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  The crossing of the Hellespont commenced only after Alexander’s

  return from Elaius. The passage was between Sestus and Abydos, which

  had clearly remained under Macedonian control ever since the expedition

  in the spring of 336. The great operation of moving the army across the

  Hellespont was entrusted to Parmenion, the most experienced of the

  Macedonian commanders, who had at his disposal 160 warships and an

  unspecified number of merchant vessels. Even if the strait was no more

  than 1.5 km wide, the transporting of 40,000 troops as well as many herds

  of horses and wagons must have taken some time. Even before the ships

  started sailing Alexander ordered alters to be raised for Zeus, Athena and

  Heracles, and exactly the same was next done on the Asian side.

  Alexander sailed with part of the fleet (of 60 ships according to Diodorus)

  personally steering the flagship. Halfway across the Hellespont he

  10 Arr., An. , 1.11.5. The story of Protesilaos: Paus., 4.2.7 (after the Kypria).

  Instinsky 1949, pp. 9-22; Zahrnt 1996, pp. 130-134; Flower 2000, pp. 108-109;

  Faraguna 2003, pp. 108-109.

  From Abydus to Alexandria

  115

  sacrificed a bull and a liquid offering poured out of a gold bowl to

  Poseidon and to the Nereids. Naturally the offerings to the sea god and

  nymphs were to ensure a successful crossing of the Macedonian army, but

  their form and location also corresponded to what Herodotus had written

  about Xerxes’ sacrifices to the Sun on the day his army crossed over to

  Europe. Again this was an allusion to the Persian wars at the start of the

  fifth century and to the revenge which at that time was the main theme of

  Alexander’s expedition.11 The sources do not explain why at that time the

  far mightier Persian fleet was not mobilised to attack the Macedonians

  crossing the Hellespont and thus thwart the entire invasion. P. Briant

  assumes that at the time Darius III’s attention could have been focused on

  quelling Khababash’s revolt in Egypt and some disturbances in Babylon.12

  The place where the fleet landed was called the Harbour of Achaeans

  in memory of the landing of the Greek force bound for Troy. The first

  member of the Macedonian expeditionary force to set foot on Asian land

  was Alexander himself. By doing so he was following in the footsteps of

  Protesilaos. Legend stated that Achilles had hesitated and did not land first

  because he knew that the first Greek to do set foot on Asian soil would die

  there. Thus Alexander was once again referring to the symbolism of the

  Trojan War and at the same time rivalling Achilles – for us a mythical

  figure but for Alexander his real ancestor. The epic landing in Asia was

  preceded by the thrusting of a spear into its soil – a gesture whose

  historical veracity there is no need to doubt. Even if Arrian does not

  mention it, most of the other sources do. Moreover, it is not only perfectly

  consistent with the logic of Alexander’s actions but also provides

  justification for his successors, the diadochi. According to both Greek and

  Persian custom one of legitimate ways of getting possession of a country

  was to wrest it from an enemy by force, and in the political terminology of

  the day such territory was called ‘land captured with the spear’ ( doriktetos

  chora). Therefore with this gesture Alexander was stating his intention to

  conquer all or part of Asia and not to just plunder enemy land. It is in

  reference to this that Plutarch sums up Alexander’s achievements: ‘For he

  did not overrun Asia like a robber nor was he minded to tear and rend it, as

  if it were booty and plunder bestowed by unexpected good fortune, after

  the manner in which Hannibal later descended upon Italy, or as earlier

  Teres descended upon Ionia and the Scythians upon Media.’ This was a

  significant addition to the so far declared character of the expedition as

  Panhellenic war of vengeance. Just as the earlier aspect of the mission had

  been stressed for the benefit of the Greeks, so this new aspect was now

  11 Diod., 17.16.2; Arr., An. , 1.11.6-7; Just., 11.5. Instinsky 1949, pp. 41-53.

  12 Briant 2003, pp. 67-70.

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  expressed more for the benefit of the Macedonian members of the

  expedition. Later, Alexander’s companions, the diadochi, would claim

  their right to govern parts of his empire using the argument that the land

  had been conquered with the spear, and no one questioned the legitimacy

  of this line of reasoning.13

  After this ceremony and after sacrifices being made to Zeus, Athena

  and Heracles, Alexander and his retinue headed for Troy. In 480 it had

  also been visited by Xerxes, who sacrificed there a thousand oxen to the

  goddess Athena. In 334 this was a small town basking in the glory of the

  epic war, the ‘genuine’ or more likely fake relics of which were

  enthusiastically shown to tourists. The inhabitants asked the distinguished

  guest Alexander if he would like to see Paris’s lyre (whose name was also

  Alexander), to which the king sarcastically replied either that he already

  had it or that he would willingly listen the Achilles’ lyre, ‘the sound of

  which, “singing of the fame of men”, relaxed him’. The inhabitants of

  Troy did not realise that Alexander had come for a more serious purpose

  than just sightseeing. Still at the start of his expedition, Alexander wished

  to fulfil all the religious obligations and once again emphasise the

  campaign’s pan-Hellenic character. Rulers and military commanders

  frequently offered up sacrifices at Troy as this was the last (or first,

  depending on where to the army was bound) Asian sanctuary on the route

  to Europe, a continent which can indeed be seen from there. Alexander

  visited the graves of the heroes in the town, honouring the memory of his

  ancestor Achilles, another of Greek champions, Ajax, as well as of Priam.

  The offering given to Priam was to avert his anger from Alexander as on

  his mother’s side the Macedonian was a descendent of Neoptolemus, the

  one who had murdered the old king after the fall of Troy. At Achilles’

  grave Alexander expressed envy that the Greek champion had had Homer

  to praise his deeds. Later literary tradition has Alexander laying a wreath

  on the grave of Achilles, and Hephaestion laying a wreath on the grave of

  Patroclus, thus drawing an obvious parallel between the mythical friends

  and Alexander and his closest companion. At the temple of Athena

  Alexander left his panoplia as a votive offering to the goddess and in

  return took some armour that had allegedly been kept there since the

  Trojan War. These valuable mementos Alexander had carried before him

  into battle. Thus Athena, the guardian of the Greeks at Troy, became the

  13 Diod., 17.17.2; Just., 11.5; It. Alex. , 18; Plu., mor. , 330d; Ps.-Callisth., 1.28.

  Wilcken 1967, p. 83; Instinsky 1949, pp. 23, 31-38; Schmitthenner 1969, pp. 32-38;

  Green 1974, p. 166-167; Briant 1980, p. 40; Briant 1993, p. 13; Mehl 1980;

  Bosworth 1988, pp. 38-39; Flower 2000, pp. 119-120. Historicity of this event put

  in doubt by Zahrnt 1996; contra Seibert 1998, pp. 56-57.
/>   From Abydus to Alexandria

  117

  deity leading Alexander against his enemies.14 Strabo erroneously dates

  Alexander’s visit to Troy after the Battle at Granicus. He states that the

  Macedonian king returned to Troy the status of a city and exempted it

  from the obligation of paying tributes. Later, in a letter sent to Troy,

  Alexander was to have promised to convert it into a great city. The

  expansion of Troy was actually achieved through synoikism by

  Lysimachus after Alexander’s death.15 The Macedonian king’s stay at

  Troy in all likelihood was not limited to a few hours only as while he was

  there some of the region’s notables visited him. Arrian names one of them:

  Chares, an Athenian commander of mercenaries who had been granted

  property at Sigeion by Artaxerxes III. He was one of the numerous lords of

  the Troad, some of whom decided to side with Alexander.16 The sources

  remain silent as to the impact Alexander’s Trojan visit had on Greek

  public opinion but it certainly raised the city’s status in the Hellenistic era.

  Still in the 4th century Troy became the centre of a confederation of Troad

  cities, focused on the Sanctuary of Athena Ilias. Soon also Hellenistic

  rulers – Alexander’s companions and their successors – funded the raising

  monumental edifices there.17

  Once the entire Macedonian army had crossed the Hellespont,

  Alexander joined his soldiers at Arisbe, whence the army marched briskly

  east towards Daskyleion, the capital of the Hellespontine Phrygia. On the

  first day the Macedonians reached Percote (today Urumbey) on the

  Hellespont. On the second day they bypassed Lampsacus and camped by

  the river Practius, which flowed into the Marmara Sea. The following day

  Alexander’s army reached Hermotus, this time circumventing the city of

  Colonae but accepting the surrender of the town of Priapus, where a

  Macedonian garrison was left. The examples of Lampsacus and Colonae

  show that Alexander was deliberately avoiding large cities that had no yet

  declared their allegiance. His priority was clearly to find a quick solution

  on the battlefield. Thus by merely posing a threat, Alexander wished to

  lure the satrap Arsites out into open territory and in a pitched battle score a

  major victory at the very start of his campaign. Of the two roads from

  Lampsacus to Granicus, Alexander’s army would have probably chosen

  the easier route to the north of the marshy lake Ece Göl, then across a plain

  14 Diod., 17.17.2-3, 17.17.6-18.1; Plu., Alex. , 15.7-9; Plu., mor. , 331d-e; Arr., An. , 1.11.7-8, 1.22.2; Ael., VH, 9.38, 12.7; Just., 11.5; It. Alex. , 18. Bosworth 1988, p.

  39; Stewart 1993, pp. 83, 249, n. 62; Zahrnt 1996, pp. 144-145; Erskine 2001, pp.

  105-106, 226-234.

  15 Str., 13.1.26. Debord 1999, pp. 427-429.

  16 Arr., An. , 1.21.1. Hornblower 1994, p. 220.

  17 Erskine 2001, pp. 230-234.

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  already marching in battle formation. Modern scholars in general claim the

  two armies clashed in May. Considering the facts that Alexander’s army

  had left Macedonia in early spring (March) and that it generally advanced

  rapidly, the Battle of Granicus must have occurred in early May. E.

  Grzybek, who has radically revised the dates of battles in Alexander’s time,

  has calculated that the Battle of Granicus took place on 8th April 334. This,

  however, seems improbable if we consider that the army would have left

  Macedonia at the start of spring and therefore in late March.18

  The Persian authorities would have known of Alexander’s expedition

  for some time, perhaps as early as the moment it left Macedonia. However,

  this time, unlike in 336-335, the Great King did not nominate a general to

  conduct the defensive war and instead entrusted the task to the region’s

  satraps just as if this was merely a local conflict. The reason for this was

  most probably a simple underestimation of the danger: Alexander had yet

  to prove himself abroad as a commander and the previous Macedonian

  expeditionary force had been easily defeated by barely 5,000 Greek

  mercenaries, even if commanded by the brilliant general Memnon of

  Rhodes. Darius’ contempt of Alexander may be reflected in the former’s

  spurious letter quoted in the Alexander Romance in which Darius

  addresses Alexander as a spoiled child and has his ambassadors deliver

  him toys. On the ground meantime the Persian army assembled to the east

  of the river Granicus, thus blocking the road to Zeleia. Its strongest

  formation was the cavalry, comprising over 10,000 men, as stated by

  Diodorus, rather than 20,000 as Arrian claims. The army’s composition

  included Iranian military settlers from the western satrapies, contingents

  from Paphlagonia, Hyrcania and Cilicia as well as detachments

  commanded by nobles from satrapies in Asia Minor. Arrian claims that

  there were approximately 20,000 mercenaries on the Persian side, but that

  is highly unlikely as such large mercenary armies were raised only very

  occasionally after a long period of preparation and under the personal

  command of the Great King. It is clear that no such preparations had been

  made prior to the Battle of Granicus and therefore we should accept that

  only a small fraction of those 20,000 troops were mercenaries, whereas the

  vast majority were local detachments of little military value. Diodorus’

  claim that the Persians had 100,000 infantry and Justin’s estimate that the

  entire Persian army numbered 600,000 men obviously belong to the realm

  of fantasy. There can be no doubt that the Persians had a far weaker

  infantry than the Macedonians but that their cavalry was numerically

  superior. Before the battle the Persian commanders held a council at Zeleia

  18 Arr., An. , 1.12.6-13.1. Foss 1973, pp. 495-496; Higgins 1980, p.132; Seibert

  1985, pp. 30-32; Harl 1997, p. 313; Grzybek 1990, pp. 61-66.

  From Abydus to Alexandria

  119

  presided over by the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, Arsites, who was

  also the overall commander of the Persian army by right of the fact that the

  enemy was on his territory. As an experienced commander who knew this

  particular enemy well Memnon was also invited to join, but not, as was

  erroneously for a long time believed, as the commander of Greek

  mercenaries. Memnon arrived at Granicus at the head of cavalry

  detachment he had mustered, like other aristocrats, on his own estate. This

  is certain because in their accounts of the battle our sources clearly report

  him commanding such a cavalry unit. Although Memnon was undoubtedly

  the best possible commander of infantry, the Greek mercenaries at

  Granicus were commanded by a Persian called Omares.19

  During this conference Memnon pointed to the disproportionate

  strength of the Macedonian infantry when compared with the Persian

  infantry and the fact that the enemy was personally commanded by King

  Alexander whereas the Persians had no royal commander. For these

  reasons he suggested that the Persian army should avoid battles and

  instead retreat, employing a policy of destroying food and fodder for

  horses on the way and eve
n destroying towns. Next he suggested that the

  war should be moved into Europe. Such advice indicates not only a sober

  appraisal of the military might of the opposing forces but also good

  intelligence on the enemy’s provisions for men and horses. According to

  the calculations of D.W. Engels, a pioneer of research into ancient

  logistics, the transporting of one day’s provisions (food and fodder) for the

  Macedonian army required the employment 1,100 pack animals. In

  Antiquity the transporting of an army’s provisions was possible for more

  or less ten days. Afterwards provisions had to be replenished, either by

  ship or by living off the enemy’s land. Of course there is no way of

  knowing how Memnon’s suggested tactics would have worked, but at that

  time of year, before the harvest, when food was difficult to come by,

  especially for such a large army, there is good reason to believe that this

  scorched earth policy would have considerably hindered Alexander’s

  actions and at least delayed the first really decisive battle, in the meantime

  compelling him do disperse his army into foraging parties. Memnon’s

  advice, however, was rejected by Arsites, who declared that he would not

  allow a single house to be burnt down in his satrapy. Other Persians

  19 Diod., 17.18.2, 17.19.4-5; Arr., An. , 1.12.8-10, 1.15.2, 1.16.3; Just., 11.6; Ps.-

  Callisth., 1.36. Badian 1977, p. 283; McCoy 1989, pp. 414-417; Briant 1996, pp.

  718, 840-841; Debord 1999, p. 430; Heckel 2006, pp. 162, 183; Sabin 2007, pp.

  130-131; Heckel 2009, pp. 29-30. Erroneous opinion of Memnon commanding

  mercenary soldiers is popular even today: Worthington 2004, p. 54; Matthews

  2008, passim.

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  supported this view, declaring (according to Diodorus) that Memnon’s

  decision was below their dignity or (according to Arrian) quietly

  suspecting that Memnon wished to prolong the war and thus be nominated

  overall commander by Darius III. One has to note that Alexander and his

  army also helped Memnon’s credibility to be undermined by sparing his

 

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