by Ravi Rikhye
12 patrol vessels up to 1,500-tons, mainly from China; protection of EEZ; 3 aircraft
Coast Guard
Protection up to 12-nautical miles, various boats, and craft
It is unclear if No. 8 Squadron is still in that role. The growing India threat requires Pakistan to have at least two maritime strike squadrons. Of course, any F-16 or JF-17 squadron can be used for that role, but a dedicated unit requires special and continued training in this role. It’s not a good idea to just hang a Harpoon or Exocet or China YJ-83 on a plane and send it out to attack the enemy fleet.
10.3 The Indian Navy
Compared to the two other services, in terms of obsolete equipment, the Navy is significantly better off.
Warship
Modern
Building/on order
Carrier
1
1 + 1 planned
Destroyer
3 Kolkata
3 Delhi
5 Rajput (armament modernized)
1 Vizak +3 (by 2024) +3
Frigate
3 Shivalik T-17
Shivalik T-17A
1 + 7 (starting 2023)
6 Talwar
4
3 Brahmaputra
Corvette
4 Kora
4 Khukri
10 Veer
Minesweeper
None
12 for delivery 2021-2024
Submarine
1 SSBN Arihant
1 on trials 2018, 2 building
1 SSN Chakra
1 SSN replacement
6 SSN cleared @$1.3-billion
1 Scorpene
2 launched, 3 building
6 of new design RFI stage
9 Kilo
Obsolete ships including 4 SS (Shihumar); and 2 FF (Godavari).
Of 42 major ships, aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates, and fleet/ballistic missile submarines, 36 are modern. The Rajput destroyers have a new armament suite, and though now the youngest is 30-years old, at least seven replacement destroyers are commissioned (1), under construction (3), and planned (3).
The minesweeper situation is truly dismal, but this is not the Indian Navy’s fault.[278] In 2014, the MoD canceled a 2008 deal with a Korean company because – Gasp! The Horror! – defense agents were supposed to have been involved. The deal was refloated in 2016, and magically only the same Korean yard bid for a transfer of technology for $1-billion, likely close to the profit it would have made on the original deal. Since only the mentally deficient or truly desperate want to make warship deals with India, there was just the single bidder. Under Indian rules, that is unacceptable, and the contract must be rebid. In an astonishing second of sanity, the MoD let the deal go ahead. Twelve ships will start delivery in (hypothetically, because an Indian yard will make them) 2021-2024. In late 2017 the contract was again canceled due differences with the vendor and is once more in the RFI stage. At some point, if everyone remains calm, another 12 will be ordered, and 16 shallow-water minesweepers have been authorized. The case is interesting because the usual Indian procurement strategy is a slow drip-drip-drip; presumably, MoF hopes the defense service will forget what it asked for. Here, however, the MoD, Cabinet Committee on Security, and presumably MoF are all on board to clear a number that meets the Navy’s requirement.
One comment. The Indian Navy has done a spectacular job in the continuity of warship names, equaled only by Royal Navy. The United States Navy, the world’s most powerful, has made such a mess of its naming protocols that the sole explanation possible is that it has suffered severe brain damage. But: of a sudden, even the Indian Navy has been unable to remain calm and has gone rogue. Its new class of destroyers is named after ports instead of as customary, state capitals. Delhi, Mysore, Mumbai, Chennai, Kolkata, and Kochi. Delhi and Mysore were formerly cruisers. Now, Kochi (Cochin) is not a state capital, but I am willing to hold my nose because it is a famous city in India’s maritime history. Minesweepers were named after ports; now two of the four destroyers have former minesweeper names. Where is the logic? Where is the glory? Yes, there was political interference, but is the Indian Navy a doormat for the Defense Minister? Readers will correctly point out that the five Rajput destroyers do not have state capital names, and I do not accept that either. Perhaps the Indian Navy could have had its own Tribal class destroyers: Rajput, Maratha, Punjabi, Gurkha, and one from Eastern or Southern India. Old-timers will recall the names Gurkha, Punjabi, Sikh, and Afridi from the Royal Navy’s Pre-World War II T26 class. Baloch and Pathan were not part of the British Tribals, because the names had already been given to other ships. The Vizak class names need to be changed: Bengaluru, Hyderabad, Lucknow, Patna and so on.
The long-term problem of the Indian Navy is that it is much too small to challenge the Chinese Navy in the Western Pacific, and when the Chinese Navy establishes itself in force in the Indian Ocean, there too. To keep the India Ocean Indian, we require are:
4 x 70,000 aircraft carriers (plus 1 x Vikramaditya for training, 1 x Vikrant as rotation reserve)
32 x destroyers (16 for carrier escorts, 16 for four surface action groups)
24 x frigates (8 for four replenishment group escort, 12 for four amphibious group escort, 4 general purpose)
36 x submarines, permitting patrols into the West Pacific to harass Chinese shipping lanes
36 x P-8I for maritime surveillance and ASW
18 x MQ-4C long endurance ocean reconnaissance drones
8 x long-range shore-based fighter squadrons
400 x helicopters all types
Costs? Carrier with 50-60 aircraft/helicopters (war load) $10-billion + each. Destroyers $1.5- to $2-billion each. Frigates $1- billion+ each. Submarines, $1-billion each. MR/ASW aircraft, about $10-billion. Long range fighter squadrons $2.5-billion flyaway each. Tankers, helicopters, supporting aircraft, say $10-billion. UAVs, helicopter, say $20-billion, with ordnance, missiles, torpedoes etc., say $250-billion.
Now let’s forget the above, that’s the future. What does the Indian Navy need in the next 3-5 years? Lots of torpedoes, SMSs, SAMs; at least 50 helicopters; towed array sonars come immediately to mind. We need skilled managers and workers from abroad to help reduce shipyard delays. As luck would have it, precisely these workers are in short supply overseas because of 30-years of decreasing naval budgets. We need to privatize all warship yards, and we need to do it without conflict with workers. If it necessary to give a worker 10, 15, 20 years of pay and benefits to get him out, allowing efficient Indian workers to thrive and foreign workers to fill gaps, so be it. That’s a whole lot cheaper than having them hang around getting in the way. Compared to the potential productivity gains, the money required is minor. For example, take a worker earning INR 40,000/month basic, double it for benefits, and we’re looking at maybe $15,000/year per worker. Buying out 10,000 workers means $150-million a year. Peanuts compared to the productivity gains. Alert readers will immediately object: how can we “reward” the inefficient workers and do nothing for the efficient? Excellent point, and if someone is willing to pay me for resolving this and 500 other defense issues, I am happy to hand over the solutions.
In other words, we urgently need to step up fleet readiness and warship production productivity. This leads into the issue of POL reserve stocks.[279] India has 5-million tons of storage, plans to add 10-million more and expand existing storage. We import 500,000 tons a day, so that will give us perhaps 20-days stocks. Oil companies also keep reserve stocks; so say 40-days. This is a good start for wartime, but insufficient for long wars, particularly is the Chinese Navy puts in a blockade. Maybe the US will force China to lift a potential blockade, maybe by 2030 or 2040 the US decides it’s too expensive or risky. Rationing reduces demand but also hits production. At current prices of $60/barrel or $420/ton, another 45-days of reserves might cost $10-billion. Please remember, that totals 90 days at today’s consumption. Stocks will need to increase when the GDP doubles and doubles again. By the way, the UAE
offered to store oil in India and give 2/3rds of it to India when needed. Did GOI jump at the offer? No. It said first taxes must be worked out. Does it take more than three minutes on a financial calculator to figure Net Present Value and Net Future Value to India versus taxes? Yes, if the persons concerned are trying to manipulate the calculator with their fat butts.
11. Air Forces
11.1 China Airforce
11.2 Pakistan Air Force
11.3. Indian Air Force
11.1 Chinese Air Force
For the Chinese Air Forces’s combat organization see: [280] “PLAAF converting air divisions into brigades.” For training see: [281]
“This report seeks to assess People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) pilot proficiency by examining training activities at aviation units with a focus on training guidance and practices at the theoretical and operational levels. The study also examines the training of pilot instructors as well as the operational competency and weaknesses of aviators and of the PLAAF training system as a whole.”
Below is a table of Chinese Air Force combat aircraft numbers. Treat as approximate.
Inventory
In service January 1, 2017[282]
J7 (MiG-21)
Obsolete
388
JH7
Same as FC-1 Flying Leopard
70
J8
In production
96
J10
1st in service 2006, light fighter
236
J11 (Su-27, Su-35)
J16 (Su-30)
In production, J16 needs more powerful engine, 24 produced
276+20
J20 (Stealth)
IOC late 2016, but still in test
6-8 (as of October 2017)
J31 (Stealth)
Development, 1st flight 2012
2 (Export)
H6 (Bomber)
Still in production
120
Q5
Being withdrawn
118
For a nice summary of Chinese aircraft1949-2018 see “Chinese aircraft designations since 1949”.[283]
We could discuss if the J7 fighters are obsolete in a South Asia context, and the Chinese will likely say the J7III version is contemporary; in my opinion, it is best to assume it is in service only to give the air force a feeling of bulk. China’s modern and relatively modern fighters number 700, which gives them the second-largest inventory in the world and is not to be scoffed at. The reason for the multiple aircraft types, some with small production numbers, is because the Chinese have the money to try multiple ideas. Their biggest problem remains engines, as is also the case with Russia. Their claims such as the F20 equals the US F-22 Raptor, and the F31 equals the F-35 need to be disregarded as fanciful.
The Chinese Air Force was organized into air divisions, each with three regiments, each with 3 squadrons each with 3 flights each with 4 aircraft. So an air division had 108 aircraft. Each division had a logistics/maintenance regiment. Now air divisions have become bases with 3-4 air brigades, each with four squadrons of 12 aircraft each. So, for example, 36th Air Division at Urmuqi (Western theatre) has four brigades at three different airbases. Presently many air divisions with regiments still remain, but regiments with more modern aircraft are usually 24 aircraft excluding trainers. A division had a single aircraft type. The air brigade is more task force-oriented, so it will have interceptors, ground attack, reconnaissance as needed for its mission, as also has other attached units, making it into a self-sufficient formation like a US Air Force Wing.
Air Order of Battle[284]
Regiments are being turned into brigades at an accelerated pace. Regiments that have transitioned since Netherlands Scramble’s last update are crossed out. The airforce frequently reequips units with a different mark of the same kind of fighter or shifts more advanced fighters to replace obsolete units. So, for example, a former Q5 unit may get F7s from another, and the F7 unit is reequipped with J10 or J11. This is a different system from IAF and most air forces, where an obsolete unit gets the latest advanced aircraft. Brigades often change airbases. Many airbases have no assigned aircraft as the air force has shrunk but are nonetheless maintained to become operational at short notice.
Eastern Theatre
Brigade
Aircraft
Regiment
Aircraft
7th
J16
40th
J11
8th
J10
41st
J11
9th
J11
42nd
J7
78th
J8, J7
82nd
Q5
85th
J11
83rd
JH7
86th
J7
84th
JH7
83rd
JH-7
94th
J7
85th
J11
95th
J11
86th
J7
40th
J11
41st
J11
95th
J11
Southern Theatre
4th
J11
5th
J10
4th
J8
6th
Su-30/Su-35
25th
J7
26th
J10
27th
J7
54th
J11
52nd
J7
98th
J16/J11
23rd
H6
124th
Su-30MKK
24th
H6
125th
J7
132nd
J7
126th
JH7
22nd
H6
130th
J10
131st
J10
Western Theatre
16th
J11 (Yinchu AB)
17th
J7
109th
J8 (Urumqi AB)
18th
J7
110th
J7 (Urumqi AB)
60th
J7, J8
111th
J11 (Korla AB)
97th
J7
112th
J7 (Urumchi AB)
98th
J11
18th
J7
99th
J7
97th
J7
Northern Theatre
15th
JH7
32nd
Q5
1st
J11
2nd
J8
1st
J11
31st
JH7
33rd
Q5
36th
J7
3rd
J10
14th
Q5 Retired
61st
J10
34th
J10
88th
J7
35th
J8
89th
J11
36th
J7
90th
J7
46th
J8
91st
62nd
J8
Central Theatre
19th
J11
20th
J7
56th
J10
21st
J7
171st
J11
43rd
J10
172nd
J16/J20A
44th
J7
43rd
J10
45th
Q5 Retired
55th
J11/Su-27
53rd
J7
72nd
J10
55th
J11
21st
J7
57th
J7
70th
J7 J10 (2018)
70th
J7
43rd
J10
72nd
J10
71st
J7
107th
H6
108th
H6
The above orbat contains many obvious anomalies. To fully equip the units listed requires 2500 fighters excluding trainers or about 2/3rds more aircraft as the Chinese Air Force has. This suggests (a) that the air force has many units that have only a few aircraft each or exist only on paper, and (b) that unlike the army, which has ruthlessly pruned unneeded, obsolete, or low-manned formations, the air force still must bring the process to its logical conclusion.