârya’s PL,
seem to be internally coherent. But Madhvâcârya presents a different
analysis of pratyakùa in his VTV. In this text, he separates pratyakùa
into three types, which seems to conflict with the seven outlined in his
PL. These are Îúvara- pratyakùa, yogi-pratyakùa, and ayogi-pratyakùa.
All three types of perception originate from the senses. Jayatîrtha adds
Lakùmî- pratyakùa to this group.28 The perception that derives from the senses of Viùõu and Úrî (Lakùmî) are eternal and inherent to their
nature.29 The senses that give rise to yogi-pratyakùa and ayogi-pratyakùa are of two kinds: inherent to the nature of the cognizer and not part
of the nature of the cognizer, namely their physical sense organs.
Ayogi-pratyakùa is threefold, daiva, divine, âsura, and madhya,
middling.30 According to Jayatîrtha, daiva is the most valid, asura is the least valid and madhya is partly valid and partly invalid.31 It is
27 tasya doùâþ râgâdayaþ | PP 25.
28 pratyakùaü trividhaü jñeyamaiúvaraü yaugikaü tathâ | ayaugiakaü ceti tathâ sarvam akùâtmakaü matam | VTV.
caturvidhaü pratyakùam | îúvarapratyakùaü lakùmîpratyakùaü yogipratyakùaü ayogipratyakùaü ceti | PP 27. See also Zydenbos for more on these possible
inconsistencies, 258.
29 akùâõi ca svarûpâõi nityajñânâtmakâni ca | VTV.
30 devâsurâõi madhyânîtyetatpratyakùamîritam | VTV.
31 bâhyendriyaü trividham | daivam âsuraü madhyamam iti | tatra yathârthajñânapracuraü
daivam
|
ayathârthajñânapracuraü
âsuram
|
samajñânasâdhanantu madhyamam | PP 28.
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27
not clear how these fit into the seven-fold classification outlined in
Madhvâcârya’s Pramâõalakùaõa. Subsequent Mâdhva commentators
such as Râghavendratîrtha and Úrînivâsatîrtha attempted to resolve this
confusion.32 Contemporary scholars of the Mâdhva school hold that the longer list is merely an elaboration of the shorter one.
Smçti , memory
Scholars both in South Asia as well as in the West have long speculated
about the epistemological status of memory. What determines the
validity of memories? Can memory be categorized as its own sense
organ? How are memories generated? Where are they located?
Madhvâcârya offers answers to these questions by proposing that smçti,
memory, is a product of the manas.33 Memory is thus characterized as a pramâõa. In fact, Madhvâcârya argues that memory must be considered
to be valid. Proof that we even had a past experience is dependent on the
validity of smçti.34 If it were not valid, moreover, then the knowledge of syllogisms produced by anumâna, logical inference and reasoning,
would be impossible.35 For example, the knowledge that ‘where there is smoke, there is fire,’ necessitates the validity of the memory of the
relationship between smoke and fire. If smçti had no validity, then one
could never conclude from seeing smoke that ther
e was fire!
The validity of smçti is necessary for the integrity of the âgama-
pramâõa as well as anumâna. If it were not valid then the âgama classified as smçti, traditional human-authored texts, would also be
invalid. In fact, any kind of knowledge that is transmitted by oral
recitation and memorization, such as úruti, the revealed texts of the
Vedic canon, would be invalid if memory was invalid. The âgamas must
be included as a pramâõa and smçti must be a valid form of knowledge.
For these reasons, in his Anuvyâkhyâna, Madhvâcârya states that manas
is a valid form of knowledge which is yathârtha, reveals an object of
knowledge as it is.36
Remember that Madhvâcârya is a realist and that therefore the objects
of our valid cognitions, including memory, must be sat, real. If memory
were not admitted as a valid cognition or one that could be sublated,
then Madhvâcârya would have to permit other kinds of seemingly valid
32 I am reliant on Zydenbos for this information. Zydenbos, 259.
33 mânasapratyakùajâ smçtiþ | PL.
34 pûrvânubhûte kiü mânam ity ukte syât kim uttaram | AV 2.1.58.
35 More on anumâna below.
36 prâmâõyaü nânuvâdasya smçter api vihîyate yâthârthyam eva prâmâõyaúabdârtho yadvivakùitaþ | AV 2.1.24.
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cognitions to be sublated. He must avoid this at all costs, otherwise he
might affirm the position of his rivals, the Advaita school of Vedânta.
The sâkùî
The sâkùî, internal witness, is the most important component of
Madhvâcârya’s epistemology.37 Perceptual cognition has several layers and the sâkùî is the innermost one. The indriyas are at the outermost layer, the manas is in the middle and the sâkùî is at the core (see Fig. 2.6).
In fact, it refers to the basic level of reflective consciousness, experience
and awareness that every sentient being possesses. A parallel concept in
Western philosophy can be found in Descartes’s Meditations. Descartes
suggests that, though there is little certainty in our knowledge, it is
nonetheless possible to be certain of one’s own existence. After all,
according to Descartes, self-reflection and thought, at the very least,
proves that there is a knower. Hence his famous dictum, cogito ergo