by Ravi Rikhye
The astonishing thing, however, is not we lack resources, but we’ve decided to cut defense spending in terms of GDP by half. Bafflingly, there seems to be no rationally planned long-term policy, only an ad hoc one. The reasons can be discussed, but rationally discussing irrationalities is unproductive. From 1963 until about 2001, we spent around 3%+ of GDP on defense, twice more than we spend today. Peculiarly, just as we began our GDP expansion breakthrough, we started spending less on defense, not more. The recommended annual expenditure for NATO is 2%, and the US spends 4%. NATO nations are part of an alliance back-stopped by the US, which in the east faces a bear with broken teeth and claws. The US has settled on 4% because it is a global power. With the rise of China this will soon prove too little. Still, it has alliances with Japan, the world’s third largest GDP, plus many countries such as ROC, ROK, Australia/New Zealand, Singapore, Thailand, and so on. These last six may not individually contribute much because their GDPs are, but together they add up to about 30% of US GDP. Given we have a two-
front situation and no ally, even 4% is too little; more likely 5-6% may
be needed. But is not the US our ally? Nominally. If it comes to a real war, however, especially with China’s increasing military strength, every year escalates risk and cost. In a few years, the cost relative to the benefit for the US might become so great that it might help us only if not directly required to fight China.
The book discusses the background to the 2-front problem, and then the problem itself. India’s deteriorating geo-political balance forced on us by the rise of China is a key part of the discussion: Military challenges rise from geopolitical challenges. China, India, and Pakistan ground forces are covered in detail; naval and air forces are discussed sufficiently to provide readers with a working knowledge. military forces in details, then proceeds to comparisons. Cold Start, which now is supposed to permit us to fight a 2-front war by quickly defeating Pakistan, followed by a shift of forces to the north, is shown to be an illusion. Solutions to attaining a true 2-front capability are provided. A chapter showing that nuclear weapons cannot play a role in a future 2-front war is included. Case studies of how intelligence is used and misused are provided as a primer for those interested in becoming defense analysts. Last is a brief discussion on how a 2-front war might play out. To save readers suspense, if this war comes in 2018 or later, unless the Government of India and its people emerge from their coma about the defense of India, a 2-front war will be a disaster. Nor is there any prospect we will be fortunate enough to have just a 1-front situation.
1.4 The Defense of India: geostrategy
The Indian sub-continent is so named because it is almost a separate land mass. It is surrounded by water on three side, and mountains on one. The mountains could be traversed, but with difficulty, and formed a barrier to invasions from the north. The Defense of India is possible only if India controls the entire sub-continent. Let us examine the US’s geostrategical situation as a comparison. Though it is part of the North American continent, on its western and eastern frontiers vast oceans protect it. The US never took over Canada because that British colony was too cold because the US had plenty of lands to settle, Canada became a mini-America in terms of culture, economic life, and geopolitics, and last, never posed any threat to the US. This last because though Canada is 9.1-million-square-kilometers and larger than the US, and well-endowed with natural resources, only 1/7th is habitable, the 350-km strip north of the US border. If you have been to Maine, Upstate New York state, Minnesota, North Dakota, you’ll know for five months of the year it’s miserable. Now move northwards, and even that 350-km strip is miserable for six months a year. So, Canada’s population of 36-million is smaller than California’s at 39-million, and the US at 325-million. Correspondingly, the US did not advance further south because it is miserably hot, resources are few, and it was densely populated when Columbus landed up over 500-years ago. While people of West European stock settled Canada and the US, the US was not particularly keen on assimilating large numbers of folks of Native Indian blood. Mexico accepted the conquest by the US of the southwest and California because as a poor country, it could not do otherwise. Thus, the US has no potential threat from Canada or Mexico and is strategically secure.
In 1946, India too was strategically secure. The entire sub-continent was one country, as has been the case many times in the past 2300-years. To the north were the Himalayas. China was as indgent as India, and the 500,000-square-mile buffer of thinly-populated Tibet provided security. To the west were the barriers of the Balochistan desert and the little-developed land of the North West Frontier Province. The British kept Afghanistan as an additional buffer against Russia. The Royal Navy dominated the waters around ust.
Now look at 2018. China is squeezing India in the North and will be the dominant naval power in the Indian Ocean. The main sub-continent has been divided into three sovereign nations. One, Pakistan, has been at war with India for 71-years, in one form or another. Since Kashmir is a zero-sum sum situation for both nations, the fight will continue. India has many times suggested a settlement based on the Line of Control, Pakistan has always refused this compromise. The other, Bangladesh, is touchy, proud, and emotional, easily taking offense, and for some reason has built a 10-division army. Pakistan used to maintain a four-brigade division in East Pakistan. In the south, Sri Lanka was part of the security of India, as was Burma in the east. Burma has gone its own way, is not hostile to India, but is falling into the Chinese orbit as are Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Pakistan is an ally of China. Nepal, previously part of the northern buffer. Is also being sucked into the Chinese sphere of influence; now the Chinese are working on winning Bhutan.
So, the barbarians are not just at the gates, in the west they have breached the gates and occupy a wing of our house (West Punjab, Sindh, Kashmir). With their increasing inroads into Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal, the Chinese are parked in our garden. Afghanistan is dominated by an Islamist movement that is the antithesis of everything we believe. The Chinese next plan to expel India from Bhutan.
In short, India is in a perilous state, besieged 360-degrees. We have arrived here because Indians prefer to put off tough decisions and hope for the best. Adversaries press on us, we adjust. I’m using the term in the Indian sense – scooching ourselves into a tighter space to accommodate the hordes compressing us. Not only are we pacifist, but we also do not realize that while pacifism is a perfectly legitimate strategy, no one can practice pacifism under attack. We had to use force in Hyderabad 1948, Goa, 1961, China 1965, and East Pakistan 1971, much to the joy of our critics who hated our holier than thou preaching. Which admittedly began moderating after Mrs. Gandhi decided on a pragmatic, non-ideological foreign policy, which has reached its logical height under Mr. Modi. We lack the conviction to push Pakistan out of Kashmir or to neutralize it because it’s too hard. To us, everything is too hard if it interferes with our meals, afternoon naps, and the time we waste just mouthing off. The most important thing is to go potty rehularly, else the world dissolves into chaos. We are so averse to risk that sometimes it seems we prefer to retreat into the Indo-Gangetic plain and lose the rest of the country than to stand up for ourselves. We are unique in that our war policy is limited to 10-days because we have deemed it a rule of the universe that by then foreign powers intervene and stop the war. That allows us to shrug off all responsibility for the use of force as a tool for our national security. If there is one matter on which we have a solid consensus, it is that we are not in charge of ourselves. Everything is done to us by others, it is never our fault, and we are helpless to resist. INS India: a rickety boat without sails, oars, rudder, or captain, at the mercy of every breath of wind.
If you understand and accept this, you will appreciate the Indian concept of defense. The English have a sly saying: if you’re going to be raped, lie back and think of England in winter. We don’t wait to be raped: 24/365, we are already lying back and thinking of England in winter just waiting f
or any casual passerby to assault us.
1.5 Forces needed for 2-front war: Summary
For ease of reference, I am putting in this section the summary requirements for additional forces required for (a) a 2-front war, which can also be taken as a 2.5-front war; and (b) to give us confidence we can recover Pakistan-held and China-held Kashmir. Also included is (c) a People’s Army to defend the borders, freeing the army for use as strike forces. (d) lists the formations that must be authorized in the next budget, as an interim to the required buildup. Please understand: none of these is intended to field an army smaller in manpower with money freed for more equipment. At 1.6% of GDP, we cannot meet our 2-front requirements. That probably requires 3.5% of GDP, and for recovering Kashmir plus deterring China and Pakistan, probably means 6% of GDP for 10-years for a crash modernization and expansion, and perhaps 4.5% of GDP after that.
54-division force
The 54-division force does not mean that we must raise a full 16 divisions to add to our current 38. We already have an army with enough brigades to equal 16 corps of 10 brigades each: nine in three divisions plus one in corps reserve, and five independent brigades. This is because we have many extra and independent brigades. They cannot all be put into corps, because there are many situations where independent brigades are required; just five will not suffice.
Before anyone starts getting anxiety attacks at the large number of of divisions suggested, keep in mind that (a) we assume India throws into the trash its 71-year plan of fielding “just enough” for a shaky defense; and (b) we assume India builds up the theatre and strategic reserves needed in place of our zero reserves policy, also for 71-years. You cannot get decisive results without strong field reserves equaling 1/3rd of the force deployed at the front. In the 72-division case, 18-divisions are uncommitted reserves, in the 54-division case 12-divisions are uncommitted reserves. Not quite enough, but sufficient for now.
As an intermediate step, I suggest 4 more divisions in the west to balance the four Pakistan has raised to our none, and 4 more against China. This does not count Army HQ reserves, of which currently we have none. Why do we need four more divisions against China? Are we not well balanced after already raising four (56th, 59th, 71st, 72nd)?
No, because we are defensively deployed, and thus cede the initiative to China. Also, it is only a matter of time before China constructs a west-east railway to give it full lateral mobility along the entire northern border. The eastern half of the line is already under construction and should be finished by 2020. The western part of the line has been long-planned. China may not start work for 5 years or even 10, but the line will be built. Already a spur from Kashgar to Hotan is operational. These infrastructure improvements will permit China to deploy many more divisions against India. We can get by on right more divisions; but without without strategic reserves, a corps each for China, Pakistan, and AHQ. Even this, however, will reiterate our “just enough syndrome”. We will be able to avert defeat, but not to win. Keep in mind by 2028 Chinese GDP could be around $20-trillion against our perhaps $5-trillion, with India’s growth rate of 7% annually. Estimates of $7-trillion have been made.[4] That requires 10% growth. There is no reason we cannot maintain that for 30-years if GOI acts rationally. That is probably not a reasonable assumption. But expecting the Government of India to be rational is not a good idea.
Incidently, let us examine at the construct of “not a single inch of our sacred soil”. If our soil is so scared, how come on independence we casually gave away a quarter of our country: West Punjab, East Bengal, NWFP, Balochistan, and Sind? Not to speak of the 75,000-km2 of West and North Kashmir, and 30,000-km2 of East Ladakh that we have lost after the feeblest of efforts to protect Kashmir.
The 54-division force is not insurmountably onerous to build. Let’s go through some figures. We’re adding sixteen new divisions, but because we have many extra brigades, we need only 40 new brigades.
A 72-division force is required to defeat China and Pakistan and recover Kashmir/Ladakh. A 54-division force is required to avert defeat.
Command
72 Divisions
54 Divisions
Current
AHQ Reserve
Italics: corps with 2 Divs
VII Mech
VII Mech
XIX Mtn
XIX Mtn
XXI Mech
XXI Mech
XXI
Northern
XIII Leh
XIII Leh
XIV Leh
XIV Leh
XIV Leh
XV Srinagar
XV Srinagar
XV Srinagar
XVI Jammu
XVI Jammu
XVI Jammu
XXII Reserve
1 division
Western
II Ambala
II Ambala
II Ambala
IX Yol
IX Yol
IX Yol
XI Jullundur
XI Jullundur
XI Jullundur
South Western
I Mathura
I Mathura
I Mathura
X Bhatinda
X Bhatinda
X Bhatinda
Southern
VIII Bhopal
XII Jodhpur
XII Jodhpur
XII Jodhpur
Central
VI HP, UK
VI HP, UK
1 division
V Nepal
North Central
IV Tezpur
IV Tezpur
IV Tezpur
XXIII Reserve
XXXIII Siliguri
XXXIII Siliguri
XXXIII Siliguri
Eastern
III
III
III
XVII Panagarh
XVII Panagarh
XVII Panagarh
XVIII Bangla, Burma
XX Reserve
People’s Army model
A third model is where the border is held by semi-static fortress divisions mainly composed of paramilitary, Territorial Army, and militia, and 39 divisions in thirteen corps form the strike force. This will not be cheaper, because the strike force formations have to be well equipped. But it will permit the regular army to remain at its current strength of 1.3-million. But please note that if manpower is a problem because of pension costs, we could return to the old standard of 7-years enlistment for soldiers, and a new scheme of 7-years for officers. Further, at some point, India will provide social security for everyone, and the short-enlistment folks will be covered from day 1. As India grows richer, there will be more opportunities for jobs for short-enlistees. This will reduce the pressure to give all volunteers a 20-30-year career just for the sake of the pensions.
Though I have not worked out costs in detail, the 14 frontier corps will probably cost as much as 5 corps. At which point the Army will say it would rather have five extra corps.
Mixed militia/paramilitary and regular army model
The tables below show we will need 12-13 new brigades, 8 new division HQs (2 armored, 2 mechanized, 1 infantry, 3 mountain), and two new corps HQ. This requires adding 225,000 more troops, which will include corps troops plus an increase in engineer brigades. Assuming three years to complete raisings, we require now for a 2-front war:
Immediately need 8 more divisions
XII Corps
Mechanize Kutch IBG. Raise new 13th Mech Div using 1 excess brigade of 12 RAPID, 340 (I) Mech Bde, and a new armd bde
X Corps
Convert 18 RAPID to 18 Armd
XI Corps
Expand 55 (I) Mech Bde into a 30th Mech Div
IX Corps
New 32 Armd Div using one extra bde each of 26 and 29 Div, 1 new bde
XVI Corps
Take two extra bdes of 25 Div plus new bde for a new 34th RAPID
XV Corps
New 35th Inf Div using one excess bde of 28 Div plus two new bdes
XIV Corps
8 Div; New 55th Mtn Div north of Changchemo: use 102 (I) Bde, existing SSN bde, 1 new bde
XIII Corps (new)
Takes 3 Div plus new 37th Mech Div using existing armd bde and two new bdes
VI Corps (new)
Sugar Sector: new 53rd Mtn Div HQ, 2 new bdes (5 bns); corps also takes 6 Div; new 50th Mtn Div HQ takes 9 (I) Bde, existing (I) Bde, new (I) Bde Barahoti
XXXI Corps
New (I) Bde for Doklam
IV Corps
Adequate
Central Arun.
New large (I) Bde (5 battalions)
III Corps
Adequate
Needed for immediate authorization: Justification
XII Corps
Mechanize Kutch IBG. One key mission of the brigade is threatening Badin, dispersing Pakistan 18 Division’s resources, and thus helping the advance of 11 Division/XXI Corps to the Indus River. Because of the vast desert area, mechanized mobility/firepower is required. If the brigade is given five battalions (2 tank, 3 mechanized), it can become a powerful battle group capable of making its own advance to Indus River after taking Badin.