Bismarck took office after promising the king that army reorganization could be carried through without subjecting the monarch to the will of the parliamentary majority. Yet his initial attempts to find a compromise that might split the opposition met with no more success than those of his predecessors. At a meeting with the lower house budget committee on 30 September, Bismarck vainly attempted to win over the Liberals by urging the importance of an enlarged Prussian army if the state were to provide leadership in Germany:
Prussia’s borders under the treaties of Vienna are not favourable to the healthy existence of the state. The great questions of the day will not be settled by speeches and majority decisions – that was the great mistake of 1848 and 1849 – but by iron and blood.1
The Liberal press denounced his words. He was widely mistrusted as a feudal anachronism whose tenure of power would be short. Were not the Liberals riding the wave of the future towards greater parliamentary power and German unity? Did not Queen Augusta, the Crown Prince and his English wife Princess Victoria detest Bismarck and the reaction he stood for? Bismarck changed tactics, demonstrating that his power rested on the favour of the king, to whom alone he was answerable and to whom he made himself indispensable. Unable to break the deadlock with Parliament, he bypassed it, declaring that a ‘gap’ existed in the constitution. The crown held all the machinery of state in its hands and simply collected the taxes it needed. Bismarck flouted legality and ruthlessly used every means of intimidation, censorship and undue influence the government could bring to bear against the Liberals, but he kept his promise to the king. Wilhelm got his enlarged army.
The army soon faced a test in a campaign against Denmark. The Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein had remained a bone of contention between Danes and Germans since the 1848 war. When in November 1863 the Danes sought to bind Schleswig by closer constitutional ties, nationalist sentiment ignited across Germany, and the Federal Diet clamoured to send troops.
Bismarck worked not to champion but to forestall the nationalists. His conversations and writings were peppered with contempt for German nationalism, which he considered a ‘swindle’. ‘I am a Prussian, not a German,’ was his attitude, and he had claimed that Bavarians were as foreign to him as Spaniards.2 For Bismarck, vigorous pursuit of Prussian interests was the only rational basis for the conduct of foreign policy; not Liberal, nationalist or indeed conservative ideology. He had visualized more clearly than fellow conservatives how Prussia might one day harness German nationalism to extend her power, but without being taken prisoner by it. To the disgust of the other states, Prussia and Austria announced that they, not the Confederation, would take the lead against Denmark, and only on the basis of existing international treaties. Austria risked alienating the German states to ally with Prussia because her ministers thought it the best means of controlling Prussian ambitions, and the racial diversity of her empire made it dangerous for Austria to champion nationalism. An ultimatum to the Danes required them to evacuate Schleswig. When they refused, a joint force of 65,000 Austrian and Prussian troops entered it on 1 February 1864.
How would the Prussian army perform? Evidently it had improved since embarrassed French and British observers had watched its inept manoeuvres in 1861, when the French General Forey remarked that the Prussians risked compromising the profession of arms. Moving across the snow-swept duchies against a smaller opponent, Prussian infantry seemed solid rather than remarkable, showing neither the dash of Austrian troops nor their élan with the bayonet. Prussian troops and supplies rolled smoothly to the front by railway under Moltke’s direction, but the advance of the Prussian contingent seemed cautious. Only after much urging by Bismarck was the king’s nephew, Prince Friedrich Karl, persuaded to mount the assault which resulted in the storming of the redoubtable Danish fortifications at Düppel on 18 April.
The victory unleashed patriotic celebration in Prussia and, just in time, strengthened Bismarck’s hand at the conference of the powers on the Danish question which convened in London, necessitating an armistice. International divisions favoured Prussia. French sympathy for the Poles during their 1863 rebellion had sharply cooled Napoleon III’s relations with Russia. His call for a European Congress in November 1863, declaring that the 1815 treaties had ‘ceased to exist’, had been rebuffed by the other powers, who rightly suspected Napoleon’s ambitions on the left bank of the Rhine. Britain, disillusioned by Napoleon’s annexations in Italy and his building of an armoured fleet, had indignantly rejected the proposal. Russia, Britain and France were not disposed to cooperate to save the Danes, who had obstinately put themselves in breach of international treaties of which Bismarck posed as the defender. The London conference broke up in June 1864, leaving him a free hand.
When fighting resumed, the Danes were compelled to ask for terms in barely a fortnight. Observers scarcely had time to note what some brisk skirmishes revealed of the needle gun’s potential in the hands of well trained and commanded units. For instance, at Lundby on 3 July 180 Danes armed with rifled muskets surprised 124 Prussians armed with needle guns. Within twenty minutes half the Danes were dead or wounded and the rest driven off. The Prussians suffered three wounded. General Bourbaki, who visited Prussian rifle ranges that year with King Wilhelm’s permission, reported to Napoleon III on the remarkable accuracy and rapidity of fire of the needle gun. Other foreign observers were less impressed. Certainly the needle gun allowed the infantryman to fire and reload from the prone position, so exposing himself less to enemy fire, and to fire more rapidly than an enemy armed with a muzzle-loader. But its effective range was inferior to the muzzle-loader and the firing pin had a tendency to break. Serious questions remained about whether the open tactics favoured by the Prussians to reduce casualties would allow officers to control their men adequately during attacks. Moreover, the very rapidity of fire could lead inexperienced men to burn their ammunition too quickly and wildly: no trivial problem when supplies were limited. The Austrian example of mass bayonet charges, based on French tactics in Italy, seemed to many experts better adapted for use by conscripts and more likely to give decisive results in any future conflict.
Bismarck Confronts Austria
Despite their alliance for the Danish war, Bismarck’s attitude towards Austria had become abrasive since his days as Prussian representative to the Diet. Austrian arrogance had convinced him that ‘The policy of Vienna means that Germany is just too small for us both; so long as an honourable arrangement concerning the influence of each cannot be concluded and carried out, we will both plough the same disputed acre.’ He thought that ‘in the not too distant future, we shall have to fight for our existence against Austria and … it is not within our power to prevent that, since the course of events in Germany has no other solution.’3 During both the Crimean and the Italian wars Bismarck had argued that Prussia should take advantage of Austria’s difficulties. Instead of heading for the Rhine in 1859 he suggested that while Austria was fighting France Prussian troops should march south ‘with boundary posts in their knapsacks’ as far as the Protestant religion predominated.4 Once in power, Bismarck frankly told the Austrian ambassador that he aimed to establish Prussian domination in northern Germany, hopefully with Austrian cooperation, but hinting strongly that other methods were not debarred if Austria opposed him.
By the peace treaty of October 1864, defeated Denmark yielded the duchies to the joint sovereignty of Austria and Prussia. Disputes between the two powers over their conquest led within two years to a war in which the stake was nothing less than mastery in Germany. From the start Bismarck pursued annexation of the duchies to Prussia. The Austrians had no long-term interest in the duchies and were willing to consider a bargain whereby Prussia might annex them in return for compensation to Austria elsewhere. Despite her failing finances, enormous national debt and the growing demands of her non-German subject nationalities, Austria sought to maintain her power both in Germany and Italy. Bismarck set out to challenge these pretensions in the manner o
f Aesop’s lion, insisting on having half the donkey’s meal, then repeatedly demanding half of what the donkey had left.
Yet the Austrians had no wish to give Bismarck any pretext for hostilities. In August 1865 they sent an emissary to Wilhelm while he was taking the waters at Bad Gastein, and a compromise was agreed. Prussia and Austria would retain joint sovereignty over the duchies, but Prussia would administer Schleswig and Austria Holstein. Prussia would also retain important rights in Holstein, including rights of transit and two concessions vital to German naval ambitions: control of the base at Kiel plus the right to build a canal from the Baltic to the North Sea. Notwithstanding that Bismarck had the best of this bargain, he was seeking new quarrels with Austria within weeks. Playing the bully, he mixed threats with protests of injured innocence. By 28 February 1866 the Prussian crown council was making plans for the probability of war. Only the Crown Prince protested at such a course.
In challenging Austria, Bismarck’s hand was strengthened by the economic transformation that had taken place since the confrontation over Hesse-Cassel in 1850, when Prussia’s army totalled 131,000 against Austria’s armed forces of 434,000. Since 1850 Prussia’s heavy industry, communications, commerce and banking had developed by leaps and bounds. By comparison, Austria’s over-extended empire had grown more slowly by almost any measure. But production statistics alone could not ensure victory. Austria could field a formidable 400,000 men in 1866. Moltke urged the necessity of allying with Italy, whose army of 200,000, opening a southern front against Austria, should enable Prussia’s 300,000 to meet the Austrians on equal terms on the northern front. The Italians were amenable, being eager to take Venetia from the Habsburgs as spoil from an Austro-Prussian contest. A secret military alliance, signed on 8 April, committed the Italians to join a war against Austria if Prussia began one within three months. This virtually set a deadline for the commencement of hostilities, and breached the constitution of the German Confederation which forbade alliances directed against member states.
Prussia had the advantage that Austria needed twice as long to mobilize and therefore would have to make the first move. Preliminary Austrian troop movements in March gave Bismarck a pretext for accusing Austria of aggression and enabled him to persuade Wilhelm to initiate similar moves. In April the Austrians proposed disarmament, and at the Prussian court opponents of a fratricidal war sought to counter the bellicose influence of Bismarck and Roon. Briefly it appeared that the doves might prevail, but on 20 April information reached Vienna of Italian troop concentrations on the Venetian border. Franz Josef ordered mobilization in the south to begin next day. Italy followed suit. Urged on by his generals, the Austrian Emperor ordered mobilization in the north on 1 May. An indignant Wilhelm responded by ordering Prussian mobilization. War was now all but certain. While mobilization proceeded, both sides engaged in a contest to win over German opinion. On 10 June Prussia presented a plan to the Diet for a new German Union excluding Austria. Austria responded by calling for Confederate mobilization against Prussia, and the vote was carried on the 14th. Next day Prussia declared the Confederation dissolved and her representative walked out.
The smaller German states had long dreaded and sought to avoid this choice, fearing that their sovereignty and independence would be ground between the upper and nether millstones of Prussia and Austria. When it was forced, most, save for some small states and free cities which were dependent upon Prussia, ranged themselves with Austria against her feared rival. The war against Austria was widely deplored. In the last days of peace the prime minister of Bavaria appealed to Bismarck: ‘Peace and war are in your hands. As a German, I pray you to examine your conscience one last time before saying the decisive word, the consequences of which are incalculable.’5 But the die was cast. Prussia sent ultimatums to her neighbours, Saxony, Hanover and Hesse-Cassel, requiring them to disarm. When they refused, Prussian troops began moving at midnight of 15 June. The Austro-Prussian War had begun.
Napoleon III Watches the Rhine
In setting out to coerce Austria out of Germany, Bismarck knew that the diplomatic situation continued to favour Prussian ambitions. Neither Russia nor Britain was inclined to an active role in European politics. France, however, remained a key piece on his chessboard. Before making any final decision for war he had been at pains to ensure her neutrality. He had visited the Emperor at the storm-swept resort of Biarritz in south-west France in October 1865 to reassure him that no anti-French alliance had been made at Gastein; nor had Prussia guaranteed Austria’s possession of Venetia, in which the Emperor made clear his close interest. Napoleon listened politely to Bismarck’s suggestions that an enlarged Prussia would be no threat to France, significantly raising no objection. Although no definite commitments apparently were asked for or given on either side, the outcome encouraged Bismarck to reassure Wilhelm that France would not stand in Prussia’s way.
Napoleon seemed to be in an excellent position as the quarrel between Austria and Prussia deepened. Military experts thought Austria the stronger party, but a long war was likely from which France might reap rewards. If he favoured any side, Napoleon seemed to lean towards Prussia, which was a force for change and might prove a useful protégé and even ally in northern Germany. A weakened Austria would enable France to gain influence in the South German states. It would also allow Napoleon to fulfil his promises made in 1859 by liberating restless Venetia from Austrian rule, thereby perhaps restoring his tarnished prestige and influence in Italy. Napoleon encouraged the Italians to ally with Prussia, so facilitating the war.
Would the Emperor ask any reward for his neutrality other than Venetia for the Italians? Napoleon dropped hints to the Prussian ambassador, mentioning the frontiers of 1814 and the Bavarian Palatinate, but declined to specify what he might demand. ‘I cannot point to an item of compensation; I can only assure you of my benevolent neutrality: I shall come to an understanding with your king later,’ he intimated in March 1866. In May he hinted to the ambassador that the Austrians were making overtures to him and that: ‘The eyes of my country are turned towards the banks of the Rhine.’6 He appeared to be playing a clever hand, keeping his options open to exploit the situation whatever the outcome of an Austro-Prussian War.
Although Napoleon’s diplomacy was secret, enough was known to inform a powerful public attack. Adolphe Thiers, leader of the French Government in the 1840 crisis, had been imprisoned and exiled briefly by Louis-Napoleon after the coup d’état of 1851. He had returned to politics in 1863, being elected to the Legislature. On 3 May 1866 he gave a superb performance in the Chamber, pushing the boundaries of criticism permitted by the imperial regime. He pointed to the dangers of encouraging Prussia’s aggressive designs and questioned the wisdom of France promoting a new German power and Italian unification. Thiers saw no advantage in revising the 1815 settlement of Germany. Stung by the attack and the stir it created, Napoleon declared at Auxerre three days later that he ‘detested’ the treaties of 1815.
The Emperor’s speech alarmed business circles and the public. Was he about to embark on some new foreign adventure? There was a run on the stock exchange. Ever attentive to public opinion, which strongly favoured peace and neutrality, Napoleon called for a European Congress to settle current disputes. To Bismarck’s relief, Austria would accept only on condition that no power should gain territory, effectively killing the proposal.
In the last days of peace, in June 1866, Napoleon nevertheless could be confident that his diplomacy would win Venetia for the Italians however the war turned out. In return for his pledge of neutrality, the Austrians undertook to surrender Venetia to him if they won. They also agreed verbally that, if they beat the Prussians, Napoleon could have Belgium, and the Rhineland would become a buffer state. Thus, as Prussian troops marched south, it seemed that Napoleon might gain handsomely from the war without shedding a drop of French blood. The Austrians, in desperation, had already offered him his price. Bismarck, meanwhile, was taking a double gamble, both on
the military outcome of the war, and on the unspecified reward France might exact for neutrality.
A Battle in Bohemia
Prussia’s offensive against Austria and her allies was executed with a speed and daring not seen since the days of Napoleon I. Moltke, the brain behind this strategy, champed with frustration during the political negotiations that followed the decision to mobilize, seeking to convince the king that with every passing week Prussia was losing her precious advantage in time. That advantage derived firstly from the Prussian system of stationing units in their home regions, so that they and their reservists reached their depots quickly upon mobilization; secondly from efficient use of the railway network to deploy forces close to the southern frontier in readiness for the advance. Moltke deployed his forces around an arc of 500 kilometres; partly because, to his irritation, he could not move them closer together until he was authorized to cross frontiers; partly because feeding masses of men was easier while they were dispersed; but also because a widely spread net created opportunities for confusing and enveloping the enemy. Moving his armies separately enabled them to move faster, and he boldly accepted the risks of leaving concentration until a trap could be closed.
Sedan 1870- The Eclipse of France Page 4