by Ravi Rikhye
The point of this is that when you have just one armored division, as we did up until 1972, as I mentioned earlier, the armored division becomes too valuable to lose. This is what I call the Jutland Syndrome. In World War I, there were few battles between the German and Royal Navies, because whoever lost the battle could also lose the war for their country. The battle fleets had to be kept intact. Armored divisions are not particularly difficult to lose. An example is Israel’s 252nd Armored Division which under Major-General A. Mandler, lost 65% of its 280 tanks in ~27-hours October 6/7, 1973.[363] Of course, this was due to (a) Israeli contempt for the Egyptian Army; and (b) its odd belief that supporting infantry was not required. So, this division simply went charging ahead and fell into ATGM ambushes carefully set by Egyptian infantry. The latter knew the IDF’s axes of counterattack because of the way the forts/strongholds in the Bar Lev line were laid out. This kind of possibility forces extreme caution on our division commanders. The example of Pakistan 1st Armored Division at Khem Karan 1965 should warn what happens if a brigade or division commander is a “Bash on Regardless” sort. Read my outsider’s analysis of Pakistan 1st Armored Division’s failed attack, and Major A.H. Amin’s professional analysis of Indian 1st Armored Division in the Sialkot sector.[364] Due to rashness, Pakistan lost 100 tanks from four regiments in three days fighting. Histories speak of 6 Pakistani regiments, but an armored brigade was held in reserve and did not enter combat. Pakistan still had 200 tanks, superior to India’s mix of Centurions, Shermans, and AMX-13s - this last was only a tracked light tank. It could have reorganized and attacked again. The division, however, was sent north, possible for worry about an Indian breakthrough in Sialkot. In 1971, Indian 2nd, 3rd, and 14th Armored Brigades were used in the Jammu-Shakergarh areas, but in the infantry support role. 1st Armored Division was kept to counter Pakistan’s 1st Armored Division, neither saw action, and 16th Armored Brigade was a reserve.
Now let’s look at the present. In terms of leadership of armored formations, it is probably fair to assess a 2-3x improvement, principally thanks to regular strike corps exercises, and sometimes even two corps in a year. There are indications armor commanders are more aggressive. The number of armored brigades is much greater. In 1971 we had just five armored brigades plus a scratch force (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 14th, and 16th plus Mike Force which later became 6th Brigade. At the time, it was no more than a reinforced battle group. Now there are 24 armored plus two mechanized brigades, 26 in all, and excluding the China front heavy brigades. Thanks to UAVs, Reconnaissance, and Support Battalions one each with several infantry divisions, and far more sophisticated mapping, the information available may have increased by more than an order of magnitude. All infantry with armored brigades and divisions is mechanized, the BMPs themselves have considerable firepower. Engineer and signals support has significantly expanded. Increasing numbers of attack helicopters are available at corps level; the IAF has a substantial armed helicopter capability. Importantly, the number of IAF cargo helicopters is very much greater. We can assume a much superior overall performance, not just of armor, but of infantry which follows up after the armor or protects flanks. Actually we can assume no such thing, because Pakistan has also greatly improved.
Pakistan in 1971 had seven armored brigades. It now has 26 armored and mechanized to our 26. True each has three regiments/battalions to our four. (Six Indian armored brigades with armored divisions also have 3 each). Pakistan mechanized infantry uses M-113s and not IFVs, though there have been rumors for years that a Chinese IFV might be inducted, such as the 8 X 8 amphibious VN-01. Pakistan both produces the M-113 in its Talha variant and has purchased thousands second hand. The advantage of the second-hand M-113s is that they are cheap, probably less than $150,000 each after rebuild; or thirteen for the cost of one BMP-2. These are approximate figures. The new built Talha and its variants will, of course, cost more. Pakistan can afford to devote APC resources to anti-tank, anti-air, and logistics versions. The ATGM version has 8 rounds plus 8 in the cabin; the launcher can retract for reloading without exposing the crew.
Most important, Pakistan has at least 343 M-109A5 155m SP howitzers, second-hand but upgraded at a cost of $500,000 each, plus 90 wheeled 155mm. Agreed this is not top-of-the line like the ROK howitzer we are buying. The point is, Pakistan has its howitzers in service, we don’t. And we have firmed up orders only four regiments that will equip a brigade in a corps artillery division, so that the brigades and divisions still lack SPs. And for the price of three Indian K-9, Pakistan can equip two regiments with refurbished M-109s. India has steadily refused to buy used equipment because it doesn’t want the Ministry of Finance to assume it can be fobbed off with second-hand. If the refusal stirred MoF into buying new weapons, that would be excellent. But MoF buys nothing, used or new.
Let’s look at war stocks. We’re supposed to have 45-days’ worth. The sad reality is we don’t have enough even for 10-days. For many critical items we probably have just a few days. The cost of some types of ammunition was discussed earlier. In 2014, Russia sold India 125mm gun ammunition at $6,600 per round. The missile launched from the gun is priced at $40,000 per round.[365] So, say a tank fires 30 main gun rounds and 3 missiles a day in the offense, that adds to $330,000/day. Add 15% for transport losses – logistic vehicles on a battlefield are vulnerable, ammunition dumps get hit by enemy aircraft, and so on, that’s $400,000 per tank, that’s $33-million/day for an armored brigade. For 25 brigades that’s $825-million/day. Add 60 rounds 155mm ammunition with 1-2 laser-guided rounds a day for each of 72 howitzers, that’s a modest $9-million/day for each of 40 division equivalents, increase by 25% for corps artillery, that only $440-million/day. We are already upto $1.3-billion a day. We haven’t counted POL, which turns out to be a modest expense, SAMs, tactical missiles, air-dropped guided and dumb bombs, ATGM, battalion ammunition, air and naval ordnance, etc. and we can safely assume $2.5-billion day. And this is modest. So, say $115-billion. And we haven’t calculated spares, annual training requirements, destroyed equipment replacement, replacing damaged/destroyed infrastructure and so on.
In 2017, the GOI reportedly authorized the Army to spend whatever needed for 10-days stocks.[366] At year’s end, the Army announced it had ordered $1.8-billion worth of ammunition.[367] A snail’s pace? Only if you want to insult snails. Since we will not get stocks for more than 10-days, and nothing can be achieved in that time, we might as well avoid getting into a fight.
14.6 Aside: more on minefields
Here are some diagrams from US Army Field Manual 20-32[368] if you are curious about minefields. Notice the diagrams talk of obstacles. This is because along with the mines you will use hasty obstacles such as earth embankments, dug in firing positions for tanks and other fighting vehicle, abatises made from tree trunks, all using the natural terrain contours. Also, read FM 3-34.214[369] Warning: do not attempt this at home even with adult supervision. If you survive, the GOI will be very interested in hosting you for 10-20 years. Your general source for US Army Field Manuals is at.[370]
Does this mean India cannot overcome Pakistan? India has a much greater ability to sustain operations. Within the first week, Pakistan mechanized forces will start to wear down because of an insufficiency of reserves. But none of this matters unless Indian is prepared for 30-90 day war. Indian doctrine, however, explicitly assumes within a few days foreign intervention that will end the war. In other words, Cold Start becomes Damp Start. There is no requirement to use TNWs because India will stop on its own. India is preparing to mechanize more brigades. So is Pakistan. Currently, I have no information about future developments to increase our combat capability.
For an article on Pakistan’s water defenses, see Vats[371], [372]. Also, note that in 1971, Pakistan used elements of three divisional engineer battalions plus drafted civilian labor to create three major lines of minefields in 40 days, which stalled the Indian advance to 1-km/day. Today each corps has an engineer brigade, substantially increasing engineer resourc
es. Pakistan is adding a Chinese origin truck minelayer battalion to each corps.
14.7 Defending the border
To free regular formations for strike while protecting the border, we should look at “People’s Defense” or “Popular Defense.” These have political overtones which we can ignore. Tito and Stalin were allies during World War II. Afterward, however, they parted ways. Tito did not want to become a satellite of the Soviet Union. Stalin did not want Tito to invade Albania and Greece, and create a new, independent, socialist bloc that could create problems for the Soviets. Moreover, Stalin had a deal with Churchill to leave Greece to the western sphere of influence; he stayed out of the Greek Civil War, which permitted the British and US to defeat the Greek Communists. Now faced with the Soviet Army on one flank, and the western powers who controlled the Mediterranean, Tito saw that no conventional army could protect Yugoslavia. In response, he created a People’s army with a nucleus of regular divisions (later Yugoslavia shifted to a brigade organization), supplemented by large numbers of reservists and militia. The reservists not just brought the regular army to strength, they also had reservist units. The militia was, of course, a politically indoctrinated organization; though perhaps not openly stated, it also formed a check on the professional army, should the latter’s generals get a Pretorian inclination or the people rise against the state.
Peoples Armies can be organized in many ways. ’m restricting myself to one way of organizing it, keeping in mind our opportunities – large numbers and high density of population, and our weakness – inability to get large numbers of people organized, The system proposed here is not a true people’s army, because there is no political or regime survival angle. Its sole purpose is to free the regular army from the close defense of the border so that it can focus on the offense. Which in turn allows the army to defeat the enemy, not just repel him, leaving free to try again. This kind of static thinking leads to improper use of the military, which is better used to achieve decisive strategic results on the battlefield. Otherwise, we simply ding-dong along. India has been engaged in a 70-year war; it is time to stop before it becomes a hundred-year war and then a two hundred-year war. The civilian government baulks at the cost of defense, little realizing that the continued stand-off costs much more. Worse, our present defense strategy of no-war/no-peace internally weakens the country with untold consequences.
What I suggest is merely a model to begin a discussion. Rather than have our defense professionals spend their energy on arguing “this won’t work, that won’t work,” a more positive approach would be “This is how to make it work.” Critics, to maintain credibility, are responsible for finding solutions. Negative criticism serves no purpose; indeed, it drains energy and leaves us in the usual Indian state of haplessness and lethargy. Repeat to yourself: “I think Ravi is wrong on this point, here is my solution.”
India’s land border is ~7500-km, and every kilometer presents an actual or future security problem. So, with a division for every 30-km, to guard every inch, we’d need 250-divisions. Since that’s a non-starter, obviously the “not an inch” must be taken metaphorically and needs to be narrowed down to protecting core areas. It can be agreed that Kashmir is such an area. Jammu is critical because the Pathankot-Jammu corridor is so narrow that losing 5-20-km depth can severely undercut our defense of Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh. Punjab is critical because its densely populated, losing a noticeable amount of ground could lead to mass panic and terrible consequences for fleeing citizens. South of Ferozepur, the land on both sides of the border is, with every passing year, becoming more densely populated, but still, we need to protect only critical areas. This means arrangements made in peacetime to evacuate affected areas in orderly fashion and to rapidly create shelter, drinking water, sanitation, etc. It also means generous payments to the civilians not just for damage or loss to property, but also for the psychological damage of having to flee homes, and for opportunity cost. India is not a nation-in-arms, we cannot insist the civilians take their share of the war burden. The state has the overriding duty to protect its citizens, and if evacuation must be ordered, to have appropriate arrangements for the welfare and compensation.
Once we move further south from Ferozepur, the population density starts decreasing, and correspondingly the need for border protection. So, just as an example, if in the Jammu-Pathankot corridor we should have a fortress division protecting 20-km, and in the Punjab 30-km, it can be 50-km in north Rajasthan, and 100-km in south Rajasthan.
In mountain terrain, even though Pakistan and China have much better access to their border positions, there are still big stretches where a brigade or bigger cannot find a gap to attack through. These stretches don’t need to be covered by frontier divisions. In many cases reinforce battalion boxes will suffice, sometimes a regiment may be needed. For example, in the Dras-Kargil sector perhaps three regiments will be required, because the intent is for 8th Mountain Division to undertake an offensive role under XIV Corps, either against Pakistan’s Northern Areas (8th and the new Sub Sector North division), or all three against Ladakh together with 3rd Division. In the Eastern Sector, IV Corps plus III and XVII will shift to an offensive role. That means division-sized fortresses are required at Tawang, Central Arunachal, and Walong. In the Middle Sector, the new XIII Corps with two new and 6th Mountain are also earmarked for offensive roles; regiments and battalions can cover the border. In the Nepal sector, fortress divisions are needed because it is low altitude terrain. Facing Bangladesh and Burma, battalion and regimental fortresses should suffice. As an approximation, the deployment may look this – again, you are welcome to draw up your own plan as makes sense to you.
Looking at many models of border defense, I spent four days on models and scrapped them as complex. Here is a simpler one, based on the Border Security Force and converting it into the first line of defense, as opposed to the second-line role in now plays in wartime. The object is to free the regular army for strike without concerning itself with holding ground. This also has the benefit of reducing the number of divisions we currently need for a 2-front defense from 54 to 39, just one more than the present strength. This would give us seven plains corps and six mountain corps, olf which one each will be in strategic reserve. [I, II, IX, X, XI, XII, XXI plains; XIII, XIV, XVI First, take the border districts in Jammu Division: Poonch, Rajouri, Jammu, Samba, and Kathua, all of which fall in the Border Security Force’s Jammu Frontier. According to the Frontier’s website[373] which lists honors and awards, the Frontier has 30 battalions (the Reserve Battalions are not yet raised):
14
75
141
27
83
142
33
91
143
35
93
145
36
102
153
39
103
163
49
117
172
52
121
200
53
129
Reserve Bn
60
132
Reserve Bn
This gives six battalions per district. So let’s assume that between the Chenab and the Ravi we have available 15 BSF battalions and give 8 to the Jammu Fortress Division and 7 to the Samba-Kahuta division. This does not represent the actual deployment. That gives the battalions in the Jammu division about 8-km sectors each, as measured in straight lines. Add a Reconnaissance and Support Battalion to each BDZ. Before anyone expresses surprise at this suggestion, during the Cold War, the Polish Border Guards had six armored brigades. So wheeled R&S battalions are not a stretch. I won’t go into the matter of engineers, artillery, and support battalions. Air defense artillery can be manned by the militia, and militia companies can assist in defense of built-up areas within a BDZ. Each battalion will cover 8-km. Each battalion will have six companies for a total of 48 companies for the
BDZ. So, companies will hold fronts of about 1200-meters each. The company itself will hold perhaps 200-meters arranged for all-around defense. Five hundred meters on each side will be held by fire.