by Ravi Rikhye
The Indian and Pakistani system started by using old British-Indian Army division numbers for a long time, with an effort made to avoid duplication. At the end of the 1947-48 War, Pakistan had the 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 12th and 14th Divisions; India had the 4th, 5th, 19th, 25th, 26th, and 27th Division. In 1963-67 raised fifteen new divisions, so it had to duplicate Pakistani numbers, for example, 7th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 14th, 15th, plus others that had been part of the British-Indian army, such as 2, 3, 6, 8th. In 2008 India acted irrationally in naming a new division as 71 to commemorate the 1971 East Pakistan campaign victory, except 1971 cannot be commemorated by 71 once you are in the 21st Century. Then naturally a 72nd Division followed, but meanwhile the 30s and 50s series each have six blanks. 71st and 72nd should have been 55rd and 59th, giving consistency as 54th and 57th already existed, and 56th and 58th were raised.
Corruption in the PLA[197]
At the end of the 1970s, when China decided to shift to a market economy, the Army was permitted to undertake civilian ventures to provide income. In 1980, Sridhar Rao of the Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis researched a US statement saying that China spent much more than its announced $5-billion on defense. The book was refused permission by GOI for publication. We took a different approach from US analysts. Understandably, they costed in dollars. Reasoning that China and India had a roughly similar GDP, and that China like India was a very poor country, we costed in rupees and concluded $5-billion was a fair estimate. Even though nominally the PLA had 35 armies and three times the manpower. But pay was very low compared to India, as was to be expected for a mass conscript army; motor vehicles were few; the PLA was a static garrison army that grew its own food and so on. It made some sort of sense to encourage the PLA to use its resources in terms of manpower, vehicles, tools and so on to set up enterprises and make money for operations and maintenance.
Very quickly, however, things went wrong, and the PLA became a major commercial entity its own right, with the money going to corruption and not for the PLA. Some examples: buying ranks from aspiring sepoys to generals; importing cars and selling them on the black market; selling military equipment – even helicopters disappeared; allowing civilian vehicles to use military license plates to escape duties; running factories whose income was mostly taken by corrupt officers; and so on. Now, of course, the Indian Army also has corruption, particularly in taking kickbacks from suppliers like food, with the contractor making up his money by supplying sub-standard foods. A few years ago, there was a scandal where senior officers bought apartments the government had built for war widows. Senior officers misused their soldier and military vehicles to build their private houses. And those of a certain age will remember when Indian 4th Division was spending its time building barracks, instead of training for war. The Indian corruption was/is, however, Mickey Mouse stuff, the equivalent of kids stealing cookies or candy when their parents are not looking. By the 1980s, the PLA was doing billions of dollars of business. When one general was arrested because his wrong-doing exceeded even the government’s tolerance for corruption, eight trucks were required to carry away booty from his house. Though in the first decade of the 21st century a clampdown began, and Xi has been particularly fierce, to a lesser degree corruption is still rampant.[198] In 2015 alone 4000 officers from Lieutenant Colonel and up were investigated, though only 10% were punished. It would be unfair not to mention that before the PLA went into business, the greatest military corruption was done by the US forces in Vietnam. The classic and quite hilarious case was when part of an order for 2-million cans of ladies’ hairspray arrived for the 700 women in the country. The then US Defense Secretary, Robert McNamara, who was comfortable analyzing numbers, is said to be the first to have caught that and started asking questions. It may seem odd that a person of his highest rank had to be the one, but that’s the thing with us numbers people. We love numbers, no matter how obscure.
There are two views on how this corruption may affect the Chinese Army in wartime. Some maintain that since most of the problems are in the logistics and armament branches, the combat units are unaffected. Others say corruption on such a scale must affect morale at all levels. My reasoning is that it is safer to assume no effect on combat performance. First, if the anti-corruption drive continues, the problem could be reduced to “normal” levels. Second, the rank-and-file soldiers have three primary concerns: fair discipline, adequate food, and timely pay. Also, China’s dual-command system needs to be kept in mind. The troops are led not just by their officers, but also by their commissars.[199] This lot is the most heavily indoctrinated group of people. In combat, they are right up with their men and at lower levels fight alongside.
8.6 The 1979 war with Vietnam [200], [201], [202]
The specific cause was that China hoped to get Vietnam to withdraw its forces from Cambodia. The underlying causes of the war were that once reunification of Vietnam was achieved in 1975, the xenophobic Vietnamese lost no time in turning their back on the Chinese, with whom they had feuded many a hundred years. Readers will recall the 1967 Sino-Soviet split, so it was natural for Hanoi to jettison Beijing and embrace Moscow more fully as a counterbalance, and it natural for Beijing to get angry. Also, the Vietnamese were mini-imperialists; having won their American war, they expanded their influence to Cambodia. They already had substantial influence in Laos. For many reasons, Hanoi decided to move against the murderous Pol Pot communist regime of Cambodia. This fine lad, by the way, holds the world record for genocide. He killed off up to 25% of his people, directly or indirectly, in his mad bid for absolute control. Compared to Pol Pot, Mao, Stalin, and Hitler were rank amateurs. But Beijing supported Pol Pot. Another issue Beijing had with Hanoi is that the Chinese had backed the latter to the tune of $20-billion worth of it and wanted gratitude. Since Beijing has no interest in Vietnam except as a vassal, and since China acted to get the US out of its backyard, possibly the Vietnamese were acting logically when they abandoned their opportunistic alliance with Beijing. Be that is may, Beijing began to escalate border incidents with Vietnam and, of course, it was the Vietnamese doing the aggression, at least according to Beijing – a pattern familiar to us Indians. It seems improbable that Vietnam, after a 40-year war against the Japanese, French, and Americans would want to provoke China. Incidents in 1978 went up to 2000+, by Hanoi’s count. At any rate, with the US withdrawal and communist victory, the Cambodian leadership got to worrying that Hanoi would reassert its traditional efforts to control Cambodia. So, they decided to attack Vietnam. At one point they had six divisions 10-km inside Vietnamese territory. The Vietnamese retaliated against Cambodia, now a Chinese ally, and this led China to attack Vietnam.
This not-so-lovely 16-day war cost the PLA heavy casualties, 26,000 killed and 37,000 wounded, about equal to the Vietnamese losses. It utilized 33-divisions in 11 armies including at least one, and perhaps two in reserve.
Three points of note. One, different sources give different accounts. Two, the Chinese leave out units that were engaged on secondary axes or in reserve. So, they say they had nine armies. Some of the reserve divisions were committed to combat. Three, it is possible some units penetrated further than the 10-15 km we’ve used as the maximum advance. That does not invalidate the narrative.
Factoid: PLA 13th Army (Yunnan) was the main striking force from Yunnan. Presumably, then, it was in better condition than 11th and 14th Armies on its flanks. Yet, it had to induct almost 16,000 soldiers to bring it to strength, which means it was likely at 60% manning. Of these, about 12,000 were new recruits (Xiaoming Zhang, p. 862).[203] Further, the PLA’s recruit intake is in October each year. So, they probably had perhaps 100-days service when war broke out. They were rushed through the basics of firing their weapons and throwing grenades, but obviously, there was no opportunity for unit training. Worse, like other PLA formations, 13th Army had been on agricultural duty. And even worse, understandably the PLA could not use hours devoted to political indoctrination for combat training.
This could take half the day.It is beyond imagining how the PLA thought it could send partly trained recruits up against the PAVN. The only plausible explanation can be that the Chinese leaders believed their own propaganda; and were so angry about Vietnam’s Cambodia invasion which began on December 25th, that they couldn’t think straight, and attacked Vietnam on February 17th, 1979.
By the Chinese own account, the Vietnamese had just three divisions along the border, one each protecting a main axis: Lao Cai, Cao Bang, and Lang Son. This last guarded Hanoi.[204] With three armies against the first, one army as a diversion, five against the second, and three against the third, the PLA planned an 8:1 superiority to get the job done quickly. 50-km from the border was to be the furthest distance of advance.
On the PAVN side, they had three divisions up, 345th (Lao Cai), 346th (Cao Bang); and 3rd (Lang Son). The first two were economic reconstruction divisions converted to regular formations in 1978, likely because of increasing tensions with China, and possibly to make up for formations planned for Cambodia. Now, we could have an extended discussion about these two divisions, but it suffices to say they were composed of veterans, and the PAVN had spent six years fighting the US, and three more fighting the RVN, who up to 1972 had full US support minus ground troops. This does not mean they were nine years at war, because the PAVN fought when to its advantage, withdrew when forced, and then rested and reorganized for the next offensive which could be months or a year later. Nonetheless, the bulk of the PAVN and the militia regiments were composed of highly combat experienced men. Moreover, the PAVN was fighting on its own ground, which had been very heavily fortified, and which most was mountain/jungle terrain. True these mountains are low hills by Indian standards, but hills create difficulties for the attacker.
PLA attack on Lang Son[205]
Please notice PLA use of 3 corps against 1 Vietnam division, 9-to-1 superiority. Classic flank, frontal, and enveloping attack conducted simultaneously.
standards, but as is known from the Korean War, which also has low mountains, it is still very difficult terrain. Also, the road network was sparse. The PLA logistics system had never been much use in a high-intensity war, and to use kind words, it could not do its job even though in one province alone the Chinese mobilized 200,000+ civilians as porters, stretcher bearers, and road construction. On the PLA’s side, it had a significant fraction of newly inducted draftees who got barely three months training, and almost all the rest had never seen action.
The PAVN moved quickly to back up 345th Division on their left with 316th Division, an elite formation. In the middle, they raised 311th Division. In both cases, militia regiments were added to regulars in a 2: 1 proportion. To back their right axis, they assembled the 327th, 337th, and 338th Divisions under HQ 5th Corps, behind which they assembled 1st Corps with 308, 312, and 320B Divisions. In Cambodia, they had eight divisions. Together, the PAVN main force consisted of 12 regular divisions not including the two newly raised, and each of 15 Military Regions had a nominal three divisions after mobilization. Other new divisions were also formed; possibly they were from deactivated divisions post-1975.
The Chinese were aware of their deficiencies. That is the reason they hugely overcompensated in the size of their deployment. They also relied on the politically-induced morale boosting of men fighting for communism and so on. Personally, I think that unless backed up by commissars and troops ready to shoot down anyone fleeing, this kind of pep is unlikely to work once the battle starts.
The Chinese attacked at 26 points along the northern border. Many were secondary thrusts or deception. Because of the unexpected presence of 50,000 militia on the 1st and 2nd axis, the PLA made little progress. It took the three provincial capitals, and while it says it penetrated 140-km along the Lang Son axis, the town itself is within 15-km of the China border, as are the other two towns. Had the Chinese attack continued, the Vietnamese planned a counter-offensive on the Hanoi-Lang Son axis with five divisions.
Since the PLA declared victory and went home after “teaching the enemy a lesson” – well-known words, their operational intent is not known. The Vietnamese also legitimately declared a success, because the PLA came, saw, and thought it best to leave. It is known some PLA units had a morale problem and had to be forced to fight, but it is probably best for India not to make much of this. The PLA was a conscript army, and the last real war was a generation earlier, in Korea 1950-53. Troops are frequently unsteady in the first days of combat; it takes ten days for them to adapt, and they reach peak efficiency in twenty-one days, after which it starts falling off again. At some point troops need to be pulled out for rest and reorganization, the real point of note is the Chinese willingness to take very heavy casualties. The wounded were counted as those hospitalized. In 2019 or later, of course, with a small army the Chinese will not be able to incur the losses of the past. The per capita income in today’s China is $10,000; we may reasonably assume that soldiers value their lives more highly than in the past.
8.7 Similarities and differences between 1962 and 1979 Wars
Similarities include (a) Chinese determination to create massive manpower advantage. In 1962, Chinese had 6:1 advantage in Ladakh, 8:1 against Tawang, 4:1 against Walong, plus a substantial firepower superiority. In these matters, people waste substantial time arguing about the relative margin; in the telling, the attacker wants to minimize it and the defender wants to maximize it, each seeks to make its position more heroic. This exercise is a waste of time. It does not matter if every formation is used. Formations in reserve allow more and riskier options, plus enhance commanders’ confidence. In Ladakh, for example, China had two divisions, not one as it maintains. The second was not employed because it wasn’t needed. Nonetheless, that it was available greatly expanded the range of options and increased Chinese confidence. (b) “Teach a lesson” theory. (c) Very short war. (d) declaring victory and leaving. (e) no use of airpower. (f) same mountain/jungle terrain, though Indian mountains were much higher. (g) As they did with India, the Chinese intruded into Vietnam some hundreds of times to gather information before attacking. In India’s case, the Chinese had years to reconnoiter and had ample time to emplace an intelligence network in Indian territory. Conversely, India began deploying a few battalions to the border only in 1959 and later, so we were ignorant of the topography; whereas the Vietnamese knew their own country very well.
Differences include (a) The Vietnamese were willing to give ground until they had the advantage to take the counterattack. This also allowed them to discern the threat axes more accurately. Losing three provincial capitals and still not launching a counter-offensive is like India willingly losing the district HQs of Leh (Ladakh); Kameng Frontier Division; and Lohit Frontier Division, before committing the bulk of the Army’s formations. (b) The Vietnamese were equal in divisional strength overall to the PLA; India had one division at the outbreak of war compared to China’s eight, the PLA had many more available if needed against India’s eventual six, three of which were raised after the onset of war. (c) PAVN was far more combat experienced than PLA. (d) PAVN aggressively fought back from the start, seeking to use guerilla warfare to the flanks and behind Chinese thrusts. (e) Vietnam had built 20,000 fortified positions in depth along a border of 500-km. This required a mammoth effort by their construction divisions and local levies. (f) Though PAVN did start to run short of ammunition, because of PLA logistics breakdown, from the start attacking units were short of even basics like food and water. Indians were short of everything even before the war began. (g) PAVN chased withdrawing PLA troops to inflict as much damage as possible; India sat back passively. (h) PAVN even attacked at least two Chinese border towns and conducted sabotage in Chinese territory. They infiltrated intelligence personnel into China to observe the PLA’s movements. (i) Vietnam had the strongest air defenses in the world, deterring the Chinese, who had planned to commit 18 fighter air regiments. Also, the Chinese feared escalation would bring Soviet retaliation. Against India, the Chine
se had no deployable airpower, but India was scared about Chinese escalation. The Chinese came prepared for use of Indian air power, they had six AA regiments, each the equivalent of a brigade.
8.8 Comparing the old group army to the new
This data permits some generalizations. The term “old army” refers to the 1980s and 1990s.
1. The Chinese group army has gained in terms of maneuver units by shifting from three divisions to six brigade groups. The former had 27 infantry battalions, 3 tank battalions, and 3 reconnaissance battalions, giving 99 companies. The new army has 24 battalions each of 4 companies, plus six reconnaissance battalions. Assume each recon battalion has two fighting companies and ignoring the likely surveillance company, the army now has 108 companies.
2. The reduction by five armies also means little, because China was heading for a four-brigade army group. Had the process been conducted its logical end, the 18 armies would have had 72-brigades, now China will have 78-brigades. This excludes units that might be retained as divisions. It remains to be seen if they are retained in their current form.
3. The old army had, roughly, 288 guns/MRL. The new armies have, again roughly, 216. Numerically this is a reduction, but the caliber of the guns has increased, and thanks to UAVs plus new fire-control systems, are considerably more capable.
4. The new armies each have an air assault brigade, earlier, for the 18 armies China had 12 aviation regiments. The process of converting the helicopter brigades with the new armies has begun, whether all will be converted remains to be seen.