These included the difficulties of photographing or bombing accurately from the air, which was rendered problematical due to the nature of the machines they were flying. According to an account by Piazza, the camera was mounted under the pilot’s seat, and, as the nose of the aeroplane prevented a clear view of the ground under a given angle, the target became invisible as it was approached. In order then to take a photograph, or indeed drop a bomb, it was necessary to calculate the length of the interval between losing sight of the objective and being in a position to photograph or hit it. Presumably after a good deal of trial and error, the interval between no longer seeing ‘the point to hit and the instant in which to drop the bomb,’ or trigger the camera, was calculated at 35 seconds whilst flying at an altitude of 700 metres at a speed of 72 kilometres per hour.10
The pilots usually flew their machines at an altitude of between 600 and 800 metres but, as they discovered, the range of the Ottoman Mauser rifles when fired vertically was some 1700 metres. Consequently, the aeroplanes were frequently hit by fire from the ground, Moizo merely being the first to encounter this. Inevitably there came a time when the fire from the Ottoman Mausers hit one of the aviators. This occurred on 31 January 1912 when a two-seater Farman piloted by Captain Giuseppe Rossi and with one of the volunteer airmen, Captain Carlo Montu, as ‘bombardier’ took off from Tobruk. Their mission involved reconnoitring an enemy encampment some 30 kilometres distant and testing the Aasen grenade. According to Rossi’s report:
We flew at an altitude of 600 metres and had covered 15 kilometres when we spotted the first group of Arab tents. These welcomed us with such a volley of accurate fire that I had half a mind to give up continuing the mission. But I immediately felt ashamed of my timidity and headed directly toward the Turkish camp, giving my companion the first signal to make ready the bomb, which had to be suspended over the side for dropping.
At 100 metres away from the centre of the camp I gave the second signal to Montu to drop the bomb and, to observe the effect, I turned immediately to the left. I saw a thick dust cloud rise from the ground and people, horses and camels scattered in every direction. It was a wonderful sight: the bomb had erupted with the intended effect. But the joy of this perception was severely impaired by the incessant crackle of the volley of fire aimed at us. I endeavoured to escape from this by turning to the right, but had to turn away again after seeing that this would take me right over the enemy camp. I steered back to the left, only to discover to my horror that a bullet had struck my aeroplane. I tried to climb but was unsuccessful, and so was passing over the left side of the camp when my companion shouted that he was wounded. I had turned around to look at him when the engine stopped and we began to descend. Happily it started again, but we were struck by two more bullets.
The engine was causing me great difficulties and to add to my misfortunes the wind, which was unfavourable, began to drive me off course. The Arabs never ceased firing for a moment whilst my machine hung in the air swaying as if in pain and almost stationary in the wind. I had an engine that was unreliable and feared that Montu might be fatally wounded, and that if he was no longer in control of himself he might unbalance the aeroplane. I expected death every minute but we managed gradually to return to our headquarters, when Captain Montu’s injuries were attended to. He was not fatally wounded.11
Captain Montu, the President of the Aero Club of Italy and the commander of the volunteer airmen at Tobruk, thus became the first ever casualty of ground to air fire in the history of warfare.12 Despite the experience of Rossi and Montu however, aeroplanes had already proven remarkably difficult to damage with rifle fire, and they had consequently become extremely useful to the Italians. This had been exemplified when Frugoni deployed all his airborne assets, both in reconnaissance roles and attempts at ground attack, during the advance to Ain Zara of 4 December 1911, where the enemy were estimated to number several thousand. Ain Zara in Italian hands would become an outpost giving advanced warning of any manoeuvres towards Tripoli and the coast that might be made by Ottoman forces. It would also protect the flank of Italian movements and communication eastward from Tripoli, particularly with regards to the coastal town of Tagiura (Tajura, Tajoura) situated on Cape Tagiura, which it was intended to advance to through the oasis. Tagiura was situated at what may be considered the far eastern extremity of the Oasis of Tripoli. The verdant area between Tagiura and Tripoli, some 18 kilometres in length and 5 kilometres wide, was described in 1817 as ‘a tract of coast […], which abounds with palm trees.’ Little had changed in the intervening period, though the population of Tagiura that had then been enumerated as about three thousand ‘chiefly Moors and Jews’ was now greatly expanded by anti-Italian forces.13 Amongst these was one of the officers that had managed to travel to Tripoli; Ali Fethi Bey (Fethi Okyar) an Albanian and the former Ottoman Military Attaché in Paris. Fethi had his HQ at a place named Suk el Juma, so called because a market was held there on Fridays. This consisted, unsurprisingly, of a large marketplace and little else. There were however some shops on one side of the marketplace, whilst facing them on the other were two government buildings where the Ottoman HQ was established. The war correspondent for Central News, Henry Charles Seppings Wright, visited the HQ which he described as being ‘right under the guns of Tripoli.’ He described the work there as dangerous, and communication between it and Ain Zara difficult because ‘the alertness of the Italians render[ed] it unsafe to ride there during the day.’ Travelling at night was preferable, because ‘one can get through without having to dodge big shells.’14 Just to the north of Suk el Juma was the village of Amruz (Amruss), described as being ‘surrounded by gardens, and containing many habitable houses, in which the Turkish soldiers were comfortably lodged.’15
Tripoli and the occupied zone, together with the hinterland to the south, following the advance to Ain Zara. After the arrival of substantial reinforcements and the formation of the I° Corpo d’Armata Speciale (1st Special Army Corps) the occupied zone around Tripoli City was expanded somewhat. Ain Zara was taken in early December 1911. The eastern portion of the Tripoli Oasis was also occupied, and the Ottoman forces withdrew. Initially they went to Azizia, some 40 kilometres to the south-west, but once the Italians began strongly fortifying Ain Zara moved their main position some 20 kilometres to Suani Ben Adem. Untrained for, and ill-equipped to wage, desert warfare the Italians were unable to make any further substantial advances for the duration of the conflict. Their enemy, consisting largely of irregulars unable to wage conventional warfare, could not eject them from their entrenched positions. The result was deadlock. (© Charles Blackwood).
Ain Zara is a small oasis about 6.5 kilometres south east of Tripoli, at which the Ottoman forces had, to some degree, concentrated; Nesat Bey had his headquarters near there some 5 kilometres to the south. The oasis itself was described by the British journalist Alan Ostler, who was employed as a war correspondent for the Daily Express. He travelled to Tripoli via Tunisia and spent several months with the Ottoman forces and their commander. According to Ostler, Ain Zara consisted of:
[…] a short street of tents along the side of a sandy hollow. Horses, tethered in a line behind the tents, snuffed the ground for stray grains of barley. […] At the bottom of the hollow, disposed in a sort of square, were barley sacks and camel saddles, boxes of cartridges, and three light waggons taken from the Bersaglieri only a few days ago. They were commissariat wagons, with the numbers of their companies and the name of the regiment stencilled in white upon their sides.16
Around the oasis, and screened from view from the north by sand ridges, were ‘many scattered villages of tents’ including one where the Ottoman cavalry were bivouacked. Further out to the west there were also two fenduks (fendukes, fondouks), Fenduk Sharki and Fenduk Gharbi.17 Fenduk Sharki was about one kilometre away from Ain Zara and had been converted into a hospital, over which flew the flag of the Red Crescent. The whole area, including the hospital, was within range of the Italian naval art
illery. George Frederick Abbott, who had ‘decided to join the main Turkish and Arab forces in the desert round Tripoli town, with the object of collecting material for a book on the campaign,’ later wrote that the patients of the hospital, ‘while waiting for the overworked surgeon to dress their wounds, amused themselves by squatting under the arched gateway and watching the Italian shells swish in the air, burst, and drop, digging deep pits in the ground around them. Some of these projectiles dropped on the hospital itself, despite the Red Crescent flag that flew over its roof.’18 Nesat had around 700 regular troops, including 60 cavalrymen and about 1,500 irregulars under his command as well as eight artillery pieces. In terms of supplies, particularly food, they were reasonably well off. Fethi Bey remarked to Ostler that, ‘No doubt it pleases the Italians to picture us as starving in the desert, but before they bring us to that stage, they must cut off our line of communication. And, as yet, they have not ventured inland beyond the range of their own naval guns.’19 The Italian reinforcements had though included heavy artillery, and for the advance on Ain Zara, Frugoni utilised batteries of 152 mm guns and 203 mm howitzers emplaced at Messri and Bulemiana. These batteries were certainly capable of reaching most of the Ottoman positions.
Italian Trenches at Ain Zara. Though probably a posed photograph, it illustrates well the difficulties the Ottoman forces faced in attempting to attack the Italian positions. Essentially composed of irregulars, the attackers might at best be classed as light infantry with little in the way of artillery to support them. On the other hand, the Italian forces had abundant artillery further supported by naval gunfire so long as they remained within range of the coast. When the Italians did advance inland they did so in such strength as to be irresistible, which had the concomitant effect of rendering their manoeuvres ponderous in the extreme. The advance to Ain Zara, a small oasis about 6.5 kilometres south east of Tripoli, on 4 December 1911 exemplifies this. Under the cover of artillery support from both naval and land-based guns, more than half of Frugoni’s i° Corpo d’Armata Speciale were deployed; the 1st Infantry Division enlarged by a third brigade and extra artillery. The objective was taken, but the enemy forces easily escaped. (Author’s Collection).
The nearest of these were around three kilometres from the Italian line and consisted of trenches and other excavations. The left of the Ottoman position was to the south-west of Bulemiana and was composed of trenches, described by Abbott as ‘primitive ditches following the up-and-down, in-and-out curves of the dunes, and providing very indifferent cover.’20 These had been augmented by shelters dug into the sand behind the trenches, though connected to them by zigzag saps, and roofed over with planks covered with sand. Each of these could provide shelter for about ten men, protect them from shelling, and conceal them from accurate observation from the air. Manning these defences were around thirty regular soldiers and about two hundred Arab irregulars under a lieutenant; their only heavy weapon was a German manufactured machine gun, probably an MG-09, the 7.65 mm export version of the Maxim machine gun. Farther to the east about opposite to the Tomb of Sidi Messri at some three kilometres distance, was a battery of three field guns and about twenty regular infantry under the command of a captain. Some three hundred irregulars were stationed to the south-west of this position, whilst to the south-east was another field piece opposite Fort Sidi Messri. A further battery of four guns was positioned just to the north of Ain Zara. Curiously both sides were armed with Krupp field artillery; the Italians had the 75 mm 1906 model and the Ottomans the 87 mm 1897 model. The range of the latter was however much inferior. Other than the troops, regular and irregular, mentioned above, Nesat had another similar sized body in front of Ain Zara and a fourth positioned some four kilometres to the west, which included some cavalry.
Frugoni’s plan was relatively simple. Under the cover of artillery support from both naval and land-based guns he would attack using more than half of his i° Corpo d’Armata Speciale, or, in other words, overwhelming force. The manoeuvre was structured around the 1st Infantry Division under Lt. Gen. Count Conte Guglielmo Pecori Geraldi, which was enlarged by a third brigade and extra artillery. The battle was to be fought by brigades; on the left was the 1st Brigade under Rainaldi, augmented by the 93rd Regiment from the 5th Brigade of de Chaurand’s 3rd Infantry Division. The task of the strengthened 1st Brigade was to operate within the oasis to the east, and apply pressure to the Ottoman forces there in order to fix them in position and prevent them manoeuvring or redeploying; the 93rd Regiment being tasked with advancing on Amruz. This would prevent the forces in the oasis from interfering with the main Italian forces operating to the south, or indeed vice-versa. Earmarked with a special duty in this regard were two battalions of the 52nd Regiment from the 6th Brigade, stationed at Fort Sidi Messri under Colonel Amari. Amari’s command was not part of the operation in the oasis, but was, if necessary, to advance from Fort Messri to interdict the road from Ain Zara to Suk el Juma should the enemy attempt to move any of their forces along it.
The other two brigades were to advance in column; the centre column, consisting of an ad-hoc Mixed Brigade (Brigata Mista), was commanded by Major-General Clemente Lequio. This brigade was formed from the 11th Bersaglieri Regiment, one battalion of Alpine Troops (the Fenestrelle), and the 2nd Battalion of Grenadiers (granatieri), together with supporting mountain artillery. With his left flank protected by Rainaldi and Amari, Lequio’s objective was Ain Zara itself, upon which he was tasked with approaching directly. This would hopefully fix the defenders in position whilst the right-hand column, the 2nd Brigade under Giardina, with two squadrons of the 15th Light Cavalry Regiment (Cavalleggeri di Lodi) on his extreme right, attempted to flank the defences and circle around behind the oasis.
In all, about 15,000 troops were to take part in the advance to the south, whilst another 3,000 or so were engaged in the oasis. Several field and mountain artillery batteries were in direct support, whilst the newly-landed heavy guns and howitzers, and the naval artillery aboard the ships, offered more distant support. The terrain over which the Mixed and 2nd Brigade were to advance was such as to make it almost impossible to conduct conventional military operations. Charles Wellington Furlong described the conditions and the difficulties they caused as follows:
It is a land essentially of shifting sand dunes, into which the narrow boots of the Italian soldiers sink deeply, and which can only be traversed by sticking to narrow, winding trails between sand mounds, which average thirty feet [nine metres] and which are sometimes ten times as high. The winding trails are only as broad as a city street. The columns of the Italian army of invasion can’t deploy or spread out in open order. The men in front are picked off as they come up on the Arabs, who lurk behind the dunes or who – a favourite trick with them – bury themselves in the sand so that even their heads cannot be seen.
Cavalry movements are impossible in such a country, and no artillery larger than a three-pounder or machine gun can be drawn. All food, water and even fodder must be transported by the invading army, because there is no such thing as ‘living on the country’ in Tripoli. The only places where vegetables, fruit and water can be obtained are the oases. And the Arabs take care that there is little left in the oases for the enemy to live on. All the fruit and vegetables are taken away and dead camels or mules are thrown into the wells to pollute the enemy’s water supply. The only method of transportation which is practical in that country is by camel. But the Italians have no camels, the Arabs having been careful to leave none behind them.21
The ground between Tripoli and Ain Zara was even more hazardous, being intersected with wadis; dry, and not so dry, riverbeds. Indeed, the night of 3-4 December had seen severe rain and there was a heavy storm at daybreak. Accordingly it is somewhat paradoxical to note that because the rains had filled many of the riverbeds, as well as creating several deep pools, one of the potential dangers faced by those advancing into the desert was drowning. One particularly large wadi that had been in flood since the advent
of the rains, wadi Mejneen, was to mark the demarcation line between the two brigades; the Mixed Brigade to the east and the 2nd Brigade to the west. The latter, deployed in column by regiments, had the furthest distance to travel and set off first when the sun rose at about 08:05 hrs, preceded by the cavalry. The central column deployed into marching order shortly afterwards, with the Bersaglieri in the van and the Alpini bringing up the rear, and began moving due south. It was a stormy morning, but the weather that soaked the troops was not bad enough to prevent flying over the desert, which wore ‘a look of desolation most depressing in the morning twilight’ according to Irace who was with the Bersaglieri. He wrote in heroic terms of ‘Captain Moizo’s aeroplane flying on the storm against the lurid background of the great clouds which the wind whirls and twists.’ Moizo, who had attached the Italian national flag to the rear of his craft, was not merely there to raise the morale of the damp soldiery. When he spotted concentrations of the enemy he attacked them. According to Irace again:
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