Murphy agreed. Rosecrans had ordered him to defend Iuka until the stores could be removed; nothing had been said about holding at all cost. Murphy tried to telegraph Rosecrans of the attack, but the wires between Iuka and Corinth were dead. Murphy sent a staff officer with a three-man escort to take a dispatch to Rosecrans; they were never heard from again. All day Murphy waited for a train that was to transport the thirty carloads of stores at Iuka to Corinth. Convinced that Armstrong had torn up the track, he sent repairmen toward Burnsville to find the break; they never returned. Murphy assumed the worst and made his preparations accordingly. He sent a single courier on a fast horse to Burnsville with a dispatch explaining his predicament, then told his brigade quartermaster to gather all the wagons in town, load them with supplies, and be ready to move.
The courier returned at 8:00 P.M. still bearing the dispatch. Burnsville had been evacuated; townspeople told him that the last Yankee had left by train for Corinth that morning. For the next six hours Murphy agonized over the commissary stores and waited for some word from Rosecrans. At 2:00 A.M. he gave orders to evacuate Iuka and detailed a company of cavalry to set fire to the stores. The wagon train left for Farmington under cover of darkness. The infantry followed at daybreak.12
Out on the Fulton road, two miles from Iuka, Price’s infantry prepared for batde. Armstrong had reported Murphy’s presence in town, and Price was eager to capture the Federals along with their stores. It was Price’s desire to close on Iuka rapidly that had driven Litde and his weary soldiers back onto the road on the night of September 13. Progress had been slow. Between 11:00 P.M. and daylight Price’s infantry covered fewer than ten miles, and at dawn the army was three miles short of Iuka. A courier from Armstrong’s cavalry intercepted Price along the road. The enemy were in Iuka in strength, he said, and reinforcements were on the way to them from Burnsville. Price’s soldiers sunk into the road to sleep while the Missourian pondered the intelligence. Having no reason to doubt the courier, Price ordered the troops roused. The Third Texas Dismounted Cavalry and the Third Louisiana were brought forward and told to move on the town at the quick time.
Armstrong’s troopers led the way. They galloped into Iuka at 7:00 A.M., brushing away a few Union cavalrymen who had lingered to burn the stores. Armstrong detailed a detachment to pursue the Yankees toward Burnsville, then sent back word to Price that the town was empty.13
Murphy’s escape disappointed Price; but his tired soldiers were pleased to have taken the town quiedy, and the wealth of abandoned stores that greeted them palliated any regret over a missed chance to fight Federals. The two officers whom Murphy left behind to superintend the destruction of the stores had failed miserably, running at the first faint echo of beating hooves. They left behind $30,000 worth of commissary and quartermaster stores, a long train of railroad cars laden with supplies, and dozens of well-stocked sutlers' shops.
The Rebels broke ranks and assaulted the stores. Remembered a Texan, “It was a sight to gladden the heart of a poor soldier, whose only diet had been unsalted beef and white leather hoecake, the stacks of cheese, crackers, preserves, mackerel, coffee, and other good things that lined the shelves of the sutlers' shops and filled the commissary stores of the Yankee army.”14
The Southerners were determined to rectify the discrepancy. As the first regiment in town, the Third Louisiana fared especially well. Sgt. Willie Tunnard came away with an armful of condensed milk, canned fruit, lager beer, and fine wines. After depositing their spoils in a safe place, a few Louisianans amused themselves with abandoned handcars. Tunnard watched them push the cars up a steep grade, jump on, and descend at breakneck speed, yelling like children.
Sadly for the trailing regiments of the army, order was quickly restored and guards posted over the stores. The latecomers skulked away, convinced that the officers had appropriated the delicacies for their exclusive use.
Lt. Col. Robert Bevier of the Fifth Missouri certainly profited. He had been ordered to post a guard over the Iuka Springs Hotel, every room of which “was filled with cheese and crackers, ham and hominy and molasses and whiskey. I found infinite difficulty in protecting my treasure. True to the ’old soldiers' motto, every guard would provide for his own mess and jealously protect from all others.” But, confessed Bevier, “my feelings were somewhat mollified when I found that my cook had amply provided for my own larder, and I ate in silence and asked no questions.”15
General Little was too tired and sick to partake of the spoils. While his colonels restored order, he slipped from the saddle, accepted as his headquarters a dilapidated house that fortunately was occupied by an attentive family, and after reading a bit of a captured Yankee newspaper, fell fast asleep.
Pvt. Sam Barron of the Third Texas Cavalry was equally apathetic. Laid low with dysentery at Baldwyn, Barron only recently had returned to duty. The night march to Iuka nearly killed him. When his comrades ran off to gather spoils, Barron collapsed in the road, “and as soon as we went into camp I fell down on the ground in the shade of a tree where I slept in a kind of stupor until nearly midnight.”
Barron’s comrades slowly drifted into camp. The excitement of the capture was wearing off, and in its place came a numbing fatigue. Those lucky enough to slip away with Yankee rations cooked and ate them, then spread out into the forests outside town to rest. By sunset nearly the entire army was asleep.16
Price indulged the men; , his mind was given over to deeper musings. Apart from Federal stores Price’s nearly bloodless capture of Iuka had gained him nothing. In fact, it was beginning to look as if the whole march had been a grueling waste of time. Reports came in that, rather than attempting to join Buell, Rosecrans had fled westward with his two remaining divisions. Assuming the Ohioan’s plans indeed were to enter Middle Tennessee, Price recognized that he had at best delayed him. The Army of the West was too far south to prevent a Federal crossing of the Tennessee River north of Eastport; Rosecrans need only march north eighteen miles and cross at Pittsburg Landing. On other hand, Price could not himself push on to join Bragg without exposing his line of communications or inviting a flank attack by the superior forces of Grant and Rosecrans. Calculating that Bragg’s orders for him to come to Nashville had been based on bad intelligence regarding Rosecrans’s whereabouts, Price opted to remain in northern Mississippi.
The only sure way of preventing Rosecrans from slipping into Middle Tennessee, Price concluded, was to attack him at Corinth. But he dare not risk his army alone. On the evening of September 14, as his men bedded down around Iuka, Price again tried to interest Van Dorn in a combined attack on Corinth: “Rosecrans has gone westward with about 10,000 men. I am ready to co-operate with you in an attack upon Corinth. My courier awaits your answer.”17
Van Dorn had been busy during Price’s advance on Iuka, but none of his activity was directed toward cooperating with Price. To the contrary, the Mississippian was zealously availing himself of Price’s preoccupation with the Federals to his front to subvert him from behind.
Van Dorn had begun his unseemly machinations on September 8, when he urged Price to ignore Bragg’s orders and instead help him retake West Tennessee. After giving up on Baton Rouge, the Mississippian had placed a garrison at Port Hudson, a river strong point located between Baton Rouge and Vicksburg. Feeling that he had sufficiently provided for the security of the lower Mississippi, Van Dorn looked to take the offensive— on his own terms. Bragg’s predicament elicited only his contempt. “If Rosecrans has crossed the Tennessee and got beyond your reach do you not think it would be better for us to join forces at Jackson, Tennessee, clear Western Tennessee of the enemy, and then push on together into Kentucky. . . . If Rosecrans is much ahead of you he could join Buell and meet Bragg before you could aid him,” Van Dorn argued, as if Bragg’s orders had been discretionary. While awaiting Price’s reply, he made ready to move his own army from Holly Springs to Grand Junction, Tennessee, preparatory to an attack on Memphis.
Price was not fooled: he mu
st obey Bragg, and if need be, he would march alone into Tennessee. Van Dorn changed his tactics. He wrote Secretary of War George Randolph and demanded that, by virtue of date of rank, he be given “command of the movements of Price, that there may be concert of action.” Van Dorn also asked Randolph to grant him 5,000 recently returned, but not yet exchanged, prisoners from Fort Donelson that Bragg had promised to Price, arguing that “I can make a successful campaign in West Tennessee with them; little without them.”
At a loss what to do, Randolph bucked the matter to President Davis. “I supposed these matters would be regulated by General Bragg, and feel some hesitation in giving directions which might conflict with his plans. Something, however, should be done,” Randolph endorsed the letter before passing it to the president. “Shall I order him to take command of the prisoners, subject to General Bragg’s orders?"18
Jefferson Davis’s tendency to pay less attention to affairs in the West than their importance dictated, too often intervening only after a crisis became acute, made itself felt now. Despite the chivalrous tone of their correspondence, there could be no cooperation between Van Dorn and Price so long as neither commanded the other. Someone had to step in, but the president’s unfamiliarity with the situation in northern Mississippi and with Bragg’s intentions meant whatever action he took would be uninformed.
Davis made a halfhearted effort at informing himself. He told Bragg about the mess in Mississippi and confessed, “I am at a loss to know how to remedy [these] evils without damaging your plans.” The danger was great, Davis pointed out. “If Van Dorn, Price, and Breckinridge each act for himself disaster to all must be the probable result.”
His impatience for a quick fix got the better of Davis. Having affirmed that a misstep in Mississippi might prove fatal, the president nonetheless went ahead without waiting for Bragg to answer. Davis addressed Randolph’s query first, but his answer was tentative and unclear. Returned prisoners should join their respective regiments as soon as they were formally exchanged, regardless of the district in which the units were serving. On the issue of overall command, Davis said only that “the rank of General Van Dorn secures to him the command of all the troops with whom he will be operating.”
What did that mean? Van Dorn was not operating with Price, and there was no prospect that, short of being in charge, Van Dorn would do so. Davis apparently recognized the inadequacy of his response, because on September 9 he wrote Van Dorn direcdy and decisively on the question: “The troops must co-operate and can only do so by having one head. Your rank makes you the commander.”
No one bothered to inform Price or Bragg of the decision. Unaware that he was now subordinate to Van Dorn, Price settled into his headquarters at Iuka to ponder his next move.19
* * *
Grant and Rosecrans were baffled. Neither could discern the purpose behind Price’s march on Iuka. Grant guessed it portended an attack on Corinth, perhaps within forty-eight hours. Rosecrans speculated that the elusive Price might bypass Grant and make for the Tennessee River. “As Price is an old woodpecker, it would be well to have a watch set to see if he might not take a course down the Tennessee toward Eastport, in hopes to find a landing,” he suggested to Grant.20
Reports from Union scouts only compounded the confusion. One report claimed that Price intended to invade Middle Tennessee and that if Grant tried to pursue him, Van Dorn would attack Corinth. Other reports repeated rumors that the Confederates were combining to attack Corinth— Van Dorn by way of Ripley, and Price from the northeast. A third report had Price over the Tennessee River and on the way to Kentucky.
All the reports agreed on one essential, that the Confederates were concentrating their forces east of the Mississippi Central Railroad. Consequently, Grant elected to draw down his scattered detachments west of the line. He ordered Maj. Gen. Stephen A. Hurlbut to reinforce the garrison at Bolivar with his division from Memphis. Next he called in the troops guarding the railroad itself, intending to bring them to Corinth. Grant countermanded the order when he learned that Hurlbut had been delayed in getting to Bolivar, and he told them to reassemble at Jackson instead. From Bolivar he took the brigade of Col. Marcellus Crocker, and he advised Maj. Gen. Edward O. C. Ord, who held the center at Jackson and Bolivar with the divisions of Ross, McArthur, and Davies, to stand ready to move to Corinth.21
In good spirits and good health, Rosecrans could joke about the Old Woodpecker Price, but the uncertainty was playing hard on Grant. He felt deeply the absence of Julia and the children. Rawlins had returned, which was some comfort, but he was as yet too weak to do much strenuous work. And Grant himself was far from well. “My health is still like it was when you left; a short appetite and a loss of flesh,” he wrote Julia. “From being some fifteen or twenty pounds above my usual weight I am now probably below it. I am beginning to have those cold night sweats again which I had a few years ago.” To his sister Grant despaired, “I have not been very well for several weeks but [have] so much to do that I cannot get sick.”
Grant’s patience was easily taxed. News of Murphy’s retreat from Iuka “disgusted” him, as it did Rosecrans, who relieved the colonel and brought him up on court-martial charges. Absorbed with the fate of Kentucky, Halleck badgered Grant for reinforcements while dismissing his fears. “There can be no very large force to attack you,” Halleck wired Grant. “Attack the enemy if you can reach him with advantage.”22
To reach Price Grant first had to find him. On September 15 he directed Marcellus Crocker to reconnoiter east along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad toward Iuka until he found the Confederates.
It was a poorly conceived order, a reflection of Grant’s anxiety. Crocker’s brigade was a reliable command, but the men were nearly played out from three days' hard marching, and they had yet to reach Corinth. The usual agonies of a summertime march in Mississippi — oppressive heat and humidity, swirling dust, and no water—had knocked nearly half the men from the ranks and consigned most of the officers to ambulances. When the brigade at last stumbled into camp outside Corinth, it had dwindled to less than a regiment.
Crocker could ask no more of his men. He ignored Grant’s order and permitted the brigade to pitch camp. Rosecrans seconded him, telling Grant that Crocker’s brigade was in no condition to move. Instead Rosecrans gave Colonel Murphy’s brigade, now led by Joseph A. Mower, a chance to redeem itself.23
The assignment was less ironic than it seemed; Mower was no Colonel Murphy. A scrappy, hard-drinking, hard-fighting Vermonter, he had entered the army during the Mexican War as a private. Mower found army life to his liking, and seven years after the Mexican War he was promoted to second lieutenant. He was in Missouri when Fort Sumter was fired upon, and there he accepted a commission as colonel of the Eleventh Missouri. Mower’s troops liked him and nicknamed him “the Wolf,” perhaps for his predatory instincts in battle. Already Mower had made an enviable record for himself as one of the most reliable regimental commanders in Rosecrans’s army, when sober.24
At daybreak on September 16 Mower set out for Burnsville by train. Voluble townspeople told him that Price was at Iuka with his entire army, but the Vermonter was skeptical and decided to press forward on foot.
It was eight miles to Iuka over the sandy, narrow Burnsville road. The day was hot and the going hard, recalled one Illinois lieutenant: “Stifling dust, parched throats, and aching eyes irritated by sand, the smell of sweaty leather from burdening knapsack . . . gun barrels that are hot and bayonets whose glint is an irritation, the water in the canteen hot and brackish, though the cloth cover is kept well wet.”
Mower pushed his men hard on the march, so hard that his brigade came to be called “Joe Mower’s Jack Ass Cavalry.” At 4:00 P.M., six miles from Iuka, his advance guard ran into pickets from Armstrong’s cavalry brigade. The Rebel horsemen squeezed off a few harmless shots, then turned for town with news of the Federal approach.25
The troopers' excited arrival roused the Confederate camp. For two days Price a
nd his lieutenants had expected the Federals to return in strength. They required the men to sleep within reach of their rifles, and the flimsiest rumor of a Yankee approach was enough to send the army out of camp and into line of battle. Already the men had been called out four times to meet phantom threats, and they were wearying of the game.
This time the crack of pickets' rifles and the low boom of cannon gave the alarm a ring of truth. Price hurried Dabney Maury’s division out the Burnsville road at the double-quick time. A mile northwest of town Maury deployed his command along a ridge that offered an unobstructed view for nearly a mile in the direction from which the Yankees were expected. He pushed out the Second Texas Infantry and a battalion of Arkansas Sharpshooters as skirmishers, protecting their flanks with dismounted detachments from Wirt Adams’s Mississippi Cavalry Regiment.26
Late afternoon shadows stretched across the road and melted into the pine forest. The air was damp and smelled of rain. On high ground a mile northwest of Maury’s position, Colonel Mower formed line of battle, and the two forces contemplated each other across 1,200 yards of darkly forested ravines. Under a warm, heavy rain their skirmishers kept up a desultory fire until nightfall.
Both sides slept on the field. The temperature fell sharply and the rain kept falling. A deserter from the Second Texas slipped into the Yankees' lines and told Colonel Mower that Price was in Iuka with at least 12,000 men. He intended to draw the Union army out from Corinth, the Texan added, after which Van Dorn would attack the town. Mower believed the Texan. Under the cover of night he quietly withdrew his outnumbered command. By 11:00 P.M. on September 16 Mower was back in Burnsville.27
The Darkest Days of the War- the Battles of Iuka and Corinth Page 8