by Amanda
Meanwhile Mazaeus barred the Macedonians’ way to the Persian camp
with an elite squadron of 3,000 cavalry. Alexander sent an advance guard
of horsemen (most probably mercenaries) commanded by the Macedonian
Menidas, but they dared not attack Mazaeus. Mazaeus, on the other hand,
24 Sachs-Hunger 1988, no. 330, verso 14; Polyaen., 4.3.26. Bernard 1990, pp. 517-
521, 524; Briant 2003, p. 80.
25 Arr., An. , 3.7.6; Curt., 4.10.1-7; Plu., Alex. , 31.8; Plin. Nat. , 2.180; Sachs-Hunger 1988, no. 330, verso 3. Bosworth 1980, p. 287; van der Spek 2003, pp.
292-295.
26 Curt., 4.10.8-17; Arr., An. , 3.9.1; Polyaen., 4.3.18.
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also did not engage the enemy and instead withdrew to Gebel Maqlub
(1,040 m), which overlooks the Nauqûr plain. Fear of the mighty Persian
army almost verged on panic in Alexander’s camp. Yet Mazaeus did not
make use of this opportunity to deliver a pre-emptive strike. Instead the
following day he withdrew from the mountain and returned to Darius’s
camp. Alexander not only managed to calm his soldiers down but also
took the opportunity and occupied the strategically important position in
the hills that the enemy had vacated. There he set up the last camp before
the battle and fortified it, so that his soldiers could rest and build up
strength in relative safety before the decisive clash.27
The exact date of the Battle of Gaugamela was for a long time the
subject of controversy among modern historians for it cannot be
unequivocally deduced from the information provided by the ancient
authors. Plutarch, for instance, states that it happened on the 26th day of
the month of Boedromion, which cannot be easily converted into a date in
our calendar system. Fortunately, thanks to the entry in an exceptionally
accurate Babylonian astronomical diary, we can now be certain that the
battle took place on 1st October 331.28 Already on the preceding day the
Macedonian army stood in battle formation ready to confront the Persians,
who were aligned for battle thirty stades (5.5 km) away. Alexander’s high-
ranking officers advised him to attack at once, but instead this time he
listened to Parmenion’s advice: he delayed the fight so as to first assess the
battlefield and seek out any traps the enemy might have prepared. In the
evening, however, it was Parmenion and other more senior officers who
were persuading Alexander to attack Darius’s army at night. They argued
that the element of surprise would even out the chances against a
numerically larger army. Perhaps behind Alexander’s proud response that
he did not wish to steal a victory there was, as Arrian assumes, not only an
unwillingness to risk so much in a night-time battle but also a desire to
prove to Darius his inferiority as a warrior in the open field and the light of
day. Perhaps he wished to exclude all factors other than quality of
command and sheer fighting ability. The rest of the night Alexander and
his circle of companions spent on religious ceremonies. We know that
sacrifices were also made to Phobos, the god of fear, panic and flight from
the battlefield who accompanied Ares the god of war. They went to sleep
27 Curt., 4.12.1, 4.12.4-5, 4.12.14-19; Arr., An. , 3.9.1-2. Bosworth 1988, p. 80;
Heckel 1992, pp. 362-363.
28 Plu., Alex. , 31.8; Plu., Cam. , 19.5; Sachs-Hunger 1988, no. 330, verso 15-16.
Questions pertaining to the date: Dąbrowa 1988, p. 74; Hamilton 1999, p. 81.
Fixing the date: Grzybek 1990, pp. 42, 58-59; Bernard 1990, pp. 515-528; Hauben
1992, p. 149; Le Rider 2003, pp. 267-268.
King of Asia
229
just before dawn. The rest of the Macedonian army slept throughout the
night. The Persians, on the other hand, spent the entire night on watch for
fear of an attack on their very large but unfortified camp. The Persian
camp fires were said to have been visible on the plain right up to the
horizon.29
Thanks to information contained in the book of Aristobulus, who had
accompanied Alexander on that expedition, we know that after the battle
the Macedonians found in the Persian camp the Great King’s written
dispositions for the day including the positioning of his forces. Darius
personally commanded the centre. He was guarded by the melophori, the
elite aristocratic cavalry called the royal ‘kinsmen’ as well as detachments
from India, Babylonia, Sittacene, the Uxians, Carians, Mardi and now a
not so numerous detachment of Greek mercenaries. The war elephants and
50 scythed chariots were also aligned in the centre. The right wing
included contingents from Syria, Armenia, Cappadocia and northern
Mesopotamia, Media, Parthia, Hyrcania as well as allies from Scythia and
another 50 scythed chariots. The arrangement of the Persian left wing
shows that a lesson from previous engagements had been learned. Here
Darius positioned his strongest units – the excellent east Iranian cavalry
(Bactrians, Dahae and Arachosians), Scythian allies as well as Persians
and Susians – for he realised they would most probably be facing
Alexander, who usually commanded his hetairoi on the Macedonian right
wing. Here too he positioned the remaining 100 scythe bearing chariots. It
is worth noting that Darius’s army included contingents from countries
that had already been conquered by Alexander. At least some of the
soldiers from these countries had obviously not given up hope of the Great
King and rightful ruler of the Persian Empire ultimately being victorious.
We even know of an Egyptian official called Samtutefnacht, who left an
account of his stay in Darius’s camp and of the subsequent crushing defeat
of the Persians.30
The Macedonian battle positions are well known because on this
subject the ancient authors agree. The right wing was held by the
Macedonian cavalry officially commanded by Parmenion’s son, Philotas,
but de facto command of this section of the Macedonian frontline
belonged to Alexander. Extended even farther to the right were
29 Arr., An. , 3.9.3-11.2; Curt., 4.12.24-13.17; Plu., Alex. , 31.8-32.1; Diod., 17.55.6-56.1; It. Alex. , 57-58.
30 Aristobul., ap. Arr., An. , 3.11.3-7 (= FGrH, 139 F17); Curt., 4.12.5-13. Treson 1931 (Samtutefnacht’s stele); Marsden 1964, p. 44; Seibert 1972, p. 131;
Schachermeyr 1973, p. 269; Bosworth 1980, pp. 297-299; Vogelsang 1992, pp.
222-223; Hammond 1996, pp. 141-143; Briant 2003, p. 78.
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detachments of Agrianians, slingers, Macedonian archers, Greek
mercenary cavalry and infantry, Paionian cavalry and Macedonian
prodromoi (scouts). The centre was, as usual, held by the Macedonian
phalanx with the hypaspist foot guard positioned between its right flank
and the whole army’s right wing. The left wing was commanded by
Parmenion and included javelin throwers, Thracians, Cretan archers,
Achaean mercenary infantry as well as allied and mercenary Greek and
Thessalian cavalry. Auxiliary units were positioned at the extremities of
both wings at slanting angles to the rest of the front line so as to prevent
the army from being outflanked.
Alexander positioned a second line
behind the front line of infantry. The Greek mercenaries, Thracians and
Illyrians in the second line were of less military value but they held an
important position in the eventuality of the numerically far superior enemy
surrounding the Macedonians. The positioning of the entire Macedonian
army took on a strange trapezoidal shape which was dictated by the danger
of being outflanked on one or both sides. Considering the large numerical
difference between the two armies and the flat terrain being attacked from
behind must have seemed inevitable to Alexander.31
The battle could not begin at dawn for the commander-in-chief of the
Macedonian forces, having spent almost the entire night preparing for the
fight, was fast asleep, and no one could or perhaps dared to wake him.
Parmenion ordered breakfast to be given to the soldiers and only after they
had consumed it did he venture to rouse Alexander, having to shake him
several times. Only then did the king deliver a speech of encouragement to
his soldiers and ordered the battle to commence. Alexander’s seemingly
strange behaviour was no doubt based on the sober calculation that since
the enemy was to the east, by attacking too early the Macedonians would
have the sun in their eyes. In that respect the later in the day they attacked,
the better. Nevertheless contemporary Babylonian sources state that the
battle began in the morning, or at least before noon.32
At the start it became apparent that the Persian lines extended so far
beyond the Macedonian formations that Alexander’s right wing found
itself directly opposite the Persian centre commanded by Darius.
Alexander therefore ordered his wing to move further right, in response to
which the Persians began a corresponding manoeuvre to their left.
However, the much more numerous and therefore slower moving Persian
31 Arr., An. , 3.118-12.5; Diod., 17.57.1-5; Curt., 4.13.26-32; Fron., Str. , 2.3.19-20.
Bosworth 1980, pp. 300-304; Bosworth 1988, p. 81; Dąbrowa 1988, pp. 93-94;
Hammond 1996, pp. 143-145.
32 Curt., 4.13.17-25; Diod., 17.56; Plu., Alex. , 32.1-4; Just., 11.13; Sachs-Hunger
1988, no. 330, verso 15. Atkinson 1980, p. 418.
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231
detachments could not keep up with Alexander’s smaller but faster units.
Worse still, by moving further left the Persians were leaving the terrain
specially prepared for the chariots, and Darius was clearly hoping that
these would play an important role in breaking through the enemy’s front
line. Moreover, the Macedonians were now moving away from the places
where the Persians had secretly dug ditches against their cavalry. For these
reasons the Great King ordered first the Scythian cavalry and next also the
Bactrian cavalry to attack the enemy and stop this manoeuvre. Alexander
sent a detachment of Greek mercenary cavalry to counter this attack and
soon afterwards other cavalry detachments were sent as well. The
excellently trained and armoured east Iranian and Scythian cavalry
inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, so, wishing to quickly resolve the
conflict, Darius now sent in his chariots. Although this archaic formation
did inflict some losses among the enemy’s frontline troops, it did not have
a very significant impact on the ultimate course of the battle since the
chariots operated unsupported by the Persian cavalry. As the chariots sped
towards them, the soldiers in the phalanx were ordered to stand apart and
let them through. At the same time javelins were hurled at the passing
chariot horses and immediately after that the slingers and Agrianians
finished off the charioteers with impunity.33
Gaugamela was the first recorded battle in history where a European
army encountered elephants. The Greeks had known about these animals
since the previous century but this knowledge was still very hazy –
Aristotle’s research into the subject marked a breakthrough but that was
only made possible as a consequence of Alexander’s expedition. The only
source to mention them being used in the Battle of Gaugamela is the
anonymous Fragmentum Sabbaiticum, whose author claims that the
Macedonians stopped the animals from advancing on them by scattering
sharp metal objects before them. Whether or not this unconfirmed story is
true, we can be certain at Gaugamela the military impact of the elephants
was even smaller than that of the scythed chariots.34
No doubt as he observed the situation develop on his right wing the
Great King also ordered his soldiers to attack the enemy on other sections
of the front. The Persians had the greatest success on their right wing.
Here too the scythed chariots acting in tandem with the Messagetae
cavalry were much more effective. The commander of this wing was the
satrap Mazaeus and he managed to get the Macedonians outflanked and
33 Arr., An. , 3.13; Curt., 4.15.1-4, 4.15-17; Diod., 17.57.6-59.1; Polyaen., 4.3.17; It.
Alex. , 59-61. Bosworth 1988, pp. 81-88; Dąbrowa 1988, pp. 96-97; Hammond
1996, p. 145; Ashley 1998, p. 267.
34 Fragmentum Sabbaiticum, FGrH, 151, F1.13. Scullard 1974, pp. 37-52, 64.
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Chapter V
pinned down by his troops. Some of his cavalry now broke through a gap
that had appeared as a consequence of the Macedonia centre and right
wing shifting further right and now headed straight for Alexander’s camp
rather than attacking the back of Macedonian phalanx. The Persian
captives joined the fight and the poorly armed Thracian detachment
guarding the camp was soon defeated. Legend would later have it that
Darius’s mother, Queen Sisigambis, chose to stay with Alexander instead
of making use of this opportunity to escape. It was at this critical moment
that the advantage of the unusual alignment of the Macedonian forces
became apparent: the second Macedonian phalanx positioned behind the
first turned around and attacked its own camp thus recapturing it.
Although some of the Bactrian cavalry was now confined to fighting
round the camp, the situation on the Macedonian left wing continued to be
dire. Parmenion sent successive messengers to Alexander with urgent
pleas for help, but none came for the battle’s outcome now hung in the
balance in the Macedonian centre and on the right wing.35 The sources are
very vague about what happened in the centre, saying only that
Macedonian phalanx advanced victoriously on the enemy. They focus
much more on what Alexander was doing. As at Issus, the Macedonian
king’s objective was to reach Darius with his hetairoi and he was now
leading a charge in that direction. Macedonians who had fought in that
battle later claimed that an eagle was flying above their king, which was
obviously a sign of the impending victory. The fiercest fighting erupted
between the Companion cavalry and the royal ‘kinsmen’ gathered around
the Great King. Although we can assume Arrian’s claim that Darius was
the first to flee is simply a product of Macedonian propaganda, there is no
way of knowing the veracity of the opposite claim that he wanted to die
b
ut was forced to withdraw by his entourage. Regardless of which version
is closer to the truth, Darius did once again leave the battlefield at a time
when his army was still fighting in a still equal struggle with the invading
enemy. The Great King’s escape resulted in the collapse of resistance in
the section he had commanded.36
At first Alexander tried to chase Darius but he was hindered by the
general confusion and the clouds of dust that limited visibility. Indeed,
Darius made skilful use of these circumstances and under the cover of dust
clouds he led the detachments retreating with him in a quite unexpected
35 Curt., 4.15.2-3, 4.15.5-13; Diod., 17.59.5-8; Plu., Alex. , 32.5-8; Arr., An. , 3.14.5-6; Polyaen., 4.3.6. Bosworth 1988, pp. 82-84; Hammond 1996, pp. 146-147;
Ashley 1998, pp. 267-268.
36 Arr., An. , 3.14.1-4; Diod., 17.60.1-3; Plu., Alex. , 33.2-8; Curt., 4.15.19-33; Just., 11.14; It. Alex. , 62. Schachermeyr 1973, p. 237; Bosworth 1988, p. 83.
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direction. According to Arrian and later quoting after him the Itinerarium
Alexandri, Alexander stopped the pursuit after yet another of Parmenion’s
messengers reported to him with urgent pleas for help. The Macedonian
king turned round and rushed to save the left flank of his army, which was
now on the verge of total defeat. However, it is possible that Arrian’s
account simply reflects the unsympathetic stance towards Parmenion
originally held by Alexander’s court historian, Callisthenes, who had
every reason to present the old general as an incompetent commander who
panicked instead of facing the enemy himself. Historians point to the
physical difficulties a messenger sent by Parmenion would have had in
locating let alone reaching Alexander in the most intensive heat of the
battle. Anyhow, news of the Great King’s withdrawal now spread among
the Persian soldiers and particular ‘national’ groups started withdrawing
from the battle in order to get back to their countries. In fact Alexander