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Legalized Violence: Punitive Measures of Buddhist Khans in Mongolia
Vesna A. Wallace
The second conversion of the Mongols to Buddhism took place in the latter part of the sixteenth century. Since then until the first decades of the twentieth century, Mongolian Buddhist khans, nobles, and Buddhist monastics engaged more than once in acts of violence on behalf of their Buddhist faith. Their acts of violence manifested in various ways: the forceful replacement of Shamanism with Buddhism as a state religion, engagement in Buddhist sectarian wars, the implementation of harsh penal systems, and so on. The first violent action took place when the Khutukhtu Setsen Khung Taiji (1540–1586), the ruler of the Ordos Mongols, along with his relative Altan Khan (1508–1582), the ruler of Tümeds, initiated the Mongols’ conversion to Tibetan dGe lugs pa Buddhism and then attempted to institutionalize it among the southwestern Mongols. He did this by mercilessly vanquishing Mongolian shamans, burning shamanic spirit figurines (onghons), and introducing severe penalties, ranging from the confiscation of people’s entire property to exile or execution.
Those who demonstrated irreverence for Buddhist monks or who continued to perform the native funerary practices of blood sacrifice, to sponsor shamanic performances, or to make shamanic blood offerings on the first, eighth, and fifteenth days of a month were subjected to brutal punishments or executed. Setsen Khung Taiji published decrees requiring that, in every household, shamanic spirit figurines be replaced with six-armed Mahklas and animal sacrifices be replaced with bloodless offerings, fasting, and alms giving. His use of harsh force in implementing this exclusivist policy was based on his political aspirations. He sought to reestablish the dual governance of the Buddhist church and the state as it once existed in the relations between Qubilai Khan (1215–1294) and his imperial preceptor (guoshi), ‘Phags pa Bla ma of the Tibetan Sakya order.
To revive this principle of dual governance, which had pervaded the Mongolian political mentality of the earlier dynasty, Setsen Khung Taiji initiated Altan Khan’s conversion to Tibetan Buddhism and Altan Khan’s meeting with the high-ranking Tibetan dGe lugs pa lama, bSod nams rGya mtsho, who conferred upon Altan Khan the title of “universal emperor” (Skt. cakravartin). He also declared Altan Khan to be an incarnation of Qubilai Khan. Due to these two acts, bSod nams rGya mtsho was able to link Altan Khan (who lacked genealogical connection with the Golden Clan of Chinggis Khan) to Chinggis’s lineage and to legitimize Altan Khan’s power.
Likewise, in order to sanction the dual political enterprise by means of the imperial Mongolian past, Khutukhtu Setsen Khung Taiji brought to light and edited the White History of the Tenfold Virtuous Dharma (Arban Buyantu Nom-un Chaγaan Teükei), which he dated to the late thirteenth century and attributed to Qubilai Khan. The White History gives an account of the policy of dual law as initially implemented in India, then brought into Tibet, and ultimately introduced in Mongolia in the thirteenth century by Qubilai Khan on the initiative of his imperial preceptor, ‘Phags pa Bla ma. It traces the Buddhist governance based on the principle of dual law among the Mongols to Chinggis Khan himself, whom it characterizes as a consummate follower of the Buddha Dharma. This characterization illustrated the desire of the newly converted Mongolian Buddhist nobility for the unification of the church and state, which viewed Qubilai Khan and ‘Phags pa Bla ma as personifications of the unified civil and religious rules. In advocating governance based on the principle of dual law, The White History points to the indestructibility of the dual law by comparing Buddhist teachings to a silken knot that cannot be loosened and the laws of the khan to a golden yoke that cannot be crushed. Thus, where the law is enduring, the Dharma and the State will be lasting. Urging rulers to eradicate those antagonistic to the Dharma, the White History provided Khutukhtu Setsen Khung Taiji and Altan Khan with justification for eliminating the shamans who performed forbidden blood rituals, as well as those who sponsored them. While justifying his violence against those engaging in shamanic practices in light of ‘Phags pa’s guidance on building an empire based upon firm Buddhist principles, Setsen Khung Taiji conveniently ignored ‘Phags pa’s instructions, provided in Explanation of the Subject of Cognition (Shes bya rab gsal). Explanation of the Subject of Cognition was composed in 1278 at the request of Qubilai Khan’s son Jingim. In Advice to the Prince Jibigtemür, the So-called Jewel Rosary (Tib. rGyal bu ji big de mur la gdam du byas nor bu’i phren ba),1 ‘Phags pa appealed for the abolishment of capital punishment. He asserted: “He who washes out dirt from his cloth is wise, but not he who burns it along with the dirt.”2 In addition, Explanation of the Subject of Cognition encouraged Qubilai Khan not to resort to violence, on the grounds that violence is never effective in strengthening royal power.3
By ignoring this advice and implementing the aforementioned measures, Setsen Khung Taiji and Altan Khan set an example for other Mongol rulers. Appropriating the titles of cakravartins and dharmarjas, they subsequently attempted to restore the principle of dual governance whenever they saw a need to consolidate their power, because the principle enabled them to justify using violent methods in their struggle for political centralization and religious unification. Indeed, the White History advises state administrators to protect the Dharma and the state by implementing harsh measures when needed:
If a monk breaks his precepts, disrobe him. Tie his hands tightly and paint his face with ink. Place a black flag on his head. Put a rope around him and beat him with a golden stick on his buttocks. Then take him around the temple clockwise three times. Afterwards, banish him to a faraway place.
If one steals, blind his eyes. If one tells a lie, cut his tongue. If one injures the state, take his life.
For a common person, a kingdom is like a black sword. When a khan passes away, free all prisoners as [a sign of ] mercy. Afterwards, if someone commits a crime, imprison him. There are three kinds of prisoners who will not be set free: one who killed his spiritual mentor, one who drew blood from the Buddha’s body out of harmful intention, and one who harmed the state out of poisonous intentions. Those who committed any of these [crimes] will not have room in, this and another world.4
While the author of the White History perceived punishment for unforgivable crimes as deserved retribution, he considered other forms of punishment to be preventive measures—means of facilitating the prosperity of the Buddha Dharma and the state.
The ideas expounded in the White History echoed in the first Mongol law, the Altan Khan’s Law (Altan Khany Tsaaz). The Altan Khan’s praises the khan as the victorious, supreme ruler, an incarnation of the bodhisattva ryabala (Avalokitevara), and a protector and pacifier of all beings within the six realms of existence. It speaks of Altan Khan’s implementation of the dual law as a unification of the indestructible vajra and the Golden Yoke. The Altan Khan’s Law regards this unification as the khan’s means of facilitating the invincibility of the state and as his method of revealing and teaching the path of peace to the beings living in the deep darkness of ignorance, who are acquiring sin and neglecting virtue. This view served Altan Khan in two ways: first, it justified the forceful conversion of his Tümeds to Buddhism; second, it justified implementing harsh penalties upon administrative leaders (and anyone else) who failed to uphold the dual law within his administrative unit. Altan Khan saw these penalties to be in conformity with those imposed by the dharmarja, lord Yama himself.5
The later Mongolian author Tserenjav justified this stand on punishment in his Notes on Important Words Selected for the Ordained and the Laity (early twentieth century).6 In this work, Tserenjav mentions a dialogue between a teacher and a disciple. The disciple asks the question, “How does one distinguish the teaching of the Buddha from that of the king’s State?” The teacher replies that the principle of abandoning one’s own ten non-virtues is the teaching of the Buddha, while causing others to abandon the ten non-virtues is the teaching of the state. Hence, both strive for the same goal but use different methods. For this reason, dual g
overnance is to be understood as a sharp double-edged sword, whose two edges are the integrated state and religious laws that cut through the faults of a mundane life. It is evident that, for those who supported the principle of dual law, this type of integrated governance (one utilizing the methods of inner, spiritual development and those of civil improvement) was indispensable. It accomplished both the strengthening of the state and the spiritual purification of the nation.
This view is also advocated in the work entitled The Pure Morality of People (Ard Tümnii Ariun Yoson), composed in 1923 by Darpa Pandita of Ar Khalkha. It is further expanded upon in the text composed by Miggiddorj (Mi bsKyod rDo rJe) called The Mirror That Perfects the Pure Morality of People (Tib. Sa mtha’i btzun gzugs ban snyoms las pa). According to these two texts, the public principles of state governance promote the moral discipline of the individual and of the nation as a whole; the two texts complement and support private religious practice, which aims at the elimination of one’s own mental afflictions and the root of all social evils. Thus, the Buddhist principle of dual governance presumes that the pursuit of happiness depends as much on the common welfare as on individual happiness; it thereby depends on the policies of the state. In lieu of this, it sees itself as a tool for achieving the social purpose of personal and common welfare. In accordance with these views on dual governance, Buddhist legal theorists viewed punishment as having two principal aims: the moral regeneration of the person and the prevention of crime. If the aim of law is to make people virtuous, then it is permissible for the state to legislate against potentially dangerous or harmful actions, for the benefit of those being coerced.
Khutukhtu Setsen Khung Taiji’s extreme measures against indigenous Mongolian practices conveyed the message that at times it is necessary for a Buddhist ruler to sanction acts of violence for the sake of establishing the Dharma and for securing the inner stability of the state. As attested in the codes of law instituted by later Mongolian rulers, this message echoed for a long time in the minds of Buddhist legislators and in the penal systems they established. Following the instructions given in the White History, which endorses the institutionalization of the Buddha Dharma and the enactment of firm laws by the khan, the Mongol rulers severely punished those who disobeyed their religious and secular ordinances.
This inculcation of virtue through legislation seems to contradict the view expressed in early Buddhist texts that laws come into existence when virtue among the people is in decline and when the Dharma deteriorates. For example, in the Bhaddali sutta of the Majjhima Nikya, the Buddha states that when the basis for moral defilements manifests, it is time to lay down rules to ward off those taints—but not before an event occurs that requires the formulation of an appropriate rule.7 Similarly, the later originators of Mongolian legal codes that inculcate virtue either implicitly or explicitly justified their legislation and harsh punitive measures on the basis of moral degeneration among the Mongols.
Although a prohibition of shamanic practices continued into subsequent centuries, as evidenced in the Mongol-Oirat Code enacted in 1640, the earlier harsh penalties for those practices were reduced to more reasonable fines of animals. However, other brutal and gruesome punishments, either inherited from the past or introduced by Manchu rulers into the Mongolian penal system, continued until 1921, when the Mongolian revolutionary government was formed. Most violent punishments were dispensed primarily for civil crimes, but brutal beatings were also legislated by the state for breaching Buddhist practices and etiquette. The harsh punishments prescribed in various penal codes were often justified indirectly with opening eulogies to legislators, many of whom were recognized as high, incarnate lamas (khutukhtus) and living buddhas (khuvilgans); they were praised for being accomplished in virtue and wisdom and for being endowed with unbiased compassion.
The punitive statutes instituted by Tüshetü Khan and other dignitaries of Khalkha in 1728 were inserted in the earlier version of “The Khalkha Regulations of the Western Khüree” (Baruun Khüreenii Khalkh Juram). These statutes end with an explanation of the pure motivation and virtuous mindset in which they were enacted. The penal codes also often begin with prayers to the buddhas and bodhisattvas for the spiritual and social well-being of the nation because their authors intended to point out the virtue-centered character of the contents of the penal codes and of those who enacted them.8 There is a strong resemblance of these opening salutations and prayers to those in the more pronouncedly religious works of Buddhist literature dealing with subjects of philosophy, ritual, and the like. This resemblance suggests that the authors of these penal systems considered their work to be their sacred duty and their codes an exclusive type of religious Buddhist text. Another possible reason behind this is that a virtue-centered punitive system requires trust in the ethical capacities of the khans and legislators dedicated to the Buddha Dharma, regardless of how cruel they may appear. Its virtuous character renders it as a just law; it also explains and justifies the khan’s use of coercive and uncompromising power.
Mongol lawmakers assumed the role of protectors of the Buddha Dharma and the state, instituted measures that protected monastic properties, defined the positions and privileges of Buddhist clergy in society, and regulated the conduct of ordained Buddhists and their interactions with lay communities and state authorities. For example, according to the “Khalkha Regulations,” attacks on monasteries were punishable by exile and the confiscation of serfs if the offender was a nobleman. If the attacker was a commoner, however, punishments included the death penalty and confiscation of property. By legislating social and ritual practices that were in accordance with Buddhist teachings and monastic rules and by introducing penal measures for the infractions of both monks and laypeople, Mongolian legislators converted Buddhist teachings and practices into state law.
Similarly, when the Manchu Qing dynasty conquered Mongolia in the seventeenth century, the Manchu rulers identified their roles as Tantric cakravartins and emanations of the dark-blue bodhisattva Mañjur1 (whose iconographic presentation appears in a semi-ferocious form). The Manchu rulers declared themselves to be the fervent guardians of Mongolian Buddhism. Under this pretense, they instituted the Mongolian Code of Laws (Mong. Mongol Tsaazyn Bichig, or Menggu Luli) in 1643, which underwent several revisions. It became increasingly harsh in regulating both secular and religious matters; under Emperor Qianlong’s rule (1736–1796), capital sentences and penal exiles increased and corporal punishments became widespread.
The traditional Mongolian form of bloodless execution consisted of breaking the person’s spine by bending it backward in the shape of a bow (khövchdön alakh) and subsequently strangling the person from behind. In addition, the Manchu rulers applied two other forms of the death penalty not previously practiced among the Mongols: decapitation (tsavchin alakh) and cutting the culprit’s body into pieces (ogtchin alakh). The property of those lawbreakers who were sentenced to one of these forms of execution would also be confiscated and their families enslaved and given as awards to others. The crimes for which the aforementioned death penalties were dispensed ranged from illegal sable hunting and illegal collecting or purchasing of ginseng, to intentional murder, robbery, the theft of large herds, arson, the desecration of graves, a commoner’s intimate relations with a wife of a nobleman, and so on. In all cases that resulted in the death penalty, the final decision was made by the imperial emanation of Mañjur1 himself. His function in this matter resembled that of the lord Yama, who is depicted in the Saddharmasmtyupasthna stra as ordering his servants to mutilate and hack to pieces the body of the guilty party, who was destined to this type of karmic retribution. An appeal for a pardon or for a change of the capital sentence was successful only if the person sentenced to capital punishment was a wealthy nobleman; he could replace his death sentence with a large fine, such as a herd of horses. During this period, juridical standardization of punitive measures was introduced into the Mongolian legal system. Two extant documents from this period, “Havin
g the Red Cheek” (Ulaan Khatsart) and “Having the Broken Face” (Khugarkhai Nüürt), contain records of cases that attest to this fact and to the cruelty of the penal system at that time.
Following the fall of the Qing dynasty, the autonomous Mongolian Bogd Khan State was established in 1911. The Eighth Jebtsundamba Bogdo Gegeen ascended to the throne as absolute monarch and as the “Holder of the Power of the Church and State.” As the embodiment of dual governance, he held two seals: one for religious affairs and one for state affairs. The inscription on his seals for religious affairs read: “The Golden Seal of Jebtsundamba, the Disseminator of Dharma, the Bestower of Happiness to Sentient Beings, the Omniscient, and the Most Sublime.” The Laws and Regulations to Actually Follow (Mong. Jinkhene Yavakh Dagaj Khuuly Dürem)9 were inaugurated by the order of the Eighth Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu in 1913. Under his auspices, the two types of execution previously introduced by Manchu rulers were replaced with execution by gun. However, armed attacks on monasteries and robberies in which the number of stolen animals exceeded twenty or thirty were still punishable by breaking the spine of the person who orchestrated the attack or robbery. Likewise, other forms of legalized brutality continued in various forms of interrogation methods and punitive actions. For instance, there were nine types of torture inherited from the Qing period as legally sanctioned means of extracting a confession from the accused: (1) flogging with a stick for up to fifty times, (2) beating with a long club for up to a hundred times, (3) beating the face with shoe soles for up to forty times, (4) tying the hands together with a narrow and wet rope, (5) trampling on the accused as he knelt on sharp pieces of wood or broken stones with a round stick placed behind his knees, (6) tying the hands with a rope and suspending him from a ceiling, (7) bolting his arms and legs to a thick and long piece of wood, (8) burning designated areas of his back and thighs with a large stick of burning incense, and (9) crushing his hands and feet in a special device until they were permanently damaged. The extent of these tortures was carefully orchestrated to ensure that the accused would suffer enough to confess but would not die during the interrogation. However, oral histories and well-kept archives from this period inform us that it was not uncommon for a person subjected to these interrogation methods to die within a week after the tortures ended.10
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