by Deepak Sarma
by Madhvâcârya himself. Deeper study reveals that although Kçùõa is
important, He is only one among many avatâras, incarnations, of Viùõu,
which are believed to be all equal to one another. 63 These avatâras are svâüúas, essential parts of the greater whole that is Viùõu. These aüúas, divisions, moreover, are not different from the whole.64 Therefore the avatâras are identical to Viùõu as well as with one another. Ultimately,
Kçùõa is not considered to be a higher-level deity in the Mâdhva
philosophical world. He is merely one avatâra among many. 65 Despite
the fact that hierarchy pervades almost every facet of the Mâdhva
system, it is not (and cannot) be found among the avatâras.
Madhvâcârya’s mitigated monotheism
Madhvâcârya’s vision of monotheism is mitigated. Some have argued
that limiting the power of God is inconsistent with certain kinds of
monotheism.66 It is true that the God of Madhvâcârya is not a creator in the same way as the God of the Christians: Viùõu does not create the
universe ex nihilo and He is an efficient or instrumental cause rather than a material one. Furthermore, there are even items and concepts in the
Mâdhva ontology that are as eternal as Viùõu, such as kâla, time, and
prakçti. Their eternality mitigates Madhvâcârya’s monotheism.
Though it is certainly possible to argue that characteristics and
limitations ‘cannot be brought together in a harmonious whole,’67
Madhvâcârya anticipated such criticisms. In his BSB he explains:
It is possible to make an inference [to prove whatever] one desires.
Therefore, in connection with the truth, a distinct inference is not
63 evamabedhenaiva | caúabdâdanantarûpatvaü caike úâkhinaþ pañhanti | amâtro
‘nantamâtraú ca dvaitasyopaúamaþ úivaþ | BSB 3.2.13. For more see Sarma’s
‘Madhvâcârya on Kçùõa.’
64 svâüúaúcâtho vibhinnâüúa iti dvedhâü ‘úa iùyate | aüúino yattu sâmarthyaü yathâsthitiþ | BSB 2.3.47.
65 Professor Varakhedi reasoned that Kçùõa’s appearance during Kali Yuga gave him greater proximity in time to devotees and that this may be why he is worshipped
above other avatâras.
66 See Yandell, ‘God and Other Agents in Hindu Monotheism.’
67 Yandell, 545.
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required. In the Skanda [ Purâõa, the following] is said: ‘As
inference can be used to prove what is desired, therefore, consistent
inferences are desired for the sake of [removing] contradiction in
preceding and succeeding [passages] of the úruti. There is no other
[use for inference].’68
In this way Madhvâcârya feels that he is able to deflect some types of
arguments.
What is solved if one accepts Madhvâcârya’s mitigated monotheism?
Theodicy, justifications for the presence of evil, no longer poses any
problem. Why not? If, for example, God is both omni-benevolent and
creates all things, then why is there evil in the universe? One answer
offered by Christian thinkers comes from the doctrine of free will. By
accepting such a doctrine, God is not held responsible for the presence
of evil. Madhvâcârya offers a different solution when he considers
Viùõu to be only an instrumental, rather than a material, cause of the
universe. All entities, including sentient beings, exist eternally and are
not created by Viùõu (though they are dependent upon Him). Viùõu
cannot be held accountable for the behavior of the wicked sentient
beings in the universe.69
Furthermore, if Viùõu is only the instrumental cause then He does not
change when the universe evolves. Madhvâcârya wishes to believe that
immutability is a perfection held by Viùõu. He cannot also believe
that Viùõu created the universe. If he did then Viùõu would change.
Madhvâcârya’s resolution also serves to explain Viùõu’s attributes.
In order to avoid these incompatible beliefs, ones that are sometimes
acknowledged but more often ignored by most theisms, Madhvâcârya
offers his mitigated monotheism.
Subject and attribute
Madhvâcârya’s ontology is based on the difference between entities in
the universe, rather than their identity. If the universe is governed by
difference and there is no identity, then one may wonder how to construe
the relationship between Viùõu and His attributes. Are they identical
with one another or entirely different? Given the Mâdhva position, the
former is clearly impossible. Besides, if they were identical, then why
68 yathâkâmaü hy anumâtuü úakyate | ato na tattve pçthaganumânam apekùyate |
uktaü ca skânde | yathâkâmânumâ yasmât tasmât sânapagâ úruteþ | pûrvâparavirodhâya ceùyate nânyathâ kvacit iti | BSB 1.1.18.
69 More on agency and freewill in Mâdhva Vedânta below in Chapter 4.
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would two terms, substance and attribute, even be used? On the other
hand, if they were entirely different, then their relationship would be
so external that it would be odd to state that something is an attribute
of Viùõu. Claiming that the relationship is bhedâbheda, one of both
identity and difference, is the most difficult to digest, since it requires
the juxtaposition of mutually exclusive qualifiers, a position which,
according to Madhvâcârya, is logically impossible.
The problem is not limited to Viùõu and His attributes but is found in
the relationships between all entities and their respective attributes. Are
they the same or are they different from one another? Take, for example,
the purple shirt that I wore when I typed this sentence. What is the
relationship between the purple color and the shirt? Are they different
from one another or identical? If they are different then how do they
relate to one another? If they are one and the same, then why distinguish
between ‘shirt’ and ‘purple-ness,’ between substance and attribute?
These questions can also be asked of ‘difference’ itself. How should
one understand the ‘difference’ between any two entities? If ‘A’ is
different from ‘B’ where does the attribute ‘difference’ (which I will call
D1) between the two reside? Surely D1 must be different from A, its
substrate. But if it were, then it would necessitate another ‘difference’,
D2, between the D1 and A, the substrate and so on! Madhvâcârya posits
a new category to avoid these potential problems. This ontological
category with epistemological import is the viúeùa, distinguishing
property.
Viúeùas , distinguishing properties
Like the sâkùî, the viúeùa is an integral part of the Mâdhva system.
Without it the Mâdhva realism would be indefensible.70 V iúeùa finds its roots in the Nyâya-Vaiúeùika tradition of philosophy. To understand
how Madhvâcârya modifies their version, I first summarize his
predecessor’s. According to the Nyâya-Vaiúeùika tradition, a viúeùa
resides between an object and an attribute. The difference between
two atoms lies in the viúeùa that resides in each of the two. There is
no explanation, however, of the relationship between vi
úeùa and the
substrate. Are they identical or different? Since they cannot be identical,
they must be different. If they are different, then they would require
another viúeùa, which I will call V1. This viúeùa, V1, would itself require another viúeùa, namely V2, which requires V3 and so forth. The result is
anavasthâ, an infinite regress, a doùa, flaw, to be avoided at all costs as
70 For a detailed analysis of viúeùa, see Sarma, Bhedasâdhanam.
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described earlier in Chapter 2. This problem with the Nyâya-Vaiúeùika concept leads Madhvâcârya to posit his revised version of the viúeùa.
Madhvâcârya’s solution concerns the ability of the viúeùa to establish
difference without necessitating another viúeùa. Given the logical
problems of the Nyâya-Vaiúeùika concept, viúeùa must have this
capacity. Madhvâcârya explains that viúeùa is sva-nirvâhaka, possessing self-sufficiency and thereby does not require another viúeùa.71 By positing this capacity possessed by all substances, Madhvâcârya is able
to solve the problems of relating substances with their attributes as
well as relating entities which are different from one another. In light of
viúeùa, it is possible for Viùõu to be related to His attributes via the
viúeùa. In fact, all objects are related to their attributes by means of
the viúeùa. This capability is intrinsic to all objects and is not itself an attribute.
Bhedasâdhanam, establishing difference
How is difference apprehended? Madhvâcârya believes that difference
constitutes the svarûpa, essence, of all objects. Difference is
apprehended when the svarûpa of any object is apprehended. An
immediate awareness of the difference of an object is an awareness of
its uniqueness. Madhvâcârya explains that, in general, the svarûpa
of an object distinguishes it from all other objects.72 If the svarûpa were not constituted by difference, then the immediate comprehension
of the general uniqueness of an object would not occur. If this
basic understanding that ‘this object is different’ did not occur, then,
Madhvâcârya jokes, ‘it would be [possible] to doubt [whether] oneself
was a pot!’73 One would not be able to see oneself as being unique and different from all other things! The difference is apprehended in the
same way as the viúeùa is apprehended: instantaneously.
For these reasons, Madhvâcârya claims that the universe is governed
by pañcabheda, five-fold difference:
The universe has five [intrinsic] differences: There is a difference
between the jîva and Lord [Viùõu]. There is a difference between
71 viúeùo ‘pi svarûpaü sa svanirvâhaka eva ca | Madhvâcârya, Gîtâtâtparyam 11.9.
72 bhedastu svarûpadarúana eva siddhaþ | prâyaþ sarvato vilakùaõaü hi padârthasvarûpaü dçùyate | VTV.
73 yadi na svarûpaü bhedastadâ padârthe dçùñe prâyaþ sarvato vailakùaõyaü tasya na jñâyeta | ajñâte ca vailakùaõye âtmani ghaña ity api saüúayaþ syât | na hi kaúcit tathâ saüúayaü karoti | VTV.
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Lord [Viùõu] and jaóa, non-sentient material entities. There is
difference between the individual jîvas. There is a difference
between jîvas and jaóas, non-sentient material entities. There is a difference between one jaóa and another. The [difference between
these five] is real ... .74
These five differences are part of the fabric of the Mâdhva universe.
They also are the fundamental bases for arguments regarding
ontological, epistemological and soteriological matters between the
Mâdhva school and all other schools of Vedânta.
Madhvâcârya’s realism asserts itself at every opportunity within his
complicated ontology. Not only is the universe real, but it is governed
by Viùõu, the only independent entity. The universe is a hierarchically
arranged with Viùõu in the topmost position. Knowledge of Mâdhva
ontology and epistemology is one step on the path to mokùa. What else
is required of adherents? How does one obtain mokùa? To answer
these questions, I will now examine Madhvâcârya’s soteriology and
eschatology.
74 jîveúvarabhidâ caiva jaóeúvarabhidâ tathâ | jîvabhedo mithaú caiva jaóajîvabhidâ tathâ | mithaú ca jaóabhedo ‘yaü prapañco bhedapañcakaþ | so ‘yaü satyo ... | VTV.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Mâdhva soteriology
Viùõu, the creator of all, is the origin of the sacred texts. He alone is
to be known. He is the object of [the unmediated] vision [granted]
in accordance [with the gradation of jîvas, enduring selves]. He is
filled with bliss. He is inside [all things and is like the] ether.1
The goal of all of the schools of Vedânta is to provide a correct analysis
of brahman/Viùõu and the universe which, when understood and acted
upon properly, will eventually lead adherents to mokùa, liberation.
Trapped in saüsâra, a seemingly never-ending cycle of birth and
rebirth, practitioners seek ways to end their bondage to living and dying
and these schools of Vedânta offer possible means of escape. Their
elaborate ontologies and epistemologies are integral parts of the
solutions that they offer. These doctrinal systems cannot be separated
from soteriologies and in this way, Mâdhva soteriology is intimately
tied to Mâdhva ontology and epistemology. One may even make the
argument that the more theoretical aspects of the tradition are in service
to and do not stand independently of, the practical goals of being granted
mokùa. At the very least, it is easy to concede that theory and practice are inseparable.
Unlike Madhvâcârya’s ontology and epistemology, which are
outlined in lucid detail in his PL and TS, his theories about soteriology
are spread throughout his vast corpus. What follows is thus a
codification of Mâdhva soteriology drawing from a variety of sources,
including Madhvâcârya’s BSB and VTV.
Before examining the elements on the path to mokùa, it is essential to
learn who and what is on the path. What is reborn in saüsâra? What are
the characteristics of the jîva, the enduring self, which is the intrinsic
element of every cetana, sentient being? Why is the jîva ignorant and bound in the cycle of birth and rebirth? One must first have answers to
these questions before learning how one may break the cycle.
1 viùõur eva vijijñâsyaþ sarvakartâ ‘gamoditaþ | samanvayâdîkùateú ca pûrõânando
‘ntaraþ khavat | AB1.2.
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The jîva, enduring self
As stated in the Parama Úruti, ‘He who suffers and enjoys, who is
bound [in saüsâra] and [obtains] mokùa, liberation, [from it and]
who knows [himself] as ‘I am,’ he is the jîva,’ enduring self.2
One may wonder about what or who persists in the cycle of birth and
rebirth, about what or who accumulates karma and, finally, about what
or who obtains mokùa. The schools of Vedânta hold that each cetana,
sentient being, has both a deha, body, and a jîva, an enduring self, that persists in saüsâra, worldly existence. Though the ontologi
cal status of
the deha, body, is a matter of debate between the schools, all concur that
the deha is finite, is born and dies and changes in each birth according to the accumulated puõya, meritorious, and pâpa, demeritorious, karma.3
In contrast, the jîva is eternal, temporarily resides in a body and is partly responsible for the accumulation of karma. The jîva, also sometimes
known as the âtman, self, suffers the bondage of rebirth but may
eventually reap the benefits of mokùa, liberation.4 Each school offers a new cognitive paradigm and accompanying path by which the jîva can
escape. But, if this knowledge is available, why is the jîva ignorant?
What is the cause of the jîva’s bondage?
Bandha , bondage
Madhvâcârya believes that jîvas are bound in a beginningless cycle of
birth and rebirth. Bandha refers to the relationship of the jîva, enduring self, with the deha, the external body. The jîva remains in bandha because of its ajñâna, ignorance, of brahman and of the universe. Its relationship with the deha ends only upon attaining mokùa.
Despite being beginningless, bandha and its mechanisms depend on
Viùõu to exist. In fact, they cannot be independent. After all, Viùõu is the
only independent entity in the universe and bandha is no exception.5
In this way, Madhvâcârya need not explain the details of the origins
2 ahamitieva yo vedyaþ sa jîva iti kîrtitaþ | sa duþkhî sa sukhî caiva sa pâtraü bandhamokùayoþ | iti ca paramaúrutiþ | VTV. In his commentary, Jayatîrtha explains that the jîva is the one that knows ‘I am a sufferer.’ yaþ sa duþkhî ... . |
Viùõutattva(vi)nirõaya-ñika, 698.
3 See Chapter 1, ‘Basic Theological Issues’. The Advaita school of Vedânta, for example, holds that dehas do not exist at the highest level of reality.
4 Though there are discussions about the difference between jîva and âtman, I will not address them here.
5 bandhako bhavapâúena bhavapâúâc ca mocakaþ | VTV.
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of karma, bandha and ajñâna yet can maintain the independence and omnipotence of Viùõu. But why does Viùõu create bandha in the first
place?
Madhvâcârya never explicitly explains why Viùõu created the
universe and all of its elements. It may be that Viùõu created out of
lîlâ, playful sport, though this explanation is functionally equivalent