by Amanda
Greek temples by Xerxes. Regardless of how sincere these declared
reasons for war were, they corresponded well with the public mood and
44 Wilcken 1967, pp. 34-38; Dobesch 1968, pp. 137-149; Markle 1976; Perlman
1976; Jehne 1994, pp. 7-19; Hammond 1994, p. 164-165; Huttner 1997, pp. 81-85;
Flower 2000, pp. 98-104.
68
Chapter II
would certainly have helped Philip become popular in Greece. In return
for participation in the war, Philip, and Alexander after him, offered the
Greeks a share in the plunder, including newly conquered territories, as
well as the satisfaction of righting the wrongs previously perpetrated by
Persia. From Philip’s point of view an additional advantage in calling for a
universal attack on Persia could have possibly been greater unity within
the League of Corinth, which apart from the negative goal of preventing
intestine conflicts had also a positive aim of defeating Persia. On top of
that, victory would provide everyone and especially Philip’s supporters in
Greek cities with wealth from the booty, which would make stronger their
political position. This in turn would strengthen the ties between the poleis
and Macedonia. Moreover a defeated Persia would no longer be able to
interfere in Greek politics and thus threaten Philip’s position as
hegemon.45
We do not know when exactly the plan to invade Persia was born.
Ancient sources do not give us an unequivocal answer, whereas the
extreme views of modern historians such as claims that Philip had already
planned to invade Persia as early as the late 350s are only hypothetical as
are claims associating the idea with Hermias of Atarneus. Philips actions
in that period can be explained perfectly well in the context of his Greek
policy and therefore it does not seem necessary to add hypothetical
explanations unsupported by evidence. The only thing we can be certain of
is that Isocrates had been advocating war with Persia since at least 346. It
is very likely that the planning of the invasion of Persia only began with
the conquest of Thrace and its reorganisation modelled on a Persian
satrapy in 342. However, Philip started implementing these plans only
after the Battle of Chaeronea. In 341 Philip’s arch enemy Demosthenes
could just presume that the Macedonian ruler had anti-Persian intentions
but he still had no concrete evidence. Artaxerxes III only started regarding
Macedonia as a threat after the siege of Perinthus in 340/339; from that
moment on we can talk of Philip’s anti-Persian plans with a high degree of
certainty.46
45 Diod., 16.89; Arr., An. , 2.14.5-8; Just., 11.5.6; revenge as a pretext for Philip:
Plb., 3.6.12-14. Varying interpretations of modern scholarship: Markle 1976;
Dąbrowa 1988, pp. 24-28; contra Flower 2000. See Lane Fox 1973, pp. 92-93;
Badian 1982, p. 38; Errington 1981, p. 83; Errington 1990, p. 103; Gehrke 1996, p.
26; Brosius 2003a; Bloedow 2003; Poddighe 2009, pp. 99-107.
46 For a review of modern scholarship see Errington 1981. Badian 1983, pp. 67-68;
Bosworth 1988, p. 18; Errington 1990, pp. 88-89; Hornblower 1994, p. 95;
Corvisier 2002, pp. 262-263, 271-276.
The Heir to the Throne
69
Another historical controversy concerns Philip’s war objectives,
particularly whether he intended to conquer the whole of the Persian
Empire or only the part in Asia Minor. In his Philippus Isocrates lays out
three scenarios for the Macedonian ruler: destruction of the entire Persian
Empire, the conquest and Greek colonisation of Asia Minor from Synope
to Cilicia or at least the liberation of the region’s Greek cities. The
arguments used in Darius III letters to Alexander indicate that Philip’s
plans or rather what was being said about his plans referred to the
conquest of Asia Minor scenario. If one can argue ex post, it is
characteristic that the actions of one of the most talented among the
Successors and Philip’s contemporary Antigonus Monophthalmus
concentrated on the eastern Mediterranean zone but not Iran. Perhaps this
also reflects the scope of territorial interest that had been formulated by
Philip’s entourage.47
It would be a gross oversimplification to view Persian Asia Minor
prior to Philip and Alexander’s planned expedition from the point of view
of Greek political authors and see there exclusively a dichotomy of
politically subjugated Greeks and the oppressive Persian rulers. Of course
in Asia Minor there was a developed Persian administration and the
country was divided into at least six satrapies: Hellespontine Phrygia,
Lydia, Great Phrygia, Caria, Lycia and Cappadocia. In the Persian system
of government – which we know most about from Greek sources in
reference to Asia Minor – the satrap had great power, imitating the
authority of the Great King locally. On his territory the satrap had civil
authority: the right to collect taxes, part of which was kept for the needs of
his army and administration, whilst the rest he sent on to the capital. The
satrap most usually governed his territory through a more often than not
local aristocracy, which in many cases meant permission to run their
regions with considerable autonomy, like local principalities. It was a
general rule that the satraps were totally responsible for the provinces
entrusted to them: only some of the empire’s most important garrisons had
soldiers directly under the Great King’s command. Satraps were
nominated almost exclusively from among members of the Iranian
aristocracy. The most notable exception from this rule was Caria, where
the position of satrap in the 4th century was held by members of a local
dynasty, the Hecatomnids of Mylasa: Hecatomnus, Maussolus, Idrieus and
Pixodarus. This dynasty indeed shows a tendency noted in other regions of
Asia Minor if not the entire empire, to make the office of satrap hereditary
in one family. After the collapse of the Achaemenid Empire some of these
47 Billows 1990, pp. 3-4; Ellis 1994, pp. 788-789; Hatzopoulos 1997, p. 43.
70
Chapter II
great Iranian families went on to found new, gradually Hellenised
dynasties that ruled over states in Asia Minor. Not all of Asia Minor was
actually ever under effective Persian rule. Some peripheral areas
maintained de facto or even quite official independence from the Great
King, the best example of which was the large Greek city of Heraclea on
the Black Sea coast. Moreover, the pragmatic Persians were more
interested in colleting tributes, which was easier, than subjugating
highland regions that were difficult to control, frequently inhabited by
wild tribes, as in Cilicia Trachea, and economically worthless. Such areas,
though frequently bounded from all sides by Persian satrapies, were
allowed to run their own affairs as they pleased. Furthermore, one should
not think of states in ancient times the same way we think of their 20st-
century counterparts. Regardless of whether they were in Asia Minor or on
any of the islands under the Great King’s rule, a state was not cut off from
the outsi
de world (not even the Greek world) by some iron curtain. In
antiquity political borders were wide open for trade and demographic
mobility.48
Certain parts of Asia Minor – including the Daskyleion in
Hellespontine Phrygia, the regions of Celaenae and Colossae in Great
Phrygia and Paphlagonia – were intensively colonised by Iranian
cavalrymen who received land for their military service. Much larger
landed estates in Asia Minor were awarded to Persian aristocrats who in
return were obliged to muster hundreds of horsemen in the event of war.
Persian kings willingly provided refuge for members of the Greek elites
forced for one reason or another to leave their poleis. Apart from the
famous Greek refugees ostracised at the time of the 5th-century Persian
wars – such as the victor of Salamis, Themistocles, or the Spartan king
Demaratus – there were dozens of other less well known émigrés. These
distinguished people were also granted vast estates in return for providing
armed forces. The cavalry recruited from these three sources together with
the cavalry units from some of the native populations were the basis of
satraps’ armies in Asia Minor, which were nearly always on standby,
ready to fight. Both Greek and Persian culture influenced the local
populace and also competed with one another as models for the social
elites. The local upper echelons of society were Hellenised and Iranicised
in more or less equal measure as is particularly well illustrated in the
archaeological remains of Lycian culture and the few extant inscriptions
from that region. Although Lycian was the primary language of the local
administration, the Lycian aristocracy spoke Greek and employed Greek
48 Jacobs 1994, pp. 117-146; Hornblower 1982; Hornblower 1994, pp. 74-82, 214-
222; Sartre 1995, pp. 7-14, 45-48; Debord 1999, pp. 139-140.
The Heir to the Throne
71
artists and craftsmen to carve monuments expressing themes deeply rooted
in Iranian culture, for instance extolling the skills of riding and archery.
Likewise the stelae and other monuments at Daskyleion, the capital of the
satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia, give evidence of a Greco-Iranian
cultural synthesis and its impact on in this case the Phrygian elites. Traces
of Iranian cultural influence, for instance in the form of Iranian cults,
could still be found in Asia Minor at the time of the Roman Empire.49
We do not know whether there was a clearly formulated Achaemenid
policy regarding what form of constitution Greek states within the Persian
Empire should have. Nevertheless, Greek sources do show a clear
evolution of political systems in Asia Minor from democracies in the
second half of the 5th century supported by powerful Athens to oligarchies
in the 4th century. Most probably the main reason for this was a natural
tendency for satraps to choose political solutions that were most
convenient from their perspective. That would have been to entrust power
to elite social groups within poleis under their control, and thus oligarchies
were formed. For the Persian aristocrats who represented Achaemenid
authority in Asia Minor, the rule in the cities of wealthy elites must have
also appeared the natural and most familiar way of running affairs. This
was the system that had predominated for much longer also in cities that
were only now being Hellenised, for instance in Caria. Moreover, the
Hecatomnid dynasty, particularly the famous Maussolus, was known as a
protector of the oligarchic system in Greek states such as those of Rhodes,
Chios, Kos, Erythrai and Miletus.50
With the mandate he had received at the 337 second council session of
the League of Corinth, in the spring of 336 Philip sent to Asia Minor a
corps commanded by Parmenion, Amyntas and Attalus as an advance
force of the main Macedonian and allied armies. The situation in the
Achaemenid Empire seemed to be favourable from the Macedonian point
of view. The much feared Artaxerxes III died and the weak government of
his son Artaxerxes IV, soon to be murdered, augured an inadequate
Persian response to an attack by Philip’s forces. While he was still alive,
Artaxerxes III had disbanded the vast mercenary army that had quelled
rebellious nobles and tyrants such as Hermias of Atarneus. Moreover the
49 Starr 1977; Mellink 1988, pp. 213-231; Boyce, Grenet 1989, pp. 197-209;
Hornblower 1994, pp. 230-232; Briant 1996, pp. 718-719; Debord 1999, pp. 20-21,
183-188; Kaptan 2003; Shabazi 2003, pp. 11-12; Raimond 2007; Briant 2009, pp.
156-160.
50 Schachermeyr 1973, pp. 171-175; Hornblower 1982, pp.107-137; Hornblower
1994, pp. 227-229; Nawotka 1999, pp. 33-34; Nawotka 2003a, pp. 21-26; Debord
1999, pp. 328, 404.
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Chapter II
commander of this mercenary army, Mentor of Rhodes, was by then most
probably dead, for the sources no longer mention him after 338. The
Macedonian advance force with an estimated strength of approximately
10,000 men initially had a number of military successes and occupied
large swathes of land in Asia Minor. Although there was no general anti-
Persian uprising, there is on the other hand no evidence to support the
view that virtually all the poleis in Asia Minor resisted the Macedonians.
At least some of the Greek cities greeted them as liberators. A genuine
democratic revolution erupted at Ephesus, no doubt led by Heropythus,
and a statue honouring the Macedonian king was raised at Artemisium.
The important cities of Cyzicus and Erythrai allied themselves with
Macedonia. It is perhaps also then that the satrap Ariobarzanes’s statue
was pulled down in the Troad. Already before the start of the Asia Minor
campaign Philip had managed to gain influence on the islands. Most
notable was an alliance with the tyrants of Eresus on the island of Lesbos,
who even became members of the League of Corinth.51
The series of Macedonian successes came to an end when Darius III
nominated Memnon of Rhodes, brother of Mentor, to take over command
of the defensive war. This probably happened after Philip II’s death but
still in 336. Ancient sources do not record any information of the new
Macedonian king, Alexander, overseeing the campaign in Asia Minor that
year. Instead he most probably left all the decisions to the commanders his
father had nominated. Heading a force of 5,000 Greek mercenaries
Memnon started a vigorous campaign against a numerically far superior
Macedonian army, but one commanded by less talented generals. The
Macedonians suffered the first defeat at the Battle of Magnesia. The
sources do not provide an unequivocal answer as to which of the cities
bearing that name the battle refers: the more northern Magnesia ad
Sipylum or the Magnesia on the Maeander to the south of Ephesus. As a
result of this defeat the invading army turned back north towards the
Hellespont. We know that at Ephesus Memnon’s mercenaries helped in
carrying out a counter-revolution that re-established a pro-Persian
oligarchy headed by Syrphax. Philip’s statue at Artemision was destroyed
as was
the grave of the city’s heroised democratic leader. One may assume
that in most of the other cities in Asia Minor pro-Persian governments
were restored too. Memnon next crossed Mount Ida and quite
51 Diod., 16.89.2, 16.91.2, 17.2.4, 17.7.7; [D.], 17.7; Arr., An. , 1.17.11; Just., 9.5; IG xii.2.526. Cawkwell 1978, p. 170; Ruzicka 1993, pp. 84-85; Hammond 1994,
pp. 167-168; Lott 1996; Briant 1996, p. 837; Debord 1999, pp. 421-425; Nawotka
2003a, pp. 23-24. Heckel 1997, pp. 194-195 formulates an unfounded hypothesis
of universal resistance to Macedonian army.
The Heir to the Throne
73
unexpectedly attacked Cyzicus, almost capturing it. Meanwhile Parmenion,
whose mission it officially was to liberate Greeks, somewhat ironically
captured the Greek town of Gryneion and sold its inhabitants as slaves.
This was the last Macedonian victory in this part of the war. Memnon
successfully relieved the beleaguered city of Pitane, which like Gryneion
was situated in Aeolis, and next we known that in the Troad he fought
another victorious battle against the Macedonians, this time led by Calas,
who may have temporarily taken over command from Parmenion. The
Macedonians were now forced to retreat to the promontory of Rhoeteium
on the Hellespont. The ancient authors do not provide information
allowing us to establish the exact chronology of these events. Nevertheless,
their description of Memnon’s campaign, especially the elements of
swiftness and surprise in his attacks would suggest that it was a short
campaign, perhaps lasting from the autumn of 336 to the summer of 335.
Philip II’s death as well as the uncertainty that accompanied Alexander’s
transition to the throne and confirmation as the new hegemon delayed the
expedition of the main Greco-Macedonian force into Asia Minor by one
and a half years. Left to fend for itself the first expeditionary corps
suffered defeat and only some of the men would have survived to later see
the arrival of Alexander’s army at Abydos.52