Hardinge, the man with ultimate responsibility for any disturbance or disruption that may have occurred amongst a Muslim population of nearly 66 million, was outraged by the Italian action. In a message of 15 October to Sir Arthur Nicolson, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs he stated that he had ‘never heard of a worse case of brigandage’ and asked ‘Were we squared by Italy? Because I do not otherwise understand how Italy could dare to move in the Mediterranean as her communications are entirely at the mercy of our Fleet.’29
British foreign policy was in the hands of Sir Edward Grey. Grey served twice as Foreign Secretary, firstly from 1892-95 in Gladstone’s final administration, and then from 1905-16 in the Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith administrations. From 1906 he authorised secret ‘discussions’ between the General Staffs of France and Britain but kept these hidden from his cabinet colleagues, and the full import of them even from the Prime Minister.30 As Lloyd George was to put it:
During the eight years that preceded the war, the Cabinet devoted a ridiculously small percentage of its time to a consideration of foreign affairs. […] Nothing was said about our military commitments. […] We were made to feel that, in these matters, we were reaching our hands towards the mysteries, and that we were too young in the priesthood to presume to enter into the sanctuary reserved for the elect.31
Grey’s policy towards Italy was, in essence, fairly simple; he wished to do nothing that might reinforce her adhesion to the Triple Alliance; Britain and France had need to ‘gain Italy against the darkening German menace.’32 This was, of course, the exact opposite of Austro-Hungarian and German policy. In purely naval terms, if Italy and Austria-Hungary were allied then their combined fleet could be a major factor in the Mediterranean. As previously related, Italy had four dreadnoughts under construction in 1911, whilst Austria-Hungary in reply had decided to build a similar number. Two of these Tegetthoff class vessels, Viribus Unitis and Tegetthoff, had been laid down in July and September 1910 respectively, whilst two more, Prinz Eugen and Szent István, were to be begun in January 1912. However, if Italy and Austria-Hungary were opposed, or at least not in active alliance, then their fleets, even with the additions proposed for the former, tended to cancel each other out. Since the British Royal Navy sought to concentrate its main strength in the North Sea, this was a matter of great strategic importance. Politically, Grey saw the danger that any unilateral intervention in the matter had the potential to upset European political equilibrium and thus precipitate a war. On the other hand he saw equal danger in a drawn out conflict causing Balkan problems. Given this, it comes as no surprise to note that Grey’s policy in respect of the Italo-Ottoman conflict was one of strict neutrality.33 He explained it in a message to Sir James Rennell Rodd, outlining his account of a meeting with Guglielmo Imperiali:
In 1902 we had made an agreement with Italy respecting Tripoli. From this we realized that in Tripoli especially Italy could not tolerate her interests being thrust aside or unfairly treated. Besides that the traditional friendly relations between England and Italy, the friendly feelings of the two peoples were such that steps, which were forced upon Italy in any part of the world to redress the wrongs of Italian subjects or protect Italian interests from unfair treatment would have our sympathy. But the outright and forcible annexation of Tripoli was an extreme step that might have indirect consequences very embarrassing to other Powers, and amongst others to ourselves, who had so many Mohammedan subjects. I hoped therefore that the Italian Government would conduct affairs so as to limit as far as possible the embarrassment to other Powers.
The Ambassador said that it would be impossible for Italy to retire from Tripoli and asked me what precisely I meant by suggesting that Italy should limit the consequences of her action.
I replied that we could not foresee what developments would follow the action of Italy and I hoped that in any developments which occurred Italy would so conduct affairs that the consequences might be as little far-reaching and embarrassing as possible.
The Ambassador asked whether I meant that we might intervene if there was war between Italy and Turkey. I replied that I was speaking from the point of view of non intervention.34
This policy of ‘non intervention’ was replicated by all the Great Powers and all of them took the position that the ‘consequences’ would be ‘as little far-reaching and embarrassing as possible’ provided the conflict was contained in North Africa. Whilst it was much to Italy’s advantage, at least initially, it was highly detrimental to Ottoman interests. It meant that when Hakki Pasa sought assistance from them he was in effect advised ‘to give way as gracefully as he could.’35
CHAPTER FIVE
The Italian’s Land
‘We advised the Ottoman government to conduct a guerrilla war from the interior of the country. The Italians may control the coast, which will not be difficult for them with the assistance of the heavy guns of their fleet. Mounted Arab troops led by young Turkish officers will remain in constant contact with the Italians, giving them no rest by day or night. Small detachments of the enemy will be overwhelmed and crushed, whilst larger ones will be avoided. We shall try to lure the enemy from his coastal bases with night attacks, and destroy those that advance.’
Enver Pasa, diary entry, 4 October 19111
ABRUZZI’S command in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas was not the only independent Italian naval unit. The outbreak of hostilities in Tripoli overlapped with Ottoman troubles in the Yemen vilayet and the neighbouring mutasarrifiyya (sub-governorate) of Asir (now a province of Saudi Arabia). Ottoman sovereignty was particularly disputed by the Idrisi, under the leadership of Sayyid Muhammad Ibn Ali al-Idrisi, who had been in a state of more or less continual insurrection from 1904.2 Indeed, part of the reason for Ottoman forces in North Africa being weak related to Yemen and Asir; a goodly proportion of the Tripoli garrison had been redeployed there to restore order.3 A new Vali, Muhammad ‘Ali Pasa, had been appointed in 1910 and his policy, aided by Sharif Faysal (Feisal) of later Arab Revolt fame, was one of repression and military occupation. This policy had succeeded, to the extent that by the beginning of October 1911 the Ottoman forces had regained control of the port city of Jizan, Asir.4
When the Italo-Ottoman conflict broke out, Idrisi saw it as a case of ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend.’ The Italians thought along similar lines, and under this temporary and unofficial alliance their naval units in the Red Sea, based in Eritrea, actively aided the insurgents and attacked Ottoman coastal installations. Fear of this policy caused the hurried abandonment of Jizan, with a great loss of stores and equipment, whereupon the Idrisi quickly took repossession. From Italy’s point of view this meant it was neutralised, but there were still several major Yemeni ports in Ottoman hands, mainly al Hudaydah (Hodeidah, Hudayda), al Mukha (Mocha, Mocca Mokha) and Cheikh Said (Shaykh Said).
The Italian naval presence in the Red Sea was neither large nor powerful, the main units in October 1911 being the old Umbria class protected cruisers Elba (1893), Liguria (1893), and Puglia (1898), together with the similarly designated Etna class Etna (1885) and (later) the Piemonte class Piemonte (1888). Other vessels of note included the Partenope class torpedo-cruiser Aretusa, the Curatone class gunboat Volturno (1887) and Governolo class Governolo (1894). This still greatly outgunned anything the Ottoman navy would be likely to deploy, their available units in the theatre amounting to seven torpedo boats. In any event, and despite the age and weakness of his vessels, a blockade of the coast was maintained without undue difficulty under the dynamic leadership of Captain Giovanni Cerrina-Feroni.
One minor incident occurred on 2 October when Aretusa and Volturno engaged the torpedo gunboat Peik-I-Shevket (Peyk i evket) near al Hudaydah and chased it into the harbour there. The Italians then bombarded the quays and forts before withdrawing, having destroyed a small vessel belonging to the customs. As elsewhere, Italian naval preponderance prevented much in the way of Ottoman activity, though there was to be a fight of so
rts on 7-8 January 1912 at Al Qunfidhah (Konfida, Kunfuda, Qunfudah, Cunfida).
More immediately though, the Italian C-in-C, Vice-Admiral Augusto Aubry, a former parliamentary deputy and State Secretary of the Navy (December 1903-December 1905), had organized his available units into two Squadrons and a separate Division and made ready to seize objectives on the coast of Tripoli. Aged 62 and a Neapolitan of humble background, Aubry had fought at Lissa and had extensive naval experience.5 He commanded the 1st Squadron, and its 1st Division, made up of the four battleships of the Vittorio Emanuele class, in person, flying his flag aboard Vittorio Emanuel III.6 The 2nd Division was under Rear-Admiral Ernesto Presbitero and consisted of the armoured cruisers Pisa (flag), Amalfi, San Giorgio and San Marco, together with supporting vessels.7 The 3rd and 4th Divisions were organized as the 2nd Squadron under Vice-Admiral Luigi Faravelli. Faravelli commanded the 3rd Division from Benedetto Brin, the other major units being Regina Margherita (which was repairing and did not join until 5 October), Ammiraglio di Saint Bon and Emanuele Filiberto. The 4th Division under Rear-Admiral Paolo Thaon di Revel was constructed around three armoured cruisers: Giuseppe Garibaldi (flag), Francesco Ferruccio andVarese. Marco Polo, following the cessation of activity in the Adriatic, was also appointed to the 4th Division. Established outside the two Squadrons was a fifth Division under Rear-Admiral Raffaele Borea Ricci. Entitled the ‘Training Division’ the heavy units consisted of the older and obsolete battleships Re Umberto, Sicilia (flag) and Sardegna, plus the armoured cruiser Carlo Alberto.
The Italian armoured cruiser Pisa off Derna. The town was approached by the armoured cruisers of the 2nd Division under Rear-Admiral Ernesto Presbitero on 15 October 1911. The division was escorting transports carrying troops from the 22nd Infantry Regiment who were to take possession of the town. However the Ottoman garrison rebuffed attempts at negotiations and Pisa opened fire against two observably military installations; a barracks and a fort. There was no reply and after 45 minutes the bombardment ceased and an attempt was made to send in a boat flying a flag of truce. This however this was met with rifle fire from Ottoman forces entrenched around the town. The four armoured cruisers then opened fire on Derna itself, and virtually destroyed it within 30 minutes. Attempts at landing were however thwarted by the sea state combined with the fire of Ottoman troops stationed on the beach. Despite heavy shelling from the fleet, these troops could not be dislodged and only after a stalemate lasting until 18 October did the Ottoman forces abandon their positions, allowing the landing of some 1,500 men. (Author’s Collection).
Aubry had concentrated the greater portion of his fleet at Augusta, Sicily, prior to the declaration of war on 29 September. Even before that declaration, on 28 September, the greater part of the 2nd Squadron and the Training Division, under the overall command of Faravelli, had left. This fleet then cruised between Malta and Tripoli, ready, as one enthusiast for Italy’s mission put it, ‘to bear down on the latter place if the Turkish and Mussulman fanatics of the town should attack our fellow-countrymen or the many other Europeans in residence there.’8 They arrived off the coast on the evening of 1 October and proceeded to dredge up the Malta-Tripoli cable, which was then cut. Tripoli was thus prevented from communicating with Istanbul in particular and the outside world in general.
Some twenty-four hours later the Giuseppe Garibaldi, with Rear-Admiral Revel aboard, entered the harbour. Under a white flag of truce Revel communicated a demand for the capitulation of the town; if no surrender was forthcoming by noon the next day (3 October) it would be subject to naval bombardment. He also offered safe passage to the various foreign consuls, and indeed any Europeans in general, who wished to leave in safety before any action began. Sources differ as to the details of what happened in response to this ultimatum. Some claim that at the instigation of the German Consul Dr Alfred Tilger, who was greatly concerned about the economic harm an Italo-Ottoman conflict would cause, a meeting was convened between the other consuls and the Ottoman authorities.9 During the course of this meeting the Ottoman authorities, the effective military commander being Nesat Bey under the nominal command of Munir Pasa, passed on the information that it had already been decided to evacuate the town. The upshot was that other than a small force left to man the coastal defences, the garrison had already withdrawn; a manoeuvre proposed by Enver on 4 October.
Ottoman Commanders in Tripolitania. From left-right: Fethi Bey, Nesat Bey, Taher Bey and Ahmed Choukri Baba. The latter was captain of the artillery.
One of the leading lights in the CUP, Enver had been the Ottoman military attaché in Berlin since 1909. He resigned his post upon hearing of the Italian invasion and travelled back to the Ottoman capitol via Thessalonica (Salonica), where the annual conference of the CUP was being held. According to his diary published in 1918 he was met at Thessalonica railway station on 4 October 1911 by friends who took him directly to the CUP Central Committee.10
According to Enver’s account the debate lasted more than five hours, but eventually it was agreed that the government would be advised that Ottoman forces withdraw from the coast into the interior of the country and adopt a guerrilla strategy. The coastal area would be left to Italy, who, with the heavy artillery of their naval vessels would not find it difficult to control, whilst the resistance gathered their forces in the interior. These, consisting of ‘Mounted Arab troops, commanded by young Turkish officers, will remain in constant touch with the Italians and constantly harass them day and night.’ Small detachments of the enemy would be ‘overwhelmed and crushed’ whilst larger formations would be avoided. Attempts would be made to lure the enemy out of the coastal enclaves by subjecting them to night attack, and any advance that thus ensued would be destroyed.11 Hakki had resigned upon the commencement of hostilities, but Enver’s advice, perforce, was taken by the new cabinet under Said Pasa and announced in the press.12 Enver was one of those sent to command this effort.13
That Enver was entirely correct in his calculation concerning conventional warfare may be adjudged by the state of the defences of Tripoli, which consisted of obsolete coast defence fortifications. To the west, and some way inland, there were a group of three earthen works, designated simply as A, B and C. To the north of these there was a coastal earthwork named Fort Sultanje or Fort Gargaresch. The harbour defences consisted of three masonry works; the Lighthouse Fort and Fort Rosso (Red Fort) built on the harbour wall, and the Spanish Fort constructed on the mole. A larger earthwork, Fort Hamidije or Scharaschat, was constructed to the east of Tripoli at a distance of about 5.5 kilometres.
Despite the decision to not defend Tripoli, there was no formal surrender. Accordingly, Faravelli moved in on 3 October, arranged his fleet into divisions for the attack. The 3rd Division bombarding the harbour forts, whilst the 4th Division took on Fort Hamidieh to the east and the Training Division Fort Sultanje. There were many foreign correspondents present to describe the event; Francis McCullagh of the Westminster Gazette for example:
The central forts were attacked first and the first shot was fired at the red fort on the mole at exactly 3.35 p.m. It was fired by the Brin and it hit the exterior surface of the fort, but injured nobody. The second shot was also fired by the Brin. When a third shot was fired the lighthouse battery answered for the first time, but the shot did not reach half-way to the ship for which it was intended.
This bombardment – for it cannot be called a duel – was carried on at a distance of only three or four miles and was the tamest affair imaginable. The Italians were so close that they could hardly have missed if they had tried. Consequently they did great damage, knocking down the lighthouse, overturning the guns, and converting the fort into a heap of ruins.14
The harbour works ceased firing at 17:00 hrs whilst the outer earthworks, being less susceptible to naval shell, continued firing until sunset at about 18:00 hrs. No fire had been directed into the city; nevertheless several stray rounds had missed their target and caused damage and fires. Much of the population of Tripoli
that remained (most of the Europeans had, taking advantage of the offer to evacuate, already left aboard the SS Hercules) now found itself in an anarchic situation as the Ottoman forces withdrew. Though many people had fled the urban area out of fear of naval gunfire, those that remained indulged themselves during the absence of the forces of order. One community that found itself under attack from rioters and the like were the Jews. This population was to a degree segregated inasmuch as it was congregated in its own quarters, areas that were well defined and relatively easy to defend. Fortuitously, the CUP Ottoman government had in 1911 begun conscripting non-Muslims in the Tripoli vilayet into the army. It followed that some 59 Jews had received military training and, more importantly, had been mobilised and thus issued with arms.15 At least some of these remained in the city with their arms, and managed to defend their communities, fighting off the mob that tried to invade the Jewish areas during the interregnum between Ottoman and Italian rule.16
The Italian fleet returned at 06:00 hrs the next morning (4 October) and, after being fired on by Fort Hamidije, resumed bombarding the earthwork forts. Within an hour these were silenced, and after having satisfied himself that they would offer no further resistance Faravelli ordered a landing. Aboard the fleet were some 1,700 marines or naval infantry (fanteria di marina), and under the guns of the fleet the majority of these made landfall at Gargaresh to the west of the city.17
Since these marines were the only troops available to the Italians until such time as army mobilisation was completed, it was fortunate for the Italian cause that the Ottoman military had completed their withdrawal two days earlier. Indeed, Nesat Bey, though still under the nominal command of Munir Pasa, had commandeered all the transport camels within Tripoli and its environs, collected provisions for 5,000 men for three months, and mobilised as many militia troops as he could locate and moved them all away from the coast to the inland oases. The regular forces he had also removed but these were initially kept concentrated around Bumeliana (Bu Meliana, Boumelliana). This was the site of several wells from which Tripoli, via a station equipped with a reciprocating steam pump, drew most of its water.18 Situated some three kilometres south of the city on the edge of the desert it was, by virtue of the water supply, a strategically important point. It seems likely that if Nesat had known of the weakness of the Italian landing force he would have modified his strategy and attempted some form of resistance or counterattack. Indeed, the landing was only possible because of the Ottoman withdrawal under the threat from the guns of the fleet, which would have been of little utility in terms of supporting any fighting in the urban environment of Tripoli. The marines, under the command of Captain Umberto Cagni (the President of the International Polar Commission, who had been with Abruzzi during several of his explorations), swiftly moved beyond the urban area and formed a thin defensive perimeter on the outskirts of the oasis of Tripoli, the hinterland immediately beyond the city. This included Bumeliana, and since this was well within range of the fleet the majority of the Ottoman force withdrew a distance of around 80 kilometres – or about two days travel – to Gharian, a mountain stronghold some 580 metres above sea level. Nevertheless, the situation was militarily precarious for the Italian cause until such time as army units arrived in sufficient numbers to form a properly manned perimeter and to keep order within Tripoli if necessary.
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