by Amanda
also had to consider logistical problems: in Antiquity an army as large as
his could not last long without new supplies of food, fodder and water.
The delivery of new provisions was not feasible at Sochoi, which was not
situated close to a river let alone near the coast. Even with the necessity of
bringing the provisions in on wagons and pack animals the local resources
of northern Mesopotamia and western Syria could not feed the great army
for long; that is why one way or another Darius had to move his soldiers
on from Sochoi. It was also no doubt for logistic reasons that the decision
was made to send the main baggage trains 300 km away to Damascus; this
way two parts of the great army did not have to seek provisions in the
same area. Another factor may have been ideological: a representative of
the heroic Persian monarchy could not idly wait for a numerically inferior
enemy to take the initiative. According to Murison’s attractive theory, the
decision to move could have been made when intelligence reports came in
regarding the movements of the Macedonian army. Perhaps having learnt
that the enemy’s army had divided into two detachments, those of
Alexander and Parmenion, the Persians decided to launch a surprise attack
and deal with each of them separately. The manoeuvre was indeed
surprising. Darius’s army left Sochoi and marched north along the River
Karasu Valley passing the southern Amanus mountain range. The Persians
eventually crossed the mountains by passing through the so-called Amanic
Gates. This could have been one of two passes: Bahçe, which today has
road and rail links running through it, or Hasanbeyli, which is situated a
bit further south. This 150-km march of the Persian army was not noticed
by the Macedonian scouts. However, Darius failed, if such was his
intention, to attack Parmenion’s corps when it was alone for it had in the
meantime rejoined the main Macedonian army. It also turned out that there
would be no battle between the two armies on the extensive Cilician
Lowlands for the previous day the Macedonians had headed south.
Apparently the Persian army had entered Cilicia the same night the
Macedonians entered Syria and thus they passed each other by a few
dozen kilometres. The Macedonian field hospital at Issus fell into the
hands of the Persians, who realising the failure of their manoeuvre now
vented their frustrated anger on the Macedonian patients. Some of the sick
soldiers were murdered while others had their hands hacked off and next,
having been shown the sheer size of the Persian army, they were allowed
to escape, no doubt in the hope that their terrifying tales would break the
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Macedonian will to fight. Indeed, these mutilated soldiers were the first to
inform Alexander that the Persians were now behind his army.88
The Persian strategy had surprised Alexander, who was now cut off
from his bases in Cilicia and the rest of Asia Minor. When we also
consider the superiority of the Persian fleet, which could cut off the supply
of provisions by sea, it becomes apparent that the Macedonian army was
now in a trap and the only way out of it was to defeat Darius III in a battle.
Alexander must have certainly been aware of the threat from the Persian
fleet for it was then that he performed the ceremony of driving his chariot
into the sea to pay homage to the sea gods Poseidon, Thetis, Nereus and
Nereids. Indeed, the Persians needed no more than an undecided draw on
the battlefield to further extend their strategic advantage.89 Fortunately for
the Macedonians, the Persian command also planned to rout their enemy
in a pitched battle. Having obtained information from the captured
Macedonians and the local population about where the enemy was located,
Darius sent his army south in the direction of the coastal plain around
Myriandrus and Syria, where there was a greater possibility of fighting a
battle in open territory. He was now aware that the coastal plain of
Iskenderun Bay was too narrow for him to make full advantage of Persian
numerical superiority. During a day’s march his army got no further than
the river Pinarus and there the Persians set up camp. Meanwhile Alexander,
having realised that the Persian army was no longer in Cilicia, summoned
a war council and declared his decision to confront the enemy in battle.
Arrian relates a speech Alexander is supposed to have given on this
occasion in which he drew attention to the tactical advantages of fighting
the battle in a confined space and of the superior combat quality of the
Macedonian soldier over feeble Asiatic slaves and mercenaries with no
real incentive to fight for Darius. He is also said to have mentioned the
rewards (booty) to be gained from defeating the Great King. Finally he
referred to historic examples, particularly Xenophon’s recorded
experiences of how in 401 Greek mercenaries victoriously marched from
Babylon to the Black Sea. Although speeches related by ancient author are
usually little more than demonstrations of a given historian’s rhetorical
talents, here one should not doubt that Alexander did actually gave a
speech. There was a tradition for commanders and politicians to deliver
88 Curt., 3.8.3-5, 3.8.13-13; Arr., An. , 2.7.1; Plu., Alex. , 20.4-5. Wilcken 1967, pp.
100-101; Murison 1972; Hamilton 1974, p. 67; Engels 1978, pp. 45-46; Bosworth
1980, pp. 199-201, 203; Bosworth 1988, p. 59; Seibert 1985, p. 59; Dąbrowa 1988,
p. 50; Hammond 1996, p. 95.
89 POxy. 1798 (= FGrH, 148) fr. 44, col. ii. Tarn 1948, i, p. 24; Green 1974, p.
226-227; Briant 1996, p. 43.
From Abydus to Alexandria
167
speeches to an assembled audience when important decisions were made,
so it is difficult to imagine that Alexander would have simply ordered his
soldiers to march towards superior enemy forces without words of
encouragement or explanations. Arrian’s account of what Alexander said
is presented in reported speech and therefore one cannot accuse him of
showing off with flowery language, which often occurs when ancient
author’s claim to cite someone directly. Besides, Alexander’s fairly
obvious arguments are confirmed in other accounts of a speech to his
soldiers before the battle by Curtius Rufus and Justin.90
Having spoken to his officers, Alexander ordered the soldiers to have
their dinner and at the same sent a unit of riders and archers to survey the
Syrian Gates, through which his army now had to return. The Macedonian
army occupied the mountain passes at around midnight, there the soldiers
rested among the rocks for the remainder of the night. Much later Cicero,
as a governor of Cilicia fighting highlanders, would as also pitch camp
there. Here too Alexander made sacrifices to the gods of the land where he
would engage in battle against Darius. At dawn the army proceeded
through the Syrian Gates, marching in a broad column stretching to both
sides of the narrow valley with the infantry first and the cavalry, which
was less useful in mountainous terrain, following on behind. Then when
the
valley opened out, Alexander ordered his men to proceed in battle
formation as if to expect the Persians to attack at any moment. Parmenion,
commanding as usual the left wing, received categorical instructions to
keep to the coastline, so that the Persians would not be able to outflank
them. Callisthenes relates that Alexander had his army proceed for the last
40 stades (7.2 km) towards the enemy in battle formation. Polybius, who is
a harsh critic of this historian and eyewitness, notes that the unevenness of
the Cilician terrain would have sooner or later disrupted the line of the
phalanx and thus greatly weakened its military value against the enemy.
Therefore perhaps battle formations were made at a later stage; both
Curtius Rufus and Diodorus claim they were not drawn up until the
Persians were 30 stades away. One should also remember that Alexander’s
army needed a lot of time to get through the mountain pass (7.5 hours
according to Engels’s estimate), which suggests that the battlefield was not
90 Callisth., FGrH, 124 F35 (= Plb., 12.17.3-4); Plu., Alex. , 20.5-6; Diod., 17.33.1; Arr., An. , 2.7; Curt., 3.10.3-10; Just., 11.9.3-4. Wilcken 1967, p. 101; Bosworth
1980, p. 204.
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far from the Syrian Gates if the two armies managed to clash that same
day in November 333.91
The battle known in historiography as the Battle of Issus was actually
fought some distance away from that town at one of the short rivers
flowing from the Amanus Mountains into the Iskenderun Bay, which the
sources call Pinarus, on a narrow stretch of lowland measuring 14 stades
(2.5 km) in width. The very limited topographical information that can be
derived from the ancient sources as well as the hydrological changes that
must have occurred in this part of the Mediterranean coast over the
centuries do not allow us to identify with any reasonable certainty which
of today’s watercourses was once called Pinarus. Therefore it is very
difficult to accurately locate where the battle took place. Three possible
locations have emerged from an academic debate that has lasted over a
century: Deli Çay, Kuru Çay and Payas. At 20 km from Iskenderun, Payas
is the southernmost of these rivers. Kuru Çay flows into the sea 3 km
further north, and it is another 8 km to the Deli Çay. The attention of
modern scholars was first drawn to the Deli Çay because it is the largest of
these rivers, the generally level terrain to the south would have made a 40-
stade march in battle formation possible and the gently sloped and low 2-3
m banks would not have precluded the cavalry charge described by Arrian.
On the other hand, the sources in no way suggest that Pinarus was the
largest river in the area, the Macedonians probably marched in battle
formation for a shorter distance than 40 stades and the coastal plain at Deli
Çay stretches for 7.5 km, which is much more than the 14 stades described
by Callisthenes. Moreover, the distance from Deli Çay to the Syrian Gates
is much too great to imagine that the Macedonian army could have
descended the mountains, reached this river and fought a battle all on the
same day. Inspections of the region by more recent historians (Hammond
and Lane Fox) have suggested that the Payas best fits the descriptions
given by the ancient sources. Its banks are steeper but the plain around it is
just 4 km wide which is much closer to the 14 stades mentioned by
Callisthenes than the 7.5 km at the mouth of the Deli Çay.92
91 Plb., 12.17-20; Arr., An. , 2.8; Diod., 17.33.1; Curt., 3.8.24; Cic., Att. , 5.20.3.
Engels 1978, pp. 131-134; Bosworth 1980, pp. 206-207, 219; Bosworth 1988, p.
60. Date: Arr., An. , 2.11.10.
92 Most important works arguing for identification of the Pinarus with these three
rivers are: for Deli Çay – Janke 1910; Seibert 1972, pp. 98-102; Atkinson 1980, pp.
471-476; for Kuru Çay – Bosworth 1988, p. 60; for Payas – Lane Fox 1973, pp.
169-170; Engels 1978, pp. 131-134; Hammond 1992, pp. 395-396; Hammond
1996, pp. 97-101.
From Abydus to Alexandria
169
Descriptions in the ancient sources of the battle fought between the
two armies in the afternoon of the same day the Macedonians had passed
through the Syrian Gates are not entirely clear. This results not only from
the fact that ancient authors were mainly interested in the personality of
Alexander but also because of the inherent chaos of battles in Antiquity,
where even the participants on the ground (and not for instance observers
from city walls or some other raised position) had a problem with
understanding what was actually happening. Already Polybius noted that
the description provided by Callisthenes, who was a contemporary to these
events, is unreliable on account of it not being compatible with the
battlefield’s topography. For the above reasons the following description
of the course of the Battle of Issus is also hypothetical. We know that the
Persians first positioned some cavalry and light infantry on the southern
bank of the Pinarus while the bulk of the Persian army assembled on the
northern (right) bank. Before the battle commenced the Persian cavalry
and light infantry returned to the right bank to join the main forces. The
Greek mercenary infantry was positioned in the centre with the Persian
cavalry to their right accompanied by a local infantry. Taking up positions
at both wings of this formation were the kardakes – probably an Iranian
heavy infantry though no doubt of much lower quality than hoplites.
Indeed, apart from including them in the order of battle, the sources make
no mention of the kardakes in the actual fighting. This might mean that
they simply fled from the battlefield or alternatively that the ancient
authors were only concentrating on particular participants, above all
Alexander but also the Greek soldiers fighting on both sides. The left
Persian wing extended at an angle to the rest of the front line far into the
slopes of the mountains surrounding the coastal plain. The Great King
took up a central position but nearer the left wing and was surrounded by
bodyguards and elite cavalry. The Persian plan was most probably to stop
the Macedonian phalanx in the centre with the mercenary hoplites, have
the local infantry positioned on the hillside tie down as many of the
Macedonian troops as possible through diversionary tactics and then use
their cavalry on the right wing to deliver the decisive blow.93 On the
opposite side Alexander arranged his phalanx eight ranks deep and
positioned it in the centre. Mercenary detachments were positioned behind
the phalanx. Parmenion was given command of the left wing, with
comprised the allied cavalry, Thracian foot soldiers and light infantry.
Alexander himself took command of the right wing, comprising the
93 Plb., 12.17.6-18 (after Callisthenes); Arr., An. , 2.8.5-9, 2.8.11; Curt., 3.9.1-6.
Bosworth 1980, pp. 208-209; Atkinson 1980, pp. 203-208; Hammond 1996, pp.
101-103; Briant 1996, pp. 819-821; Sabin 2007, pp. 134-135.
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Macedonian and Thessalian caval
ry. And it was with this force that he had
planned to resolve the final outcome of the battle. But before it even began,
Alexander learnt that most of the Persian cavalry was positioned opposite
Parmenion’s weaker detachments on the left wing, so he reinforced it with
his Thessalian cavalry. The Thessalians moved to the other wing from
behind the Macedonian formations, so that the Persians would not notice
the change. Against the local infantry facing his right wing Alexander
positioned two squadrons of cavalry as well as some Agrianians and
slingers.94
These last Macedonian units had the greatest fortune for the local
infantry on the Persian side did not take up the fight and just fled. Thus the
all-important Macedonian right wing faced no danger. The infantry who
were now no longer needed there moved to reinforce the phalanx in the
centre.95 The rest of the Macedonian army had the much more difficult
task of attacking the Persians across the river Pinarus. They were greeted
by a shower of arrows – so dense that they collided with one another in the
air, as Diodorus with some artistic licence would have us believe. But the
sources do not tell us how effective this hail of missiles was. The left
Macedonian wing was unable to make progress against the massed Persian
cavalry, which managed to repulse Parmenion’s attack and then chase his
squadrons over to the southern side of the river. Here both sides were
engaged in intensive fighting up until the Persian frontline collapsed on
the other wing. 96 In the centre the mercenary hoplites attacked the
Macedonian phalanx before it had finished crossing the river. As the
Macedonians tried to ascend the fairly steep and brambly bank, parts of
their phalanx line got disjoined. This the Greek mercenaries exploited
mercilessly by concentrating on those sections in particular. On this
occasion the Greek hoplites fought with a far greater doggedness than was
normal for mercenaries. This was because the phalanx symbolised
Macedonian military dominance in Greece and therefore the mercenaries