by Deepak Sarma
sum, ‘I think, therefore I am.’38
indriyas
manas
sâkùî
2.6 Cognition
The sâkùî serves an identical purpose in Madhvâcârya’s epistemology as
the experience and source of absolute certainty and awareness that there
is a knower.
37 I am reliant upon B.A. Krishnaswamy Rao’s lucid presentation of sâkùî in his Outlines of the Philosophy of Sri Madhwacharya and conversations with Professor Varakhedi for much of this discussion.
38 Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, Meditation 1.
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As the conclusive adjudicator, the sâkùî cannot err. Not only must the
sâkùî exist, but it must also follow that it is without doùa, defect. Any defect would make the sâkùî as erroneous as the six-fold indriyas and the manas, thereby requiring another epistemic apparatus to serve as final
judge of the truth. To avoid this problem, Madhvâcârya holds that
the sâkùî is sva-prakâúa, self-luminous and self-validating.39 If it were not, then it too would require a mechanism by which it is validated,
which I will call V1. This ground for validity, V1, would itself require
another validation, namely V2, which requires V3 and so forth. Infinite
regressions such as this one are deemed doùas, flaws, in tarka and to be avoided at all costs. Madhvâcârya posits the sâkùî, internal witness, to
avoid this epistemic problem. The existence of the sâkùî means that the
experience of the sâkùî can never be sublated or replaced at any time. 40
The sâkùî is thus the final judge of the truth about the self. 41
What does the sâkùî experience directly? The sâkùî experiences itself, pain, pleasure, manovçtti-jñâna, the modifications of the manas via the senses, kâla, time, and âkaúa, space. These are qualities of the self and are a matter of self-awareness and do not involve extrinsic data or
experiences external to the sâkùî. Furthermore, the intuitive capability
of the sâkùî is required to explain certain kinds of experiences and
awareness that cannot be derived by any other means. For example, the
sâkùî serves the purpose of establishing generalizations.42 The manas does not have this reflective function, since it is merely the channel or
conduit for particular, and not general, knowledge. When one has the
perception ‘this is X,’ for example, one distinguishes X from all else.
The manas cannot generate such knowledge, so there must be some
organ that can. This organ is the sâkùî.
Why is the sâkùî the organ that experiences kâla, time? According to Madhvâcârya, the perception of time and space is never sublated and
hence it can occur only through a defectless sense organ, namely the
sâkùî. Madhvâcârya contends that the ability to perceive time during
sleep is evidence that it is an object of the sâkùî. 43 None of the sense organs, including the manas, function during sleep. Still, when one
39 sâkùinaþ svaprkâúatvam anavasthâ tato na hi | AV 3.2.56. More on these doùas below.
40 sâkùisiddhasya na kvâpi bâdhyatvaü tadadoùataþ sarvakaleùvabâdhyatvaü sâkùiõaiva pratîyate | AV 1.4.98.
41 sâkùipratyakùato hy eva mânânâü mânateyate | AV 3.2.55.
42 ataþ sarvapadârthâú ca sâmânyât sâkùigocarâþ | sarvam ity eva vijñânaü sarveùâü katham anyathâ | AV 3.2.83.
43 kâlo hi sâkùipratyakùaþ suùuptau ca pratîtitaþ | atîtânâgatau kâlâvapi nâsâkùigocarau | AV 1.4.99.
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An Introduction to Mâdhva Vedânta
awakes from dreamless sleep one recognizes that some time has passed.
Consequently there must be some perceiver of time and that perceiver
can only be the sâkùî.
If the sâkùî is infallible, then why are there errors? The sâkùî suspends its judgment when the manas provides defective data. The result is
saüúaya, doubt. As already mentioned, the manas can be effected by
passions and the like, and misperceptions can result. When such a
situation arises, then the outcome is doubt. On the other hand, defectless
data conveyed by the manas to the sâkùî and experiences that are
available only to the sâkùî (time and so on) result in cognitive certainty.
As evidenced by its unusual capabilities, the sâkùî is the foundation
of Madhvâcârya’s epistemology. Not only does it permit intuitive
knowledge, but also it acts as a final adjudicator due to its innate
ability to determine validity. Without sâkùî, the Mâdhva realism would
be indefensible. As for its defensibility, it is equally problematic as
Descartes’s cogito, which can be viewed as eminently compelling, or
radically flawed.44 Nevertheless, accepting the truth of Madhvâcârya’s system necessitates accepting the unquestionable validity of the sâkùî.
Anu-pramâõas: anumâna , defectless inference
Madhvâcârya defines anumâna as the instrument of defectless
inference.45 It is an inferential cognition, moreover, that is dependent upon the other anu-pramâõas, namely pratyakùa, defectless perception, and âgama, defectless sentences and/or texts. One example already
mentioned, ‘where there is smoke, there is fire,’ illustrates why logical
inferences are impossible without perception. If one cannot perceive the
elements of the inference then one cannot infer! As already mentioned,
one must be able to see the smoke and fire to connect the two!
All of the schools of South Asian philosophy present analyses of the
components of the syllogism and explanations of how they can be relied
on collectively as authoritative sources of knowledge. Madhvâcârya’s
analysis is dependent on the presentation of the logic of the syllogism
that is posited by the Nyâya School of philosophy. To explain
Madhvâcârya’s modification, I will first present the Nyâya position.
Though the position changed in the development of the Nyâya School,
the one that I present is commonly accepted as foundational.
44 For criticism of Descartes, see Cottingham, The Cambridge Companion to Descartes.
45 nirdoùopapattir anumâ | PL.
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The structure of the inference according to the Nyâya School
One standard form of the inference that is found among the schools of
South Asian philosophy has five components.46 The classical example that has been used to illustrate the components of the inference is the
conclusion that there is fire on the mountain if smoke is observed. Here
is how Gautama breaks it down in the Nyâya Sûtras:
1 pratijñâ, proposition: This mountain has fire.
2 hetu, reason: Because it has smoke.
3 udâharaõa, example: Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, just as
in a kitchen.
4 upanaya, application: This mountain is smoky.
5 nigamanâni, conclusion: Therefore, this mountain has fire. 47
Here are the four components of the inference:
1 The mountain is the pakùa, the minor term, the subject, the
probandum.
2 ‘Fire possessing’ is the sâdhya, thing to be proven, the major term.
3 ‘Smoke-possessing’ is the hetu (different than the use above).
4 The kitchen is the sapakùa, a similar instance confirming the
concomitance.
The vyâpti is the universal concomitance between t
he hetu, the middle term, and the sâdhya, major term. That is, there is a universal
concomitance between fire and smoke. The vyâpti is the relation of
class-inclusion, where there is a pervasion of one by another, where the
hetu is pervaded by the sâdhya, where smoke is pervaded by fire. Vyâpti thus concerns relationships that are necessary.
Not surprisingly, debates have arisen about the indispensability of
these components and their exact definitions. Buddhist (most notably
the logician Diïnâga), Jain and Hindu scholars have contributed
enormously to these debates.48 Madhvâcârya’s analysis of anumâna should properly be contextualized within the history of debate
between the schools of thought in South Asia. Later Mâdhvas, above
all Jayatîrtha in his Pramâõapaddhati and Vyâsatîrtha in his Tarka
46 See Matilal, The Character of Indian Logic, King, Indian Philosophy, and Potter, Presuppositions for more introductory materials on these and related topics.
47 Nyâya Sûtras 1.1.32.
48 See Wayman, A Millennium of Buddhist Logic and King.
45
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An Introduction to Mâdhva Vedânta
Taõóava, expended an enormous amount of intellectual energy to
produce detailed explanations of the nuances of Madhvâcârya’s
position. Although these are useful for study of the history of anumâna
in South Asian philosophy, an in-depth analysis would digress too far
from the matters at hand.49
Madhvâcârya’s analysis of defectless inference
According to Madhvâcârya, vyâpti is the indispensable component of
an inference. In fact, the foundation and only essential component of
anumâna, defectless inference, is the vyâpti, the invariable concomitance between the hetu, the middle term, and the sâdhya, the major term. 50
It is the concomitance between smoke and fire that is the essential
component of the inference. The remaining ones are superfluous,
since all the others are founded on the vyâpti. In a straightforward
interpretation of anumâna, Madhvâcârya concedes that only the vyâpti
is necessary. 51
The syllogism has only practical utility as a method of proof and,
depending on the situation, does not require that all five members be
enunciated. It is a means to ends and not ends in and of itself. There is no
need to posit components in addition to those mentioned. While others
hold them as independent pramâõas, Madhvâcârya places arthâpatti,
presumption, and upamâ, analogy, under the scope of anumâna. Both,
according to Madhvâcârya can be reduced to inferences and thus they
cannot be considered independent pramâõas. 52 Given its peripheral nature, I will not offer detailed analyses of the justifications for
Madhvâcârya’s theory of anumâna.
Tarka-doùas , logical errors
Madhvâcârya lists a number of logical errors in his PL. These are
anumâna that can be used to show doùas in opponent’s positions. The schools of South Asian philosophy each provide accounts of these errors
in their manuals and many agree on them. After all, if they did not, then
philosophical dialogue would become impossible, pointless, or both!
These are âtmânyonyâúraya, mutual dependence, cakrakâ, circularity,
anavasthâ, infinite regress, kalpanâgaurava, complexity (Ockham’s
49 Interested readers should consult Matilal, King, and Potter.
50 vyâptir upapattimûlam | PL.
51 See Sharma, Philosophy of Úrî Madhvâcârya and N. Rao, Epistemology for more on this topic. Sharma, 133–134. Rao, 69.
52 arthâpattyupame anumâviúeùaþ | PL.
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33
Razor), úrutadçùñahâ, destruction of what is seen by what is heard,
among others. 53 More detailed descriptions of these and other fallacies can be found in Potter’s Presuppositions on Indian Philosophies. Though
detailed analyses of these doùas and a plethora of others are found in
Madhvâcârya’s Pramâõa Lakùaõa and Jayatîrtha’s Pramâõapaddhati,
they are not relevant for our purposes. 54
Anu-pramâõas: âgama , defectless sentences and/or texts
gama is defectless sentences and/or texts.55 The schools of Vedânta are, above all, commentarial traditions, so the authority of words has
significant consequences. In fact, the schools are defined by their
relationship to the Vedas and auxiliary texts. The term vedânta, a
tatpuruùa determinative compound comprised of the two terms veda
and anta, means ‘the culminating sections of the Vedas.’ The
epistemological foundations of schools are inextricably linked to the
úruti, the revealed texts of the Vedic canon.
Each, in theory, founds its entire system on the validity of âgama,
defectless sentences and/or texts. Of course the question arises as to
whether the philosophical positions of each respective school derive
from the âgamas, or if their interpretations of passages from the âgamas derive from independent philosophical positions. The end result is
a chicken-or-egg debate (or in vegetarian Vedânta, a seed-and-tree
debate!), which often pits the schools of Vedânta against one another.
Regardless, the importance of the âgamas as a central component in
Vedânta cannot be underestimated. gamas serve as the backdrops for
debate, as the lexicon for deliberation.
According to Madhvâcârya, the content of the âgamas is information
about Viùõu, his consort Lakùmî, dharma, law and doctrine, and other
matters unseen or unavailable by any other means. Drawing from
explanations given by his Mîmâüsâ predecessors, Madhvâcârya holds
that knowledge of dharma and adharma is beyond the scope of human
capability. 56 After all, he argues, humans are ignorant and deceptive and cannot derive such truths independently.57 All of the schools of Vedânta believe that the âgamas are to be studied. Any claim that they ought not
53 âtmânyonyâúrayatâcakrakânavasthâkalpanâgauravaúrutadçùñahânâdayo dûùaõânumâþ | PL.
54 See N. Rao, Epistemology, 70–97 for more on doùas.
55 nirdoùaþ úabda âgamaþ | PL.
56 See Jha’s Pûrva Mîmâüsâ in its Sources for more on the Mîmâüsâ view.
57 na ca pauruùeyeõa vâkyena tatsiddhiþ ajñânavipralambhayoþ prâpteþ | VTV.
More on the relationships between anumâna, pratyakùa, and âgama below.
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An Introduction to Mâdhva Vedânta
to be the object of study or that they are irrelevant is held to be ludicrous.
That they are efficacious and necessary is an unquestionable truth and
part and parcel of the commentarial tradition that is Vedânta.
According to Madhvâcârya, âgamas are two-fold: apauruùeya,
sentences and/or texts not having human authorship, and pauruùeya,
those having human authorship. First I offer a summary of apauruùeya-
âgama and then of pauruùeya-âgama. I then examine, in brief, an
unusual set of texts that, though excluded from the canon, are an integral
part of Mâdhva mythology.
Apauruùeya-âgama , sentences and texts not having human authorship
Apauruùeya-âgama are nitya, eternal, while the pauruùeya-âgama are anitya, not eternal.58 Apauruùeya texts, also known as úruti, heard texts, are comprised of the Vedas. They are úruti, heard tex
ts, because,
according to the myths and history of their origins, they were revealed to
humans and were transmitted orally. Since no author of the Vedas is
established, Madhvâcârya concludes that they are authorless.59 All schools of Vedânta categorize the four Vedas, the èg, Yajur, Sâma and Atharva Vedas as úruti and, therefore, âgama. The relevant summaries on the Vedas, the Brâþmanas, the raõyakas and the Upaniùads are also included in what is deemed the úruti and, therefore, apauruùeya
(see Fig. 2.7).60
Apauruùeya-âgama
Nitya
úruti
Vedas
èg
Yajur
Sâma Atharva
Vedas
Brâþmanas raõyakas Upaniùads
2.7 Apauruùeya-âgama
58 úrutir vâva nityânityâ vâva smçtayo yâúcânyâ vâcaþ iti paiïgîúrutiþ | VTV.
59 apauruùeyatvaü ca svata eva siddhaü | vedakartuaprasiddheþ | VTV.
60 The Brâhmanas, the raõyakas, and the Upaniùads are works that comprise each of the four Vedas.
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These texts are regarded as úruti by all of the schools of Vedânta and
by their immediate predecessors, the Mîmâüsâs. But what is the
relationship between Viùõu and these texts?
The atheist Mîmâüsâ School is based on belief that the Vedas are
completely independent and eternal and did not require a divine power
to be created or manifested. In contrast, Madhvâcârya’s theism requires
him to associate with and subordinate these eternal texts to Viùõu. He
offers an explanation of this relationship in his VTV. According to
Madhvâcârya, the Vedas existed in Viùõu’s mind before they were
revealed. In each creation, they are revealed in exactly the same form
and their word order and phonemes do not change.61 Viùõu, moreover, chose sages to be the recipients of a portion of the Vedas.62 The texts held to be úruti are the portions that have been preserved since they were first revealed. Given that the Vedas are eternal, it follows that they were still not even created by Lord Viùõu.63 The varõas, phonemes, themselves are eternal and without a creator.64 Viùõu is not the author of the texts, for if he were, then they would be created and not eternal.65
Once again, drawing from their Mîmâüsâ predecessors, Madhvâcârya
proposes that the Vedas are svataþ-prâmâõa, self-valid. That is, their validity cannot be derived from an outside authority. If one tries to,