by Amanda
sarissai. Moreover the greater length of the sarissai meant that Greek
hoplite spears could not anyhow reach the Macedonian phalangites.61
These are all very hypothetical arguments, however, especially when even
sources describing successive battles fought by Alexander tell us that the
Macedonian phalanx incurred loses in clashes with Greek hoplites.
Therefore even with their longer sarissai Macedonian phalangites were
60 Feyel 1935; Polyaen., 4.2.10 in Krentz’ translation. Griffith 1979, pp. 422-423;
Lush 2007.
61 Markle 1982, p. 94; Borza 1990, pp. 288-289; Hammond 1994, p. 18-19. On
deflecting arrows by the dense forest of sarissai: Plb., 18.30.3-4.
28
Chapter I
not invulnerable. Above all the argument that armour was superfluous is
countered by the fact that phalangite officers wore it. In accordance with
the universal custom of that period, officers were recruited from higher
social groups than ordinary soldiers and therefore they would have been
able to afford to buy armour if it offered them significant protection during
battle. This suggests that there may have been non-military reasons for not
equipping Macedonian phalangites with abdominal armour, which, apart
from the shield, was the most expensive item of a phalangite’s gear. It is
therefore plausible that Philip took into account the fact that most
phalangites could not afford abdominal armour and, what is more, on
account of the cost of constant wars, nor could his treasury. In other words
he realised he would have to economise on this particular expenditure.
Having to decide between a small, at most a couple of thousand-strong,
hoplite army and a much larger though less well armoured army of
phalangites, Philip chose the latter. As it turned out, he made the right
decision.62
Thus a phalangite’s protective armour was generally limited to the
helmet and shield. The phalangite’s helmet did not offer as much
protection as that of the hoplites (among whom the most popular sort was
of the Corinthian type), but it was lighter to wear and did not limit the field
of vision so much. Both these factors would have been significant for the
Macedonian phalanx, which had to be very mobile and flexible. The
phalangite suspended his shield on a strap around his neck and shoulder as
he needed to hold his long sarissa with both hands. Moreover, his shield,
called the telamon, was much smaller than the hoplite aspis shield; the
former measuring on average 60 cm in diameter as opposed to ca. 90 cm
in diameter of the aspis. This reduced size meant that the shield would not
hinder movement when marching in battle formation. Although the
telamon offered less protection, it allowed the Macedonian phalanx to
fight in a tighter formation than its Greek equivalent.63
Even the shortest sarissa was more than twice as long as the hoplite
spear, which in the 4th century measured approximately 2.1-2.2 m and
weighed slightly over 1 kg. These two different types of weapon were
used differently. The hoplite would grip his spear with his right hand more
or less in the middle and when attacking the enemy he would raise it above
his head so as to thrust it on the opponent from above. The phalangite, on
the other hand, need both hands to hold his long sarissa. The best
description of a phalanx attacking with sarissai is provided by Polybius:
62 Griffith 1979, pp. 423-424; Billows 1990, p. 31; Billows 1994, pp. 12-13.
63 Markle 1982, pp. 92-93; Markle 1999; Lendon 2005, pp. 123-124, 417-418.
Childhood, Family, Macedonia
29
‘That when the phalanx has its characteristic virtue and strength, nothing
can sustain its frontal attack or withstand the charge can be easily
understood for many reasons. For since, when it has closed up for action,
each man, with his arms, occupies a space of three feet in breadth, and the
length of the pikes is according to the original design sixteen cubits, but
has now been adapted to the actual need of fourteen cubits, from which we
must subtract the distance between the bearer's two hands and the length
of the weighted portion of the pike behind, which serves to keep it
couched – four cubits in all – it is evident that it must extend ten cubits
beyond the body of each hoplite when he charges the enemy grasping it
with both hands. The consequence is that while the pikes of the second,
third, and fourth ranks extend farther than those of the fifth rank, but even
those of the fifth rank extend two cubits beyond the bodies of the men in
the first rank. Of course this is only possible when the phalanx has its
characteristic close order as regards to both depth and breadth… This
description is both true and fine, and it is evident that each man of the first
rank must have the points of five pikes extending beyond him, each at a
distance of two cubits from the next. From this we can easily conceive
what is the nature and force of a charge by the whole phalanx when it is
sixteen deep. In this case those further back than the fifth rank cannot use
their pikes so as to take any active part in the battle. Therefore they do not
severally level their pikes, but hold them slanting up in the air over the
shoulders of those in front of them, so as to protect the whole formation
from above, keeping off by this serried mass of pikes all missiles which,
passing over the heads of the first ranks, might fall on those in front of and
behind them. But these men by the sheer pressure of their bodily weight in
the charge add to its force, and it is quite impossible for the first ranks to
face about.’64
Written virtually as an addendum to his account of the 197 battle of
Cynoscephalae, Polybius’ description of a contemporary Macedonian
phalanx includes many significant characteristics in common with the
phalanx formation of the last of the great Argeads. The most significant
feature mentioned is the extension of the sarissai held by five ranks of
phalangites in front of the first rank. Of course one should not imagine that
these pikes were held in a stationary position – in all probability each
phalangite would be manoeuvring and thrusting his weapon in an attempt
to get at the enemy. With five ranks taking part in the fighting that was
two ranks more than in the Greek phalanx, and that of course gave the
Macedonian phalanx a natural advantage. The Macedonian phalanx in
64 Plb., 18.29-30.
30
Chapter I
Philip II’s time and for most of his son’s reign was most probably eight
ranks deep. According to the account of Callisthenes, that was, indeed,
how many ranks there were in Alexander’s phalanx at the Battle of Issus
in 333.65 The three ranks that did not directly engage in battle formed a
tactical reserve which could, for instance, turn about if the enemy tried to
attack the phalanx from behind. Ancient sources testify that various
manoeuvres were carried out by the phalanxes of Philip II and Alexander:
the last ranks turning round to face the opposite direction; moving aside to
let through charging chariots or feigning
a retreat from the battlefield. We
also know that the Macedonian phalanx was able to fight in both loose and
tight formations, depending on what the situation required. If we add to
this the ability of phalangites to expertly use diverse weapons, it becomes
very apparent that these skills were acquired through persistently long and
rigorous training. The above-mentioned sources (Diodorus and Polyaenus)
recount intensive exercises with weapons and 30-stadion marches fully
armed, with provisions and other necessary equipment. Such training not
only developed physical strength and endurance, but also made the
phalanx act as a single unit automatically and reliably able to follow the
commander’s orders even in the thick of battle. In fact Philip required such
toughness and staying power not just form the phalangites but from all his
soldiers. Polyaenus recounts an anecdote about Philip dismissing a
mercenary officer, Dokimos of Tarentum, for taking a warm bath, which
apparently even Macedonian women would not do after giving birth to a
child.66
Philip’s phalanx comprised large units called taxeis ( taxis in the
singular), each including approximately 1,500 soldiers. At the start of his
Asian campaign Alexander had eight such units. During his reign
particular taxeis were recruited from particular regions. We know of taxeis
being recruited from the Upper Macedonia regions of Tymphaea, Orestis
and Lyncestis as well as Elimeia. We do not know if the whole
Macedonian army was recruited on a territorial basis, but it is certain that
at the time of his expedition to Asia Alexander respected this rule,
allocating troops sent on by Antipater to army units recruited from the
same region. Respecting soldiers’ territorial loyalty was a way of building
a sense of unity, solidarity and pride in the Macedonian army. Smaller
military units called lochos comprised 240-256 soldiers. The smallest
65 Callisth., FGrH, 124 F35. Griffith 1979, p. 420.
66 Cawkwell 1978, p. 34; Manti 1992, pp. 37-38; Lloyd 1996, pp. 171-174; Hanson
1999, p. 150; Corvisier 2002, pp. 102-105. Polyaen., 4.2.1.
Childhood, Family, Macedonia
31
military unit, called the dekas, in Philip II’s time comprised ten soldiers,
whereas under Alexander the number was increased to 16.67
On account of the significant reduction in armour Macedonian
phalangites could not be categorized like the hoplites of the Greek phalanx
as a classical heavy infantry. Yet despite this formal dissimilarity, the
Macedonian phalanx performed exactly the same role in the battlefield as
the Greek phalanx, only the Macedonian phalangites generally performed
their task better. One of the significant organisational differences between
Greek hoplite phalanxes and those of Philip II was the elimination of
supply trains and a reduction in the number of army servants. In the
Macedonian army there was a servant to every cavalryman and one
servant to every ten phalangites, whereas in the Greek army every hoplite
was usually accompanied by his own servant who actually took no part in
the fighting. The limited number of servants greatly enhanced the
Macedonian army’s mobility and logistical capabilities. Unable to rely on
supply trains and servants to be employed as porters, the phalangites were
forced to greatly limit the amount of camp equipment they took on
expeditions. Moreover, given that similar numbers of soldiers were
involved, the Macedonian army required more or less half as much food as
a Greek army – regardless of whether they were fighting on behalf of their
own polis or as mercenaries serving the Persians. Without the supply trains
the Macedonian army was able to move surprisingly quickly and stay in
occupied territories for much longer, living, as was the military custom of
those times, off the enemy’s land, i.e. plundering or commandeering food
and other property.68
The Greek armies of the 4th century included elite groups of heavy
infantry of which the most famous was the so-called Theban Sacred Band,
founded in 378. This fairly small unit of just 300 hoplites, according to
ancient sources, comprised specially selected pairs of homosexual lovers.
In the opinion of Greek military theorists, this guaranteed that each soldier
would rather get himself killed in battle than show himself up in front of
his lover as a coward. Apart from the sexual orientation, purely physical
attributes were also taken into consideration and each such soldier
underwent thorough infantry and cavalry training so as to make the Sacred
Band a fully professional unit whose military value could at least be
compared to that of today’s commando units. They were commanded by
67 Anaximenes, FGrH, 72 F4; Diod., 17.57.2; Curt., 4.13.28; Arr., An. , 3.16.11.
Milns 1976, pp. 89, 103-105; Errington 1990, pp. 242-243; Lloyd 1996, pp. 171-
172; Sekunda 2007, pp. 330-331.
68 Fron., Str. , 4.1.6. Garlan 1994, p. 689; Hanson 1999, pp. 149, 174-176; van
Wees 2000, p. 109; Carney 2006, pp. 67-68.
32
Chapter I
the very best Theban commanders: Epaminondas, Pelopidas and
Pammenes. In pitched battles the Sacred Band would be positioned
opposite the strongest section of the enemy’s frontline. Its task was to
break through the ranks of this part of the enemy’s phalanx and kill the
enemy’s leader, at which point the battle was usually victoriously ended.
There are also known cases of the Sacred Band carrying out military
operations on its own.69 Historians presume that here too the Theban
example inspired Philip, who, according to Theopompus, decided to form
an elite infantry battalion comprising the tallest and strongest
Macedonians. In Philip’s time they were called the pezhetairoi (‘foot
companions’) and modelled on the aristocratic cavalry hetairoi
(‘companions’), which no doubt served to raise the new battalion’s
prestige and sense of self-esteem. The pezhetairoi served as the royal
guards and the elite unit must have been created early on because,
according to Demosthenes, it was already present in 350. Alexander,
wishing to win over the infantry, extended the prestigious name
pezhetairoi to refer to the whole phalanx, whereas the elite unit,
comprising by then most probably 3,000 soldiers, was re-named
hypaspists. The new name was derived from the word aspis, the hoplite
shield, which suggests that the hypaspists were armed similarly to the
hoplites. In the Macedonian army, especially under Alexander, the
hypaspists were entrusted with performing the most difficult and
physically demanding tasks such as the capturing of cities or crossing
mountainous barriers, while in the battle they often covered the exposed
right flank of the phalanx.70
The continuous stress on creating a strong Macedonian infantry did not
mean the Macedonian cavalry was neglected. On the contrary, Philip II
greatly enlarged and enhanced this part of his army. During his reign the
number of cavalrymen rose from approximately 600 at the time of his first
battle in Illyria to 3,500 by the en
d of his reign. These figures only refer to
the Macedonian cavalry, but from 352 Philip II and Alexander also had at
their disposal large cavalry units recruited from Thessaly and other
countries. The Macedonian cavalry comprised two basic formations: the
hetairoi or Companion cavalry, originating from the traditional aristocracy
who had formed the core of the Macedonian army before Philip’s rise to
power, and the prodromoi or Scouts. The hetairoi wore abdominal armour
69 DeVoto 1992.
70 Theopomp., FGrH, 115 F348; D., ap. Phot., s.v. pez◊tairoi; EM, s.v.
pez◊tairoj; Hsch., pezeta∂roij; Anaximenes, FGrH, 72 F4. Milns 1976, pp. 89-96;
Griffith 1979, pp. 414-418; Errington 1990, pp. 244-245; Billows 1990, p. 32;
Ashley 1998, p. 40; Lendon 2005, p. 125; Thomas 2007, pp. 78-79.
Childhood, Family, Macedonia
33
and helmets, and in terms of protective as well as offensive gear they were
better equipped than most of the opposing cavalries they encountered in
Philip II and Alexander’s time. The prodromoi, on the other hand, were a
typical light cavalry. They also had good horses and a high military value
equivalent to that of the Thessalian cavalry. Thessalian horsemen wore
less armour than the hetairoi and instead of the sarissa, each rider had two
javelins and a curved sword. The light cavalry also included contingents
from Thrace and Paionia.71
The fact that another verified name for these mounted scouts is
sarissophoroi allows us to assume that their chief weapon was the sarissa.
This was also a weapon of the hetairoi. Iconographic sources show that
unlike the Sarmatian cavalry or Macedonian infantry the Macedonian
cavalry held the sarissa with just one hand, not both. This was possible
because the sarissa used by the cavalry, alternatively called the xyston,
was shorter (4.5 m, and some historians even believe it to have been no
longer than 3 m) and lighter than its equivalent used in the infantry.
Another difference in the cavalry version was an iron sleeve in the centre
of the shaft. Its purpose is not entirely clear and one cannot be certain that