by Ravi Rikhye
Chinese investment 2005-2017[84]
Pakistan
62[85]
Russia
54
Malaysia
42
Indonesia
39
Singapore
37
Kazakhstan
30
Iran
24
Bangladesh
24
India
24
Laos
23
Vietnam
23
Sri Lanka
15
Turkey
14
Philippines
11
South Korea
11
Thailand
8
Myanmar
8
Japan
7
Mongolia
6
Nepal
3
2. They’ve tied up Pakistan as an ally. As an example, the Chinese are expected to increase their total to $100-billion by 2030, some to account for cost inflation.[86] This has been termed China’s Marshall Plan. On a GDP basis, it would be like a $1-trillion investment in India. To detail all the projects is unnecessary, it suffices to appreciate the magnitude. There are new motorways, modernization of Pakistan Railways, including upgrading Karachi-Peshawar to 160-kmph and building missing links for the Kashgar-Gwadar railway, increasing the capacity of the Karakoram Highway, oil and gas pipelines. It’s important that Delhi understand while China has never openly intervened for Pakistan in its wars against India, in the next war China will intervene. Meanwhile, US influence over Pakistan, already diminishing, will soon come down to near nothing. And to show Pakistan that doing business with China means being honest, the Chinese have told Pakistan that they will withhold money if they see corruption. The Chinese have much at stake, and they’re showing you can’t fool around with them.
3. They’re busy tying up Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Burma, and they’re starting to squeeze Bhutan.
In other words, the Chinese dragon has wrapped itself around India, like Face Huggers from the Alien movies. Look at Bangladesh. India gave $2-billion aid in 2017. China in 2016-17 agreed to invest $39-billion. China is Bangladesh’s biggest trade partner. In 2012-16 China delivered arms to 44 nations; 60% of the total went to Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Burma. Below is a table of the major announced items as known to SIPRI. To be clear: these countries are sovereign. They have a right to buy what they want. It is not for Delhi to grumble and complain, only to understand that in the case of Pakistan and Bangladesh, India is the sole actual or potential adversary. Regarding Burma, arms are a way of deepening relations between seller and buyer, especially when the seller is a great power aspiring to super-power status. Aside from what we’ve listed, all three are buyers of Chinese surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles. The list is incomplete.
Items
Bangladesh
Burma
Pakistan
Tanks
300 T-59G, 44 T-90
50 T-90
300 T-90
Frigates
4 + 6 to be built in BD
4 + 2
Submarines
2
8
Fighters
40 F-7, 8 F-10C
150 JF-17 co-produced
Armed Trainers
9 K-8 + more
50-72 K-8
60 K-8
Artillery
70 155mm PLZ-45, 18 122mm SP; 54 towed
20 SP 122mm
48 300mm MRL, 90 SH-1 155mm SP 6x6
Attack helio
20 WZ-10 (not confirmed)
SAMs
3 batteries
Some
20+ batteries
In contrast, India has offered Bangladesh a $500-million arms credit.
I am repeatedly told not to worry because Indian’s neighbors are coming to realize they can never pay China back. Except they already know that. China will restructure the deals, as it has done for Sri Lanka’s new port and industrial estate at Hambantota, which it has acquired on a 99-year lease in exchange for the $8-billion Sri Lanka owed China for building the port. The Chinese are playing a long-term game. They are quite prepared to lose money because their economic system is answerable only to the party and because strategic goals are more important than making commercial returns on their investments. In response to local protests, partly on nationalistic grounds and mainly because of the 60-km2 land being acquired for the industrial estate, China promised the port will not be used for military purposes and made other “compromises”. Think about this. First, what kind of industrial estate requires that much land? Second, an estate that size could provide a very large number of jobs. So down the road when Sri Lanka is fully invested in the project, what happens when the Chinese tell Colombo that the US and India have a military base agreement, that India has invaded Sri Lanka 26 times throughout history and is hardly a friend of Sri Lanka’s, besides which Sri Lanka is behind on payments for its part of the project, but something can be worked out. That will be naval access. Can Sri Lanka afford to refuse? It might be useful to recall that the then-Ceylon did not condemn China’s attack on India, and it was quite willing to hand over its defense to the UK. Then is not now, but once Sri Lanka has China to protect it, will it still be sensitive to India’s security concerns? As for our self-congratulations on replacing Sri Lanka’s government to make sure an India-friendly government took over, if we really did do that, how long can we continue before Sri Lanka’s dependence on China forces Colombo to abandon attention to India’s concerns?
Shipping: an example of how China is rising to global domination
China already has the largest tanker fleet in the world and the third largest container fleet. It is moving up in bulk carriers. One of its techniques is to finance ships for other countries, then one way or another buy them back and lease them to the original owners. Currently, Chinese banks own 969 ships worth $16.5-billion that are leased out to the world. The following is an example of how it proceeds, from 10-years ago.[87]
When Brazilian iron ore giant Vale, a key exporter to China began establishing its own dry bulk fleet of 14 ships, it contracted the majority of the work to Chinese shipyards with Chinese banks financing the construction. However, during their first return voyage to China loaded with ore, Valemax carriers were forbidden from docking in Chinese ports on safety grounds due to their large size. Sources claim that Vale was targeted by private Chinese shipping firms under an extension of the “national oil, nationally carried” campaign and with the blessings of the Chinese government. In the end, Vale sold the unprofitable ships to Chinese shipping firms and banks. Twelve of them were then leased back to Vale on long-term contracts, and Chinese ports opened for the now-Chinese-owned Valemax carriers.
A miracle! Brazil-owned ships, built in China for the export of Brazilian iron ore, “fail” Chinese safety standards. The Brazilian owner is now stuck. So China buys the ships, we don’t know at what reduced price, leases them back, and now of a sudden, they meet Chinese safety standards! The Chinese are not just commercially ruthless; they will go to any length to strengthen themselves with government, banks, and industry working together. In China that essentially means the government. You will see the same pattern of sharp dealing in the Chinese acquisition of the Sri Lankan port of Hamanbota, discussed later.
5.2 China and Pakistan
Pakistan is China’s major ally in the South Asia/Indian Ocean region. This reasonable, since after India, Pakistan has by far the largest population, 190-million and growing; the largest economy, $300-billion; and the largest military, likely around 700,000+. Plus, Pakistan is India’s mortal enemy and actively engaging in subverting the India state through insurgency. Other countries in the region are wary of India’s heft and reach, but they don’t hate us with Pakistan’s single-minded passion. The relations between China and Pakistan go back to the earl
y 1960s when Pakistan was theoretically a full-fledged US ally. What India fails to understand is that the US can count numbers as well as anyone else, and right from 1947 knew that in an era of opposing coalitions, India was potentially the more valuable ally. It went to Pakistan only after repeated Indian rejections. The 1962 War forced India to compromise on its unremitting Brahmanical intellectual hostility. But the US trouble with Pakistan started earlier, around 1960, and oddly, one dispute was the US refusal to supply a second F-104 squadron for the PAF. Contrary to what India believed, the US always kept a tight leash on Pakistan to ensure the latter did not attack India. Since the seizure of Kashmir was Pakistan’s priority, this leash was deeply resented. Pakistan began improving relations with China about this time. While it is easy to accuse Pakistan of being treacherous, how could Pakistan simply ignore the biggest country in Asia and a neighbor? After the severe reduction in military aid to Pakistan after the 1962 Sino-Indian War, followed by the embargo imposed in 1965, Pakistan’s ties with China began deepening. Yet China was still a weak nation and was limited in the military aid it could give. Economic aid, other than token examples, was completely out of the question. Nonetheless, between 1966-1976 China supplied Pakistan eleven army division sets of equipment. (9 and 16 around 1966-68; 17, 18, 23, 33, 35 and 37 in 1971-72; 9, 14, and 16 all reraised 1974. This was twice the 5 ½ division sets the US gave 1954-1950).
By 2017 China had so much money that for Pakistan it invested/earmarked around $110-billion – equal to $1.1-trillion for India. We’ve noted that the CPEC funding alone has grown to $62-billion. $50-billion is for non-CPEC projects for five dams. One Pakistan Government estimate is that Chinese investment will increase to $150-billion.[88] And because the Chinese work rapidly, the material benefits are available in a short period. For example, $35-billion is for 19 power plants which will add 16-GW of capacity versus 15-GW existing, which is 5-GW short of demand. By 2018, 6-GW additional will be installed, allowing Pakistan to meet demand finally. This could mean increasing annual GDP growth by 1-2%. Until the Chinese stepped in, Pakistan was bedeviled with power shortages so extreme, India’s power woes in the 1970s-2000s seem minor by comaprison.
So, is all sweetness and light, cooperation and harmony? No, and it cannot be when development on such a gigantic scale is underway. For example, the Indus Cascade of dams, about 22.5-Gigawatts, has come under severe attack from environmentalists, who argue that in any case solar/wind are much cheaper than hydel now.[89] The plan for a major boost to coal is also giving environmentalists fits. We’ve already mentioned the financing problems for Diamer-Bhasha, part of the Cascade. India, however, should not draw any comfort from this. Pakistan desperately needs more power, talking green has not delayed any projects. Disagreements about financial terms are normal, and will be worked out.
Regarding railways, China is investing $8.5-billion to revitalize Pakistan Rail. The major project is upgrading the Karachi-Lahore-Rawalpindi-Peshawar line to 160-km for passengers and 120-km for freight. Apart from spur lines, Rawalpindi-Peshawar is to be double tracked, making for 1872-km improvements/expansion.[90] The major new construction is two lines, Kashgar (China) to Gwadar, and Karachi to Gwadar. Additional lines are planned for the North West Frontier Province. The Kashgar-Gwadar line via Balochistan involves restoring abandoned lines. The money for the two trunk lines is likely to be an extra $20-billion. For a map of Pakistan Rail and the new lines, see Wikipedia.[91] Six-laning the Karakoram Highway has been underway since around 2007, with expansion from a 10-meter width to 30-meters. The highway between Multan – Lahore – Rawalpindi will become a dual-carriageway. The Indus Cascade will submerge significant lengths of the current KKH, requiring rebuilding. Thanks to China’s already very considerable tunneling/bridging capability and expertise, the new KKH will be shorter than the old one, with higher speeds. For many interesting details on the KKH and Chinese expansion into Gilgit-Baltistan, read the five annexures in this report. [92]
Regarding weapons, below is an almost complete list from SIPRI 2010-2016.[93] It includes earlier deals that were concluded in 2016, like the ATGMs. Nonetheless, there is no assurance that there are not additional announced deals.
It can be seen with Muzaffarabad and Gilgit linked by rail, Pakistan’s logistics posture in Kashmir will change significantly, particularly in the Northern Areas.
Kashmir part of Karakoram Railway (Wikipedia)
5.3 China and Bangladesh
To repeat: Bangladesh and India have no deal-breaking issues worth going to war for. Still, India would be negligent if it did not keep a close eye on the Bangladesh Army buildup and have contingency plans to counter should relations turn hostile. It would be good if Dhaka would explain to India why its needs ten divisions and three corps HQ. This is not infringing on the nation’s right to arrange its defense as it wants. It is solely a request for clarification. Below is a current open-source army orbat: The army freely announces new developments.[94]
Order of Battle Bangladesh Army (March 2018)
7th Division is in the process of raising; in early 2018 it has only one brigade, a skeleton artillery brigade, a tank regiment, and 1 EME Field Workshop company. Aside from the independent brigades, there are now 27 brigades with the ten divisions.
Division
Brigades
Cantonment
7th
6
Barisal, by 2021
9th
71
81
99 Comp.
Savar
10th
2
97
Ramu (Cox Bazar)
11th
93 Armd
111
Bogra
17th
11
52
306
Sylhet
19th
77
98 Comp.
309
Ghatail
24th
66
69
203
305
Chittagong
33rd
44
101
Comilla
55th
27
36 Armd
88
105
Jessore
66th
16
72
222
Lebukhali
Other brigades: 14th Engineer, 24th and 34th Construction Enginee, 6th ADA, 86th Signal
“Comp” stands for Composite Brigade. Additionally, 21st Airborne and 46th Infantry are independent brigades, and an ad hoc independent Para Commando Brigade (3 battalions) also exists.
The three corps HQs, long talked about, began raising in 2016: Western, Central, Eastern, all facing India.
The 2017-18 defense and internal security budget is about $6-billion. All divisions have artillery brigades, numbered after the division. There are 66 infantry battalions. The Composite Brigades are for civil engineering tasks. One has 1 infantry, 1 armored, and 1 engineer battalions; the other has 2 infantry and 1 engineer battalions and self-protection. Including the independent brigades and an ad hoc brigade, there are 30 total. Not every brigade has 3 infantry battalions; some have 2, some have even four. A Special Forces Brigade with two Paracommando battalions works with the 21st Independent Parachute Brigade. The 55th Division is a mechanized formation, but not fully so yet. In addition, the border force, the Bangladesh Border Guards (up to the 2009 mutiny called the Bangladesh Rifles), has 61 battalions. Large as it may seem, each battalion must guard a sector averaging 70-km. It is adding 15,000 men for a strength of 65,000+, with a new operational HQ at Ramu with three sectors, with eight battalions plus four reserve, and two riverine battalions. The operational area will have 225 border posts. The new raisings will shorten an average battalion front to 60-km. Mithamain in Kishoreganj District will be the site of a new riverine brigade.
Bangladesh sees an overt military threat from a “jingoist” Burma.[95] It is not for outsiders to j
udge if this is a real contingency, but the recent expulsion of the Muslim Rohingya from Burma cannot be reassuring. Multiple and growing terror organizations have sprung up. Yet the Elephant sitting on the house is colored green, white, and saffron. After the conclusion of the 1971 War, India withdrew with extreme rapidity. True, part of the rush was to shift formations to the west and to send troops back to the northern border before the spring thaw. But much of it was because of India’s sensitivity to Bangladesh’s nationalist ethos. India has been unusually careful about a dominant regional power to avoid acting in ways that antagonize the new nation. There are the usual occasional firing incidents between the border guards of both sides; these mean nothing. The issue is an irrational fear of India. It would be of interest to know how Bangladesh is reacting the Doklam incident between India and China because that has raised the need to widen the Siliguri corridor.
An interesting aspect of the Bangladesh Army is its determination to modernize. For example, Army Aviation is to be expanded to 26 helicopters. Bangladesh bought 300 T-59G from China, some of which will remain as MBTs, some will become heavy APCs, and some will be used as targets. Somehow, I have the impression that 4 new regiments will be equipped with the tanks. Recently Bangladesh signed an order for 680 light armored fighting vehicles from Turkey, including 600 Kur-3 4 x 4s and 80 Kur-2 6 x 6s.[96] No painfully stretched out delivery process: 100 to arrive in 2018, all by 2021. Equally, Bangladesh is determined to manufacture artillery, IFVs, and SAMs. An example is the Chinese MV-22 122mm rocket launcher: 18 were ordered from China, more will be assembled in-country. The Army will soon have over 600 BTR-80s, these are used mainly for the nation’s large UN peacekeeping contingent.