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  and survived. A thousand Athenians lay dead on the battlefield as did a

  similar number of Boeotians and considerable numbers of other Greek

  allies who had fought in the centre, especially the Achaeans. The

  Macedonians captured 2,000 Athenians and many other Greeks.18

  The annihilation of the Sacred Band symbolically marked the end of

  hoplite dominance on the battlefield as indeed the political dominance of

  the type of state they defended – the powerful Greek polis. From the

  purely military point of view, Chaeronea marked a turning point in the

  history of Western warfare in that for the first time a battle was essentially

  won by the cavalry. Here the infantry secured a large part of the front line

  thus allowing for a horseback riders’ offensive. This was also probably the

  first time the Macedonian cavalry fought using sarissae, which were so

  effective against the Boeotian infantry. At Chaeronea the infantry was

  deployed to hold the front line against a greater number of enemy troops

  and then the decisive blow was delivered with a heavy cavalry charge.

  This would become Alexander’s favourite tactic with which at the head of

  his charging companion cavalry he carried off successive victories against

  the Persians. To his father’s joy, the outstanding role in the fighting played

  by the heir to the throne made the Macedonians hail Alexander as their

  king, whereas Philip remained their military leader.19

  After the battle Philip treated each of his chief vanquished enemies

  very differently. With Macedonian troops now able to access all parts of

  Boeotia, the king had his erstwhile allies, the Thebans, completely at his

  mercy and punished them very harshly. They not only had to pay ransoms

  for hostages but also for the privilege of burying their fallen soldiers. A

  Macedonian garrison was now installed in the Theban citadel of Cadmea.

  Anti-Macedonian politicians were either executed or exiled, whereas 300

  previously exiled supporters of Philip were now allowed to return. On top

  of this, the Boeotian cities that the Thebans had destroyed were now

  rebuilt, which greatly weakened the position of Thebes in the Boeotian

  League. Philip’s harsh treatment of the Thebans may have resulted not

  only from the correct assumption that this polis was the linchpin of Greek

  18 Diod., 16.85.5-86; Plu., Alex. , 9.2-3; Plu., Cam. , 19.9; Polyaen., 4.2.2, 4.2.7; Fron., Str. , 2.19; Paus., 7.6.5, 9.40.10 ; Str., 9.2.37 ; Just., 9.3. Cawkwell 1978, pp.

  144-149; Griffith 1979, pp. 596-603; Hammond 1994, pp. 148-154; Carlier 1996, p.

  111; Ashley 1998, pp. 154-157; Hamilton 1999, p. 23.

  19 Plu., Alex. , 9.4; Plu., Pel., 18.5. Borza 1990, p. 225; DeVoto 1992, pp. 17-19; Sabin 2007, pp. 127-128.

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  resistance against Macedonia but also because of its traditionally strong

  ties with Persia. The Thebans had not only backed the Persian side during

  the Greco-Persian wars at the start of the 5th century but also in more

  recent times when they helped Artaxerxes III in quashing the satrap revolts

  in Asia Minor and in his conquest of Egypt in the years 343-341. The

  Theban stance could not have gone unnoticed by Philip, who was already

  planning war with Persia at the time. Other Greek states were also

  punished. Macedonian garrisons were installed in Corinth, Ambracia and

  Chalcis, thus placing strategic routes into the Peloponnesus and Euboea as

  well as northwestern Greece under Macedonian control.20

  After Chaeronea everyone in Athens was expecting the Macedonians

  to launch a direct attack. In what now seemed to be an unavoidable

  situation, extraordinary military and political measures were resorted to.

  The strategos Lysicles was made a scapegoat for the defeat at Chaeronea,

  while political leadership was held firmly in the hands of the war party

  headed by Demosthenes, Hypereides and Lycurgus. The Attic populace

  were evacuated into the city, whose walls underwent repairs and were next

  manned with soldiers. The Athenians took in anti-Macedonian refugees.

  For the sake of increasing army numbers, unconstitutional steps were even

  considered such as actually granting citizenship rights to the metoikoi and

  liberating those slaves who were able to fight. Athens could afford to resist

  Philip for a long time on account of her powerful fleet assuring a constant

  flow of provisions into the city. But the showdown never materialised.

  Instead the victorious Macedonian king released from captivity

  Demosthenes’s political opponent Demades, which was a clear signal that

  he was willing to start peace negotiations. Captured Athenians were set

  free without a ransom, whereas the remains of those who had fallen were

  delivered to Athens by a delegation of the highest ranking Macedonian

  officials including Alcimachus, Philip’s closest companion Antipater and

  the heir to the throne Alexander. With the emerging possibility of finding

  a peaceful end to a war that had already been lost the mood in Athens

  changed. Negotiations were entrusted to pro-Macedonian or rather just

  anti-war politicians Aeschines, Phocion and Demades. There were prices

  to be paid by the Athenians for peace, the heaviest of which was the loss

  of Thracian Chersonese and thus also control of the Black Sea grain

  import route. Other territory, however, remained in the hands of the

  Athenians. It was also probably then that Philip ‘magnanimously’ granted

  the Athenians the Oropus region, which had been disputed with Boeotia

  20 Cawkwell 1978, pp. 167-168; Corvisier 2002, p. 255; Zahrnt 2009, pp. 19-20.

  The Heir to the Throne

  53

  and was now ceded to Athens no doubt in order to enflame anew an almost

  forgotten disagreement between Athens and her Chaeronean allies.21

  Philip’s conditions for ending the war with Athens were milder than

  had been expected. The Athenians expressed their gratitude by granting,

  probably on motion of Demades, the Macedonian dignitaries appropriate

  awards. Athenian citizenship was bestowed on Alcimachus, Antipater,

  Philip and therefore in a way also automatically on his son and heir

  Alexander. Moreover, a statue of Philip was erected in the Agora, whereas

  Alcimachus and Antipater were also awarded the honorary title of

  proxenos. The Macedonian king’s very moderate treatment of Athens after

  the Battle of Chaeronea is usually put down to political motives. Philip

  was planning war against Persia and therefore could not afford to prolong

  the conflict in Greece; besides, the Athenian fleet of an estimated 350

  warships could be of considerable use to him. Besides, plundering of

  Attica, once occupied by Xerxes, would weaken Philip’ Panhellenic cause

  in the planned war with Persia. There are also opinions that the

  determination and energy the Athenians had shown in preparing for the

  continuation of war inclined the Macedonians to conversely seek a

  peaceful solution. However, we may also assume that for the parvenu

  Macedonian laying siege to and eventually destroying Athens – in the

  words of Thucydides, the school of Hellas – was contrary to what

  throughout his life he had striven for, full acceptance in the
Greek world.22

  3. The congress at Corinth and the beginning

  of the Persian war

  From the battlefield of Chaeronea the Macedonian army marched to the

  Peloponnesus and there accepted the capitulations of the poleis that had

  sided with Thebes and Athens. The army also conducted a punitive raid

  into Laconia as a result of which Sparta lost border territories to

  Macedonia’s allies – Argos, Messenia and the Arcadian states. Sparta was

  thus weakened, but Philip did not punish it further, no doubt because he

  21 Griffith 1979, pp. 604-609; Hammond 1994, pp. 155-157; Habicht 1999, pp. 11-

  12; Brun 2000, p. 65; Corvisier 2002, p. 256. On the date of transfer of Oropus to

  Athenian control (338 or 335) see Faraguna 2003, p. 100.

  22 Hyp., Philippides, fr. 8; Hyp., ap. Harp., s.v. Alk∂macoj; IG ii2 239; Plu., Dem. , 22; Paus., 1.9.4; Scholia in Aristid., Panathenaikos, 178.16; Just., 9.4.5. Cawkwell

  1978; p. 167; Cawkwell 1996, pp. 98-99; Osborne 1983, pp. 69-70 (T69); Griffith

  1979, pp. 619-620; O’Brien 1992, p. 26; Whitehead 2000, p. 41; Badian 2000, pp.

  54-55; Brun 2000, pp. 64-65; Hammond 1994, p. 157; Carlier 1996, p. 116;

  Corvisier 2002, p. 256 ; Worthington 2008, pp. 155-156.

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  Chapter II

  wished to use it as a counterbalance: fear of the region’s former ruling

  power seeking to exact revenge would in the future naturally incline the

  other Peloponnesian states to maintain their alliance with Macedonia. Thus

  two major land powers of Greece, Thebes and Sparta, were weakened and

  kept in check by their neighbours.23 In the autumn of 338 Philip sent an

  invitation to all the Greek states, described by many as more like a veiled

  order, to attend a meeting which was to be held at Corinth the following

  spring. The choice of Corinth was not made by chance. It was there that in

  480 the majority of states in continental Greece formed a symmachia

  (alliance) which victoriously opposed the great army of Xerxes I. More

  recently, in 344, the Corinthians sent the famous general Timoleon to

  overthrow the Carthaginian tyranny in Sicily and victoriously fight for

  freedom of the Greeks in the West. The historic symbolism of Corinth

  destined it to become the place where yet another initiative was made to

  unite the Greeks in a common cause.24

  Alexander in all probability did not accompany his father in the

  Peloponnesian campaign but instead, after his mission to Athens, he was

  sent back to Macedonia. There are some scant references in our sources

  that at the time there was trouble on Macedonia’s northern border. It must

  have been then that Alexander engaged in the short and victorious war

  against the Illyrians which is mentioned by Curtius Rufus in his

  description of events that happened much later.25 However, we know of no

  other details about this war.

  With the exception of Sparta, all the poleis of mainland Greece as well

  as some of the island states, such as Chios and Eresus on Lesbos, accepted

  Philip’s invitation. During two sessions in 337 they accepted a resolution

  ratifying a new state of affairs in Greece. We know it thanks to an

  inscription found in Athens containing an extensive extract of the oaths

  made by the Greek states in their treaty with Philip. The signatories were

  obliged to: remain at peace and not to wage wars on other member states;

  not to occupy their cities, forts or ports; not to oppose Philip’s rule or that

  of his successor (i.e. Alexander); not to interfere in the internal affairs of

  any other state and to oppose anyone who breached the treaty as specified

  by the synedrion (council) and ordered by the hegemon of the league, who

  was naturally the king of Macedonia. If, as modern historians believe, the

  charter drawn up by Antigonus Monophthalmus and Demetrius Poliorcetes

  in 302 repeats the resolutions made in 337, then at Corinth some other

  23 Ryder 1965, pp. 150-162 ; Hammond 1994, pp. 157-158; Ashley 1998, pp. 159-

  160; Corvisier 2002, pp. 258-259; Faraguna 2003, p. 101; Zahrnt 2009, p. 20.

  24 Lane Fox 1973, p. 93; Flower 2000, p. 98.

  25 Curt., 8.1.25. Heckel 1979, p. 390.

  The Heir to the Throne

  55

  important decisions were made to guarantee a conservative social peace,

  namely, a ban on expelling citizens against current laws as well as a

  rejection of the traditional lower class demands such as the redistribution

  of land or annulment of debts. The treaty accepted in Corinth took the

  form of a universal peace ( koine eirene) and the Greek states that signed

  this treaty in modern historiography are known as the League of Corinth.26

  In the 4th century, which experienced plenty of wars and general chaos,

  the koine eirene was a popular diplomatic device resorted to as many as

  six times in attempts to restore political stability – though not to great

  effect. But the Corinth universal peace included new solutions. Apart from

  naming a hegemon, it also called into being a council ( synedrion) in which

  each member state had a number of delegates proportionate to its size.

  Thus all signatories to it formed a Philip-led alliance ( symmachia) at the

  same time. For Philip the universal peace formula was a convenient tool to

  impose Macedonian hegemony over Greece without immediately exposing

  the political implications. According to the treaty signed in Corinth

  hegemony was only a means of guaranteeing a universal peace demanded

  by Greek public opinion. One should not interpret the League of Corinth

  as a mere tool of Macedonian tyranny, though nor was it, as Philip and

  Alexander’s apologists claim, a voluntary union of Greek states under the

  benevolent leadership of the Macedonian descendents of Heracles.27 The

  principle agreed at Corinth of not interfering in the internal affairs of other

  states effectively meant a universal, be it foisted, agreement to support

  pro-Macedonian oligarchies and tyrannies even though such forms of

  government were by then outdated in Greece. Although not even his

  enemies in Greece questioned Philip’s leadership, the free hand he was

  granted to act against breaches of the treaty went far beyond the nominal

  principle of equality in the koine eirene. On the other hand, the universal

  peace did force Macedonia to act within the law and not at will. On more

  than one occasion the synedrion acted as a mediator in disputes between

  smaller Greek member states. Epigraphic evidence presents a case of the

  council arbitrating in a dispute between Melos and Kimolos over three

  islets – one which was eventually resolved in favour of Kimolos. This of

  course does not alter the fact that the universal peace signed in 337 and

  then again when Alexander succeeded his father enshrined in legal terms

  26 [D.] (=Hypereides?), 17; Diod., 16.98.3; Just., 9.5.1; IG ii2 236 = Syll.3 260; Moretti, ISE 44. Heisserer 1980, pp. xxiii-xxvi; Bosworth 1988, pp. 189-193;

  Blackwell 1999, pp. 38-40; Faraguna 2003, p. 101; Poddighe 2009, pp. 103-106.

  27 Opposing views: Cawkwell 1969, p. 167 and Hammond 1994, pp. 158-164;

  1996, pp. 22-23. Ryder 1965, p. 106; Adams 1999.

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  Chapter II

  Macedonian control over Greece at the
end of Philip II’s reign and under

  Alexander.28

  In the autumn session of 337 the decision was also made to wage war

  against the Great King under the pretext that Persia had broken the

  universal peace.29 This decision officially set in motion a chain of events

  leading to war with Persia, Alexander’s conquest of the Achaemenid

  Empire and the start of what 2,200 years later was referred to as the

  Hellenistic Epoch. This was a genuine turning point marking the start of

  one of the most profound revolutions in Mediterranean civilization, though

  we may assume that for those participating, the importance of these events

  was not as apparent as it would be for observers in later centuries. The

  resolution was passed by the synedrion of the League of Corinth at a time

  when Alexander was still the heir to the throne and so the decision to wage

  war on Persia actually belonged to his father. The momentous consequences

  of this decision have made it the subject of great controversy among

  modern historians, particularly with regard to the moment when Philip

  decided to attack the powerful Persian Empire and also as to what his

  objectives in this war were.

  In the 4th century the Greek attitude towards Persia was quite

  ambivalent. The most powerful empire that had ever existed both terrified

  and fascinated the Greeks. Its sheer size, the fact that it encompassed

  virtually all known lands to the east of Greece, meant that it was

  frequently simply referred to as Asia as if in a sense the empire and the

  continent were one and the same – a continent of whose boundaries before

  Alexander’s expedition the Greeks had no idea. Its population, at the start

  of the expedition an estimated 30 to 35 million people, greatly exceeded

  the demographic potential of not only individual poleis or Macedonia but

  even the entire Greek world. The Greeks called the ruler of Persia the

  Great King or simply the King. Unlike the kings of Sparta, Macedonia or

  of the Molossians in Epirus, who were all referred to by name, the Persian

  monarch was a king par excellence. The way Greeks referred to the

 

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