These, and later additional reinforcements, ensured that the Italian occupation could not be dislodged. However from the Italian politicians’ point of view, stalemate appeared to be leading towards a considerable problem and the longer it endured the greater it became. What haunted the government was the possibility of the Great Powers becoming involved and brokering a peace that would leave Italy without total, undisputed and undiluted, sovereignty over Tripoli. That one or more of the Powers would try to become involved seemed highly likely, as none of them would wish to see the Ottoman Empire weakened. The last thing they wanted was for the Eastern Question to violently erupt and shatter the status quo in several areas. For Austria-Hungary this area was the Balkans, for Britain and Russia the Turkish Straits (The Bosphorus and Dardanelles). France had massive Ottoman financial investments and Germany was also cultivating the Empire; the Berlin-Baghdad railway being an example. Indeed, both Italy’s partners in the Triple Alliance had begun mediation efforts from the moment Italy had delivered the ultimatum. Moreover, as long as the military situation remained stalemated then the greater the likelihood that diplomatic pressure would be applied to the Italian government to come to reasonable terms, with ‘reasonable’ meaning allowing the Ottoman Empire some face-saving device. The historic precedents for this were several; Britain administered and ran Egypt and Cyprus under purely nominal Ottoman sovereignty and had done so for a number of years, whilst the same applied to France and Tunisia and, until 1908, Austria-Hungary and Bosnia.
Initially Giolitti and San Giuliano appeared to favour some such measure, as was signalled by the Prime Minister in a speech at the Teatro Regio, Turin, on 7 October. Though he described the conflict as a ‘crusade,’ he also implied that Italy’s best interests would be served by coming to compromise resolution with the Ottoman Empire to end it. It is arguable that some arrangement with the Ottoman government was, at that time, at least possible. The Grand Vizier Hakki Pasa and his government had resigned upon the outbreak of hostilities, to be replaced by a cabinet headed by Mehmed Said Pasa. The new Grand Vizier indicated in talks he held with the German Ambassador, Baron Adolf Marschall von Bieberstein, early in October that he foresaw a compromise solution. On 4 October he noted the inevitability of abandoning Tripoli to Italian occupation and administration, though under the maintenance of the Ottoman Sultan’s sovereignty. Marschall conveyed these views to his government in a series of telegrams, noting particularly that the new Foreign Minister, Assim Bey, told him on 11 October that the Ottoman government recognised that any residual sovereignty left to the Sultan would be ‘fictitious,’ but that on such a basis mediation by Germany could proceed.2
‘Public opinion’ put paid to such notions on the Italian side. Compromise was anathema to the jingo right and the full force of their invective was unleashed on Giolitti and his government for even hinting at such a thing. Enrico Corradini’s newspaper L’Idea Nazionale predictably viewed any such notion as ‘treachery’ and anything less than Italy dictating peace terms as ‘humiliation.’ The opposition leader Sidney Sonnino was ‘incensed’ by such notions, claiming that anything less than full and outright annexation would be detrimental to Italian prestige.3 Having pandered to ‘public opinion’ in respect of the invasion of Tripoli, the government now found itself the prisoner of it, and by the end of the month Giolitti changed his opinion to match that of the ‘public.’ Though the cliché about riding the tiger springs unbidden to mind, he was later to justify this by the effect it would have on the local population:
Now, even leaving aside the impression on Italian public opinion, the maintenance of the Sultan’s nominal authority in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica had several serious consequences. Such a solution would have reduced much of our authority on the Arab population, who would continue to regard the Sultan as their sovereign as well as their religious leader.4
What Giolitti’s change of mind amounted to in real terms was the issuing of an annexation decree. On 5 November Victor Emmanuel III proclaimed Italian sovereignty over Tripolitania and Cyrenaica:
We have decreed and do decree: Tripolitania and Cyrenaica are placed under the full and complete sovereignty of the kingdom of Italy. An act of parliament will establish the final regulations for the administration of the said regions. Until this act shall have been promulgated, they shall be provided for by royal decrees. The present decree shall be placed on the table of parliament for the purpose of its conversion into a law.5
This was the burning of diplomatic bridges taken to extremes, and there were several consequences. Perhaps the least important was the ridicule it brought upon Italy in the foreign press and elsewhere. The British journalist, W T Stead, put it thus: ‘From the point of view of international law this annexation was as null and void as from the point of view of the actual facts it was grotesquely absurd.’6 The point about international law was well made; according to the respected jurist Lassa Oppenheim, annexation of conquered enemy territory, whether of the whole or of part, confers a title only after a firmly established conquest, and so long as war continues, conquest is not firmly established.7 Under this principle it followed that as long as the Ottoman Empire refused to end the war by negotiation then the war could not end, and whilst this was the case Italy’s annexation would not be recognised by any other powers. The announcement that Tripolitania and Cyrenaica was Italian sovereign territory also led to the curious situation of Italy seemingly carrying out a blockade of her own coastline. Indeed, because of Italian supremacy in the maritime sphere, this duty devolved upon four armed merchant ships, formerly mail steamers each armed with six 150 mm guns, from 10 November. Italy was in danger of looking foolish. However the international press agencies began, from 7 November, to carry messages to the effect that the Italian government regarded the annexation ‘as a second ultimatum.’ If the Ottoman Empire refused to concede on Italian terms then the Italian fleet would be ordered ‘to attack Turkey at one of her vital points.’
Unfortunately for Italian aspirations, the Ottoman government had also had a change of mind. Following the Battle of Tripoli it suddenly became clear that resistance to the Italian occupation was not a forlorn hope. The local population, or at least the significant proportion of it, would fight under Ottoman leadership. The Ottoman military leadership also recognised that the Italian Army was, as currently organised, incapable of winning an outright military victory. They therefore decided to send as much assistance as possible to the forces resisting the Italians. This was no easy task due to Italian command of the sea and the attitude of the British. Cyrenaica shared a frontier with Egypt, which was nominally Ottoman territory under the ‘Khedive of Egypt and the Sudan,’ Abbas II (Abbas Hilmi). On 20 September 1911 Lord Kitchener of Khartoum had left England for Cairo to become agent and consul-general to the Khedive, and it was he who effectively ruled during the time of the conflict. Despite a popular clamour from several sections of the Egyptian population, he was able, in accordance with British neutrality, to prevent any overt large-scale assistance being offered to the Ottomans from Egypt.
Kitchener was often credited with having knowledge of the workings of the ‘oriental mind’ and he seemingly managed the matter diplomatically. When a number of officers in the Egyptian Army asked permission to volunteer to fight against the Italians, he gave the impression that he would not oppose this. However, he warned them that when they returned their positions might not be open and they would have to retire from the army. Similarly, he told the Bedouin chiefs that if they raised levies from their people to fight for the Sultan, then the Khedive would no longer exempt them from conscription into the Egyptian army. Accordingly, neither group went ahead with the idea.8 Similarly, the Ottoman government was denied the use of Egyptian territory for sending materiel or personnel to the war zone. Given the size and nature of the area concerned, and the lack of communications, the appearance of an Ottoman army on the frontier of Cyrenaica was not a realistic prospect in any circumstances.
What was po
ssible was the covert infiltration of individuals and small groups into Cyrenaica via Egypt. This operation was carried out under the auspices of the Teskilat-i-Mahsusa or Special Organisation. The origins of this organisation are, because of the lack of any documentary evidence, obscure. Some accounts trace its origins back to 1903, whilst others argue that it did not come into being until the advent of the First World War. Then it was to become infamous for its role in the Armenian Genocide, as well as being involved in operations in the Caucasus, Egypt, and Mesopotamia. Having sifted all the available evidence, the Turkish historian Taner Akcam has concluded that a group of officers associated with Enver Bey began to describe themselves as the Special Organisation, which was founded in order to organise and supply the guerrilla war that was to be waged in the Tripoli vilayet.9
A number of Ottoman officers, totalling 107 according to Stoddart, were to travel surreptitiously to Tripoli and Cyrenaica via Tunisia and Egypt. Several of these were to achieve high status, including Enver Bey, later the Ottoman minister of war and member of the triumvirate that took the Empire into the Great War on the side of Germany.10 Robert Graves was later to memorably, if inaccurately, describe him as ‘the son of the late Sultan’s chief furniture-maker, and a soldier politician who had worked his way up, it was said, by murdering every superior officer who stood in his way.’11
Enver, according to his 1918 account, left the Ottoman capitol in ‘absolute secrecy’ on a steamer bound for Alexandria in Egypt on 10 October 1911. He was in disguise with ‘dark glasses, clean shaven, [and] wearing a black fez down to the eyebrows.’ Nevertheless he feared that he would draw attention to himself and be recognised. This fear was unfounded, but he records that he was feeling depressed about the magnitude of the task of getting to the war zone and fighting the Italians.
The ship arrived off Alexandria at noon on 14 October, but the docks were in quarantine and so the vessel had to moor offshore and await clearance until the next day. After disembarking and passing through an ‘unpleasant half hour’ clearing immigration and baggage inspection, Enver was taken to a hotel by his guide. This guide is identified as one Arif Pasa about whom nothing further is known, though Salvatore Bono has speculated that he might have been the former Governor of Adrianople (1907) and Navy Secretary (1909).12 If so he was of very high rank and perhaps not the best person to meet someone travelling incognito. In any event, Enver seems to have maintained his guise as an academic until 22 October, when he records that he has changed identity and moved to ‘a dirty little room, where a stifling air prevails,’ the gloom of which is only partially relieved by a candle. Feeling depressed by his surroundings Enver went out but records that he had an encounter with the police, who ‘seemed to suspect that I was not the innocent merchant from Syria who I now pretend to be.’
Two days later however he was en route to Cyrenaica by train, travelling third class to avoid being recognised and with ‘an Arab woman with two young children, a German and a Frenchman as travelling companions.’ The journey was not a comfortable one:
Through the sea of sand our little train rolled slowly forward. Heavens, what a train! I feel every part of my body. I’ve just had breakfast: raw dates, that was all. I now need to get used to this diet. […] The desert wind covers us in very fine sand, which penetrates even though the windows are all closed. Our faces and hair are covered with it and it is very unpleasant! It fills the mouth, and one has to swallow it.13
At some point in the journey to the terminus of the railway at Ed-Daba Enver records that he had to change trains for an even more uncomfortable berth in a freight wagon; ‘it was terrible being in there, and it stank such that I could hardly breathe.’ The ordeal was not overly prolonged and after sleeping a night on the train he started the rest of the journey on horseback with five companions and seven horses; ‘Five Arabian horses for me and my comrades […] and two horses for our luggage.’
By 7 November Enver and his small caravan had reached a point some 15 kilometres west of Tobruk. He records that he had ridden 60 kilometres the previous day on a Hegin, the largest and strongest type of camel, which covered the distance in ten hours. During the course of this journey he had carried out a reconnaissance of Tobruk, concluding that there were only two battalions of Italian troops stationed there, and heard of an action five days previously in which an attempt to cut the Ottoman telegraph lines had been repulsed. This arduous journey could not of course have been undertaken without the active assistance of the Arab inhabitants. For example, on the night of 16 November Enver and his companions were at the zavia14 at Unirn er-Rezm, some 10 kilometres northwest of Bomba. He records that they were given a room to stay the night, though there were no beds; ‘the carpets on the floor are the beds.’ Of much more importance though was the allegiance sworn to him as commander of the Ottoman forces by the leaders of the various tribes in the area. This meant, according to his calculations that in two days around 10,000 irregular fighters could be mobilised if necessary.
By 19 November Enver had reached the zavia of Martuba, situated some 20 kilometres south east of Derna on the strategically important caravan route. This was close to his final destination and around 800 kilometres from the starting point at Alexandria. It was the day after he had reconnoitred the defences at Derna:
Yesterday I was very close at Derna. The hostile pioneer trenches [earthworks] lay at my feet, and outside the city was an armored cruiser. The Arabs are happy when they see me. Initially they had been terrified of the shells from the warship but have now realised that the thousands of shots fired have caused no damage or injuries. The Italian advanced positions have been driven back and they do not try further advances. They are afraid of the Arab forces, in bands from 10 to 100 strong, who swarm around them and attack, especially at night.15
The first Ottoman regular officers had arrived by the middle of October 1911 and their influence began to be felt on the character of the war almost immediately as they took over the coordination of military resistance to the Italians. One example of this was the harassment referred to at Derna, with a particularly worrying (from the Italian point of view) probing attack on 17 November. Most notable in retrospect was the presence of Mustafa Kemal, who arrived after travelling through Egypt disguised as a carpet salesman according to some sources, and crossed the Egyptian-Cyrenaican border on 8 December. Some ten days later he reported to Enver, who had been promoted to Lieutenant Colonel on 12 November 1911 and appointed as commander of the forces in Benghazi.16 Enver accordingly informed the Ottoman War Ministry that ‘Staff Major Mustafa Kemal joined the army at his own request on 18 December 1911.’17
Mustafa Kemal (left) and Enver Bey in the hinterland south of Derna in 1912. Enver Bey (Ismael Enver) was one of the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) or ‘Young Turks’ as they were known colloquially. He was serving in Berlin as Ottoman Military Attaché when Italy declared war and hurried back home. According to his own account, he persuaded the government to adopt a guerrilla strategy in the Tripoli vilayet and journeyed clandestinely to the theatre to put it into practice as commander in Cyrenaica with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. Headquartered near to the Italian occupied port of Derna, the Ottoman led forces were able to prevent the invaders from venturing beyond their coastal enclaves where they were covered by the guns of their fleet. Major Mustafa Kemal, who joined Enver’s command on 18 December 1911 after travelling incognito via Egypt, initially commanded the Ottoman-led forces around Tobruk. He stressed discipline and order to the men under his command, and divided them into small units. As soon as he arrived he personally reconnoitred the Italian positions and recommended a small-scale attack. This, his first engagement with the enemy, took place outside Tobruk on 22 December, and was deemed a victory. It was though, as elsewhere, impossible to do more than attempt to hold the Italians within their defences. On 30 December Kemal was reassigned to Ayn al-Mansur (Ain Mansur), where he was to command the forces before Derna and Tobruk while Enver commanded the who
le Cyrenaican theatre from the same place. (Author’s Collection).
Enver had written on 20 October that the morale of the Arabs was improving and that their understanding that he was related to the Caliph had affected them enormously.18 As early as 4 October Enver had foreseen that countering Italian aggression would be impossible by conventional measures, and argued that a fallback on guerrilla warfare should be made.19 The Ottoman Army had significant experience in counter-insurgency warfare and they used this knowledge, albeit in reverse as it were, to organise the resistance movement, the manpower for which had of necessity to come from the inhabitants of the vilayet.
There was at the time little in the way of a national identity amongst these peoples, though a nascent version was to be forged during the period of resistance to Italian rule. Indeed, one of the local leaders who came to the fore during this episode, Farhat al-Zawi (Farhat Bey), is reported to have told a French journalist who reported from the Ottoman side during the conflict that the population were ‘patriots in bare feet and rags, like your soldiers of the revolution, and not religious fanatics […] if the Turkish government abandons us we will proclaim that it has forfeited its right over our country. We will form the Republic of Tripolitania.’20 Despite this, and his admonition to the same journalist not to write of ‘Holy war’ as it would make the resistance suspect in French eyes, there is no doubt that the backbone of the struggle was indeed religious and based on the Senussi Movement.
A Box of Sand Page 17