n. K&R 1855 = πέντε.
o. This does not appear in Arc 1613.
p. K&R 1855 = πάρεστι σκοπεῖν.
q. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
r. K&R 1855 = σαρίσαις.
s. Rob 1552 = τούτου.
t. K&R 1855 = ἀκμὰς.
u. K&R 1855 = κελεύων.
v. K&R 1855 = δὲ.
w. K&R 1855 = ἀναγκάσει.
x. This does not appear in K&R 1855.
1. See also Ascl., Tact. 5.1–2; Arr., Tact. 12.
2. Polyaenus (Excerpts 18.4), for example, describes the Hellenistic phalanx as an ‘invincible beast’. According to Plutarch (Aem. 19), at the battle of Pydna in 168 BC, the Roman commander Aemilius Paulus ‘had never seen a more fearful sight’ than a Hellenistic phalanx marching against him. Plutarch also describes the phalanx as ‘a dense barrier of pikes that is everywhere unassailable’ (Aem. 20; cf. Pyrr. 21) and describes how Alexander’s line at Gaugamela ‘rolled forward like a flood’ (Alex. 33). Likewise Livy (44.41) says that ‘the phalanx is irresistible when it is closely packed and bristling with extended pikes’ (see also Front., Strat. 2.2.1; Asclep., Tact. 5.1; Curt. 3.2.10–16). Arrian (Tact. 12) states that the phalanx looked fearsome even when standing still and not just when it was in action. Diodorus (17.4.4) simply describes a phalanx as a formation that ‘causes concern’ (κατάπληξις).
3. See Chapter 11.
4. This passage of Aelian is almost identical to the description of the weapons of the mid- and late Hellenistic period found in Polybius (18.29), and is most likely the source for it. As such, despite the claim in his introduction that the book contains ‘Alexander of Macedon’s manner of marshalling his army’, and his probable references to the 10- or 12-cubit long weapons of the early Hellenistic period in Chapter 12, Aelian is clearly incorporating information on the mid- and late Hellenistic period as well. It is also clear that Aelian has not copied Polybius’ entire passage verbatim, as the information contained in the next sentence in the work of both authors does not agree (see notes 5 and 6).
5. Asclepiodotus (5.1) also says that the pike was held by the rearward 2 cubits. However, Polybius (18.29) says that the weapon was held by the last 4 cubits, so that a 14-cubit weapon would project 10 cubits forward of the bearer. Arrian (Tact. 12) says that the sarissa ‘approached’ 16 Greek feet (512cm, or just under 11 cubits) in length (τῶν σαρισῶν πόδασ ἐπεῖχεν ἑκκαίδεκα). Of this length, Arrian says that 4 Greek feet (128cm, or just under 3 cubits) were taken up with the grip, so that the weapon extended 12 feet (384cm or 8 cubits) beyond the bearer (καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν τέσσαρες ἐς τὴν χεῖρά τε τοῦκατέχοντος καὶ τὸ ἄλλο σῶμα ἀπετείνοντο, οἱ δώδκα δὲ προεῖχον πρὸ τῶν σωμάτων ἐκάστου τῶν πρωτοστατῶν).
6. Arrian (Tact. 12) says that the weapons of the first six ranks project beyond the front of the line. However, Polybius (18.29) says only the first five ranks have their weapons levelled for action. Asclepiodotus (5.1) also says that only the weapons of the first five ranks are projected forward. However, his calculations are based upon the use of a shorter (12-cubit) weapon than Aelian’s. How Arrian was able to correlate the even shorter weapons of the first six ranks extending ahead of the formation is not stated. The difference between Aelian and Polybius can only be due to Polybius assuming that 4 cubits of the weapon is taken up with the grip, whereas Aelian states that the grip took up only 2 cubits. This would account for the ability of the weapons of the sixth rank to project beyond the front of the formation.
7. Polybius (18.29) says these men held their weapons angled upwards and forwards over the heads of the men in the front ranks, both in preparation to lower them for action should the man ahead of them fall, and to provide a means of disrupting volleys of missiles that might be fired at the formation so as to provide a certain level of protection.
8. The ‘pushing’ (or othismos) of ancient Greek warfare has been a much debated topic for decades. However, it appears that a physical pushing action by the rear ranks only occurred under certain conditions on the battlefield; see C.A. Matthew, ‘When Push Comes to Shove: What was the Othismos of Hoplite Combat?’, Historia 58.4 (2009), pp. 395–415. The ‘push’ that Aelian mentions here is more likely to be taken figuratively: either a ‘bracing’ of the forward lines by the rearward ranks if the formation was operating defensively, or in a supportive role if the formation was advancing into the attack, rather than the act of physically driving the front ranks forward by pushing them in the back. It is unlikely, if the ‘push’ was a more tactile action, that pressing into the back of the man in front would not inhibit his movements and so limit his combat effectiveness. This suggests a more metaphorical ‘push’ than a literal one.
9. Polyaenus (Excerpts 18.8) says, ‘the form of the phalanx ought to be deployed as follows: let the spears of the first, second and third ranks be proportionate according to their rank within the phalanx so as for all of their heads to present an even front’. However, it is uncertain whether this passage should be attributed to a Greek, Macedonian or later formation of spearmen; and there is no reference to a historical individual or event to place the passage in its correct context. Regardless, it is unlikely that this was ever a practiced battlefield precedent, as it would pose all sorts of logistical and operational problems within the phalanx (or any other formation). For example, should a man in the front rank fall, and the man in the second rank move forward to replace him, as the replacement was carrying a longer weapon, the front of the line would instantly become uneven. This suggests that all members of the phalanx carried a weapon of the same length. As Hammond points out, the close formation and the manoeuvrability of the Macedonian phalanx depended upon the standardization of weapons and equipment; see N.G.L. Hammond, ‘A Macedonian Shield and Macedonian Measures’, ABSA 91 (1996), pp. 365–367.
Chapter 15
a. Arc 1613 = ὅταν; K&R 1855 = ὁτὲ.
b. Rob 1552 = ὀπίσω; this does not appear in K&R 1855.
c. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
d. K&R 1855 = χιλίοι.
e. K&R 1855 = τοῖς.
f. Rob 1552 = τῶν.
g. This does not appear in Arc 1613.
h. K&R 1855 = αὶ.
i. This does not appear in Arc 1613.
j. K&R 1855 = ἀλλ’; Arc 1613 = εἶναι δεῖ ἀλλὰ τοὺς.
k. K&R 1855 = ἡμίσει.
l. K&R 1855 = χιλίοι.
m. K&R 1855 = ὀκταχίλιοι.
1. See also Ascl., Tact. 6.1; Arr., Tact. 13.
2. For the number of light troops compared to the number of armed infantry, see Chapter 5. For the reasons behind the need for a reduced depth of rearwardly positioned light troops, see Chapter 4, note 3.
Chapter 16
a. K&R 1855 = αλοῦνται.
b. K&R 1855 = νδρες.
c. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
d. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
e. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
f. This does not appear in Arc 1613.
g. Arc 1613 = δύ.
h. This does not appear in Rob 1552.
i. K&R 1855 = ένενήκοντα.
j. Arc 1613 = δύο.
k. K&R 1855 = ένενήκοντα.
l. K&R 1855 = νδρες.
m. Rob 1552 = τέσσαρων.
1. See also Ascl., Tact. 6.3; Arr., Tact. 14.
2. Sixtus Arcerius, who translated an edition of Aelian in 1613, uses the word systema instead of systremma. However, Robortellus, who released a translation of Aelian based upon three separate Greek manuscripts in Venice in 1515, uses the word systremma. The word comes from the Greek term systrepho [συστρέφω] meaning ‘to
gather together’. Here it is used to refer to the arrangement of a body of men.
3. In many ways, the arrangement of the light-armed bears a certain resemblance to the arrangement of the armed infantry:
Chapter 17
a. This does not appear in Arc 1613.
b. K&R 1855 = ἀποχωρεῖν.
c. K&R 1855 = οὗτοι.
d. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
1. See also Arr., Tact. 15.
2. In this passage, Aelian outlines many of the uses of lightly armed infantry. By provoking the enemy with missile fire, light troops could draw armies led by inexperienced commanders onto unfavourable ground, into concealed kill zones, or into areas of ambush. Once an opponent was so engaged, the light troops could be used in a number of supporting roles including flank attacks against the vulnerable sides and rear of a phalanx or the pursuit of a routed enemy. The lightly equipped skirmishers could easily chase down a more heavily encumbered infantryman. During the battles of the Classical period, a winning side could expect to lose about five per cent of their men. A losing side, on the other hand, could lose as much as forty per cent of their number. Many of these casualties were sustained during the rout, when the fleeing heavy infantry were pursued and massacred by cavalry and light troops; see P. Krentz, ‘Casualties in Hoplite Battles’, GRBS 26 (1985), pp. 13–20.
Chapter 18
a. K&R 1855 = πρὸ.
b. K&R 1855 = ὥς φασι.
c. K&R 1855 = πλάγιον.
d. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
e. Arc 1613 = διίπευσιν.
f. K&R 1855 = ἢ.
g. This does not appear in Arc 1613.
h. K&R 1855 = εἰς πολλὰ.
i. This does not appear in Arc 1613.
j. K&R 1855 = τε οὕτω.
k. Rob 1552 = ἀθρόους.
l. K&R 1855 = τῶν.
m. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
n. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
o. Rob 1552 = ζυγοὺς.
p. K&R 1855 = ἵππων.
q. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
r. This does not appear in Arc 1613 or K&R 1855.
s. This does not appear in K&R 1855.
t. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
u. This does not appear in K&R 1855.
v. K&R 1855 = εἴλης.
1. See also Ascl., Tact. 7.1–4; Arr., Tact. 16.
2. For example, see Ascl., Tact. 7.1–10; Arr., Tact. 12.
3. Jason of Pherae was a Thessalian ruler of the early 4th century BC. Justin (7.6.8) tells us that one of the reasons why Philip of Macedon invaded Thessaly was to gain access to the Thessalian cavalry. According to Plutarch (Alex. 24), Alexander the Great found them to be very effective. Plutarch also says (Pyrrh. 17) that the Romans were unable to withstand a charge of Thessalian horse. The Spartan king Agesilaus thought it a great achievement to have defeated Thessalian cavalry with his own (Plut., Ages. 16). Polybius (4.8) says that the Thessalian horsemen were irresistible when charging in formation, but that they had neither the inclination nor the courage for single combat. The rhombus is something of a diamond shape with corners that can be formed at any angle. (See Plates 7 and 10.)
4. Presumably, the ouragos was still at the rear of the formation while the troop commander was most likely positioned in the centre of the front rank with the two flank-guards in command of the file on either wing.
5. See Chapter 14 note 7.
6. It is unlikely that many of these things regularly happened in infantry formations either. See Chapter 14 note 7.
Chapter 19
a. K&R 1855 = εἰλάρχου.
b. K&R 1855 = εἰλάρχῃ.
c. This does not appear in K&R 1855.
d. K&R 1855 = εἰλάρχου.
e. Rob 1552 and Arc 1613 = ἐκ δεξιῶν.
f. This does not appear in Arc 1613.
g. This does not appear in K&R 1855.
h. Arc 1613 = τραύμα.
i. Arc 1613 = μὲν.
j. K&R 1855 = ζυγεῖν καὶ στοιχεῖν.
k. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
l. K&R 1855 = οὐκέτι δὲ στοιχεῖν.
m. K&R 1855 = ζυγεῖν καὶ στοιχεῖν.
n. Rob 1552 = τὸν.
o. K&R 1855 = εἴλῃ ζυγῶν.
p. K&R 1855 = οἷον ἕνδεκα ἢ τρεισκαὶδεκα ἢ πεντεκαὶδεκα.
q. K&R 1855 = δ’.
r. K&R 1855 = εἴη πεντεκαὶδεκα.
s. K&R 1855 = ἀνὰ τρεισκαὶδεκα.
t. K&R 1855 = εἶναι.
u. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
v. This does not appear in Arc 1613.
w. K&R 1855 = αὐτὸν.
x. This does not appear in Arc 1613.
y. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
z. K&R 1855 = εἰλάρχην.
aa. K&R 1855 = εἰλάρχου.
ab. Rob 1552 = ἵν ὡς.
ac. K&R 1855 = τούτων τῶν ἵππων κατὰ.
ad. K&R 1855 = τῷ προτεταγμένῳ ἵππῳ τυγχάνωσι.
ae. K&R 1855 = περιττῶν τὸν ἀριθμὸν.
af. K&R 1855 = εἰλάρχου.
ag. This does not appear in Arc 1613.
ah. This does not appear in K&R 1855.
ai. Arc 1613 = όσανει.
aj. K&R 1855 = ποιεῖν.
ak. K&R 1855 = εἴλη.
al. This does not appear in K&R 1855.
am. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
an. K&R 1855 = ἑνὸς.
ao. K&R 1855 = ὥστε.
ap. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
aq. K&R 1855 = παραστάντος.
ar. K&R 1855 = ἐν.
as. K&R 1855 = ἔτι ἐν τοῖς.
at. K&R 1855 = οὕτως.
au. K&R 1855 = ἐν τοῖς.
av. K&R 1855 = οὕτως.
aw. This does not appear in Arc 1613.
ax. This does not appear in Rob 1552.
ay. K&R 1855 = εἴλη.
az. K&R 1855 = εἴλης καὶ.
ba. This does not appear in Arc 1613.
bb. Arc 1613 = τὰ μέσα.
1. See also Ascl., Tact. 7.5–9; Arr., Tact. 17.
2. For the rhombus with both ranks and files, see Plate 7.
3. From the different ways that the rhombus could be formed, it seems clear that it could be made up of any number of men and horses in formation. The largest formation that Aelian describes is of 113 horsemen. However, it is hard to imagine what effect such a formation would have against a line of well-ordered infantry (especially if they were pikemen). In Chapter 8, Aelian outlines how an entire phalanx would be accompanied by 4,096 cavalry. It is thus easy to imagine that a cavalry charge would be conducted by a number of such formations, possibly across an extended frontage, all hitting a specific target simultaneously. In other instances, smaller cavalry formations may have been used individually to harass the sides and rear of enemy formations, with a steady stream of troops hitting the enemy line one after the other.
4. in other words, a wedge was merely one half of a rhombus that used the largest central line as its base.
5. This is more like the shape and configuration of the wedge rather than the rhombus.
6. In Plate 8, the wedge formation (which is half of a rhombus) is configured with ranks but not files.
Chapter 20
a. Arc 1613 = πρὸς.
b. This does not appear in Arc 1613.
c. This does not appear in Arc 1613.
d. This does not appear in K&R 1855.
e. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or K&R 1855.
f. K
&R 1855 = ζυφῳ.
g. This does not appear in Arc 1613.
h. K&R 1855 = εἶλαι ἐπειλαρχία.
i. K&R 1855 = τετραχίλιοι καὶ ένενήκοντα ἕξ.
1. See also Ascl., Tact. 7.1, 10; Arr., Tact. 18.
2. It is clear that here Aelian is discussing a wedge rather than a rhombus or a square formation.
3. See Chapter 19 note 1. It appears that each syntagma of infantry had a contingent of cavalry attached to it. Whether these formations of horsemen deployed equally along the line, in association with their respective infantry, or in separate groups to operate independently, was at the discretion of the commander and due to the tactical requirements of the situation.
4. On the Tarantine horsemen, see Chapter 2 note 6.
5. In Chapter 9, this term is also given as the occasional name given to a merarchia of armed infantry of 2,048 men arranged in 128 files. Here, in relation to cavalry, it applies to a completely different number of men.
6. This is also the term used to describe the whole body of light infantry that was attached to the phalanx.
Chapter 21
a. K&R 1855 = συντάξεις.
b. K&R 1855 = εἰλῶν.
c. Rob 1552 and K&R 1855 = περὶ μὲν.
d. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
e. K&R 1855 = εἴλας.
1. See Chapters 18–20.
Chapter 22
a. Arc 1613 = ζευκτικῆς; K&R 1855 = ζευκτοῖς.
b. K&R 1855 = ἅρμασιν.
c. Rob 1552 = δρεπανοφόρα; Arc 1613 = δραπανοφόρα.
d. Arc 1613 = ἐλεφανταρχία.
e. This does not appear in Arc 1613.
f. This does not appear in Rob 1552 or Arc 1613.
1. See also Ascl., Tact. 8.1–9.1; Arr., Tact. 19.
2. In this chapter, we again see the number sixty-four as the basis of a study of one part of a Hellenistic army. It is clear that these units could be enlarged or reduced at the discretion of the commander and the availability of both animals and vehicles. At Raphia in 217 BC, for example, Ptolemy IV Philopater had seventy-three elephants in his army, while Antiochus III had 102 (Polybius 5.79). Chariots were generally not used by Hellenistic armies but were commonly used by foreign armies that opposed them. At Gaugamela in 331 BC, for example, the Persian king Darius sent scythed chariots against the line of Macedonian heavy infantry forming the core of Alexander the Great’s line (Arr., Anab. 3.14). Later, at the Hydaspes River in India in 326 BC, Alexander faced off against the Indian king Porus, who had both chariots and elephants in his army (Arr., Anab. 5.15; Diod. Sic. 17.87.2; Curt. 8.13.6).
The Tactics of Aelian Page 18