by Ravi Rikhye
The solution to all these ifs and buts is simply to have adequate reserves to begin with. We’ve already discussed the minimum we require without pulling divisions from the north and then returning them. But now we must assume a 2-front situation Aside from this, however, we need to counter Pakistan’s buildup, for example, between Sukkar and Karachi. To do this, our XII Corps needs a third division, and Southern Command needs a reserve division so that it has options, for example, attacking the Hyderabad-Karachi sector from the Rann of Kutch. India must stop the nonsense of “just enough to avoid defeat” with respect to Pakistan. It’s beyond logical belief that we act this way with an economy ten times Pakistan’s!
13. Cold Start
13.1 Origins
13.2 Fake excuse of mobilization time
13.3 India is curiously passive about Kashmir
13.4 Cold Start sector balances
13.5 How realistic is Cold Start?
13.6 Is a zero-warning attack possible?
13.7 The fallacy of a short war
13.8 Pakistan can stop Cold Start
13.1 The origins
By the mid-1980s, one Indian general was thoroughly fed up with existing army doctrine, which can be characterized as defensive-offensive. This meant very limited offensives on the outbreak of war, designed to force the adversary to show his hand; engaging his main forces defensively to tie him up; putting him under pressure to commit his offensive forces, and then launching the Indian offensive. The result was: no result, only a stalemate because it gives up the initiative to the adversary. Now, the above is a vast generalization, but to avoid getting bogged down in details, and miss the forest for the trees, it’s a fair statement of Indian strategy. General Sundarji flipped Indian strategy to offensive-defensive: strike first and hard, make big gains, then go on the defensive to protect the gains. Parenthetically, it needs noting that German strategy in World War II was solely the offensive pushed to the limit, aiming to encircle and crush the defender’s forces until he was defeated and the Germans free to impose the political outcomes they wanted. In World War I, the Germans planned an offensive-defensive, but it would take us too far afield to discuss that. The US also followed the German strategy in World War II. Just months after Pearl Harbor, the US Pacific fleet, strengthened with carriers from the Atlantic fleet, went on the offensive against the more powerful Japanese fleet, evened the odds at the Coral Sea and Midway, and then stayed on the offensive till the end.
Exercise Brass Tacks, to be converted to an operation should Pakistan attack in the plains in response to the general’s offensive defensive in Trident, called for cutting Pakistan in half in the general area of Rahim Yar Khan, advancing south of RYK to the Indus River, and making whatever headway possible north of RYK, while Trident took the Northern Areas. In the end, Pakistan would have been forced to trade West Kashmir in return for an Indian withdrawal from the Sindh and all other areas outside of Jammu and Kashmir. It was a good plan, achievable, though not in the very short period General Sundarji wanted and went wrong because the General and his like-minded friend the Defense Minister were caught out by the US, who informed the Prime Minister. Logically the Prime Minister should have allowed the plan to continue, but those were the early days of the blossoming Indo-US response, and the Ministry of External Affairs, as usual, did not want trouble with Pakistan or the US. The latter was engaged, you will remember, in that little affair in Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, the next year, 1988, Pakistan too jettisoned its old doctrine, switched to offensive-defensive, and tested its ideas in the 200,000-troop, 8-division exercise Zarb-e-Momin. The US evaluation of the results was unfavorable, mainly because of confusion the offensive did not go as well as expected, and Red ended up winning some victories. Pakistan sources[352] allege the exercise, witnessed by many military attaches including the Indian, was cut short after Red refused to accept his preprogramed defeat and scored victories. Personally, I feel the US was over-critical. This was the first 4-corps exercise staged by the Pakistan Army, and in my opinion resulted in valuable lessons on which Pakistan could build.
After the 2001-02 Indian failure to launch anything, for reasons discussed below, India switched to Cold Start, also offensive-defensive; Pakistan came up with its counter, defensive offensive; India increased its offensive capabilities, Pakistan responded, to the point today Cold Start is going to become Hot Fizzle, with the honors – or lack of them – even between them and us. In other words, a giant stalemate. This, I will show, will be the inevitable result of India’s continuing failed attempts to obtain strategic gains in very short wars. India refuses to understand this, and the siren song of a short war continues to enthrall our Army. There is, alas, no Ulysses to put wax in our ears to block the song.
13.2 The fake excuse of extended mobilization times
To remind: why is Cold Start relevant to a discussion of if India can fight a 2-front war? Because, thanks to a shortage of divisions, we can fight only a two-phase war. This requires knocking out one enemy before taking on the second. India has chosen as Phase I to knock Pakistan out for the duration. This and other factors require us to shift several mountain divisions from the China front. India will then initiate Phase II: not just the mountain divisions, but plains divisions plus several armored brigades will move north to give us a solid superiority over China.
India’s rationalization for Cold Start is that in the 2001 crisis since India takes longer to mobilize than Pakistan, by the time we were ready for war, it was too late as Pakistan had mobilized. I have a very firm rule: lie when there’s no other way but make the lie so plausible that it cannot be contradicted. The Indian Army fails on both counts and deserves a zero out of one hundred twice over. The GOI gave the armed forces no order to fight, only to mobilize. I have covered this in a forthcoming book. So, there was no need to lie; it was enough to say “we followed GOI’s orders.” Second, the Army has known since the mid-1950s that we require at least ten days to mobilize. That was when the Army made a permanent change of station for 1st Armored Division, our sole strike reserve, from Punjab to Central India. The reasons need not detain us. After the China war, it was always assumed mountain divisions would shift west before we intiated hostilities. This increased mobilization time to 21-days. The Army knew perfectly well that Pakistan mobilizes in 72-hours. There never was any assumption that we could gain an advantage by mobilizing faster than Pakistan. I am not berating the Indian Army, because aside from myself, no one cares about the Big Fat Fib, and my objection is solely because the Army’s inaptness is aesthetically revolting. Lying isan art requiring brains.
That said, moving mechanized formations closer to the borders to shorten reaction time is reasonable, given that so much of the Pakistan Army is already on the border with the rest up to 72-hours away. The trouble began when India fantasized that it could hit Pakistan with zero warning – Cold Start – grab territory; and then sit down to negotiate the return of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir in exchange for Indian withdrawals elsewhere. This idea is infuriating because it is entirely devoid of logic, even of Indian logic. But why, in the first place, did India want to abandon its traditional defensive-offensive strategy and instead adopt a straight offensive followed by defense to hold our gains? The primary reason is that India, fed-up of having no options to retaliate against Pakistan in our low-level war over Kashmir, now in its thirtieth year, wanted to punish Pakistan. Even the slow-plodding, ever-patient Indian elephant eventually is provoked by stinging flies.
Now it is necessary to step back even further. This continued step-back process can cause confusion in the minds of readers, but because everything in the world affairs is cause-effect and effect-cause, it is necessary to go back enough that readers understand India’s motivation. Why did India not have options? Because every option to punish Pakistan for its insurgent attacks ends in inevitable escalation. We parrot the western term “coercisve diplomacy” without the least understanding of what it requires. So, what is the problem?
If it escalates, it escalates. If we attack by air, say Pakistan Occupied Kashmir terror training camps, and Pakistan responds, so what? India says escalation will lead to full-scale war. Again, however, so what? We have been at war for thirty-years, isn’t it time to end this farce? But neither GOI nor the military wants to end this if it means full-scale war. As a nation, we are top-class at talking. But do something? That’s crazy talk.
But what are we frightened of? Aren’t we much stronger than Pakistan? Here’s what we fear: (a) escalation; (b) more escalation when China steps in; (c) foreign intervention to foil us. To answer these points, unfortunately, we need to step back even further. Let’s start with the last point. Aside from diplatic pressure, how exactly can the west intervene? We are under attack; we have the the right to defend ourselves. The west has neother the will or the means to intervene if we are defending ourself.
Here is how our wars have ended.
1947-48
Accepted Anglo-US pressure to stop fighting and start negotiating
1961
Took Goa, despite western condemnation
1962
Defeated, accepted Chinese orders to keep regulars out of 32-km zone from border
1965A
Kutch: Accepted British offer to mediate and consequent settlement
1965B
Fearing Chinese intervention, accepted Soviet offer of mediation
1967
Sikkim clashes; stood our ground, China withdrew
1971
Won Eastern campaign; gave in to US-Soviet pressure to ceasefire in Western campaign
1984
Siachin; successful, but larger objectives not authorized for fear of escalation
1986-87A
Triden; succumbed to US pressure and aborted the operation
1986-87B
Falcon, fear of China led to cancelling the operation
1987-90
Sri Lanka, militarily defeated LTTE, withdrew when asked by Colombo
1987- on
Fought Kashmir insurgency without crossing border, due US pressure
1999
Kargil, agreed to let US sort it out, which Washington did, return to status quo ante
2001-02
Parliament attack, lacking any plan, we accepted US intervention, gained nothing
2008
Mumbai terror attack; did not bother doing anything, US happy.
2016
Made symbolic raid to satisfy domestic outrage, kept US in the picture
This is a dismal record. When the going gets tough, we Indians get going – for the exits. In Goa, thanks to hugely disproportionate force, we won before anyone could stop us. In 1971, since GOI did not reveal all war aims to the public, it could satisfy the public with the part victory. But please to note: in 1967 we stood our ground and China backed off. China being China, refuses even to acknowledge anything happened. The Sri Lanka intervention was a special case: Colombo invited India to intervene, the US backed the intervention; when Sri Lanka asked us to withdraw, we did. India made a bad start by assuming the LTTE would not fight, but finished well, with the LTTE suppressed to Colombo’s satisfaction.
13.3 India is curiously passive about Kashmir
Part of the reason is undoubtedly part of our national security ethos: don’t go looking for trouble, and trouble will return the favor by leaving us alone. In the last two years, when I intensively studied India’s military crisis response for a Ph.D. thesis (which could not be submitted for lack of funds to enroll in the university where I was accepted), another factor came up. Starting with Nehru, we seem to have an insurmountable guilt complex about Kashmir, and this leads us to avoid the use of force when pushing our claim. This explanation makes me uncomfortable, because how is it to be empirically proved? Nonetheless, having spent 47-years studying Indian national security issues, intuitively I believe this is at least half of the reason for our inaction.
The above statement may seem at odds with the high nationalist sentiment for keeping Kashmir at all costs. Conversely, however, since 1948 India has offered multiple times for a compromise based on the Cease Fire Line. Pakistan has rejected all compromises. The best deal it ever offered was that two districts for India, all the rest must go to Pakistan. This deal is no deal.
But why do we feel guilty? Because India, having said that no Hindu majority royal state could join Pakistan – Junagarh and Hyderabad, for example, we did not apply the same principle to ourselves on Kashmir. Indians are intensely legalistic, but also deeply moralistic. Under the terms of Partition, set by the British, in princely states, the ruler’s decision was the sole factor. There was no provision for referendums. Hyderabad came to India because of the principle of contiguity – it had no border with Pakistan. East Bengal, which became East Pakistan after 1947, should not have been part of Pakistan by any definition. Kashmir signed for India. That was legal. Nehru, however, without any legal requirement, simply based on personal morality, promised a Kashmir plebiscite. Nehru felt guilty exercising realpolitik, so much so that a case can be made were it not for Sardar Patel, India would geographically look quite different today, and not for the better. When the Kashmiris gave out they were happy with India, India was happy with Kashmir. But when the insurgency began in the mid-1980s, some Indians are afflicted by doubt as to the legitimacy of Indian rule. This has paralyzed us. We will not give up Kashmir; yet we are not ready to fight for those parts of Kashmir ccupied by Pakistan and China.
To clarify my personal position, which clearly no one in India accepts, the Partition of India is illegal under the laws of self-determination as set in the 1944 UN Charter for Human Rights. Self-determination as a principle enshrined in the UN Charter of Human Rights applied to colonized countries only. India ahould return Pakistan and Bangladesh to the Union, by any means necessary. Peaceful means are best but very difficult to implement. War is logical and easy.
Because of our moral ambiguities, we have taken the position that we won’t fight for Kashmir unless attacked. In 1965, of course, we did fight and then politely handed back our gains. We are clearly under attack for the last 30-years. GOI will not respond because it is gripped in paralyzing fear that our actions could lead to escalation. A reasonable person could ask: So what? Yes, actions have consequences, yes, these consequences can be unforeseen, but the entire point of fighting is to seize and hold the initiative so that we determine the outcomes.
To assure a victory, a military force must be large and proficient enough to meet contingencies. I argue, again, that we do not have the margin of superiority to give us the confidence to act. The margin can be gained on 3.5%, but as I have argued in Taking Back Kashmir[353] 6% of GDP is better. 3.5% is something that requires no sacrifice; 6% does require some sacrifice, but nations have spent 40% and up of GDP during wartime.
13.4 Sector balances in a Cold Start scenario
An aside: in the power-generation industry, a cold start is called a black start. It means that if you’ve lost power at your generating stations, to restart, you need power. Normally, power utilities have back-up power plants, or if other parts of the grid are live, get the jump start from them. I will show that there is no external power source to make Cold Start come live, so it will remain cold.
Below, as an example, is a rough balance of deployed power in the Multan sector. The reason to choose it is this is a natural sector for Cold Start, as there are already three armored brigades in the area during peacetime: the armored brigades with 18th and 24th RAPIDs, and the corps armored brigade.
Pakistan XXXI Corps has Multan as its AOR and protects a front of about 240-km from Suliemanke to half-way between Adampur East and Rahim Yar Khan. Ahmedpur East is now renamed Dera Nawab Sahib, in Pakistan’s southern Punjab. This is as measured in a straight-line right opposite the Indian border.[354]
1940s and 1950s, one brigade at Bahawalpur from 8th Division (I’m excluding the 6th Division story because it was disbanded when Pakistan joined the US-led alliances
).
1965, one brigade of 8th Division and 105th Independent Infantry Brigade Suliemanke.
1968, one brigade (16th Division?) Bahawalpur, 105 (I) Suliemanke, HQ 16th Division plus 2 brigades as a strategic reserve for the entire desert sector, Suliemanke to the Arabian Sea; say 3 brigades available in wartime.
1971, 16th Division transferred to East Pakistan, 33rd Division newly raised replaced, assigned to II Corps Multan); 35th Division new raised November 1971, with 25th Brigade at Bahawalpur, rest still raising; so now four brigades.
1974, reraised 14th Division at Okara, 35th Division at Bahawalpur; plus 105th (I) Brigade at Suliemanke, so seven brigades.
In 1986 XXXI Corps is raised at Bahawalpur to take 14th and 35th Divisions. 1st Armored Division and the new 40th Division are with HQ II Corps, Multan. There are still seven brigades with XXI Corps.
By 2008 or so, there are three independent brigades grouped under a new HQ 26th Mechanized Division. Two were armored, and one given as a mechanized heavy anti-tank brigade. At some point it appears that there were two armored and a mechanized infantry brigade. So, ten brigades.