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land, which, like the properties of his brother Mentor, was presumably
situated in the Troad on the former estates ( peraia) of Chios and Mytilene.
This and the failure to give Memnon command of the infantry can only
confirm the claim in the sources that the satraps were jealous of him. Some
historians also suppose that the satraps wished to defeat Alexander with
the Iranian cavalry to in a sense compensate for the defeat of the earlier
Macedonian expedition by the Greek infantry. P. Briant also points to an
important aspect of Persian culture that prohibited them from accepting
scorched earth tactics. It was a fundamental part of Achaemenid ideology
that the Great King and his representatives, the satraps, were duty bound to
protect royal subjects. It was indeed this duty that gave the state the moral
right to demand tributes and other services from the people. Memnon’s
suggestion contravened this important principle and therefore if only for
this reason the satraps could not accept it.20 Thus the decisions fell and
now all there was left to do was fight the battle.
The Granicus is now known as the Kocabaş Çay, which in its lower
reaches up to the Marmara Sea is called Biga Çay. It was along this stretch
of the river to the north of a tributary (today called Koça Çayi) that the
battle was fought. On a 5 km long section from Koça Çayi to the Iğel
trench, confined by marshes in the north, there is a stretch of flat terrain
that was very suitable for cavalry. The ancient authors present Granicus as
a large river with a strong current and steep banks that made it difficult to
cross: ‘for one can see that many parts of it are deep; its banks, as you see,
are very high, sometimes like cliffs,’ ‘but most of his army were afraid of
the depth of the river, and of the roughness and unevenness of the farther
bank, up which they would have to climb while fighting,’ and ‘precipitous
positions covered with infantry and cavalry, and through a stream that
swept men off their feet and surged about them’. Today the Kocabaş Çay
(Granicus) has a channel 15-25 metres wide, whereas in May, the month
the battle is said to have taken place, the river is no more than 5-7 metres
wide, half a meter deep, and flows slowly. The eastern bank, which was
occupied by the Persians, is higher than the western bank, but both sides
20 Diod., 17.18.2-3; Arr., An. , 1.12.9; Polyaen., 4.3.15. Engels 1978, pp. 18-22;
Briant 1980, pp. 43-45; Briant 1996, pp. 841-842; Seibert 1985, p. 37; McCoy
1989, pp. 428-430; Wirth 1989, p. 16; Heckel 1997, p. 195; Ashley 1998, pp. 187-
190; Debord 1999, pp. 434-435.
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121
could be crossed by the cavalry. However, if the infantry tried to cross, the
phalanx line would undoubtedly have been broken and the resulting
confusion would not have rendered its attack effective.21
We have three major accounts of the battle, of: Arrian, Diodorus and
Plutarch. Their rhetoric is somewhat confusing and the accounts also differ
from each other with regard to certain details, such as the time of the day
the battle was fought. All the authors agree that the Macedonian army
reached the Granicus in the afternoon, but there are two versions of what
happened next. According to Diodorus the Macedonians set up camp and
attacked the Persians at dawn the next day. According to Arrian and
Plutarch the Macedonians attacked immediately, and this was possible
because on their way to the river they were already marching in battle
formation. Both Arrian and Plutarch also mention a council held by the
Macedonian commanders. According to Arrian, Parmenion advised
Alexander to postpone the attack until dawn the following day assuming
that the much inferior Persian infantry would not dare spend the night near
the river and that at daybreak it would be easy to cross. In response
Alexander is said to have uttered one of his famous sentences: ‘I should
feel it a disgrace if, after crossing the Hellespont so easily, this small
stream… should bar our way for a moment.’ Ancient authors more than
once relate disputes between Alexander and Parmenion regarding not only
military tactics but also the strategy of the entire war. In these accounts a
careful Parmenion weighing up the pros and cons of each possible move is
contrasted with a young and impatient Alexander eager to achieve great
things. In these confrontations, befitting his literary persona, Alexander
not only always wins the battle of words but is also always successful in
victoriously realising the very plans the old general advised him against.
Such accounts are therefore a literary topos, which makes it virtually
impossible to conduct historical analysis if we cannot even establish
whether such discussions between the Macedonians ever took place. This
topos was probably started in Callisthenes’ book, where Parmenion was
presented as foil to enhance Alexander’s glory. In the case of Granicus,
delaying the battle would have given the weaker Persians an opportunity
to escape; whereas Alexander’s determination to march swiftly shows that
he wanted a confrontation as soon as possible. Moreover the king’s option
of attacking in the second part of the day was logical as it meant that the
Persians would have to fight with the sun in the eyes, whereas in the
morning the Macedonians would have been facing the sun in the east. The
21 Arr., An. , 1.13.4; Plu., Alex. , 16.2, 16.4. Topography of the battlefield: Janke 1904, pp. 126-135; Nikolaitis 1974; Foss 1973; Harl 1997, p. 304; Sabin 2007, p.
129.
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Chapter IV
experienced Parmenion would have known that too. Therefore in all
probability the Macedonian army attacked at the first available opportunity:
in the afternoon the same day the army reached the banks of the river
Granicus.22
The Persian cavalry was positioned along the entire section of the
river’s eastern bank, whereas the Persian infantry was stationed on slightly
higher ground a certain distance behind the cavalry. Such a positioning of
the Persian army has been frequently criticised by modern historians as it
did not allow the Persian cavalry to gather enough momentum to make full
use of the force of its charge. It is obvious that the cavalry needed some
distance from the river bank to do this. However, the fact of the matter was
that the Persian cavalry tactic at the time was not to charge at the enemy in
tight formation with lances – this was only first tried against Alexander’s
army at Issus. An earlier tactic, still used at Granicus, was to approach the
enemy and thrown javelins at it, so as to disrupt the advancing battle
formations. Only then did they start to attack with curved swords. In the
escalating confusion the fast and well trained Persian horsemen usually
gained the upper hand. And that must have been what the Persians hoped
would happen on this occasion. Alexander traditionally commanded the
right wing together with the companion cavalry, whereas the left wing was
entrusted to Parmenion, who had the Thessalian cavalry and the Greek
&
nbsp; allies under his command. The first unit to attack was composed of scouts
armed with sarissai, Paionians and one ile (squadron) of hetairoi all
commanded by Amyntas, the son of Arrhabaeus. The Persians in turn had
concentrated their best forces on their left wing – this was where we are
told the satraps Arsamenes (or Arsames) of Cilicia, Spithridates of Lydia
and Ionia and Arsites himself were positioned. The commander of the
Cappadocian cavalry, Mithrobuzanes, was also probably a satrap.
According to Arrian the Persians had spotted Alexander in his magnificent
armour and wished to resolve the battle by clashing with him directly. Of
course this was also what Alexander wanted to achieve, and this feudal
code of conduct respected by aristocrats on both sides would ultimately
work to his advantage.23
Amyntas’ detachment was attacked as it tried to ascend the eastern
bank. First Persians threw javelins at the Macedonians and then advanced
towards the enemy, thus descending the bank and entering the river. That
was without doubt exactly what Alexander wanted to happen for he
22 Diod., 17.19.3 (similar in It. Alex. , 20); Plu., Alex. , 16.2-3; Arr., An. , 1.13.2-7.
Badian 1977, pp. 271-277; Bosworth 1988, p. 41; Ashley 1998, pp. 191-192.
23 Diod., 17.19; Arr., An. , 1.14. Badian 1977, pp. 277-287; Harl 1997, pp. 306-313;
Debord 1999, pp. 430-431.
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123
immediately attacked the Persians in the river channel, where they no
longer had the advantage of holding the high ground. The Macedonians
were better armed than the Persians, especially as they had longer spears
which were especially important in the first moment impact. The
ferociously attacking Companion cavalry personally led by Alexander
gradually pushed the Persians back up the eastern bank until both sides
were out on land above the river channel. Alexander himself was the focal
point of the entire battle, personally fighting many duels with Persian
aristocrats desperately trying to kill him. Alexander’s spear broke at the
very start of the clash but one of the hetairoi, Demaratus, gave him his
own. It was then that Mithridates, Darius III’s son-in-law, attacked
Alexander but was instantly killed with the sarissa spearhead thrust into
his face. Hereupon Rhoesaces, Spithridates’ brother, struck Alexander on
the head, crushing his helmet and possibly wounding him. Despite this, the
Macedonian king managed to kill the assailant with his spear. Meanwhile
Spithridates had raised his sword and was poised to strike down on
Alexander. Now it was Cleitus who managed to forestall the disaster by
hacking off the Persian’s arm at the shoulder. Alexander and those
Macedonians around him were also attacked by another group of Persian
aristocrats, courtiers and relatives of the Great King, among them
Pharnaces, the brother-in-law of Darius III, and Mithrobuzanes. Meanwhile
the battle was also being fought on the Macedonians’ left flank, but we
know virtually nothing about it apart from the fact that the Thessalian
cavalry distinguished themselves with superior riding skills and
manoeuvres. One can assume that when the Macedonian companion
cavalry defeated the elite cavalry squadron of Persian aristocrats, the rest
of the Persian cavalry fell into disarray and fled. But Alexander quickly
halted the chase to unite the Macedonian cavalry with the phalanx, who in
the meantime had crossed the Granicus. Now together they attacked the
Persian infantry. The local detachments immediately fled, whereas the
Greek mercenaries tried to negotiate terms for capitulation. But Alexander
refused to negotiate and instead personally led the attack. The fighting was
vicious though probably not as spectacular as in the earlier phase of the
battle. Alexander’s horse was killed and most of the Macedonian
casualties were incurred in this particular clash. Of course the vast
numerical superiority of the Macedonians meant that the outcome was a
foregone conclusion. Despite a valiant effort, the Greek mercenaries were
defeated, with 2,000 of them taken captive. Alexander decided to make an
example of these prisoners by punishing them harshly: they were cast in
chains and shipped off to Macedonia as slaves. In doing so he was
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Chapter IV
fulfilling the mandate of the League of Corinth which prohibited all
Greeks from militarily serving Persia.24
The Battle of Granicus was a decisive Macedonian victory. Here
Alexander displayed attributes as a military commander that would also
serve him well in other battles: an ability to assess the terrain and select
the most advantageous place to attack the enemy, an understanding of
when to attack and a strong faith in his own abilities as well as those of his
soldiers. Added to this was Alexander’s reckless courage. He would risk
his life without considering the dramatic consequences his death, without a
nominated successor, would have to Macedonia.25 There is considerable
divergence in claims of how many soldiers were killed on either side. On
the Macedonian side figures vary from 34 (according to Plutarch, who
derived these figures from Aristobulus) to 129 (Justin). The Persians were
to have lost from 1,000 (Arrian) to 2,500 (Plutarch) cavalry and between
over 10,000 (Diodorus) and 20,000 (Plutarch) infantry. Of course one has
to bear in mind that ancient authors would minimise the number of those
killed on whichever side they considered ‘theirs’ and exaggerate the
enemy losses. Thus only Justin’s figure for the number of Macedonians
killed seems in any way plausible, especially when we consider that as
many as 25 hetairoi fell and therefore losses among the less well trained
and equipped soldiers must have been proportionally higher. There can be
little doubt that the Persian losses were indeed high for Alexander was
wont to chase and destroy the defeated enemy, so that it could not regroup
and fight again. Many distinguished Persian aristocrats were also killed,
fighting courageously in the most difficult section of the battle against
Alexander and his Companions. The Persian commander-in-chief, Arsites,
managed to escape from the battlefield but, blaming himself for the defeat,
soon afterwards committed suicide. Alexander now undertook every
measure to gain from this military victory as much political and
propaganda capital as possible. He ensured that his wounded soldiers were
cared for and personally visited them. The families of those killed were
exempted from taxation. Alexander honoured the memory of the 25 fallen
hetairoi with bronze statues at Dion, the commission for which was given
to Lysippus, the greatest sculptor of the era. Of what was plundered from
the Persians Alexander sent to Athens 300 complete sets of armour as a
votive offering to the goddess Athena with the inscription ‘Alexander the
son of Philip and all the Greeks except the Lacedaemonians from the
24 Diod., 17.19-21; Arr., An. , 1.15-16; Plu., Alex. , 16.3-14; Plu., mor. , 326f-327a; P.Hamb. 652; It. Alex. , 21-23. Badian 1977, pp. 287-291; Bosworth 1988, pp. 42-43
; Harl 1997, pp. 313-324.
25 Badian 1977, p. 293; Bosworth 1988, pp. 42-43.
From Abydus to Alexandria
125
Barbarians who dwell in Asia’. Thus at the Acropolis, whose temples had
been desecrated by Xerxes 146 years earlier, there was now visible
evidence that Alexander was realising the Panhellenic vendetta. It is also
possible that there was irony in Alexander’s gesture, because among those
captured at Granicus and sent in chains as slaves to Macedonia there could
have been many Athenians – though probably not majority as claimed in
Itinerarium Alexandri. Their release from captivity was for a long time an
object of Athenian diplomatic efforts. 26 The purple gowns, precious
utensils and other valuable items found in the Persian camp now became
the victor’s property. These things Alexander sent as a gift to his mother,
which she most probably next submitted as expensive offerings at
Delphi.27
A direct consequence of the Battle of Granicus was the capture of
Daskyleion, the capital of Hellespontine Phrygia, which surrendered to
Parmenion without putting up resistance. Alexander nominated the
Macedonian Calas his satrap in Phrygia and stipulated that the amount of
tributes collected was to be the same as it had been under Persian rule.
These first administrative decisions to be made on conquered land became
guidelines to be applied – with only a few exceptions, discussed later – in
all lands subsequently acquired by Alexander during his campaign: as an
heir of the Achaemenids Alexander took over their territories without
changing the established administrative and financial systems. Insofar as
we are able to judge on the basis of very imperfect numismatic evidence, it
was indeed as an Achaemenid successor that Alexander was perceived by
the Greeks of Asia Minor for he appears in satrap attire on coins
autonomously issued by some of their cities.28
2. Freedom for Greeks of Asia
The main Macedonian force commanded by Alexander now headed for
Sardis. The sources do not specify which route the army took other than