Kennedy's account of “the hasty grab for the nearest excuse” offered a fairly accurate description of why he had lost his job as Stanford's president several months earlier. But one should not be misled by Kennedy's use of the inclusive “our.” He considered himself the totally innocent victim, who had been misunderstood and scapegoated by the dullards of American society:
Above all, I hope you will not shrink from that special form of responsibility that will require you to stand up, state the program, accept the risks and bear the consequences. Even at their worst, and you are hearing this from an expert, they're not intolerable—not if you acted from conviction and know you did the right thing.85
By the end of the speech, the fact that Kennedy had been attacked became transformed into evidence of victimhood and, ipso facto, confirmation that he had done “the right thing.” The self-righteous tone of Kennedy's lecture was nothing new to most students, but many parents and guests were simply stunned. Most of the audience recognized that Kennedy was not exactly the best person to preach about responsibility.
The hypocrisy was compounded in Fall 1993, when Kennedy returned to Stanford as a full-time professor. The first subject he would teach: ethics. According to the Stanford Daily, Kennedy would offer “the first comprehensive examination of ethics of university life offered anywhere,” a course entitled “Professional Responsibility and Academic Duty.” “I think it will be terribly informative to me,” Kennedy pronounced, “and I hope it will be to [the students].”86 The irony did not end there. From his tenured perch in semiretirement, Kennedy reflected upon the university's budget woes, pontificating about the greed of the 1980s: “I think we're starting to pay off for the 12 binge years from 1980–1992.”87 Although Kennedy was referring to Republican administrations, the dates 1980 to 1992 ironically refer to his term in office as well—“12 binge years” if there ever were. Still busy looking for scapegoats, Kennedy would rather blame Stanford's problems on the president of the United States than on the president of Stanford.
Metamorphosis
Caliban's rebellion succeeded at Stanford. By the early 1990s, the multicultural leaders had taken control. They had expelled the West and many of its defenders. But their success—if it should be called that—was replete with contradictions. Though in no way bullish about capitalism, the multicultural vanguard behaved just like their caricature of the hated “robber barons”—looters who squeezed every penny out of others. In seeking to impose egalitarianism, they made themselves an elite. In seeking to eliminate what they perceived as oppression, they acted far more tyrannically. In enacting new codes of conduct and creating new-age crimes, they exempted themselves from common standards of decency.
The comparison between Donald Kennedy and Stanford's founder, Leland Stanford, is particularly telling. The original Stanford had been one of the West's premier railroad builders, one of the legendary captains of industry, or, less positively, “robber barons.” But the original Stanford had been more charitable than the latter caricature might suggest: He contributed his vast fortune to the establishment of a university in memory of his son, who died at age 15. He hoped hoping to provide others with the education his only child never had the opportunity to receive. Such nuances have been lost upon Stanford's current generation of leaders, who piously rail against the capitalist sins of those who came before them. Under Kennedy's leadership, any reminders of Stanford's capitalist founding family were gradually expunged, to the point that even the group statue of the first family (father, mother, and son) was relegated to a forsaken lot (see chapter 4).
Donald Kennedy certainly is no Stanford. Any comparison is flattering to the former, not the latter: Kennedy operated by spending the public's money rather than his own, and in the process almost destroyed the institution Stanford had built. Whether the university's hard-working founder was really a “robber baron” or deservedly earned the money is open to debate. But Kennedy actually fit the bill rather nicely. A refined acquisitiveness ensured the best lifestyle capitalist loot could buy, but without the hindrance of capitalist or even democratic restraints, such as a respect for taxpayers’ property or the kind of accountability the American polity requires. In a final bizarre twist, Donald Kennedy's life had come to bear a striking resemblance to the vilified image of Leland Stanford.
If Caliban's liberation implied that he would be free to do whatever he pleased, then Stanford's Calibans—the Great Experimenters—had chosen to exercise their freedom in a most peculiar way: They had become like Prospero—or, more precisely, like their distorted image of Shakespeare's Prospero, the vile character depicted in Cesaire's angry book. Like Cesaire's Prospero, who did not realize that he was a “colonial addict” or “anti-nature,” Stanford's Great Experimenters suffered a similar blind spot regarding their own transgressions.
Yet oddly enough, such a transformation seemed to follow ineluctably from the logic of the multiculture itself. The only roles that could be conceived of in the multicultural production were those of victim and victimizer, Caliban and Prospero. On the multicultural stage, if one no longer played the role of Caliban, then one must have become Prospero. The sort of “liberation” achieved by Stanford's egalitarian elite simply amounted to an inversion of who was doing the controlling.
For the multicultural vanguard, there was no escape from the historical dialectic between the class of the oppressed and the class of the oppressors. There could be, at best, a substitution of roles, with new groups of victims—the American taxpayers—to take the place of the old. A third possibility, of the true individual, whose ontological status depends neither on being a gnostic victim nor on being an ignorant oppressor, could not even be imagined. At the end of their remarkable metamorphosis, Stanford's multicultural leaders had become their own worst enemies.
Notes
1. Scott Willis, The San Jose Mercury News, January 25, 1991.
2. Joel Shurkin, “Congressional Committee Criticizes Stanford's Accounting Procedures, Suggests Some Employees May Be Guilty of Fraud in Indirect Cost Issue,” Stanford University News Service, March 14, 1991.
3. This was the finding of Fred Newton, deputy director of the DCAA (Defense Contracting Auditing Agency), whose auditors conducted an onsite investigation. Milton Socolar, special assistant to the comptroller general of the General Accounting Office (GAO), the investigative branch of Congress, testified that “serious deficiencies in Stanford's cost allocation and charging practices, combined with inadequate oversight by ONR [Office of Naval Research], had led to significant overcharges to the government. We identified over $3.6 million in unallowable and inappropriate charges, of which almost $1 million was erroneously charged to the government.” Ibid.
4. John Wagner, “In troubled waters; Stanford billed yacht costs to U.S.; revelation raises ire of congressman,” The Stanford Daily, December 5, 1990.
5. Eugene Methvin, “He Caught the Campus Chiselers,” Reader's Digest, January 1992. Marcia Barinaga, “John Dingell Takes on Stanford,” Science, February 15, 1991.
6. According to the GAO, the university eliminated the shopping center charges in 1988, but the charges for 1986 and 1987 were never corrected. As a result, the government paid more than $185,000 of the shopping center's bills. Shurkin, supra note 2.
7. Paul Biddle, Letter to James Gaither, Stanford University News Service, January 26, 1992.
8. Ibid.
9. John Dingell, “Deserving projects are underfunded as Stanford overcharges taxpayers,” The Peninsula Times Tribune, March 31, 1991. Shurkin, supra note 2.
10. John Wagner, “University may retreat on costs,” The Stanford Daily, January 14, 1991. Maria Shao, “The Cracks In Stanford's Ivory Tower,” Business Week, March 11, 1991. John Wagner, “House subcommittee lambastes Stanford; Hearing reveals more embarrassing charges, hints of ‘criminal liability,’” The Stanford Daily, March 14, 1991. Methvin, supra note 5.
11. Dingell, supra note 9. Jeff Gottlieb, “U.S. probe of Stanford may cost oth
er schools,” The San Jose Mercury News, January 22, 1991. Philip Hager, “Grants Helped Pay for Reception,” The Los Angeles Times, February 16, 1991. The wedding reception charges were withdrawn from Stanford's bill to the government in January 1991. Donald Kennedy, “Statement by Donald Kennedy, President, Stanford University,” Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, March 13, 1991. Shurkin, supra note 2.
12. Shurkin, supra note 2.
13. Donald Kennedy, “Statement on Indirect Costs,” Campus Report, January 8, 1991.
14. Shao, supra note 10.
15. Wagner, “University may retreat,” supra note 10.
16. Lisa Koven, “Man of the Year Paul Biddle,” The Stanford Review, January 27, 1992.
17. Methvin, supra note 5.
18. Jeff Gottlieb, “Stanford investigated for research billing,” The San Jose Mercury News, September 13, 1990.
19. Koven, supra note 16.
20. John Wagner, “Stanford vulnerable on indirect cost issues,” The Stanford Daily, October 16, 1990.
21. Tracie Reynolds, “Probes of grant funding,” The Peninsula Times Tribune, September 13, 1990.
22. Faculty Task Force on Indirect Costs, “Task Force reports on indirect costs,” Campus Report, April 6, 1988.
23. Jeff Gottlieb, “U.S. probe of Stanford may cost other schools,” The San Jose Mercury News, January 22, 1991.
24. Lynn Ludlow, “Stanford probed on costs of U.S. research,” The San Francisco Examiner, September 13, 1990.
25. Gottlieb, supra note 23.
26. Marcia Barinaga, “Stanford Erupts Over Indirect Costs,” Science, April 1990.
27. Ibid.
28. Norm Book, “Is Stanford's spending out of control?” The Stanford Review, January 1988.
29. Heather Heal, “No budget cuts here: Stanford seeks new multicultural educator,” The Stanford Review, January 19, 1993.
30. Andy Dworkin, “No cuts for student centers,” The Stanford Daily, April 8, 1994. Christopher Yeh, “Res Ed Trims the Fat: Director promises to preserve essential services and staff,” The Stanford Review, February 3, 1992.
31. Jeff Gottlieb, “Stanford raises its tuition by 5.5 percent: Year on The Farm to cost the same as a BMW 325i,” The San Jose Mercury News, February 9, 1995.
32. Mary Madison, “Stanford to raise tuition 5.5%: Undergrad costs will be $26,749 with room, board,” The San Francisco Chronicle, February 9, 1995.
33. David Sacks, “Departments Paid Bonuses for Minority Hiring,” The Stanford Review, November 4, 1991.
34. Biddle, supra note 7.
35. Ibid.
36. Methvin, supra note 5.
37. Ibid.
38. Peter Robison, “Casper finds improving Stanford image a slow, difficult process,” The Stanford Daily, February 26, 1993.
39. Gerhard Casper, “Statement on the Resolution of Outstanding Disputes Between Stanford and the Government on Indirect Costs Issues,” Stanford University, October 18, 1994.
40. Mark Simon, “Out of scandal, Stanford has a chance to redefine itself and seek greatness,” The Peninsula Times Tribune, July 28, 1991.
41. Donald Kennedy, “Statement to the Stanford Faculty Senate on Various Reviews of Indirect Cost Recovery,” September 27, 1990.
42. Kennedy explained: “While the degree of attention being paid to indirect costs will be intense, we are unusually well positioned to handle it. In our Controller and his senior financial staff, we have highly respected professionals with years of experience with indirect costs. I have great confidence in the competence and integrity of these colleagues, and I believe we have nothing to fear from a fair and thorough examination.” Ibid.
43. Wagner, supra note 20.
44. John Wagner, “Stanford self-study finds no wrongdoing on indirect costs,” The Stanford Daily, October 17, 1990. Jeff Gottlieb, “Stanford report denied overcharging U.S.,” The San Jose Mercury News, October 18, 1990.
45. John Wagner, “Rosse: Stanford won't collect money it says government owes,” The Stanford Daily, October 19, 1990.
46. Wagner, supra note 4.
47. Donald Kennedy, “Statement on Indirect Costs,” Campus Report, January 8, 1991.
48. Wagner, “University may retreat,” supra note 10.
49. Jeff Gottlieb, “Stanford withdraws bill; Taxpayers won't have to pay for wedding reception,” The San Jose Mercury News, February 14, 1991. Hager, supra note 11.
50. Shao, supra note 10.
51. Gottlieb, supra note 49.
52. Wagner, “University may retreat,” supra note 10.
53. The chairmen explained: “Our view has been and continues to be that the Hoover House expenditures are important, reasonable and appropriate ones for Stanford University…. [The] services provided to the president and his family, such as the salaries of staff and household help and their reimbursement for mileage in connection with errands which may be wholly or partly personal to the president or his family, payment for phone service, other utilities and the like…are also appropriate Stanford expenses.” See James Gaither, Warren Christopher, William Kimball, Peter Bing, Chairmen of the Board 1976–1991, Letter to Representative John Dingell, Stanford University News Service, March 1, 1991.
54. Shao, supra note 10.
55. Gottlieb, supra note 49. See also John Cox, “Probes, fines tarnish Stanford's golden image,” The Sacramento Bee Final, January 31, 1991.
56. Jeff Gottlieb, “Stanford appoints two to oversight committee,” The San Jose Mercury News, February 16, 1991.
57. John Wagner, “Elite image a liability in controversy,” The Stanford Daily, January 29, 1991.
58. Donald Kennedy, “Statement by Donald Kennedy, President of Stanford University,” Stanford University News Service, March 14, 1991.
59. Shurkin, supra note 2.
60. Ibid.
61. “Stanford's image,” The San Jose Mercury News, March 17, 1991.
62. Howard Libit, “Controversy's glare scorched Kennedy: The politics of indirect costs proved too hot for Stanford's eighth president,” The Stanford Daily, May 22, 1992.
63. John Manley, Letter to President Kennedy, Stanford University News Service, April 18, 1991.
64. Donald Kennedy, “What have we learned? Our obligation is to do what is right, Kennedy asserts,” Campus Report, April 3, 1991. Jeff Gottlieb, “Kennedy apologizes to alumni,” The San Jose Mercury News, March 24, 1991.
65. Donald Kennedy, “Message to the Faculty,” Stanford University News Service, April 4, 1991.
66. “Chronological guide to indirect costs at Stanford,” The Stanford Daily, May 28, 1992.
67. John F. Burness, “Report of Public Affairs/News Services Site Visit: Stanford University 31 May – 2 June 1989,” Stanford University News Service, July 14, 1989.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid. More specifically, Beyers wrote in an addendum to the report, the administration had “Mandated publication of bowdlerized reports; Forbidden our staffers from contacting public agencies; Ordered photographers not to take their pictures at a public demonstration; and Suggested that editors stonewall legitimate news inquiries.” See also Skip Schwartz, “‘A fact sheet?’ Faculty Senate expresses control over Casper's control of Campus Report,” The Stanford Daily, March 5, 1993.
70. John Wagner, “Bookstore brass enjoys perks unheard of elsewhere,” The Stanford Daily, February 5, 1992.
71. Ibid. Juthymas Harntha, “Store directors not fully aware of perks,” The Stanford Daily, February 7, 1992.
72. Ibid.
73. Steve McCarroll, “Attorney general intensifies Bookstore investigation,” The Stanford Daily, October 1, 1992. See also John Wagner, “Bookstore perks were ‘inappropriate,’ review finds,” The Stanford Daily, May 18, 1992; and Steve McCarroll, “Bookstore's lease on campus called sweetheart deal,” The Stanford Daily, May 28, 1992.
74. “Bookstore getting rid of perquisites,” The Stanford Weekly, August 20, 1992. Miranda
Doyle, “Bookstore to sell vacation home: Pricey perk on the market for ‘ambitious’ $425,000,” The Stanford Daily, February 11, 1993.
75. Miranda Doyle, “Bookstore costs from state probe near $900K,” The Stanford Daily, February 12, 1993.
76. Cecilia Tom, “Conklin arrested for using cocaine,” The Stanford Weekly, July 4, 1990. See also John Cox, “Probes, fines tarnish Stanford's golden image,” The Sacramento Bee Final, January 31, 1991.
77. Anne Stroock, “Drug Program for Stanford Dean,” The San Francisco Chronicle, July 26, 1990.
78. Tom, supra note 76.
79. Stroock, supra note 77.
80. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Archuleta sentenced to probation, service,” The Stanford Weekly, July 2, 1992.
81. Martha Brockenbrough, “Archuleta resigns, admits a ‘problem': Long-time administrator arrested for secretly videotaping women,” The Stanford Daily, June 3, 1992.
82. Terry Shepard, “Assistant Dean Archuleta arrested, placed on leave,” Stanford University News Service, May 30, 1992.
83. Donald Kennedy, “Fond farewell: ‘You have made me proud to be president,” The Stanford Observer, May–June 1992.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. Julie Makinen, “Kennedy teaches hard lessons,” The Stanford Daily, September 30, 1993.
87. Interview with Donald Kennedy, The Stanford Weekly, July 1, 1993.
8
Caliban's Kingdom
Western civilization has suffered a setback at Stanford. Civilization will recover. Whether Stanford will is another question.1
—Charles Krauthammer
It was time for a change. On March 18, 1992, Gerhard Casper, the dean of the University of Chicago Law School, was named Stanford's ninth president.2 The silver-haired legal scholar's most important credential was perhaps his status as an outsider, in no way tarnished by the indirect cost scandal. Hailed as “the right white knight to lead the university into the 21st century,” the first president from outside the university in 25 years acknowledged Stanford's position as a chastened institution and sought to convey an austere, academic tone.3 The trustees, Casper told local newspapers, wanted him to refocus Stanford's attention “on the central purposes of the University, that is, teaching and research, not being diverted by all these political controversies.”4
The Diversity Myth Page 32