Why People Die By Suicide

Home > Other > Why People Die By Suicide > Page 27
Why People Die By Suicide Page 27

by Thomas Joiner

represent a good example of the coming together of theory and

  treatment. Beck and many other people working from a cognitive

  206 ● WHY PEOPLE DIE BY SUICIDE

  viewpoint have developed theories of psychopathology wherein a

  maladaptive schema for the understanding and making sense of one’s

  role in the world confers vulnerability to various forms of psycho-

  pathology. The treatment revolves around correcting the maladap-

  tive schema.

  My goal in this chapter is to try to emulate Beck in a useful, rele-

  vant, and productive bringing together of theory and practice. The

  previous chapters have laid out the theory and its anecdotal and sci-

  entific support. This chapter attempts to use the theory to inform

  clinical practice regarding suicidal behavior, starting with the impor-

  tant area of suicide risk assessment.

  Risk Assessment

  Recall the distinction between the alarmist and the dismissive ap-

  proach to suicide risk assessment. The alarmist position involves the

  idea that whenever someone mentions suicide, it is a life-threatening

  situation and alarms should be sounded. Those who take a dis-

  missive approach make a mistake in the opposite direction. They be-

  come blasé about suicidal behavior, often attributing it to manipula-

  tion or gesturing on the part of the potentially suicidal person. A

  compromise is thus needed between the alarmist and dismissive

  approaches—one that is efficient and clinically useful, scientifically

  supported, and conceptually consistent with the model developed in

  this book.

  Any risk assessment system has to grapple with the fact that there

  are dozens of suicide risk factors, some of which are associated with

  imminent risk (e.g., severe agitated anxiety), and others of which are

  important but are more distal and not clearly tied to imminent risk

  (e.g., family history of suicide). In fact, a quick survey of the websites

  of organizations like the American Association of Suicidology, the

  American Foundation for Suicide Prevention, and the American Psy-

  Assessment, Intervention, Treatment, and Prevention ● 207

  chological Association, among many others, shows that over seventy-

  five factors are listed as suicide risk factors or warning signs, includ-

  ing things as diverse and questionable as “loss of religious faith,”

  “neurotransmitters,” “perfectionism,” and “loss of security.” Given

  limited time, clinicians cannot thoroughly assess all of these various

  factors, and even if they could, how are they to organize the resulting

  mass of data?

  Of all the numerous risk factors and warning signs, do any stand

  out as particularly important? If so, then a risk assessment approach

  might be built around them. Of course, based on the model devel-

  oped in this book, the acquired ability to enact lethal self-injury de-

  serves emphasis, as do perceived burdensomeness and low belong-

  ingness. To assess acquired ability, my colleagues and I argued that

  two factors deserve particular weight: a history of multiple suicide

  attempts and the specific nature of current suicidal symptoms, with

  specific reference to whether the symptoms include resolved plans

  and preparations or suicidal desire.

  Multiple attempt status is emphasized because it is perhaps the

  clearest marker of the acquired ability for lethal self-injury. The dis-

  tinction between resolved plans and preparations and suicidal desire

  is important too. Resolved plans and preparations includes the fol-

  lowing symptoms: a sense of courage to make an attempt; a sense

  of competence to make an attempt; availability of means to and op-

  portunity for attempt; specificity of plan for attempt; preparations

  for attempt; duration of suicidal ideation; and intensity of suicidal

  ideation. Suicidal desire includes a different set of symptoms: reasons

  for living, wish to die, frequency of ideation, wish not to live, passive

  attempt, desire for attempt, and talk of death or suicide.

  Symptoms of the resolved plans and preparations cluster are evi-

  dence of the person’s ability to lethally injure themselves, because the

  symptoms require a fearlessness and sense of resolve in order to for-

  mulate clear and actionable plans about death. My theory also sug-

  208 ● WHY PEOPLE DIE BY SUICIDE

  gests a broadening of the focus in suicide risk assessment from mul-

  tiple attempters to anyone who has, through various means, acquired

  the capability for lethal self-injury. This capability is acquired by

  means of repeated practice or repeated exposure to self-injury. Prac-

  titioners should assess for instances in which a patient may have been

  able to practice self-harm, including aborted suicide attempts. Expe-

  riences like multiple surgeries and repeated tattooings and piercings

  represent other possible areas of inquiry. Various forms of exposure

  to violence, as well as other provocative experiences like self-injecting

  drug use, are other possible areas of investigation.

  Another implication of the theory is that the desire for suicide

  may be most pernicious when it contains themes of both burden-

  someness and thwarted belongingness. If suicidal desire in general is

  endorsed, it should be explored as to whether burdensomeness and

  thwarted belongingness undergird it. If so, risk may be more ele-

  vated; if not, risk may be more moderate. One complexity is that

  feelings of burdensomeness and low belongingness are not necessar-

  ily static; they are fluid and may vacillate in some people. A patient

  who has mild feelings of burdensomeness one week may have intense

  feelings the next day or the next week. A person who genuinely

  professes strong belongingness on one day may subsequently de-

  velop a sense of disconnectedness on another day, perhaps as a func-

  tion of relationship conflict. Clinicians therefore have to monitor

  risk regularly, even in previously low-risk patients, and in particular

  need to monitor variables like perceived burdensomeness and failed

  belongingness, which are both central and fluctuating.

  Returning to the overall risk assessment framework, it emphasizes

  two general domains—multiple attempt status and the two factors of

  suicidal symptoms described earlier (resolved plans and preparations

  and suicidal desire). For multiple attempters and those who indicate

  they have resolved plans and preparations for suicide, risk assess-

  ment proceeds differently than for everybody else. In these cases, risk

  Assessment, Intervention, Treatment, and Prevention ● 209

  is automatically viewed as elevated, especially in the presence of at

  least one other risk factor (e.g., burdensomeness, low belongingness,

  current and serious substance abuse, or severe negative life events).

  For those who are neither multiple attempters nor endorse symp-

  toms of the resolved plans and preparations factor but who do have

  symptoms of suicidal desire, the threshold to establish elevated risk is

  set higher.

  More specifically, here is how the framework is used: For multi-

  ple attempters, mos
t any other additional risk factor (e.g., substance abuse) translates into at least moderate suicide risk. For nonmultiple attempters, those with resolved plans and preparations and most

  any other additional risk factor are at moderate suicide risk at

  least. For nonmultiple attempters with no resolved plans and preparations but who do voice suicidal desire, the presence of two or more additional risk factors translates into at least moderate suicide risk.

  The framework is not a completely automated statistical predic-

  tion rule, but provides a relatively objective starting point for clinical

  decision-making in risk assessment. In Chapter 1, I mentioned my

  patient “Gayle,” who had recurrent depressions and who had de-

  veloped ideas about dying by severing her hand with a machete.

  She had acquired the ability to enact lethal self-injury not through

  previous suicidal behavior—she had never attempted suicide—but

  through severe substance abuse and an array of associated painful

  and provocative experiences in her past. When I saw her, she had

  been sober for many years, but there were residues of this past, and

  one was the acquired ability to lethally injure herself.

  I wanted to hospitalize Gayle because of her clear and detailed sui-

  cide plan and perhaps especially because of her sense of calm and her

  lack of fear about the plan. But she was not at particularly high risk

  for suicide, because she did not report thwarted belongingness and

  perceived burdensomeness. On the contrary, Gayle was very con-

  210 ● WHY PEOPLE DIE BY SUICIDE

  nected to her son and had many friends. Also, she was a particularly

  capable woman, and there was no evidence that she felt ineffective,

  certainly not to the point that she believed she burdened others. The

  risk assessment framework described above clarifies clinical deci-

  sion-making regarding a situation that would otherwise be very dif-

  ficult to handle.

  When combined with the current theory, an assessment approach

  like the one just described encourages scientifically and theoretically

  informed assessment and relatively routinized clinical decision-mak-

  ing and activity. This assessment approach also represents a satisfy-

  ing integration of theory and application. This same kind of integra-

  tion can be seen in the important area of crisis management and

  resolution, to be discussed next.

  Crisis Intervention

  As demonstrated by the case of Gayle, the acquired ability to enact

  lethal self-injury, once in place, does not fade quickly. It is a relatively static quality that does not come and go over time. It therefore would

  not be a particularly useful focus for crisis intervention, where the

  goal is to take the edge off the pain of the current crisis, so that it is

  within a tolerable range. Since acquired ability is unlikely to change

  much in the short-term, it does not provide any leverage to accom-

  plish short-term reduction of distress.

  By contrast, professionals who deal with suicidal crises would do

  well to focus on burdensomeness and belongingness. Unlike the ac-

  quired capability for serious suicidal behavior, burdensomeness and

  belongingness may be more malleable and thus more amenable to

  short-term crisis intervention. My colleagues and I have described

  techniques for in-session diminution of distress.6 For example, tech-

  niques such as the symptom-matching hierarchy and development

  of a crisis card often take the edge off of intense negative moods.

  Each of these techniques is described next.

  Assessment, Intervention, Treatment, and Prevention ● 211

  The symptom-matching hierarchy simply involves listing disrup-

  tive symptoms and feelings. The patient ranks these in terms of

  which are most upsetting (e.g., as rated on a one-to-ten scale). For

  the top two or three symptoms or feelings, very concrete recommen-

  dations are made (e.g., sleep hygiene for insomnia; relaxation for

  general emotional distress; pleasant activities for depressive symp-

  toms). These recommendations are not intended or expected to solve

  the problem or to even change it very much; rather, they are intended

  to just take the edge off of the problem, so that the person is some-

  what more comfortable and thus better able to tolerate the crisis and

  to start working toward solving the underlying problems.

  Feelings of burdensomeness and low belongingness should rou-

  tinely be targeted within this straightforward crisis-resolution ap-

  proach. For example, a clinician might say, “I see that you perceive

  yourself a burden on your family, but do they see it the same way?”;

  or “Let’s briefly review the relationships and groups, not just right

  now but in the past too, to which you felt a sense of belonging”; or

  “Let’s review the ways you have contributed to people or society, not

  just right now but in the past too.” The therapist could summarize

  the products of this discussion, perhaps in bulleted form on an index

  card, and give the summary to the patient, with instructions to ex-

  pand and elaborate the list at home. Again, the point of this exercise

  is not to fully undo underlying feelings of burdensomeness and low

  belongingness, but to destabilize and reduce them slightly, so that the

  patient will be in a better position to handle the current crisis and

  build skills through therapy that will eventually target long-standing

  problems.

  The crisis card is another simple technique designed to lessen the

  intensity of a crisis so that more clear-headed approaches can emerge.

  The crisis card simply involves the development of a straightforward

  crisis plan that can be written down on an index card or a sheet of

  paper. An example would be:

  212 ● WHY PEOPLE DIE BY SUICIDE

  When I’m upset and thinking of suicide, I’ll take the following steps:

  1. Use what I’ve learned in therapy to try to identify what is upset-

  ting me, focusing especially on feeling I’m a burden on others and

  like I don’t belong;

  2. Write down and review some reasonable, nonsuicidal responses

  to what is bothering me;

  3. Try to do things that, in the past, have made me feel better (e.g.,

  music, exercise, etc.);

  4. If the suicidal thoughts continue and get specific, or I find my-

  self preparing for suicide, I’ll call the emergency call person at

  (phone number);

  5. If I feel that I cannot control my suicidal behavior, I’ll go to the

  emergency room or call 911.

  Both the symptom-matching hierarchy and the in-session devel-

  opment of a crisis card may dilute intense distress then and there in

  the session. Both techniques should be focused on relieving feelings

  of burdensomeness and low belongingness. This, in turn, may de-

  crease discomfort—not completely, but enough so that difficulties

  can be better tolerated and tackled with skill-based therapeutic tech-

  niques (to be discussed in the next section). A slight decrease in dis-

  comfort, incidentally, may also facilitate the occurrence of general

  positive moods, which my colleagues and I have shown improves

  treatment outcome
in suicidal individuals.7

  I recommend the use of a crisis card, as described above, instead of

  what are known as “no-suicide contracts.” No-suicide contracts are

  written agreements that patients will not attempt suicide while under

  treatment. They usually are signed by both patient and therapist.

  One reason that I do not recommend them is that they apparently do

  not work very well. For example, a survey of Minnesota psychiatrists

  found that of those who used no-suicide contracts, over 40 percent

  reported that they had patients die by suicide or make a near-lethal

  Assessment, Intervention, Treatment, and Prevention ● 213

  attempt while under a contract.8 In a study of self-harm incidents

  among psychiatric inpatients, some of whom were on no-suicide

  contracts, there was some indication that being under contract was

  associated with more self-harm.9 This could be because the most seriously ill patients were put under contract, but nevertheless, it does

  not represent a ringing endorsement of no-suicide contracts.

  Another reason that I do not use no-suicide contracts is that they

  only tell patients what not to do and neglect telling patients what

  they should do instead. Relatedly, no-suicide contracts ignore impor-

  tant aspects of the model developed in this book. Instead of advising

  patients not to try suicide, a better approach would be to advise them

  what to do in the event that suicidality in general escalates and that

  perceived burdensomeness and feelings of failed belongingness in

  particular intensify. The crisis card accomplishes this.

  I borrow one last thought on crisis intervention from William

  James. He wrote that to persuade a suicidal person to live, one could

  “appeal—and appeal in the name of the very evils that make his

  heart sick—to wait and see his part in the battle out.”10 In their 1933

  book on suicide, Dublin and Bunzel expand the point: “the consent

  to live on is a resignation based on manliness and pride” (pardon

  their politically incorrect use of “manliness,” which I suppose was

  not politically incorrect in 1933). This perspective neglects the pain

  of perceived burdensomeness and failed belongingness; when these

  feelings are very intense, people do not want to continue living re-

  gardless of pride or manliness. However, it is an interesting idea to

 

‹ Prev