by Salim Mujais
Turkish troops marching before French militarymen in the region of Alexandretta in 1939. This territory which belonged to Syria was given by France to Turkey in exchange for Turkey not entering the war on the German side.
In January 1937, The League decided that the Sanjaq should remain nominally part of Syria, but should enjoy almost total internal autonomy. The agreement reached made the Sanjaq an autonomous region with its defense handled jointly by the French and Turks. The Turkish government then proceeded to raise the ante and massed troops on the border again in a show of force. The French buckled and gradually gave in to Turkish demands.
Saadeh, in an article on January 29, 1937. “The granting of the right of the defense of the Sanjaq to Turkey endangers the safety of all of geographic Syria,” he declared. In response to Ataturk’s statement that Turkey will collaborate in any initiative toward pacification of the world, and the Syrian hinterland government of the National Block running for safety under the pretext of peaceful relationships, Saadeh writes, “Nothing is more favorable to peace than the willingness of some nations to perish in the struggle for survival. If the Syrian government is headed by people who cherish peace more than life and who stand mute and inactive in the face of danger, their attitude does not represent the will of the nation.” In his words, the nation was getting “sick and tired of the sterility and paralysis of its traditional politicians.” 48
Fearing ongoing defeatism on the part of the National Bloc, Saadeh addressed a memorandum to the Syrian government on January 30, 1937 expressing the regret of the SSNP in view of “the position taken by the Syrian government in the face of Turkish maneuvers… that effectively removed Syrian sovereignty over the Sanjaq.” 49 He asked the Syrian government to take a strong stand with the Mandate by including cautionary provisions in the Franco-Syrian treaty. He declared that the SSNP was willing to support the government in any action, no matter how bold, in the support of national right. The inaction of the National Bloc, however, was galling.
The National Bloc was more concerned with saving the treaty than saving the province.50 They hoped that a campaign of “Arab solidarity” would be sufficient to calm the internal front while they cajoled the French establishment into moving the ratification of the treaty forward. The ethnic approach by the National Bloc was doomed to fail. The majority of Arab-speakers in the Sanjaq were not Sunni Muslims, but rather Orthodox Christians and Alawite. The National Bloc may have viewed them as insufficiently Arab or unworthy of sustained assistance.
NORTHERN OUTREACH
In December 1936, Saadeh undertook a public visit to the region of the Alawites on the northern Syrian coast. This area is unique in having high concentrations of groups traditionally considered as esoteric religions with separatist tendencies.51 French policy in the district was to encourage Alawite separatism and from 1922 to 1936, the Alawites had their separate state. From the French perspective, the Alawite territory had a vital geopolitical position. It could be used, in conjunction with Greater Lebanon, to create an area of French control over a large segment of the Levantine coast.
The French promoted separatism by mere interest and similarly discarded it by mere interest. In 1936, they agreed to the incorporation of the Alawite territory into the State of Syria, as per the Franco-Syrian treaty. This was retracted in 1939 when the treaty was suspended and the area again became Territoire Autonome Alaouite!
The trip started on December 18, 1936. Over a four-day period, the convoy visited Safita, al-Mashta, Marmarita, Tel Kalakh, and Tartous. The agenda of the tour consisted of several public meetings during which speeches by Saadeh, local SSNP members and local dignitaries as were made. Additionally, open-air gatherings with brief speeches by Saadeh in colloquial Arabic took place in the smaller hamlets. Courtesy visits to area notables and chieftains either by Saadeh himself or by delegates he sent for that purpose were inevitable. Finally, Saadeh spent some time in extensive review of administrative and organizational issues with SSNP branch leaders.
Saadeh delivering a speech during his tour of the Alaouites region in December 1936
In Safita, Saadeh addressed a very large gathering of SSNP members and supporters who braved the rain to listen to his speech. Saadeh took the occasion to clarify important aspects of the SSNP’s approach to Syrian unity.52
“The Syrian National Party inaugurated its national endeavor by addressing the greatest need of the Syrian nation, namely the need for a common general foundation that unifies the interests of the Syrian people and is suitable to support the edifice of Syrian nationhood and the revival of the Syrian nation. It is an endeavor ignored by political groups that antedated the Syrian National Party and their calls for national unity remained sterile and unheeded… We did not simply assert the need and necessity of national unity, but sought the foundations of national unity in the true needs of the people and the interests of the nation and promulgated basic and reform principles that address these needs and safeguard the interests of the nation…
This land that sustains us is threatened from two directions, from the south and from the north. In Palestine, the Zionist incursion continues to acquire fertile lands that can support thousands of Syrians. In the north, the Turkish danger looms trying to breach our borders and acquire another part of Syrian land necessary to our life and progress…
Thirty thousand Syrian nationalists in Lebanon, and tens of thousands of supporters and sympathizers, consider geographical Syria as their homeland and are ready to mobilize to the border in the case of real danger…
I declare that Alexandretta is a Syrian territory necessary to our life and the advancement of our interests and we are ready to defend it at any cost…”
He did not forget that his listeners were farmers and workers:
“The reactionary forces oppose the Syrian National Party because the Syrian National Party wants to liberate the farmer from servitude and indenture.
The reactionary forces oppose the Syrian National Party because the Syrian National Party demands fair treatment of workers and their rights in decent living.
The reactionary forces oppose the Syrian National Party because the Syrian National Party liberates the citizens from the servitude of blind obedience and the authority of corrupt old institutions.” 53
The notable aspects of this trip are that it took place with minimal interference from the local governments or the French Mandate. Saadeh brought a message of national unification to an area noted for its separatist tendencies. The region was fraught with feudalism, tribalism and sectarian conflicts. It was a microcosm of all the social, economic, political, and religious strife afflicting Syria. It was exactly the test region for the success of the national revival ideology of the SSNP.
Saadeh’s visit to the Alawites area, although restricted to the district of Tartous in the southern part, is symbolic of the momentous change that the SSNP effected in this area. Philip Khoury, an expert on Syrian affairs during the French Mandate describes that effect as follows: “There were two other institutions which were to have more lasting impact on the Latakia province and the Alawite community more than the Murshidiyyin. One was the emerging radical nationalist organization known as the al-Hizb al-Qawmi al-Suri or, as the French called it, the Parti Populaire Syrien (PPS) and the other was the military. The PPS, with its strongly secular ideology, appealed first to the Christian Orthodox community of the province, as it did in Lebanon, but it also appealed to Syria’s other minorities. The Alawite intelligentsia found the party attractive because it rejected Arabism and religion altogether. It also stressed the values of village life over those of the city where Arab nationalism had its deepest roots... Both the army and the PPS promoted in different ways the process of Alawite integration into Syria...” 54
LEBANESE CONFRONTATIONS
AMATOUR
Demonstrating the material presence of the SSNP in the various regions of Lebanon was a political necessity after the long hiatus caused by Saadeh’s repeated incarceratio
ns and the proclamation by the Lebanese government that the SSNP had been dissolved. After the success of the trip to the Alawite district, Saadeh planned further demonstrations in the Shouf and the Metn districts of Lebanon.
The Shouf region was under powerful feudal control. The feudal system in this region was coterminous with the religious minority – the Druze – who under the leadership of Sitt Nazira Junblatt were aligned with the Mandate. SSNP activities in the district started with an initial meeting of regional SSNP officials with Saadeh in Baaklin. This limited display was favored by the local SSNP leadership and endorsed by the head of the SSNP political bureau Salah Labaki who was averse to any unnecessary clashes with the authorities. The visit also involved meeting local dignitaries. On his way to Baaklin on January 9, 1937, Saadeh’s convoy was diverted by the police so that Saadeh would meet the Qa’immaqam (district administrator) Nazim Akari. Akari, failing to convince Saadeh to cancel his visit, urged restraint in public display. The modest meeting in Baaklin proceeded without incident. Another larger meeting had been planned for Amatour, in the upper part of the Shouf. Opinion was divided within the SSNP leadership whether to proceed or to delay the Amatour gathering. On the morning of January 11, when large groups of SSNP supporters started converging on Amatour from the surrounding villages, the Qa’immaqam summoned the senior SSNP administrator in the area and reiterated his advice for moderation. When the full public meeting started at around 3pm, a police force of around fifty uniformed individuals approached the meeting area. The SSNP organizers cleverly made way for the police commander and his troops to be escorted to the front row and displayed all courtesy and hospitality. The meeting proceeded without any incident and all disbanded in an orderly fashion.
The attempts of the local government to dissuade the SSNP from holding the meeting, and the nominal endeavor at intimidation by sending a police force may be viewed as halfhearted. The local players may have had a more significant role in preventing a confrontation in Amatour (and precipitating a clash in Bickfaya) than typically recognized. The diplomatic overtures of the local SSNP organizers vis-à-vis the civil and police officials greatly helped their case. In creating a historical narrative for the early years of the SSNP, an image of defiance is inspirational.
In his speech at the Amatour meeting, Saadeh did strike a note of defiance:
“We have gathered as an attacking force not a defensive force. Those that enslave people need to be on the defensive, they need to defend their monopolies and privileges. We are a liberation movement and it is the nature of liberation movements to actively advance and effect change…
Our party is no longer merely a national doctrine and a worthy idea. It has become a political force and a material force.” 55
BICKFAYA
The meetings in Amatour and Bickfaya were primarily symbolic events to assert physically the existence of the political party. The events of February 21, 1937 in Bickfaya, however, were of a different ilk. A successful display of SSNP strength and organization in a notable Christian district would not sit well with a francophone president who wanted to monopolize the Christian voice. The SSNP had gained some political credit from the event in Amatour and was therefore emboldened by that success.
The confrontation was not spontaneous, but premeditated and born of the exasperation of the Lebanese government officials who had failed to prevent the gathering in Bickfaya at the grass root level. Early in February, when it became known that the SSNP was planning a public meeting in Bickfaya, the Qaimmaqam of al-Matn started calling the local civil servants in Bickfaya and surrounding area and the police departments to gather intelligence on the preparations and date of the event. He was also urging the local civil servants to mount an opposition campaign and to file petitions with the government asking it to prohibit the gathering.
On February 21, just over 300 SSNP members in organized formations and flags assembled in the main square facing Hôtel Continentale. Saadeh reviewed their ranks and a few speeches were delivered. The government armed forces (around 250 Gendarmes) were in steel helmets, full gear and bayonets fixed to their rifles. They advanced on the arrayed ranks of the SSNP and ordered them to disband. The SSNP members tightened their ranks and prepared to face the Gendarmes. The two groups were equal in number and mere physical strength and massed bodies were not going to lead far. An agreement was reached by which the Gendarmes would stand back and allow the SSNP ranks to retreat in an orderly manner as per their original program since the display was already completed. The Qaimmaqam agreed and the SSNP men retreated in an orderly fashion to various destinations. When fewer than a hundred SSNP members were left, the Gendarmes attacked in contravention of the agreement and a fierce hand-to-hand combat ensued. Dozens of SSNP men and Gendarmes were injured, some seriously and several SSNP members were arrested.
Saadeh decided to thwart the attempts of the government to apprehend him, and planned a series of civil disobedience events that would, it was hoped, force the government to reconsider its oppressive policies. Saadeh went into hiding and started to prepare public opinion for the forthcoming uprising. On March 1, 1937, he issued a blistering indictment of the proxy Lebanese government describing it in the harshest terms and stating the case for freedom of expression against the tyrannical behavior of the government.
“A veil of tyranny unprecedented in history has descended on Lebanon…
For what is Lebanon and who are we? Are we perchance foreigners? This fatuous boasting of loyalty to Lebanon makes it seem as if Lebanon was the private property of those boasting, or that Lebanon is something separate from the Lebanese people and above this people, or that the domain of some and not others, or the domain of only those in government…
We are members of the Lebanese state and have the full right to express our opinion in its affairs and its destiny… The government is not the state; this principle was buried with Louix XIV and lies in peace in his grave…
The government that prevents citizens from free deliberation on the affairs of their state and prohibits them from expressing their civil and political rights is a government that has overstepped its limits and violated the principles on which it stands. It has rebelled on the will of the people who alone has the right to decide its own destiny and that of its government. A government of this kind is a rogue government and I declare it a rogue government…
The government of Lebanon has become a bureau of inquisition…” 56
After the clashes in Bickfaya, Saadeh stayed at a secure safe place in Beirut from which he made secret visits to various regions. Saadeh moved his hideaway from Beirut to Aley. Sensing that his cover may have been jeopardized, Saadeh decided to move on to Damascus. His departure, however, was conveyed to the government by an informer and he was apprehended before he could reach the border. The Lebanese government arrested 300 SSNP members during this new wave of persecution.
It is clear from the above that the activities of the SSNP during this phase were continuously plagued by the ability of government informants to gain access to critical posts in the SSNP and to sensitive information.
Saadeh’s third imprisonment (from March 10 until May 15) was shorter than his previous stints in prison. This was a punitive type of incarceration by a government uncomfortable with the visibility of the SSNP and the resilience of its leader.
A TENUOUS TRUCE
Saadeh was released from prison for the third time on May 15, 1937 and his release was a culmination of a political process. He did undergo a trial, unlike his release from his second imprisonment. In this second trial, the presiding judge was Lebanese and the proceedings did not gather the interest of the media like the first trial. Receiving a verdict of not guilty was a political necessity for the settlement process negotiated between Saadeh and the government of President Eddeh.57 The case he made to Eddeh’s government was that the SSNP was working for national unity, and that the SSNP did not aim to destroy the Lebanese state.
The “understanding” between
him and the authorities was acknowledged in a letter he addressed to the examining magistrate George Murad dated May 12, 1937.58 In the letter, Saadeh asserts the categorical opposition of the SSNP to foreign propaganda and its efforts to combat it by every available means. He states that the SSNP had hoped that the Mandate would facilitate the task of a national reform movement, as it is the task of the Mandate to assure that countries under its jurisdiction rapidly acquire the skills and undergo the reforms necessary for national self-governance. As regards France, he states that the SSNP favors a strong friendly relationship with France to serve the Syrian national interest.
A few days after the release of Saadeh from prison and on the specific request of Khayr al-Din al-Ahdab, the Lebanese Prime Minister, Saadeh paid a visit to an aide of the French High Commissioner. Meyrier was the Secrétaire Générale in the Haut-Commissariat. He was frequently an acting High Commissioner when de Martel was absent.59
Saadeh extended these gestures of political good will to the French. On July 14, 1937, Bastille Day, he went to the commemorative reception traditionally held at the residence of the High Commissioner in the Palais des Pins. As Saadeh went through the line of the reception, the High Commissioner, noting with surprise the presence of Saadeh, said to him jovially “Zaim means leader, n’est ce pas, so where do you want to lead us?” To which Saadeh retorted, “To what is best for both of our countries.” 60