by Ravi Rikhye
An explanation of the above table is required. We’ll start with North Kashmir’s five brigades, Pakistan four or five. 8th Division with three brigades protects the front from Matayan to the east past the Chorbatla. 102 (I) Brigade protects the Pakistan side of north-south line Siachin to Piun. Another independent brigade protects the Gurais sector. Pakistan has four independent brigades in the region, at Gilgit, Astore, Skardu, and Siachin. Astore and Siachin are the two forward brigades, Gilgit and Skardu are the reserve brigades. Nonetheless, at times I have been told there are now five brigades permanently assigned to FCNA. If so, it is probably reasonable to assume Pakistan has two brigades on the line and three in reserve. The reserve can join with the troops deployed Kishanganga to Chorbatla to overwhelm one of our brigades 3-1, or make two attacks of 2-1, threatening two sub-sectors. And we have nothing in reserve to meet this contingency. (b) Pakistan can send anywhere between 1 and 4 four brigades to reinforce the north; one combination is 7th Division and 111th Independent Brigade. At which point we are in serious trouble. A third division in XV Corps would make all the difference between holding the line or losing at a 10-50 km depth in North Kashmir.
In West Kashmir, India has 19th Division under XV Corps and 28th Division which protects Tithwal-Gurais, provides internal security, and reserves for the corps. Opposite is Pakistan 12th Division, which by having 6-7 brigades permanently complicates things for us because excluding the Gurais independent brigade, we have 8-9 brigades left. This parity, because 1-2 brigades must remain on internal security. Pakistan can throw its XI Corps with two divisions with Pakistan 12th Division, making the equivalent of a 2-1 superiority against our two-division corps. This is hardly a happy prospect. One division must be in Srinagar for internal security, so that becomes the second of the five new divisions needed for the western front. Doubtless, someone will want to know: But in 1965 the Kashmiris stayed loyal, why do we need internal security troops for the next war? To answer this requires posting an alert for “Boring analysis ahead”.
What do the Kashmiris want?
First, we need to toss the rose-colored glasses aside and understand the true wishes of the Kashmiri people realistically. Kashmiris, from 1947, have wanted independence. They don’t want Pakistan or India. They realize they are caught between two powers determined to have them, whereas they want neither. That they are not entitled to independence is irrelevant to them. The right of self-determination as laid down by the UN applies to colonized people. It does not mean tomorrow the US Pacific (northern California, Oregon, and Washington) want to create their own country, Arcadia, that they can simply have a referendum, win 50.1%, and push off. The referendum must be nation-wide.
The Kashmiri wish for independence should induce no sympathy because, under the terms of the Partition Act, the ruler of a princely state had the absolute right, without reference to his subjects, to opt for either new nation if his territory was contiguous to both. Hari Singh opted for India not because of Indian coercion, but because he was coerced by Pakistan, whose militias reached within an hour’s drive of Srinagar, thanks to Nehru’s dithering, despite Hari Singh’s request from weeks earlier. Neither NWFP or Balochistan wanted to join Pakistan, do we hear liberals worldwide crying for them as they cry for Kashmir? East Pakistan was made to join Pakistan solely because of religion as if South Asian Islam was more important than culture, language, and history. Where was the wailing and weeping for the East Pakistanis 1947-71?
The idea that in 1965 the Kashmiris were loyal to India is just another of the myths with which we Indians console ourselves. (a) Pakistan did not prepare the ground and inform the Kashmiris there were to be “liberated”. This omission was to maintain secrecy. The Kashmiris were as surprised as anyone else when Pakistan attacked. (b) As opportunists, throwing their lot with whoever has the greater power, the Kashmiris sensibly refused to rise en masse until they knew which direction the kingfisher would fly. Had they made the mistake of rising for Pakistan before they were certain, they would have suffered terrible revenge by a betrayed India. Yes, they cooperated with Indian security forces. And where the balance of force required, they cooperated with the invaders. (c) Right up to the 1980s, when the spillover from the Afghanistan War began lighting up Kashmir, the people, regardless of religion, had their own sense of community and were as secular as anyone could get while still considering themselves religious. That’s history now.
Fundamentalists, Kashmiris, Pakistanis, and foreign militants control Pakistan Kashmir. In the event of the next war, they will fight the Indians, fully backed by Pakistan and by Gulf money. An even greater danger will come from the tens of thousands of Islamists who live in Pakistan and have been creating havoc for Afghanistan since 2001, as also the Taliban, originally a creation of Pakistan, now semi-independent, but always up for a cheery bash at the infidels – that’s us, including our Muslims who will also be targeted.
The question is not: do we really need a third division in Kashmiris. It is: will we be able to hold on without that division. Kashmiris, will we be able to hold on? True we have 63 Army battalions disguised as the paramilitary Rashtriya Rifles. Its not numbers that matter so much as the ruthlessness needed to subdue an insurgency. My personal belief is we lack the will. A classic fallacy of the post-1945 world is that hearts-and-minds campaigns defeat insurgencies. They do not. They are won by squeezing the non-combatant population until it decides it cannot support the insurgents, and by killing insurgents faster than they can regenerate.
Coming to XVI Corps, 25th Infantry and 10th RAPID, we have perhaps 11+ infantry and two armored brigades. But Pakistan has eight brigades in its 19th and 23rd Divisions. Plus, there is the new Pakistan division, of which two independent brigades are under raising and another independent brigade in existence. Will this become a third division for Corps Reserve XI Corps, a GHQ division, or another reserve for X Corps? Technically 19th Division is the X Corps reserve. Also, Pakistan has its One Belt – One Road security brigades (currently 1 in Gilgit, two in Gwader, and 1 in Karachi).
Now, on to the Pathankot-Jammu corridor. For years I have assumed an infantry division to reinforce IX Corps in consonance with long-standing AHQ plans. But while writing this book, it became evident that the situation has changed because of Pakistan’s now fully mechanized/armored Corps Reserve XXX Corps. In short, XXX Corps has three armored, one mechanized, and eight infantry brigades to our IX Corps of nine infantry and one armored brigades. That reinforcement division now must be a permanently deployed armored division. But look: sitting right there is Pakistan I Strike Corps of five armored and two infantry brigades. Worse, GHQ Reserve of 37th Infantry Division with one armored and two infantry brigades is available. In the next five years, expect one more brigade each of 17th and 37th Divisions to convert to armor, or 17th Division could become fully mechanized. Like it or not a fourth division will have to be permanently stationed with IX Corps if want to keep at least two divisions of our II Strike Corps free instead of tying it up in this dead end.
The Punjab situation is not easily described, but essentially at least one more division must be inducted on a permanent basis.That makes six, plus 1 in Himachal and 1 in Uttarakhand. As discussed earlier the Eastern front is reasonably well protected. And the same is true Rajasthan. Are we done yet? Unfortunately, no, because this leaves us without reserves.
The PLA is shifting to an independent brigade group structure, with six under a group army HQ. Three brigades are equated to one division to permit comparison with India and Pakistan. 3 brigades are equated to a division. The motorized/mechanized division estimate includes armored brigades.
Assuming eight new divisions, making a total of 46, India can fight a 2-front war, but only defensively. But if we are to fight offensively, I will show sixteen new divisions are required.
In 1962, Pakistan did not take advantage of India when the latter shifted three divisions from Punjab to the northeast. Part of the reason was undoubtedly US pressure on Pakistan. Part wa
s that aside from moving two reserve brigades from West Kashmir to Ladakh, India did not uncover positions opposite the India-Pakistan Line of Actual Control. And part was simple fellowship on the part of the Pakistan ruler. In 1965, China made some minor movements along the Tibet-India border, spooking New Delhi to the point as early as September 11 India told the US it was prepared to a accept a ceasefire. In 1971, China made no troop movements. In 2018, however, the situation is different. Pakistan and China are political, economic, and military allies, and Pakistan is a key link in China’s chain of encirclement around India. Both countries have regular joint air exercises, and Pakistan is an important point for Chinese dominance of the Arabian Sea and maritime points west. Prasun Sen Gupta believes that in 1999 China sent an M-9 missile unit into Pakistan via the Karakoram Pass should the war escalate.[227] India must assume that Pakistan and China will act in concert in the event of another crisis.
In the offensive, Pakistan is limited except for nibbling gains but is much stronger defensively than India realizes. Its weakness is (a) modernization backlog; (b) limited staying power due to lack of money; (c) many formations have been on CI for years, and their training is compromised. Last, (d) it remains vulnerable to a US spares/ordnance embargo, though not as severely as in prior decades because Chinese-origin and locally produced weapons now dominate. The Pakistan Army has not performed well against insurgents because (a) the rebels are co-religionists, and (b) many groups are allied with Pakistan and are attacked only because of US insistence. Against India, its traditional adversary, Pakistan troops will fight very hard. At sea and in the air, it has sufficient strength to protect its territory, even though it cannot take the offensive.
The northern border with China
In 1962, India had perhaps 13 battalions stationed at high altitude (Ladakh 5 battalions; Utter Pradesh 3; Sikkim 3; West NEFA 1, and East NEFA 1), whereas the Chinese had permanently stationed or well-acclimatized 15 divisions of various kinds in Tibet and Sinkiang.
Deployments 1962, circa October 1
Theatre
India
China
Ladakh
5 battalions (114 Ind Inf Bde)
Available 2 divisions
Himachal
1 battalion ex 17 Division
Border regiment
Utter Pradesh
3 battalions (9 Ind Inf Bde)
Border regiment
Sikkim
2 brigades (5 battalions)
2 divisions
NEFA (Tawang)
1 brigade (3 battalions)
3 divisions
NEFA (Walong)
1 battalion
1 division + 1 regiment
Total
5 brigades
8 divisions + border troops
Deployments 2018
Area
India
China
Ladakh
1 div plus 3 brigades
Border troops
Himachal
1 strong brigade
Border troops
Uttarakhand
1 div + 2 brigades
Border troops
Sikkim
3 divisions
Border troops
Tawang
3 divisions
Border troops
Walong
3 divisions
2 brigades + Border troops
Chumbi Valley
1 brigade + Border troops
Other
1 brigade (Lhasa)
Reserve
2 divisions + 4 bdes, not all formed
One brigade (requires mobilization)
Total
13 divs + at least 10 ind bdes
4 brigades
Technical Reconnaissance Bureaus
These are Signals Intelligence Units.[228] Western Theatre Army has five: one each at Kunming, Chengdu, PLAAF Chengdu; Urumqi; and Lanzhou.
Chinese Border units
Chinese border units are not paramilitary as is the case with India, but regular PLA. Until recently, at least, units were deployed in company strength, and great emphasis is put on technical means of control. Given the length of China’s borders, 22,000-km on land alone, the longest of any country in the world, utilizing this option makes good sense. India has also been moving in that direction, starting with its fencing of borders with Pakistan, China, and Bangladesh.
China is converting its border regiments to brigades. For example, Andrew KC[229] says that 36 border regiments in the Northern Theatre Command have been formed into 15 brigades, including 4 coastal). If the latter, that changes matters to our detriment. Border regiments used to have as few as two battalions of 500 men each plus some supporting troops; the above suggests that border brigades have four battalions plus supporting arms. Blasko,[230] in the second edition (2012) The Chinese Army Today gives the following border units in Xizang (Tibet). I’ve also interpolated data given by J. Ranade from a Chinese article.
Regiment
Blasko’s HQ
Other spelling HQ
1
Shannanlonzi
Shanan Linzhi. 180-km air N of Tawang
2
Cuonei County
Shannan
3
Tingri County
(Shigatze City)
4
Chandu
Town exists, unable to find it on map
5
Saga
Shigatze, Saga County
6
Yadong
Yadong or Yatung (Chumbi Valley) (Shigatze City)
Battalion
1st
Jiangzi
Gyangze, 81-km air north of Jigme Dorgi National Park
2nd
Gangba
Shigatze
3rd
Motou
Medog Linzhi
4th
Nyani
Linzhi
5th
Luozha
Shannan City, Luozha County
J. Ranade reports a Mofan Battalion in the Medog Garrison, no number is given, separate from 3rd Independent Battalion.
An official Chinese media report in April 2015,[231] claimed that the principle followed in the PLA’s deployment in the Tibet region is that of “lighter in the front, and heavier at the back.” Fantastic geniuses, the Chinese, to understand the obvious, except that we follow “Heavier at the front, nothing behind.” It explained that there are three lines of defense. The first is the Border Defense Regiment, which is deployed nearest to the border; second is the Mountain brigades whose objective is to safeguard Tibet, and the third comprises a division-level of Motorized Combat troops. Focusing on the need to augment rapid transportation capability in the Tibet region, the report observed that the third line of defense, or Motorized Combat troops, require a still faster mode of transportation for the troops.
This report also confirmed the strategic objectives of the dual-use road and rail transportation network being developed in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Observing that the troops are largely dependent on the construction of railway infrastructure, the report said that in August 2014, a new railway line from Lhasa to Shigatse had been officially operationalized. It noted that construction of a 402-kms long railway line from Lhasa to Linzhi began in December 2014. Stating that the Lhasa-Shigatse Rail line and Lhasa- Linzhi Rail line will connect the two extreme points of east and west in the region, it said this would enhance the PLA’s ‘deployment ability’ and ‘response capability’. The Tibet region, it added, will in future become the center of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway.
The report also referred to air power and transport and said that in the last few years China had successfully constructed several airports on the Qinghai plateau. It said that among them there are 7 modern airports located in the TAR, where a significant number of J-10 and J-11 aircraft are deployed to create a “defense line” of air combat. It disclosed that there had also been a gradual rise in the number of J-10
aircraft deployed in the Gonggar region adding that the HQ-9, a Chinese made air defense missile, has been deployed to provide safety and security for the airports and railways as well as to guard against the threat posed by the deployment of Indian aircraft on the border.
While I am partially repetitive in the following orbat, you can get an idea of the unit number system China uses, and also learn the location of Chinese units in Tibet down to the village in which they are. One recent official Chinese bulletin catering mainly to PLA personnel discussed some of the military deployments in the TMD. Among the PLA Artillery Regiments deployed in the TMD it disclosed that Unit 7761 of the 308 Artillery Regiment is deployed in Lhasa; Unit 77678 is based in Nixi, Bayi village in Linzhi County; and Unit 77625 is deployed at Duilongdeqing County of Lhasa Municipality. It also listed the deployment of a few other PLA units directly under the TMD.
Units Directly under Tibet Military District: 15th Engineer Brigade (Dazi, Lhasa); Unit-77619，308 Artillery Regiment, Lhasa; Unit-77611，65th Air Defense Division, Lhasa; Unit-77616，16th Vehicle Regiment, Lhasa; Communications Battalion, Lhasa; Special Operations Division, Lhasa; Unit-77606，Lhasa。
52nd Mountain Brigade, Bayi village, Linzhi County), Unit-77675; Artillery Regiment (Nixi, Bayi village, Linzhi County) Unit-77678; 1st Battalion (Bujiu village, Linzhi County); 2nd Battalion (Yongjiu village, Linzhi County); 3rd Battalion (Yongjiu village, Linzhi County); 4th Battalion (Bujiu village, Linzhi County).
53rd Mountain Brigade（Linzhi City, Milin County) ，Unit-77680; Artillery Regiment (Jiage village, Linzhi City, Milin County) Unit-77683; First Battalion (Wolong village, Linzhi City, Milin County); Second Battalion,(Gangga village, Linzhi County); 3rd Battalion (Linzhi County)，4th Battalion,(Wolong village, Linzhi City, Milin County).