By this time two battalions of 4th Regiment and one battalion of the 63rd Regiment were ashore, but the weather was becoming rougher causing problems in the landing of troops and equipment. It had been found impossible to disembark the mules that carried the mountain artillery – so the guns could not easily be moved – and ammunition in particular was running short. Briccola therefore decided to regroup and await reinforcement and supplies whilst considering the next phase of the operation. The objective was Berca, and the attack was to be made by advancing on and thus holding the enemy between the shallow water and the marsh whilst a second formation circled around the marsh and approached from the south.
The attack resumed at 15:30 hrs and was successful, with the result that by about 18:30 the Italians had dislodged the defenders. They advanced north and then northwest around the salt-lake, and past Berca, where the Italian flag was hoisted just as the sun set, to Sidi Ussein and the outskirts of Benghazi. It was now dark, but the defenders in Benghazi continued to fire at the Italians. Briccola therefore signalled to the fleet to bombard the town. The shelling started at 19:00 hrs and lasted some twenty minutes, after which the white flag was raised. However, amongst the buildings destroyed was the British Consulate, though the consul, Francis Jones, was unhurt. However, eight Maltese British subjects were amongst the twelve Europeans killed – nobody bothered to count how many non-Europeans perished – and according to Irace the British Consul was furious; ‘The Italians have fired on the British flag. This act will cost Italy dear!’32 It didn’t! In fact the only ‘cost’ was to Sir Edward Grey, who had to endure some rather irate questioning in the House of Commons.33
Benghazi. Utilizing their command of the sea the Italians made an amphibious descent at Juliana Beach, Benghazi, on the morning of 19 October 1911. Though the landings were virtually unopposed, strong resistance was encountered on the neck of land between the shallow water and the marshy salt lake. The enemy was fixed there whilst a second formation circled around the marsh and approached from the south. By about 18:30 hrs the Italians had dislodged the defenders and they advanced north and then north-west to Berca, where the Italian flag was hoisted. It was now dark but the defenders in Benghazi continued to fire at the invaders. The Italian fleet then bombarded the town for some twenty minutes, after which the white flag was raised. Amongst the buildings destroyed by the bombardment was the British Consulate. (© Charles Blackwood).
The Italian forces took possession of Benghazi on the morning of 20 October. They were unopposed within the urban area as, unable to respond to naval gunfire, the Ottoman forces had retreated to the hills inland of the town. Indeed, it had been the fire support from offshore that had made the enterprise possible. As a later exponent of the art, Sir Roger Keyes, was to put it: ‘To launch and maintain an amphibious operation, it is necessary to possess Sea Supremacy in the theatre of the enterprise […].’34 The possession of such superiority does not of itself guarantee success however, and there can be no doubt that the Italian landing forces had performed a hazardous operation with skill. Some 6,000 troops were eventually landed, with losses amounting to 36 killed and 88 wounded, the most senior amongst the former being guardiamarina (midshipman) Mario Bianco. The dead in general were commemorated by a Monumento ai caduti della Cirenaica erected on Cape Juliana. Designed by Marcello Piacentini it bore the words ‘At dawn on 19 October 1911, the ships of Italy gave Cirenaica Latin civilization.’ (The RAF bombed it in 1941, presumably in error).35 The death of Bianco in particular inspired the poet Gabriele D’Annunzio to write La canzone di Mario Bianco, one of his Canzoni delle gesta d’Oltremare (‘Songs of Overseas Deeds’ or ‘Songs from the Overseas Action’) in 1912. This work was initially suppressed and then censored by the Giuliotto government, mainly because of one song entitled La canzone dei Dardanelli, which attacked other European nations, particularly Italy’s allies Austria-Hungary and Germany, for their indifference towards Ottoman barbarity and general dislike of Italy.36
The Italian Monument to the Fallen at Benghazi (Monumento ai caduti della Cirenaica). Those who perished during the operations to captures Benghazi on 19-20 October 1911 were commemorated by an obelisk-like structure erected on Cape Juliana. Designed by Marcello Piacentini it bore the words ‘At dawn on 19 October 1911, the ships of Italy gave Cirenaica Latin civilization.’ It was bombed by the RAF during the Second World War and destroyed. (Author’s Collection).
By 21 October 1911, Italian arms had gained all that the politicians had asked of them. However, the plan for invading Tripoli left several interrelated questions unanswered. One of the most important from the military point of view being what was to be done to the Ottoman forces that had retreated from the beachheads? Caneva had pointed out to the Minister for War on 18 October the difficulties he foresaw in this regard. He stated that operations against the ‘main nucleus of regular Turkish troops’ were problematical because such a body did not exist. The Ottoman forces had become ‘dislocated,’ and now formed only ‘meagre detachments,’ which were at least six hours march from Tripoli. Dealing with them was a political rather than a military matter, achievable via a peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire rather than by force.37 Indeed, wearing his political hat as Governor, Caneva had, on 12 October, issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of Tripoli, and indeed to the wider population if they got to see it, to the effect that they had been liberated from Ottoman rule. They were assured that their own chiefs, under the patronage of Victor Emmanuel III, would govern them. All their customs and religious laws would be respected, whilst unjust Ottoman taxes would be abolished. The address concluded by reiterating that Italy desired that Tripoli shall remain a land of Islam under the protection of Italy.38
It has to be admitted that Caneva had made several good points to his superior. The Italian army in general, and the Expeditionary Force that he commanded in particular, was neither trained nor equipped for desert warfare. This extended to small matters; as Francis McCullagh noted, ‘The water bottle of the French soldier in Algiers always holds two litres. The water bottle of the Italian soldier here does not hold half a litre.’39 This was of no small significance given that the inland oases where the Ottoman forces were located were anything from 10 to 50 kilometres away or, as Caneva had pointed out, a six-hour march at least. In terms of clothing the officers and men wore the low visibility grey-green uniform that had been introduced following the lessons by observers of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5.40 McCullagh, who had also observed the Russo-Japanese War, was unimpressed with its suitability: ‘It is a thick, grey, heavy material, quite hot enough for St Petersburg at this time of year, but absurdly, criminally, out of place here. It closely resembles the stuff used in Ulster for making heavy overcoats.’41
Given that Caneva considered that military operations against the ‘meagre detachments’ of Ottoman forces was militarily beyond the capabilities of his force, he had made the best of his situation by ensuring that the Italian position, particularly at Tripoli City, was as secure as possible. There the thin lines of marines had been replaced with entrenched soldiers, some 37,000 in number, backed up with their own artillery and, ultimately, by the guns of the fleet. The Italian trenches formed a rough somewhat flattened semicircle around Tripoli and its oasis, running south-east from the coast at Fort Sultanje, to the outskirts of the oasis encompassing the wells at Bumeliana. From there they arced back north-eastward towards the coast, touching it slightly beyond Fort Hamidije at a place called Shara Shatt (Sharashet, Shara-shett, Shar al-shatt). The total area enclosed was about 10.5 hectares.
The line between Fort Sultanje and Bumeliana was held by four battalions of Gaetano Giardino’s 2nd Brigade, two from each of the regiments, whilst from Bumeliana to Fort Sidi Messri the 1st Brigade under Luigi Rainaldi manned the entrenchments. From Fort Sidi Messri to the sea, a front of around six kilometres, about 1,800 men of the 11th Bersaglieri were deployed; the 1st and 3rd Battalions were between Sidi Messri and the plateau of Henni, with the 2nd Battalio
n between there and the sea, based on Shara Shatt. It was to be their misfortune on 23 October to discover that far from being militarily defeated, the Ottoman forces were not only capable of offensive action, but had managed to recruit significant allies. This, and a similar action two days later, and more particularly the Italian reaction, was to profoundly change the course and nature of the war.
CHAPTER SIX
The Battle of Tripoli
‘It is true that soldiers sometimes commit excesses which their officers cannot prevent; but, in general, a commanding officer is responsible for the acts of those under his orders. Unless he can control his soldiers, he is unfit to command them.’
H W Halleck, International Law: or, Rules Regulating the Intercourse of States in Peace and War, 18611
THE inability of the Army Expeditionary Force to project its power much beyond the Tripoli oasis prevented any interference with the Ottoman forces outside. Nesat Bey, who based his command at the oasis of Ain Zara, thus had time to assess the situation and to organise and arm the Arab and Berber tribesmen that wished to join the fight against the Italians. Though the numbers of regular army troops available to him vary widely according to source, there were probably somewhere around 4,000 nizams (Regular Ottoman Troops) under his command. This force possessed a small contingent of artillery comprised of four field batteries and two mountain batteries.
Italian inactivity also allowed a potentially weak area in the Italian line to be identified. All the evidence suggests that Caneva, and his political and military masters at home, were labouring under an illusion concerning the attitude of the Arab and Berber population to the occupation. They believed, and honestly so it would appear, that this population was overwhelmingly hostile to Ottoman rule and friendly towards Italy. As one commentator wryly put it:
[T]he Italians had not the slightest idea of how the administration of an occupied territory should be carried out. The General Staff evidently believed in grandiloquent proclamations, and the arrival of the army was signalled by the publication of several proclamations, some of which, if I mistake not, were plagiarisms from Prussian proclamations found in some history of the Franco-German War. […] no adequate measures were taken, either to police the town and its environment, or to picket the outlying villages and hamlets in the palm-groves. […] A descendant of the house of Karamanli was appointed as vice-governor of the town, and some Moslem as the mayor. With these measures the entire staff and army reposed a confidence in the Arab population which, though engaging enough in the simplicity that prompted it, was a culpable weakness in the stern path of war.2
The City and Oasis of Tripoli, and Ain Zara, in October-November 1911. Following their initial landings, and the withdrawal of Ottoman forces to Ain Zara, the Italians dug in around the southern edge of the Oasis of Tripoli, but their eastern line ran north-south within the dense oasis. This was a front of around six kilometres, defended by about 1,800 men of the 11th Bersaglieri Regiment. On 23 October 1911 the Ottoman forces assaulted this line, an attack coordinated with a rising of the people of the oasis. Attacked from front and rear the Italians lost 21 officers and 482 other ranks missing or killed, though the assault did not succeed in totally penetrating their lines and occupying the oasis. The next morning a further assault breached the Italian lines around Kemal Bey’s house, though again did not succeed in a complete penetration. The Italian reaction to The Battle of Tripoli was drastic, and out-of-control soldiery massacred thousands of the oasis’ inhabitants. That the Italian command believed they had come close to disaster is borne out by their response. In an attempt to bolster the strength of the defensive line it was shortened and withdrawn some two kilometres on the afternoon of 26 October. Huge reinforcements were also ordered from Italy. Any Italian illusions that their conquest would be easy were now dispelled. (© Charles Blackwood).
It is difficult to ascertain where this belief originated. McCullagh blames Captain Pietro Verri of the General Staff, who had travelled to Tripoli prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Utilising the pseudonym Vincenzo Parisio, and pretending to inspect the Italian post offices, he had gathered information on the disposition of Ottoman forces and defences and passed this information on to the invasion force. Verri arrived only a week or so prior to the declaration of war however, so any inquiries he might have made would inevitably have been somewhat cursory. In any event, if he did advise that the population would be receptive to an Italian takeover he was to be proved mistaken. Angelo del Boca finds Carlo Galli, head of the consulate general in Tripoli, guilty of much the same attitude. He quotes his communication of 19 August 1911:
Once we have overwhelmed the resistance of the garrison in Tripoli, the small garrisons will fall, nor should we fear in any case that there will be a call for holy war. The coastal population in any case would not answer the call, because it is all too well aware of what a European government can do. And the tribes that might conceivably respond to such an appeal are poor, unarmed, or too distant to present any real threat.3
There seems little doubt that there was in any event a great deal of wishful thinking on the part of the Italian government and General Staff.4 Indeed Senator Maggiorino Ferraris, a former government minister and the proprietor and chief editor of La Nuova Antologia, admitted it in the February 1912 edition of the magazine. He ‘frankly’ acknowledged ‘that the Italian nation was deceived as to the probable attitude of the Arabs towards them, and that the resistance of the latter has introduced an entirely new element into the military situation.’5 In concrete terms though, this deception, this ‘confidence in the Arab population,’ led to some errors in the defensive arrangements of the territory occupied.
The Italian entrenchments encompassed most, though not all, of the oasis of Tripoli, so that immediately behind the greater part of the line, and stretching backwards to the town itself, were a number of villages and hamlets. These were interspersed amongst a large number of gardens, orchards, olive groves, and the like, intersected by sandy roads and winding paths. Earthen walls or hedges formed of prickly pear cactus delineated the roads and gardens, the whole forming what the journalist William Kidston McClure, who visited the area in November 1911, called ‘a bewildering labyrinth.’6 Dotted amid this maze were the dwellings of the local people, and where a number of these were clustered together, usually around a well, there was a hamlet or village.
The Tripoli Oasis. Following the initial landings the Italian entrenchments roughly encompassed the majority of the periphery of the oasis of Tripoli, so that immediately behind the greater part of the line, and stretching backwards to the city itself, were several villages and hamlets. These were interspersed amongst a large number of gardens, orchards, olive groves, and the like, intersected by sandy roads and winding paths. Earthen walls or hedges formed of prickly pear cactus delineated the roads and gardens, the whole forming ‘a bewildering labyrinth.’ The eastern portion of the Italian line was within the oasis however, which allowed the enemy to approach unseen. This part of the line was broken during the Battle of Tripoli (23-24 October 1911). (Author’s Collection).
To the south and west the Italian trenches generally overlooked scrub and desert, meaning that the opportunities for an enemy to concentrate and launch a surprise attack were limited. This had not prevented several approaches being made by Ottoman forces, particularly in the region of Bumeliana, but these had seemingly achieved little. They had, nevertheless, tended to focus Italian attention on that portion of the line. To the east however the Italian defences were within the oasis itself, so that the ground was much the same in front of the lines as it was behind them. According to an Italian officer who was there, the occupied zone in this area was delineated by ‘A wide, sandy track, near which the palm trees thinned out.’7 What this, of course, meant was that it was possible to approach the defences whilst unobserved.
This was the area chosen by the Ottoman forces to attempt to penetrate the Italian lines, the operation being supported by diversions at seve
ral other points of the perimeter. Francis McCullagh told of how he arose early on the morning of 23 October and went up onto the roof of his hotel. Two Italian aeroplanes were aloft, and these flew to the south to conduct a reconnaissance mission over the desert. Returning after some thirty minutes they reported that they had observed four Ottoman encampments between 5 and 8 kilometres south of the Italian lines. Numbers of these forces, consisting of both Ottoman regulars and Arab tribesmen, moved forward until they were within visual distance and artillery range of the southern line of defences, though dispersed so as not to offer a favourable target. These manoeuvres caught the attention of the defenders and the Italian artillery, and at least some of the guns of the fleet, fired upon them.8
Meanwhile, concealed by the foliage of the oasis, a large force of regular Ottoman troops, formed of the 8th Infantry Regiment reinforced with Arab irregulars, had approached the eastern flank of the defences and was concentrated facing the line between Fort Sidi Messri to the sea. This was a front of around six kilometres, defended by about 1,800 men of the 11th Bersaglieri Regiment; the 1st and 3rd Battalions were between Sidi Messri and al-Hani (Hanni), with the 2nd Battalion between there and the sea and based on Shara Shatt. Al-Hani was a sandy hill some 50 metres tall topped with a plateau, upon which stood a villa, in some sources referred to as the ‘white castle,’ formerly occupied by an Ottoman official but now used as the HQ of the Regiment. Apart from the position at al-Hani, which was also the location of a machine gun battery, it seems that no great effort had been put into constructing proper defences along the eastern flank. Indeed, several sources state that there were few, if any, entrenchments. This seems doubtful; would the troops have just stood and sat around without any cover? What is beyond doubt, however, is that the eastern flank in general, and the area around Shara Shatt in particular, had been identified by Nesat Bey and his officers as the weakest point of the line.
A Box of Sand Page 14