by Amanda
Chapter IV
the start of a long diplomatic correspondence between the two rulers. All
the major sources mention this exchange of letters, but the way in which
they present Darius’s successive proposals and Alexander’s responses to
them is so convoluted that any attempt to reconstruct these events can only
be hypothetical. One can only be certain that Darius wrote to his adversary
on three occasions and that on each occasion he increased his offer. The
ancient authors all agree that in the letter received by Alexander at
Marathus Darius demanded the release of the captured members of his
family. According to Arrian, who gives the most detailed account of this
first diplomatic exchange, Darius also accused Philip and Alexander of
breaking their alliance with Persia and unjustly invading the country,
whereas the outcome of the Battle of Issus he attributed to the will of the
gods. In response Alexander recalled real and imagined wrongs committed
by Persians against Greece and Macedonia, accused Darius of lacking the
legitimacy to rule and finally declared himself – by right of being
victorious in battle – to be the rightful monarch of Asia, in other words,
the Persian Empire. In a much more general manner Curtius also relates
this exchange of views regarding responsibility for the war as well as other
rival claims and there is no reason to doubt that the two monarchs referred
to each other in this way. Alexander’s letter was not addressed exclusively
to Darius but also to a much wider audience. His use of the arguments of
Panhellenic propaganda (Persian crimes in Greece) and his questioning of
Darius’s right to the Persian throne must have been directed more to public
opinion. In this letter Alexander for the first time so openly declares his
aspirations to the Persian throne. He refers to himself as the ‘king of Asia’,
which could only mean the ruler of the Achaemenid empire, reserving for
Darius at most the position of vassal. We know that at the moment of
writing this was far from the case as Darius still had control of most of the
empire, but it is the declaration itself that is important. For the first time
Alexander openly announced that he intended to capture the Achaemenid
throne and that this was his real war aim. Both Arrian and Curtius mention
Darius’s offer of peace and friendship in return for the freeing of his
family, but only Curtius also mentions the offer to pay a ransom, which
would have been quite natural in such situations. This last offer in the
peace negotiations is also mentioned in other sources and there is every
reason to believe that it was actually made. What we do not know is the
actual size of the ransom for the only sum mentioned in the sources –
10,000 talents in Itinerarium Alexandri – was probably copied from a later
offer made by Darius. Nevertheless, the amount offered must have been
vast because this was, after all, a ransom for the family of the Great King.
An exceptionally important part of Darius’s letter was his offer of peace
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and friendship since this was a de facto recognition of Alexander as a king
equal to ruler of Persia. In other words, Darius was resigning from the so
far maintained Achaemenid political theory that placed the Great King
above other monarchs and states. On the other hand, there is no mention
made of any territorial concessions, which at first sight might seem strange
in light of the war so far and the loss of much of Asia Minor. However,
this was only Darius’s first offer and he must have wanted to reserve some
concessions so that they could be used at a later stage in the negotiations.
Alexander rejected all of Darius’s proposals and responded with a letter
that was deliberately insulting. The impression seems to be that on this
occasion, as in later diplomatic exchanges, Alexander was trying to
provoke his adversary to confront him again militarily, so that the war
could be ultimately resolved on the battlefield. Moreover, in light of
inconsistencies in the sources regarding Darius’s offers, one cannot reject
outright the idea suggested by Diodorus that Alexander kept the Persian
monarch’s real letter hidden and revealed to those around him a forgery
which concentrated mainly on who was responsible for the war. The real
offer might have been so beneficial to the Macedonian side that its
rejection would have angered those of Alexander’s soldiers and officers
not interested in the continuing of the war after having already gained so
much. The genuine letter would have been kept hidden by the royal
secretary and not revealed until after Alexander’s death. If that were the
case, our sources could have combined elements of one version of the
Great King’s letter with the other. However, this is only a hypothesis, as
there is not enough primary evidence to prove or disprove it.114
The Macedonian army left Marathus most probably at the start of
January 332 and headed south along the Phoenician coast. The next
Phoenician state they entered after Aradus was Byblos (Gubal, today Jbeil
in Lebanon), and it too capitulated without resistance. The decision to
surrender must have been made by the council of elders as the last king of
Byblus, Ainel (Enylus in Arrian’s Greek transcript), was still commanding
the Byblos squadron of ships in Autophradates’s fleet.115 Soon afterwards,
under pressure from his subjects, the king of the next Phoenician state,
Sidon (today Saida in Lebanon), was also forced to capitulate. However,
despite his capitulation, King Abdashtart III (in Greek sources Straton) of
114 Arr., An. , 2.14; Curt., 4.1.7-14; Diod., 17.39.1-2; Just., 11.12; It. Alex. , 39-40.
Tarn 1948, i, pp. 36-37; Wilcken 1967, pp. 106-107; Griffith 1968; Lane Fox 1973,
p. 180; Schachermeyr 1973, pp. 222-227; Bosworth 1980, pp. 227-233; Mehl 1980,
pp. 185-186; Briant 1980, pp. 51-64; Bloedow 1995; Hamilton 1999, pp. 70-71.
115 Arr., An. , 2.15.6, 2.20.1; Curt., 4.1.15. Moscati 1968, p. 26; Atkinson 1980, p.
279; Dąbrowa 1988, p. 59; Sartre 2001, pp. 42-43.
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Sidon did not gain Alexander’s trust perhaps because he was a son of the
king appointed to the throne by Artaxerxes III after the quelling of the
rebellion of Sidon. Therefore Alexander had him removed from power and
most probably executed. The ancient sources devote a great deal of
attention to the matter of the succession to the Sidonian throne. There is a
tale that in Hellenistic and Roman times would become a classic example
of the omnipotence of Tyche, the goddess of fortune, who could
unexpectedly topple people from the highest positions of authority and
raise others from the depths of obscurity. Having deposed Abdashtart,
Alexander learned that there was no rightful successor to the throne and so,
wishing to maintain the same political system as before, he asked his
closest companion Hephaestion to find an appropriate candidate. Well
born Sidonians informed Hephaestion of Abdalonymus, who was the only
surviving male member of the royal dynasty but a mere gar
dener. The
ancient authors with relish portray a scene of officials and soldiers
approaching this humble man at work in a garden, have him dressed in
ceremonial robes, presented before Alexander and then installed on the
throne. Regardless of whether or not this colourful description of events is
true, we know for certain that Abdalonymus did become king. Moreover,
he was the first Asian to be included among Alexander’s Companions.
Abdalonymus’s greatest contribution to posterity happened years later
when he commissioned the famous marble Alexander Sarcophagus. One
of the longer sides depicts Alexander and his companions fighting the
Persians at the Battle of Issus. The other side presents a lion hunt, which is
often interpreted as one of outings the newly nominated king of Sidon
organised in the Lebanon hills to entertain his benefactor and hetairoi.116
In the winter of 332 Alexander reached the last of the major
Phoenician cities – Tyre. This would have been in February for we know
from Curtius’s account that at the time the inhabitants of Tyre were
celebrating the feast of Melqart-Baal and other sources state that this feast
was always held in that month. The victorious Macedonian march was
supposed to stop at this city until summer. Initially there were no signs of
the trouble that lay ahead. King Azemilcus was away with his Tyrian
squadron supporting Autophradates’s fleet, so his son headed a delegation
– appointed either by the people’s assembly (according to Arrian) or, more
probably, by an aristocratic council of elders. They greeted Alexander with
116 Arr., An. , 2.15.6; Ath., 12.41; Curt., 4.1.15-26; Diod., 17.47 (Diodorus mistook
Tyre for Sidon); Plu., mor. , 340c-e (Paphos is the setting of the story); Just.,
11.10.8-9. Lane Fox 1973, pp. 180-181; Atkinson 1980, pp. 278-283; Grainger
1991, pp. 30-31, 34-35; Stewart 1993, pp. 294-306; Heckel 1997, p. 199; Sartre
2001, pp. 44, 72; Nawotka 2003, pp. 128-129.
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a heavy gold crown as a sign of surrender and with food for the soldiers as
a sign of hospitality. Alexander accepted these gifts, but also announced to
the Tyrians that he wished to lay an offering at the temple of Heracles,
which is the name the ancient authors give to the god of Tyre, Melqart-
Baal. The sources do not fully explain why Alexander made such a request
let alone why he was so unyielding about it. Ultimately this request led to
a siege that lasted many months and ended with the destruction of Tyre.
Modern historians often suggest that, by entering the town with troops to
lay offerings at the temple, Alexander wanted to test the sincerity of the
Tyrian declaration and confirm its submission. However, this is not the
only possible explanation of the events that happened in February 332, all
the more so as one cannot point to any sensible strategic considerations
that would have forced Alexander to impose on the Tyrians an
unconditional surrender even at the cost of a many month long and costly
siege. This major conflict could also have been started by a cultural
misunderstanding which both sides were subsequently unable to stop from
escalating. As many other incidents in his life demonstrate, Alexander had
a very scrupulous habit of offering sacrifices to gods, particularly those
with whom he felt a close affiliation. And this was particularly true with
regard to his mythological ancestor Heracles. According to Tyrian
religious principles, on the other hand, no one but the king could lead a
procession to lay offerings to the city’s god. Therefore, if they allowed
Alexander to lead such a procession, they would have to recognise him as
their king and thus renounce the sovereignty they had so jealously guarded
for centuries. Trying to find a way out that would leave their status of
sovereignty intact but also not offend the powerful Macedonian ruler, the
Tyrians suggested that Alexander should lay his offerings at a different,
allegedly even older temple of Melqart located in Old Tyre on the
mainland and therefore beyond the main city of Tyre. This refusal, albeit
polite, provoked one of Alexander’s famous outbursts of anger. Now in a
quite different, indeed demanding tone he gave an ultimatum: they would
comply with his request or else he would have the city stormed. After
some hesitation, the Tyrians rejected the ultimatum but offered in return to
stay neutral and allow neither Macedonian nor Persian troops into the city.
Using such an argument in negotiations with Alexander was exceptionally
unfortunate, as Miletus had discovered one and a half years earlier. Only
one of the ancient authors, Curtius, claims that at this stage Alexander
tried to continue the negotiations; in his version Alexander once again sent
messengers to the Tyrians, but they had now decided on war and so killed
the messengers. Ancient accounts also relate (after Chares) that when
ordering the start of the siege, Alexander mentioned that he had had a
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dream in which Heracles took him by the hand and led him to Tyre.
Alexander’s soothsayer interpreted this to mean that the city would be
taken but only after a long hard struggle as foretold in the twelve labours
of Heracles.117
Apart from the force of religious conviction, the Tyrians’ decision to
refuse the ultimatum was also based on a faith in the strength of their fleet
and the natural impenetrability of their city. For this great city with an
estimated population of 50,000 inhabitants was located on an island very
close to the shore and on more than one occasion it had proved able to
withstand even very large land armies. Phoenician mastery of the art of
siege warfare as well as of constructing fortifications was among the most
advanced of its day, whereas its fleet, with new five-row type ships, was at
least equal to that of the Greeks. Along the edge of the Tyrian island there
was a 45-metre wall of cemented together stone. In the past only a sea
blockade had been able to force Tyre to negotiate, but at the start of 332
the Persian fleet largely supported by Phoenician ships still prevailed in
the Aegean, and this must have certainly given the Tyrians a false sense of
security. The inhabitants were also counting on support from their
powerful colony Carthage, whose delegates were incidentally present at
the metropolis on account of the Melqart festival. Citizens unable to carry
arms were now shipped off to Carthage, not only for their own safety but
also to make food supplies in the city last longer for the defenders.
Diodorus attributes the Tyrians with the intention of holding the
Macedonian army tied down for as long as possible so that Darius could
have enough time to raise a new army. But perhaps these were just the
author’s own speculations or those of the source he derived the
information from, for in 332 there is no evidence of any coordination
between the actions of Darius III and the defence of Tyre. Instead of
concentrating his forces and launching an attack on Alexander from
behind, the Great King
wasted his time on ineffective diplomacy and as a
consequence not only lost Phoenicia but also Egypt.118
The island of Tyre was just four stades (700 m) from the shore.
Moreover the water in the strait between the island and the coast was very
shallow except for the part right next to the island, which was five metres
117 Arr., An. , 2.15.6-16.8, 2.18.1; Curt., 4.2.1-7, 4.215-17; Diod., 17.40.2-3; Plu.,
Alex., 24.6; Just., 11.10; It. Alex. , 42. Wilcken 1967, p. 109; Moscati 1968, pp. 26-27, 30-41; Edmunds 1971; Lane Fox 1973, p. 181; Green 1974, pp. 247-248;
Atkinson 1980, pp. 298-299; Bosworth 1980, p. 235; Bosworth 1988, p. 65;
Bloedow 1998, pp. 270-276.
118 Diod., 17.40.3; Arr., An. , 2.18.2, 2.21.4; Just., 11.10. Sartre 2001, pp. 73-74.
Population of Tyre: Hammond 1996, p. 113.
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deep. That is why Alexander instructed his men to construct a mole from
the mainland. Perhaps he was inspired by the tyrant of Syracuse Dionysius,
who in 397 had his engineers construct a causeway to capture the Sicilian
Punic fortress of Motya. Ultimately, this Macedonian engineering venture
also proved to be successful; today Tyre is connected permanently to the
mainland by this mole (a tombolo in fact) in time expanded with accretion
of sand. However, its construction and thus the capture of Tyre proved
much more difficult than Alexander had originally supposed. The king did
not just encourage his men with speeches recorded by the ancient authors
but is even said to have himself carried baskets with soil used to create the
mole. Initially the builders made rapid progress. Tree trunks were hauled
down from Mount Lebanon to create stakes that were easily driven into the
muddy seabed. These palisades delineated the mole’s outline and protected
the subsequently deposited rocks and stones from the effects of the waves.
The houses of Old Tyre were demolished and their masonry was used as
building material for the causeway. Initially merely amused by the
Macedonian efforts, the Tyrians changed their mind once the mole’s
structure started to emerge out of the water and came up ever closer to