by Ken Wharton
He also came close to death in March 1984, when Loyalist paramilitaries, the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), shot him several times in a vain assassination attempt. He has always denied culpability for the disappearance of Mrs Jean McConville, a Catholic widow who was abducted, murdered and secretly buried by the Provisionals for unstated, certainly unsubstantiated, ‘crimes’. Evelyn Gilroy, former PIRA Volunteer from the Divis Street area, says that Adams was the only person in a position to order that particular murder.*** Gilroy made allegations that Adams gave a direct order for the abduction and murder of Jean McConville who was one of several of the sad group of victims known as ‘the disappeared’ that will be looked at in another part of this book. Another senior Republican, Peter Rodgers, claimed that Adams had ordered him to take unsafe explosive material to Britain for a bombing campaign there.****
Adams later became a Sinn Féin Teachta Dàla (TD) in the Irish Parliament; in 2003, Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) MP Iris Robinson claimed that Adams was involved in the 1978 napalm-style bombing atrocity at the La Mon restaurant in Belfast, which burned to death twelve innocent Protestants and badly injured almost eighty other people. He has always denied this, but it would appear that his protestations of innocence are only believed by extreme left-wing Labour Party politicians and the IRA’s Irish American supporters, as well as himself. Indeed, on 29 September 2012, Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Enda Kenny accused Adams of having not only been a member of the IRA, but also a member of the IRA Army Council. He called for Adams to ‘... be absolutely truthful about this ...’ but to date, Adams has absolutely refused to be forthcoming about his PIRA past. We will examine further allegations later in this chapter.
In 1969, the old IRA had Thompsons, old German Mausers and the obsolete though effective Lee–Enfield .303, as well as a plentiful supply of home-made explosives, mixed in the kitchens and bathrooms of the Falls Road and Ballymurphy. By the ‘end’ of the Troubles, they would be using US-supplied Armalite 7.62mm automatic weapons, M60 heavy machine guns, RPG7s (rocket-propelled grenades), surface-to-air missiles (SAM) capable of bringing down a helicopter and the latest Czech-manufactured Semtex explosives.
It wasn’t just the $200-a-head Sinn Féin fundraising celebrity dinners in the United States, and it wasn’t just the ever-filling NORAID collection boxes, nor the contributions from Irish Australians and Irish Canadians – there was a more sinister element to it; funds and weapons supplied by the USSR, Czechoslovakia and the rogue state of Libya were pouring into Northern Ireland via many circuitous routes; for every discovered PIRA arms cache, a dozen more were available to bring about further death and destruction.
The IRA was divided into a Northern Command, which operated in the nine ‘traditional’ Ulster counties (including Cavan, Monoghan and Donegal) as well as the border counties of Leitrim and Louth, and a Southern Command, which operated in the rest of Ireland. The Provisional IRA was originally commanded by a leadership – the ‘Army Council’ based in Dublin. It is alleged that both Adams and the late Martin McGuinness occupied senior positions on this body. It can only be conjecture – certainly informed speculation – that both of these men were at the head of PIRA; they steadfastly maintained that they were ‘only’ members of Sinn Féin. Whatever their roles were, fellow Republicans – Dolours Price and Brendan Hughes – have named Adams as a PIRA commander. However, Adams and McGuinness resolutely stuck to the Republican ‘party line’, refusing to condemn or criticise any actions on the part of their military wing.
Throughout the organisation’s history, there appears to have been a steady stream of men and women who were willing to betray their comrades; whether it was for reasons of altruism or for money, the IRA was riddled with informers – touts in their parlance. There was also major penetration by agents working for both RUC or Gardaí Special Branch, MI5 or British Army Intelligence – men and women doing a professional, invaluable job. The dedication of these people – whatever their motives – undoubtedly saved hundreds of lives by revealing arms caches and smuggling operations, as well as assassination plans. In an attempt to tighten up security, at the behest of top Provisionals such as Ivor bell, Brian Keenan and allegedly Gerry Adams, control of what they termed ‘the war zone’ was given over to Northern Command, as well as the introduction of the ‘cell’ system in 1977.
The ‘cell’ system operated by ensuring that once an order came down from the Army Council to the local Brigade commanders, only a select number of Volunteers would be made aware of forthcoming operations, assassination targets and so on. Moreover, if there was a leak, because the information was confined to a narrow circle, there was only a finite number of suspects. Both the Army and RUC, once in command of leaked intel, had the power of life or death over planned targets. For example, if the prevention of an operation might lead to internal suspicion of their informer, a blind eye was turned to a planned ‘hit’. Consequently, an off-duty UDR or RUC officer would be allowed die to ensure that the informer would remain active, invaluable and alive. In the vast majority of instances, the SF would arrest the PIRA/INLA active service unit (ASU) en route to an operation or stage a subtler ‘deterrent’ operation of their own. These would involve, for example, an ‘unexpected’ high level of military personnel in the target area, or off-duty soldiers and police being away from work or home at the time of the planned ‘hit’.
Occasionally, examples would be made of the terrorist gangs, generally when information was passed down to SF handlers from high-ranking Provisionals, such as the SAS/RUC ambush at Loughgall in May 1987 that saw the deaths of eight PIRA members in a well-planned ambush in Co. Tyrone. Other pieces of high-grade intelligence allowed undercover units to compromise and destroy PIRA operations at Drumnakilly in 1988, Coagh in 1991 and Clonoe in 1992 (see Chapter 13).
The IRA came into the campaign in the late 1960s using First World War vintage equipment, even old Thompson machine guns originally placed in ‘mothballs’ after the failure of the border campaign of the late 1950s. They relied on explosives mixed in garden sheds in the Falls Road, the Short Strand and other nationalist areas, which often were far more dangerous to the handlers than the intended victims. However, they became increasingly professional, better equipped, better armed and better trained. They were very good at doing what they did best: killing soldiers and policemen as well as taking part in thinly disguised sectarian murders. By the 1990s, they could shoot down Army helicopters and rain murderous fire at SF personnel using US-supplied M-60s and Soviet-manufactured DShk heavy machine guns capable of hitting aircraft. They even had the capacity to take out armoured vehicles with RPG-7 anti-tank rocket launchers. For their operations, they could rely on AK-47 Kalashnikov and AKM assault rifles as well as Taurus, Glock, Vs-58 and Beretta handguns. Additionally, they had a near-inexhaustible supply of Czech-manufactured Semtex explosives, using the latest in electronic technology to detonate them. Their bombs became more effective; they were even able to produce their own versions of military flame-throwers.
A fine example of their advance in technology and execution of their plans occurred in the early 1990s at Newtownhamilton in Co. Armagh. As an RAF Puma lifted off from a field opposite the RUC station, a mortar was fired from a trailer loaded with hay bales with not a single PIRA operative in sight. The mortar base plate was set up on a wire linked to a nearby generator, angled to fire in the direction of the helipad. As the gang watched from some distance away, they cut the electrical supply to the entire Newtownhamilton area. In doing so, the emergency generator powered into life, creating a circuit that launched the mortar. The projectile brought down the Puma, injuring several officers as well as the pilot.
One of the most senior British officers killed during the Troubles was the popular commanding officer (CO) of the Royal Green Jackets’ 2nd battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Ian Corden-Lloyd (39), on 17 February 1978 near Jonesborough in Co. Armagh. It was several years before the actual facts about the death of this officer emerged. On that February day,
the CO with other soldiers took off in an Army Air Corps (AAC) Gazelle to run a check on a Green Jackets close observation platoon (COP), which had been inserted in thick undergrowth close to the local vicarage. Their brief was to monitor the Edenappa Road, which the Provisionals were using to mount illegal vehicle checkpoints (IVCP). These were carried out for propaganda purposes, to demonstrate that it was they, not the Army or RUC, who controlled South Armagh. The official version was that the helicopter came under RPG attack by a PIRA ASU that was dug in on the Irish side of the border. The pilot of the Gazelle took evasive action, but in doing so crashed into fields nearby. Corden-Lloyd was killed, and several other soldiers – including Philip Schofield – were very badly injured.
The wreckage of an AAC Gazelle helicopter that was shot down by the IRA, killing Green Jackets CO, Lt Col Iain Corden-Lloyd.
The official British Army report reads as follows:
The Gazelle got to the point where it had to turn back. According to the ARF Scout, a burst of tracer came up from across the border and the Gazelle rose to 150 feet. The helicopter, avoiding the tracer fire, carried out a fast, evasive manoeuvre during which the pilot may have made an error: it appeared to stall, before falling and hitting the ground. It bounced, was seen to cartwheel, hit a stone wall, and landed in another field on its right side. The IRA confirmed to the Press the next day that they had been firing at the helicopter, but there was no evidence that the helicopter had been hit.
As an organisation, rarely passing more than 8,000 active members* – the peak year was 1972 – PIRA thrived on the support of an army of dickers and sympathisers. It knew that if the nationalist communities didn’t offer open and willing support at best, it could at least rely on their sense of Nationalism, ‘Irishness’ as well as downright fear. There wasn’t merely the threat of physical intimidation or worse, the Provisionals knew that Catholic families who didn’t co-operate would be ostracised by their neighbours, which would in turn keep them in their place. This ‘army’ of dickers and sympathisers were the eyes and ears of the terror organisation; they could be relied upon to pass on information that might lead to the launching of successful operations against the SF. There are several examples – books passim by this author – of PIRA attacks on off-duty RUC and UDR personnel visiting their relatives either in Nationalist areas or even across the Irish border.
The murder of UDR soldier Roy Butler in a West Belfast shopping centre on 1 August 1988 is a perfect example. He and his wife visited relatives in the Nationalist Donegall Road; it is thought that neighbours alerted the IRA to his presence. He was followed to the shopping centre before being shot dead by gunmen in full view of his family, in front of hundreds of shoppers. Jimmy Johnston was a UDR soldier who worked as a porter in Drumglass Hospital in Dungannon. It is very likely that fellow workers betrayed him to the local PIRA commander; he was shot and killed by gunmen, disguised as ambulance drivers, on 8 May 1984. Another UDR soldier, Steven Megrath, regularly visited his stepbrother’s house in Duncairn Gardens, close to the interface with the Catholic New Lodge. He was betrayed by neighbours to the IRA, which led to gunmen shooting and killing him as he arrived for a visit.
Other examples of the value of dickers to the IRA was the female employee of British Telecom in Belfast who was able to access the home addresses of RUC ex-directory officers who had wisely tried to avoid revealing their locations to Republican hit squads. There were numerous other examples of Loyalist sympathisers working for local councils and in HR departments of various firms who were able to access personnel records. They were then able to reveal the religion and addresses of Catholic workers, leading Loyalist murder squads to their homes.
The actual strength of PIRA varies from 8,000 to 10,000, with about 10,000 ‘passing through the ranks’ between 1969 and 1998. By the 1980s, it is estimated that their total strength shrank to as few as 3,000 to 4,000 active volunteers, with a further 450 in ‘support’ roles.
A senior British officer once famously described the Provisionals as a ‘professional military unit’, and it is difficult to argue with that description. However, it was only a part of this organisation’s raison d’etre; it was ruthless, duplicitous, often cowardly, scheming but well organised and well disciplined. Paranoia, too, had its place in its ranks, evidence of which can be found in Chapter 9 of this book. Proof of some of the aforementioned epithets can be found in the two chapters of this book that deal with atrocities, 4 and 12.
Its organisation was formidable, as shown in the planning of escape routes from bombing operations or their infamous ‘shoot and scoot’ attacks. For example, one such attack took place on 12 July 1981, when a car containing two PIRA gunmen opened fire on a Loyalist parade rehearsal close to Dunmurry in south-west Belfast. An armoured RUC vehicle was quickly on the trail of a stolen Lada estate car, which drove at high speed towards the Nationalist Suffolk estate along Black’s Road. The gunmen – armed with AK-47s – opened fire at the pursuing RUC vehicle, keeping up a ferocious rate of automatic fire. Eventually, they were able to completely disable the engine of the armoured pursuit car, but as others took up the chase, ‘spontaneous’ riots broke out along the route, thus curtailing any further police action. The way in which these riots were orchestrated left SF commanders scratching their heads at such incredible organisation. It is well worth noting that these were pre-mobile phone days, which gives an insight into PIRA’s ability to communicate and co-ordinate.
From 1969 until their semi-standing down in the late 1990s, the Provisionals have always claimed that they were a non-sectarian organisation. This author, however, has provided invaluable evidence throughout this and other books to the contrary. When they were unable to explain manifestly obvious sectarian killings, their apologists would claim that it was ‘flawed intelligence’ with a meaningless apology being issued on the spot, or in many cases, twenty or thirty years later.
One other PIRA phenomenon was the way that they controlled the ‘jungle drums’ in the Nationalist areas, which were under only the nominal control of the security forces. For example, the almost daily riots in places such as the Ardoyne, ’Murph, New Lodge, Falls Road and many other Catholic areas that involved petrol bombs, nail bombs, rocks, catapulted steel ball-bearings and the like were never spontaneous. Gunmen would be ready, armed with their Armalites or the ‘widow-maker’ AK-47, waiting for the signal that soldiers or police were ready to break through the barricades. Word would be sent to the mothers in the area; almost like magic, the young ones would disappear from the streets, pulled indoors by the scruff of their necks. Observant soldiers would call out: ‘They’re taking the kids indoors,’ and, all at once, their backs would stiffen and safety catches would be flicked off as they tensed up for the arrival of gunmen. Again, like magic, the front line of the rioters would part, like the Red Sea for Moses, as a gunman or gunmen appeared in the freshly created gap. They would fire a quick burst of automatic fire towards the soldiers and police. Seconds later, the gunmen would retreat, leaving the line to close up again, safe in the knowledge that the disciplined soldiers and police would not fire indiscriminately into the massed ranks of civilians.
One feels that, given the political circumstances, the rules of engagement (ROE) as laid down in the ‘yellow card’* , there was little chance of the British Army or the RUC militarily defeating the Provisional IRA. It could restrain them, it could restrict their operations, even in the ‘bandit country’ of South Armagh, but it could not eradicate them. It was true that they could not militarily defeat the Provisionals, however, the soldiers were able to ‘cut their teeth’ in the urban and rural conflict; they became less naïve, more professional, certainly more streetwise than in the bloodiest years of the fighting between 1971 and 1976.
Let us now turn to the IRA’s public image, particularly on the international stage. They had many ‘celebrity’ supporters, both in Hollywood and in US politics. Turning to the latter, it is no secret that several US presidents welcomed people such as Gerry A
dams and the late Martin McGuinness into the White House – notably Bill Clinton and Barack Obama – shaking hands with these former commanders of the IRA, declaring them international statesmen. During the Troubles, the IRA had powerful backing, not only from the Irish American community through the NORAID collecting tins, but from powerful men and women at the very apex of US politics. The self-proclaimed ‘Four Horsemen’: Senator Edward Kennedy; Governor of New York Hugh Carey; Tip O’Neill, Speaker of the US House of Representatives; and Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York State, were instrumental in helping to fight the cause of the IRA, constantly interfering in the internal politics of a supposed ally. They actively encouraged the US Supreme Court to back on-the-run PIRA men and women, thus delaying or preventing extradition. The notoriously anti-British Senator Kennedy, brother of the assassinated US President** and son of the Anglophobe wartime US Ambassador to Great Britain, Joseph Kennedy, was a particular thorn in the side of successive British governments. He once proclaimed that ‘Ulster is becoming Britain’s Vietnam’. He followed this by making an irrelevant comparison between his own country’s embroilment in a war in South-East Asia and the British predicament in Northern Ireland. He stated that the Bloody Sunday killings in January 1972 was equivalent to the ‘Pinkville massacre’ in 1968 when US troops killed more than 500 South Vietnamese civilians in cold blood at My Lai.
The Provisionals committed a series of outrages – La Mon, Frizzell’s, Droppin’ Well, Birmingham and Kingsmills being but a few – but they continued to do so because they simply didn’t care what the British on the mainland, the Protestants in Ulster or the Catholics in the Republic thought; they were prepared to do literally anything to achieve their goals.
No history of the Provisional IRA or their ‘political wing’ Sinn Féin, however concise, would be complete without a look at the 1981 hunger strike. The repercussions of this have echoed on for almost four decades with a bitterness that may last for ever. Since the very first days of internment, Republican detainees have considered themselves ‘political prisoners’, demanding that they wore their own clothes, had rights not afforded to ‘common’ criminals, as well as refusing to accept that their sentences were in any way a form of rehabilitation. In the very early days of internment, there was an acceptance by the authorities that they were a ‘special’ type of prisoner. The sudden ending of these privileges led to a campaign both inside and outside the prisons for the re-introduction of political status. This manifested itself in a number of ways, including inmates wearing blankets instead of prison uniforms, smearing their cell walls with faeces, before embarking on the ultimate protest: the hunger strike.