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  would have been to the south of the 250 mm isohyet where the lack of

  water meant a shortage of grass and therefore also a shortage of fodder for

  animals. By then a couple of months had passed since the harvest and all

  the grain and straw would have been long ago transported to the towns.

  Therefore the only way for the Macedonians to get hold of food for the

  soldiers and fodder for the horses and pack animals would have been to

  rob the granaries of fortified towns, which would have required even more

  effort and time. It is therefore quite understandable why Alexander chose

  to take a northerly route across the foothills of the Armenian highland,

  most probably along an ancient Babylonian military road. It may not have

  been an ideal route for soldiers but it was better than marching through

  central Mesopotamia. In the summer the temperatures in the north of this

  country are and were almost 10oC lower, the wells and what rivers there

  were (the Balikh and the Khabur) provided enough water and the pastures

  supplied enough food for the animals. According to Eratosthenes –

  referring to the notes of Macedonian surveyors ( bematists) – Alexander

  selected the shortest route between Thapsacus and the Tigris. The army

  5 Arr., An. , 3.7.1-2; Curt., 4.9.12; It. Alex. , 54. Engels 1978, pp. 65-66; Bosworth 1980, pp. 285-286; Atkinson 1980, p. 382; Dąbrowa 1988, pp. 66-67. The alleged

  secret dealings of Mazaeus: Lane Fox 1973, p. 227.

  King of Asia

  217

  covered the 2,400 stades (430 km) to reach the other great Mesopotamian

  river in the second half of September 331.6

  In that time Darius III had managed to gather another army for the

  decisive battle against the Macedonian invaders. For the first time in 200

  years the king of Persia was cut off from the Mediterranean Sea and

  therefore from the Greek mercenary recruitment market. Now there were

  only around 4,000 left in his service, which was as many as had retreated

  with him from Issus. In an attempt to compensate for the shortage of

  hoplites the Persians provided their Asian infantry with better weapons

  modelled on the Macedonian example, i.e. longer spears and swords.

  However, if only because there had not been enough time to train, this

  experiment did not prove to be successful and the infantry failed to have a

  discernable impact on the battlefield. The fundamental force in the army

  amassed by Darius III was, as usual, the Persian cavalry. The long time the

  Great King had to prepare enabled him to bring over the best horsemen of

  the empire from eastern Iran: the cavalry of Bactria and of Sogdiana as

  well as allied Scythian detachments. With their excellent horses, good

  training and flexible armour the east Iranian riders were of comparable

  military value to the Macedonian hetairoi and Thessalian cavalry. On the

  other hand, Darius’s 200 chariots with 2/3 m scythes to cut or terrify the

  enemy were an exotic anachronism. Fifteen war elephants were brought

  over from India. All the ancient authors cite huge numbers of soldiers in

  the Persian army: 200,000 infantry and 45,000 cavalry according to

  Curtius, 400,000 infantry and 100,000 cavalry – Justin, 800,000 infantry

  and 200,000 cavalry – Diodorus, 1,000,000 soldiers – Plutarch,

  Fragmentum Sabbaiticum, or even 1,000,000 infantry and 400,000 cavalry

  according to Arrian. Even the lowest of these figures given by Curtius is a

  gross exaggeration but, despite this, Alexander’s army was certainly

  numerically inferior to that of the Persians. It has been estimated that he

  had approximately 47,000 men. The weakness of Darius’s army was its

  disparate ethnicity which hindered communication and effective command.7

  The Persian army gathered at Babylon. The reason for this was no

  doubt not only Mesopotamia’s agricultural potential, which was well able

  to adequately feed such an army, but also strategic considerations. Darius

  probably assumed that Alexander would follow the example of Cyrus the

  Younger and march to Babylon directly from Thapsacus. That would have

  6 Eratosthenes, ap. Str., 2.1.38; Arr., An. , 3.7.3; Curt., 4.9.13-14; It. Alex. , 54.

  Engels 1978, pp. 67-70; Dąbrowa 1988, pp. 68-69.

  7 Arr., An. , 3.8.3-6, 3.11.7, 3.12.5; Diod., 17.53.1-3; Curt., 4.9.2-4, 4.12.13; Plu.,

  Alex. , 31.1; Fragmentum Sabbaiticum, FGrH, 151 F1.12; Just., 11.12; It. Alex. , 55.

  Dąbrowa 1988, pp. 75-90; Bosworth 1988, pp. 76-78.

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  Chapter V

  been why he moved the great Persian army out of Babylon north towards

  Nineveh, so that this time he could make full advantage of his excellent

  east Iranian cavalry on the extensive Mesopotamian Lowland plain. But of

  course the two armies did not meet there for the Macedonians chose to

  march across northern Mesopotamia to the Tigris. Darius therefore was

  also forced to move his army east across the Tigris and find another

  suitable site for the decisive battle.8

  It was sometime during Alexander march from Tyre to Gaugamela that

  messenger delivered to him a third letter from Darius with yet another

  peace proposal. According to Curtius and Justin, despite the previous two

  flat refusals (see Chapter IV.5), Darius was given the opportunity to yet

  again turn to Alexander in a conciliatory tone without losing face on

  account of the death of his wife Stateira. On receiving the sad news Darius

  is said to have responded by thanking Alexander for the humane treatment

  of his family and at the same time renewed his peace offer. Plutarch and

  Diodorus, on the other hand, maintain that Darius’s wife died after he had

  sent the last peace proposal. Then again Plutarch and Justin write that

  Stateira died in childbirth. If the expected child was Darius III’s, his wife’s

  death could not have been later than in the summer of 332. Many of the

  sources mention the romantic tale of a loyal eunuch who fled back to

  Darius and informed him of his wife’s death but also of the noble way in

  which Alexander treated his family. On receiving the news Darius was to

  pray to the Persian gods for victory, so that he could have it in his power

  to show equal magnanimity towards the Macedonian king; if, on the other

  hand, he were to be defeated, he asked the gods to let no man other than

  Alexander sit upon the throne of Cyrus, as he was his only worthy

  successor.9

  Regardless of when Stateira actually died, Alexander certainly received

  the peace proposal some time before Gaugamela but when he was already

  in Mesopotamia. Despite all his preparations and the Persian army’s

  numerical superiority, Darius must have been aware of the very grave

  danger of losing another battle and for this reason he made a very

  generous offer. In doing so he showed a great sense of responsibility for

  the state, which did not allow his emotions to get the better of him after

  Alexander’s last very insulting letter. An offer to cede land, especially on

  such a large scale, was virtually unheard of in the history of Achaemenid

  diplomacy and Darius was resorting to this measure in exceptional

  8 Diod., 17.53.1-3; Curt., 4.9.6-7. Marsden 1964, pp. 15-19; Badian 1985, p. 434;
<
br />   Seibert 1985, pp. 93-95; Dąbrowa 1988, pp. 67-69.

  9 Plu., Alex. , 30; Plu., mor. , 338e; Curt., 4.10.18-11.22; Diod., 17.54.7; Just., 11.12; It. Alex. , 57; Arr., An. , 4.20.1-3; Karystios, ap. Ath., 13.80.

  King of Asia

  219

  circumstances: he was trying to avoid the invasion of Iran, the very

  heartland of the Persian Empire, and Babylonia, its richest province. In

  return for peace he was offering Alexander his daughter’s hand in

  marriage, land right up to the Euphrates and the unbelievably high sum

  30,000 talents. By accepting this offer Alexander would make a territorial

  gain that was far greater than any of Philip II’s war aims. When Alexander

  received the offer he only controlled part of the territories to the west of

  the Euphrates and right up to his death the Macedonians failed to gain

  absolute control of this vast area. The sky-high ransom would cover all the

  king’s imaginable expenses for many years. Therefore Darius’s offer

  provoked a major debate in the Macedonian command over whether or not

  to accept it. In reputedly saying that he would accept the offer if he were

  Alexander, Parmenion was no doubt expressing the views of many

  Macedonians. The ruler’s famous response was to say that would also

  accept it if he were Parmenion. As usual, Alexander was determined to

  seek a solution on the battlefield and therefore rejected the peace offer. By

  then there could be no doubts that he was not after any concessions from

  Darius but instead he wanted rule over the entire Achaemenid Empire.10

  2. The revolt of Agis III

  On several occasions during his campaign against Darius III Alexander

  received news of disturbing events in Greece. The greatest source of

  trouble was Sparta, in whose dual monarchy the more important role was

  played by the ambitious Agis III of the Eurypontid dynasty. He became

  king in 338, having previously ruled as regent during the absence of his

  father, Archidamus III. He ascended the throne at a time when Sparta had

  never been weaker. After its victory at Chaeronea Philip II’s army

  triumphantly marched into the Peloponnesus, confiscated territory from

  Sparta and gave it to her neighbours (see Chapter II. 3). That same year his

  father Archidamus III had been killed at the Battle of Manduria in Apulia

  in Italy. He had been there as the commander of a mercenary force

  employed by the wealthy Spartan colony of Tarentum in its war against

  the Lucanians. All this happened in the lifetime of a single Spartan

  generation that had earlier experienced a catastrophic war against Thebes,

  the collapse of hegemony in the whole of Greece but especially in the

  Peloponnesus and the loss of Messenia after 300 years of Spartan rule.

  10 Diod., 17.54; Curt., 4.11; Plu., Alex. , 29.7-8; Just., 11.12; Constantinus

  Porphyrogenitus, De sententiis, 195. Griffith 1968, p. 36; Bosworth 1988, pp. 75-

  76; Bernhardt 1988, p. 196 ; Bloedow 1995, pp. 109-110; Briant 1996, pp. 855-859;

  Stoneman 1997, pp. 37-38.

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  Chapter V

  Agis III devoted his entire reign in trying to restore Sparta to previous

  position of power. During his regency and in his first years as king of

  Sparta he steered clear of the main political disputes by not taking

  anyone’s side in the 339-338 war, not participating in the League of

  Corinth and not allying itself with either Thebes or Macedonia in 335. In

  338 Sparta’s suffered at the hands of Philip but her intransigent attitude to

  Macedonia earned her respect in Greece.11

  Agis attempted to bring Sparta back into the main political arena in

  333 when the Persian offensive in the Aegean was at its most successful.

  He sent two diplomatic missions to Darius III, no doubt to offer an alliance

  against Macedonia. The Spartan envoys from these missions were

  subsequently captured together with Theban refugees, Athenian envoys

  and the Persian baggage train outside Damascus. Agis himself learned of

  the Macedonian victory at Issus when he was at Siphnos negotiating with

  the Persian commanders Autophradates and Pharnabazus the terms and

  conditions of financial and military support for his actions. Despite these

  negotiations, which are recorded in the sources, they were not immediately

  followed by any discernable cooperation between the Persians and the

  Spartan king. In 333 he remained passive, which left the limited

  Macedonian forces to concentrate on fighting the Persians in the Aegean

  Sea. The fact that the Persian commanders gave Agis III a subsidy of no

  more than thirty talents reflects the state of their finances after Issus. To

  this Autophradates added ten ships. But even this made a difference, for

  after receiving this help Agis sent mercenaries commanded by his brother

  Agesilaus to wage war in Crete, which Arrian euphemistically calls

  restoring order. When in 332 this Spartan expedition was joined by the

  8,000 mercenaries that had survived Issus and by the remnants of the

  Persian fleet, their success on the island was great enough to force

  Alexander to respond in the spring of 331 by dispatching there a

  Macedonian squadron commanded by Amphoterus. Nothing is known as

  to how successful this Macedonian mission was, though it obviously failed

  to stop mercenary detachments being subsequently shipped from Crete to

  the Peloponnesus.12

  War erupted on the Greek mainland in the spring of 331. Macedonia,

  governed by Antipater, was simultaneously threatened by the revolt of

  Memnon, the governor of Thrace, and by Agis III’s insurrection. There is

  no evidence in the sources that the two revolts were coordinated but we do

  11 David 1981, pp. 110-113; Kulesza 2003, pp. 284-296.

  12 Arr., An. , 2.13.4, 2.15.2-5, 3.6.3; Diod., 17.48.1-2; Curt., 3.13-15, 4.1.39, 4.8.15.

  Badian 1967, pp. 175-179; Bosworth 1988, pp. 187-200; Wirth 1993, pp. 212-213;

  Blackwell 1999, pp. 53-54; Kulesza 2003, p. 296.

  King of Asia

  221

  know that they occurred at a time when anti-Macedonian sentiments were

  running high. For now Macedonian supremacy was even more feared in

  association with the possibility of there no longer being an Achaemenid

  monarchy to counterbalance it. Antipater personally took charge of dealing

  with Memnon’s revolt, which also had the support of Thracian tribes, and

  he sent most of his forces to confront these rebels. The ancient authors do

  not provide us with any details concerning the military campaign but we

  can assume that an agreement was eventually reached between the two

  Macedonian leaders because Memnon held his position as governor for

  some time. A few years later we know he sent Alexander some Thracian

  reinforcements to India. In all probability Antipater acted as Philip II

  would have done and made some concessions so as to be able to next

  concentrate all his forces on whom he rightly considered to be the more

  dangerous enemy.13 That same spring in 331 Agis III started military

  operations at the head of a large mercenary army, having managed to gain

  the support of many Peloponnesian states, including Tegea, almost all the

  poleis of Arcadia, Elis and Achaea except for Pellene
. The only states not

  to back him were those which had Macedonian garrisons or were

  themselves bitter enemies of Sparta, such as Argos or Megalopolis. The

  states of Aetolia provided Agis with non-military aid. The Athenians did

  pass a resolution to send its fleet to help the Spartan king, but the pro-

  Macedonian politician Demades ensured that this resolution was never

  realised. The coalition Agis managed to form posed the greatest threat to

  Macedonian hegemony in Greece in Alexander’s entire reign. The start of

  the war augured well for Agis for in the Peloponnesus he defeated a

  Macedonian corps commanded by Corrhagus. 14 News of what was

  happening in the Peloponnesus reached Alexander during his second stay

  in Tyre. One cannot doubt that the possibility of Antipater being defeated

  would have led to the collapse of the Argead hegemony over Greece, next

  the invasion of Macedonia and finally an end to the unfinished war in Asia,

  for in such an eventuality even Alexander would not have been able to

  stop his soldiers from returning home. Yet whether it was because he had

  so much faith in Antipater’s military talent or whether it because he was

  eager not to delay his confrontation with Darius, Alexander did not decide

  13 Aeschin., 3.133-134; Diod., 17.62; Curt., 9.3.21. Some scholars argue for

  coordination between Memnon and Agis III: Badian 1967, pp. 179-180; Hamilton

  1974, p. 78; Blackwell 1999, pp. 54-55. Contra: Heckel 1997, p. 202; Briant 2002,

  p. 49.

  14 Aeschin., 3.165; Din., 1.34; Diod., 17.62.6-8; Curt., 6.1.20; Plu., mor. , 818e-f;

  Just., 12.1. Bosworth 1988, p. 201; Badian 1994, pp. 268-271; Habicht 1999, pp.

  20-21; Blackwell 1999, pp. 55-56, 58.

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  Chapter V

  to send back any of his land forces. Instead he despatched an allied

  Phoenician and Cypriot fleet and by diplomatic means ensured that Athens

  would remain neutral.15

  At the time the insurrection was at its most successful. After most of

  the Peloponnesian states had joined Spartan king, he had under his

 

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