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  nerve among the Macedonian soldiers, whose pride had been deeply

  injured. If the creation of this new army unit had been intended as a

  political ploy to discipline the Macedonian troops by showing them that

  they could be replaced by other soldiers, it failed completely. For the time

  being the Macedonian veterans merely cast scorn on the young Iranian

  phalangites by calling them dancers, but soon their pent-up negative

  emotions would explode.36

  4. The mutiny at Opis

  Towards the end of spring 324 Alexander together with the hypaspists and

  some of the Companion cavalry sailed down the Pasitigris into the Persian

  Gulf and thence up the Tigris to the town of Opis situated to the north of

  Babylon. There Alexander and his men met up with the rest of the army,

  which had marched from Susa under Hephaestion’s command. On their

  voyage up the Tigris the Macedonians encountered some weirs that had

  been built during Achaemenid rule. They were most probably used for

  irrigation purposes but at the time the Macedonians believed them to be

  deliberately constructed defences against attacks from the sea. Therefore,

  for the sake freeing river traffic, Alexander had the weirs dismantled.37

  Alexander’s voyage was probably associated with his current plans of

  conquering Arabia, for which the free access of his fleet to all the great

  rivers of Mesopotamia was considered essential. One may assume that the

  inspiration for this project came from the Persians inscriptions and reliefs

  Alexander had seen in Susa and Persepolis which included Arabia as part

  of the Achaemenid Empire. Arabia was never a Persian satrapy but some

  of its territories had acknowledged Persian suzerainty and it had been

  considered a fief of the Achaemenid Empire. Although Arabia had

  probably broken its ties with the Persian state by the end of the 5th century

  monumental art continued to present the Persian Empire as it had been

  during the time of its greatest territorial expansion. The successor of the

  Achaemenids may have therefore seen the conquest of this land as a

  36 Arr., An. , 7.6; Diod., 17.108.1-2; Plu., Alex. , 71.1-3, 71.6. Lane Fox 1973, pp.

  422-423; Hamilton 1973, pp. 134-135; Hamilton 1999, pp. 128-129; Green 1974,

  pp. 446-447.

  37 Arr., An. , 7.7; Str., 16.1.9.

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  fulfilment of that empire’s political ideology.38 On the other hand, Nearchus’

  voyage had actually ‘rediscovered’ the Arabian Peninsula. Although

  Scylax had already discovered this peninsula two centuries earlier, there is

  no evidence that his voyage was well remembered in the years 325-323.

  At a time which is now difficult to pinpoint but before Nearchus’ return

  Alexander dispatched a reconnaissance expedition from Egypt to discover

  whether circumnavigation of the Arabian Peninsula was possible. This

  expedition was not successful. After receiving information regarding the

  Arabian Peninsula in the winter of 325/324, Alexander called for another

  expedition. This time a fleet, making use of the monsoon winds, set out

  from Heroonpolis in Egypt in the late summer of 324 with the intention of

  sailing all the way to Susa. The fleet got as far as Qana in southern Arabia

  and then turned back on account of tales of dry land that blocked further

  progress. Such stories were invented by local merchants who jealously

  guarded the Peninsula’s secrets from the Europeans to protect their

  monopoly in the trading of incense and spices.39 The next steps in the

  conquest of Arabia were supposed to be made in the spring of 323.

  Meantime in mid summer 324 at Opis Alexander summoned together

  the entire Macedonian army. He announced to the assembled soldiers that

  all those who were no longer fit for military service due to old age or

  wounds would be discharged from the army but he would grant them such

  rewards that they would become the objects of general envy back home.

  Alexander’s intention was to satisfy the Macedonian veterans’ expectations

  for they had for a long time been longing to return home. Yet in the

  atmosphere of growing tension between the army and their commander-in-

  chief, instead of gratitude, the soldiers felt offended, so much so that the

  offer released an outburst of complaints. The soldiers, who still held the

  Macedonian traditional views of simplicity and contempt for foreigners,

  were outraged by the orientalization of Alexander’s court and by the

  inclusion of Iranians in positions of privilege and power, positions which

  should have been reserved for the victor only. Alexander’s words

  provoked uproar, the gravely offended soldiers started demanding to be all

  relieved of further military service; one even sarcastically suggested that

  Alexander should continue fighting wars together with his father Ammon.

  Now Alexander was enraged. He ordered his hypaspists to arrest thirteen

  of the most outspoken critics and have them immediately executed. This

  had a sobering effect on the rest of the army, which now fell silent, and it

  38 Högemann 1985, pp. 12-17, 124; Badian 1998, p. 220.

  39 Thphr., HP, 9.4.1-9; Arr., Ind. , 32.7, 43.9; Str., 16.3.2, 16.3.4, 16.4.4; Plin., Nat. , 6.98. Högemann 1985, pp. 73-87.

  The Last Years

  351

  was then that Alexander delivered another speech.40 The words related to

  us by Arrian and Curtius are merely a display of the historians’ own

  rhetorical skills but that such a speech was actually delivered cannot be

  doubted. Nor should we doubt the basic arguments later related by the

  authors for modern research has shown that they clearly fit the late 4th-

  century cultural context. In a direct response to the ridicule of his having a

  divine father in Ammon, Alexander started by reciting the achievements of

  his earthly father Philip II, who had raised Macedonia from a very humble

  level of civilization to become the greatest power in the Balkans. He went

  on to recount his own military achievements, recalling the countries he had

  conquered and their riches that were now Macedonian property. To those

  who complained of the wounds and toil they had had to endure he recalled

  the wounds he himself had suffered. He also reminded the soldiers of all

  the booty and other benefits they have received, including the settlement

  of the debts they had wantonly incurred. Finally he bade them all to depart

  as they wished, for he himself desired to be left under the protection of the

  barbarians he had conquered: to desert one’s king in a foreign land was

  virtually the most indelible military dishonour to a Macedonian.41

  Having delivered this speech, Alexander retired to his quarters and saw

  no one for two days. On the third day he ostentatiously distributed army

  commands among Persians, some of whom he also advanced to the court

  distinction of ‘royal kinsmen’. What is worse, the Iranian detachments

  now received the distinguished names that had previously only been held

  by Macedonian army units. All this was part of Alexander’s arsenal in the

  psychological war he was conducting against his defiant soldiers; at Opis

  the final outcome was different to what even
tually happened at Hyphasis.

  This time the Macedonians concluded that their king could really do

  without them by relying on mercenary and Iranian detachments. This time

  on the third day the king’s residence was thronged with soldiers begging

  for forgiveness and promising to surrender the instigators. Alexander

  relented and when Callines, one of the veterans of the Companion cavalry,

  said how it grieved the Macedonians that their king called Persians his

  kinsmen, Alexander immediately declared that henceforth all Macedonian

  soldiers were his kinsmen. The soldiers could hardly conceal their joy as

  they returned to the camp and thus the mutiny ended.42

  40 Arr., An. , 7.8; Diod., 17.109.2; Curt., 10.2.8, 10.2.12-14, 10.2.30; Plu., Alex. , 71.2-3; Just., 12.11.

  41 Arr., An. , 7.9-10; Curt., 10.2.15-29; cf. Plu., mor. , 327a-b. Tarn 1948, ii, pp.

  290-296; Errington 1990, pp. 107-112; Hammond 1996, pp. 248-249; Nagle 1996.

  42 Arr., An. , 7.11.1-8; Diod., 17.108.3; Curt., 10.3.1-4.3; Plu., Alex. , 71.4-8; Just., 12.12. Heckel 2006, p. 76.

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  Confrontations between mass gatherings of the Macedonian army and

  their monarch such as occurred on the Hyphasis or at Opis never happened

  in Philip II’s time. The events on the Hyphasis and at Opis were the result

  of very specific circumstances but in both cases they were also the

  outcome of events that had happened earlier: Alexander had previously

  summoned his army ad hoc to use it as an element in the internal politics

  of the Macedonian elites. This is what happened during the Philotas affair

  and when Alexander wished to justify his murder of Cleitus. These gave

  the soldiers a sense of power and the ability to play a role in the decision

  making process normally reserved for the king and his aristocratic advisers.

  With his exceptional charisma and political talent, Alexander was nearly

  always able to control the crowd into which the army in such situations

  changed. However, this tradition of soldiers participating in the making of

  political decisions which developed during his reign was to have great

  significance in the diadochi period, when there was no one able to

  command the authority that had been previously held by the last of the

  great Argeads.43

  The reconciliation between Alexander and his soldiers was celebrated

  with a great banquet for 9,000 people. Of those invited the Macedonians

  sat closest to the king and a bit further away the Persians and other guests.

  The feast was preceded by the offering of sacrifices by Greek priests and

  Iranian magi as well as a prayer for ‘the harmony and unity of the

  Macedonian and Persian state’. This statement, recorded by Arrian in his

  work, probably reveals Alexander’s intention of creating an empire that

  was cosmopolitan but where the Macedonians, whom he had earlier called

  his kinsmen and were now seated closest to him, would hold a privileged

  position.44

  Despite the reconciliation, the plan to discharge veterans went ahead.

  10,000 foot soldiers and 1,500 horsemen were sent back. This does not

  mean that so many soldiers were genuinely unfit. Plutarch mentions a

  soldier being caught simulating disability to avoid further military service

  and we can assume that there were many more similar cases that were

  never discovered. Alexander made sure that the discharged veterans had a

  really good send off: they were to receive army pay for their journey home

  and an additional one talent (the equivalent of 20 years of army pay) each.

  Alexander also advised them to leave behind their Asian concubines and

  any children they might have with them, promising that they would be

  raised as Macedonians at his expense. This way Alexander wanted to

  make the veterans feel even more grateful to him and also ensure that in a

  43 Errington 1978, pp. 110-113; Anson 1991; McKechnie 1999, p. 56.

  44 Arr., An. , 7.11.9. Badian 1958a, pp. 429-439; Bosworth 1988, pp. 160-161.

  The Last Years

  353

  dozen or so years’ time he could have reputedly as many as 10,000

  soldiers for whom the only homeland would be the army camp and the

  only authority their commander-in-chief. As another mark of respect to his

  Macedonians, the king also decided he would also pay the orphans of

  deceased soldiers. In a letter to Antipater Alexander wrote that the

  veterans were to receive an honourable homecoming welcome and the

  right occupy the best seats in theatres, which was the customary way of

  distinguishing those who had done the kingdom a particularly great service.

  The veterans were also to feel greater security during the homeward

  journey as their appointed commander was Craterus, the best and the most

  respected of the Macedonian generals, known for his conservative views.45

  Craterus’ mission was not only to lead the veterans back to Macedonia

  but, above all, to replace Antipater, who had very bad relations with the

  women of the royal house, as the king’s proxy in the Balkans. Antipater

  was to hand authority over to Craterus and personally bring to Alexander’s

  court new Macedonian reinforcements to make up for the old soldiers now

  being sent home. The contingent of veterans proceeded at such a slow

  pace that they were still in Cilicia when they received news of Alexander’s

  death in the summer of 323. There Craterus was supervising preparations

  for a naval campaign in the Mediterranean.46 As a trusted representative of

  the king in this region he was also in touch with Greece and Macedonia. It

  was on Alexander’s instructions that he contacted the Athenian politician

  and general Phocion. This was a man the king held in great esteem as is

  evidenced by the fact that after the Battle of Gaugamela Phocion and

  Antipater were the only correspondents Alexander continued to greet in

  the traditional Greek fashion. At a time not specified by the sources

  Alexander offered Phocion 100 talents as a gift. Although this was not a

  bribe but as an expression of generosity and sincere friendship, the

  Athenian statesman, who was proud of his independence and also liked to

  show off his material self-denial, turned the offer down. Now Craterus was

  to make Phocion a new offer in the king’s name: the revenues of a town in

  Asia Minor which had not been officially liberated in 334 and which

  therefore was the personal property of the king. Naturally, this offer was

  also rejected, in response to which Alexander simply commented that he

  could not consider his friend those who did not want anything from him.

  Both Alexander’s offers, and in particular the one concerning the town’s

  revenues, were typical of the Achaemenid system of government, in which

  45 Arr., An. , 7.12.1-3; Diod., 17.110.3, 18.4.1; Curt., 10.4; Plu., Alex. , 41.9-10, 71.8-8; Plu., mor. , 181a, 339c-d; Just., 12.12.

  46 Arr., An. , 7.12.4-7; Diod., 18.4.1, 18.12.1. Bosworth 1988, p. 161; Bosworth

  1988a, pp. 209-210; Bosworth 2002, p. 31; Blackwell 1999, pp. 155-157.

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  the monarch offered presents to the most powerful men in circle as a mark

  of distinction. Different than in Greece where gifts were granted by peers


  to help cement a ritualised friendship ( xenia), in Persia presents given by

  the monarch could not be rejected. Both the offer of granting a town’s

  revenues as well as the king’s reaction to Phocion’s rejection show that

  Alexander thought and acted as the successor to the Achaemenids and he

  no longer attached enough importance to winning over members of the

  Greek ruling elites in a way that was for them natural and easy to accept.

  The ability to establish bonds with the Greek ruling elites was one of the

  secrets of Philip II’s might. His son did not feel it necessary to devote so

  much effort, care and attention to such matters and this was an indirect

  cause of the political crisis in Greece and Macedonia after his death.47

  Though summoned to do so, Antipater did not appear before

  Alexander, nor did he raise let alone personally deliver the reinforcements

  his king expected to replace the veterans he had sent home. Instead

  Antipater sent his oldest son, Cassander, whose presence at Babylon is

  recorded in the late spring of 323. In Justin’s account, widely accepted in

  modern historiography, Antipater feared for his life on account of what

  had happened to those Alexander had considered to be his rivals, for

  example, Parmenion, who was of Antipater’s generation. Justin uses this

  information to explain the role Antipater was supposed to have played in

  the alleged poisoning of Alexander. However, we can be fairly certain that

  Alexander died of natural causes (see Chapter VIII.1) and this makes the

  version that Antipater feared for his life less plausible. One cannot speak

  of any enmity between Alexander and his regent in the Balkans as the king

  continued to consider Antipater’s youngest son, Iolaus, to be one of his

  most trusted courtiers, responsible for what the monarch drank. Cassander

  appeared in Babylon in the late spring of 323, which would mean that he

  had probably left Pella a couple of months earlier, i.e. after Antipater had

  received written summons from the king. If Antipater had genuine reasons

  to fear Alexander’s true intentions he would probably not have sent

 

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