First of all, England made the successful demand that the blockade by our warships, which extended up to the Egyptian frontier, as marked on all the maps, should be withdrawn, because, forsooth, we had blockaded that part of Tripolitan territory upon which Egypt had seen fit to encroach. And now, to-day, by a gracious concession from the Sultan, who has no longer any right to dispose of a single yard of territory in the vilayet he has lost, the Egyptian frontier has been advanced so as to include the port of Sollum. Why should England derive such vast profit from the war between ourselves and Turkey?27
Britain was not the only state to indulge in a spot of boundary revision. In the far south-west of Fezzan France took the opportunity of occupying the Oasis of Djanet (Ganat). This was an area that had long been in contention; France claimed that it was in Algeria, whilst the Ottoman government argued that it was a part of Tripoli. Situated in an incredibly remote area some 2300 kilometres south of the Mediterranean coast, the Oasis of Djanet derived its importance from its being situated on an important trade route that ran from the Fezzan to the western Sahara. This trade, it was believed, included slaves kidnapped from the eastern regions of Morocco and it was in an attempt to stop this that France had occupied the area in 1905. The following year both France and the Ottoman Empire had reached an understanding that neither would place military forces in the region prior to reaching a final settlement of the matter. However, France claimed that this agreement had been broken in 1908 and 1910 when Ottoman troops were found to have been deployed in the area.28 These forces were recalled to the north when Italy invaded, but to prevent ‘insecurity’ a small column of Algerian troops and cavalry under the command of Captain Edouard Charlet was despatched. The oasis was occupied on 27 November 1911 and a small fort constructed to defend it. Djanet was renamed Fort Charlet in 1916 in memory of the captain who was killed on the Western Front in 1915.29 France also quietly moved small forces based in Chad into the areas that were to become the Borkou, Ennedi, and Tibesti regions of that colony, itself a part of French Equatorial Africa. The border between Ottoman and French territory was amorphous and disputed, and an attempt at settling it was to have taken place in late 1911. Small Ottoman garrisons had been established at oases such as Bardaï, Tibesti, Aïn Galakka and Borkou, but they were steadily withdrawn following the Italian invasion. The news of these manoeuvres took months to reach Rome.30
If Italy had a bone of contention with France over these areas there was some consolation in the fact that they were located in little known places that were thousands of kilometres away from areas of Italian occupation. Any disputes could then be resolved out of the public eye. This was not to be the case however with what the British ambassador to Rome, Sir James Rennell Rodd, was to term ‘an unfortunate incident’ that occurred in January 1912. It was actually the first of a series, and occurred at 06:30 hours on the morning of 16 January in the open sea some 27 kilometres off the coast of Sardinia. The French mail steamer Carthage, of the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, was on its regular voyage between Marseilles and Tunis when it was intercepted and stopped by the protected cruiser Agordat. Aboard the French vessel was an aeroplane and an aviator named Emile Duval, who had received his pilot’s licence in 1910.31 Italian agents at Marseilles had notified their masters that Duval and his cargo were aboard the vessel, and it was believed that both man and machine were heading to Tripoli for service with the Ottoman forces. The captain of Agordat informed his opposite number on the mail ship that the aeroplane was contraband of war, and that the Carthage was therefore to proceed under escort to Cagliari, the capital of Sardinia. Once berthed, the Italian authorities ordered the aeroplane to be offloaded. The captain refused to comply with this order and thereupon the Italians declared the ship had been sequestered and proceeded to seal up the hatches.
This news, telegraphed from the French vice-consul at Cagliari, landed on the desk of Raymond Poincaré, who had become head of the French Government and Foreign Minister on 13 January. In the latter capacity he immediately telegraphed the French Ambassador in Rome, the Italophile Camille Barrère, instructing him to demand the release of the ship and Duval. The next day Poincaré summoned the Italian Ambassador, who explained that his government’s attitude was based on the belief that Duval had signed a contract to serve with the Ottoman forces. The ship would be allowed to leave and to proceed to Tunis after the aeroplane had been offloaded.
Negotiations between Barrère, who counselled caution throughout the affair, and the Italian government were proceeding when at 08:00 hours on 18 January the Agordat intercepted another French ship off Sardinia. Aboard this vessel, the Marseilles-Tunis mail steamer Manouba of the Compagnie de Navigation Mixte, were twenty-nine citizens of the Ottoman Empire. Having ascertained this fact, the commander of the Italian warship escorted the Manouba to Cagliari. Upon arrival the Italian authorities requested the French captain to deliver the Ottoman passengers to them, and upon his refusal to do so the Manouba was seized. The French vice-consul at Cagliari again became involved and, following instructions from his embassy in Rome, he ordered the Captain to disembark the passengers. The embassy had been assured by the Italian authorities that they carried weapons and were soldiers, so the next day they were taken into Italian custody. The Manouba was then allowed to proceed, leaving Cagliari at 19:20 hours on 19 January.
The Carthage was released the next day with Duval and his aeroplane aboard, the Italians having been satisfied that it was not intended for the Ottoman forces in Tripoli.32 If they really believed this then they were mistaken, though the publicity ensured that Duval never got to fly against the Italians. However, the Ottoman War Ministry made at least two further attempts to get aeroplanes and mercenary pilots into the vilayet. These efforts included recruiting the noted French aviators, Jules Vedrines and Marc Bonnier, and procuring two Deperdussin aircraft. This particular attempt came to nothing when, according to Ottoman sources, the pilots got cold feet and flew to Algeria where their machines were impounded. Quite what might have been achieved had any of these attempts been successful is another matter, but it seems likely that another aviation first, that of air-to-air combat, might not have had to wait until the German-Japanese confrontation over eastern China in late 1914.33
There remained the question of the Manouba passengers, of whom France also demanded the release. Their passage had been negotiated by the Ottoman and French governments on 5 January. They were not combatants, but members of the Ottoman Red Crescent Society, a humanitarian organisation equivalent to the Red Cross Society that had been formed in 1867 and formally recognised ten years later. The Italian ambassador to Paris had been informed of this and had telegraphed his government explaining their status. This message had seemingly miscarried or been delayed, and in any event the French Foreign Office, urged by the Ottoman Ambassador, made pressing representations for their release and demanded compensation for the detention of both ships. They also demanded that the Italian navy cease the interception of French vessels. Italy replied to the effect that the right of search for contraband of war would not be renounced.
Poincaré made his first significant speech on foreign affairs to the French parliament on 22 January relating the incidents. He argued that it was for the French authorities, and not the Italian, to establish the status of passengers aboard its ships, and that the aeroplane was not an instrument of war. His language throughout was moderate; he described the incidents as painful though argued that they would not change the friendly relations between the two countries.34 That same morning, Prime Minister Giolitti had in the absence of Barrère discussed the matter with Albert Legrand, the First Secretary of the French Embassy at Rome. According to Giolitti’s memoirs he, Giolitti, then proposed that the matter would best be resolved by referring it to the adjudication of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. Legrand asked if he might telegraph this proposed referral to his government, and Giolitti asked that it be done immediately. Accordingly the telegram was sent at 13:0
0 hours. Poincaré made his speech at 15:00 hours, and the Italian Prime Minister was unprepared for what he termed the ‘rather harsh and almost threatening’ content, in which the arbitration proposal was not mentioned.35 According to Rennell Rodd, Poincaré’s words ‘aroused strong resentment in Italy, and the cordial relations which had prevailed since the outbreak of the war, were inevitably compromised.’36 On the other hand, if it aroused the ire of some Italians, the address was acclaimed by many in France. As one ‘Veteran Diplomat’ wrote:
[…] Poincaré has by his prompt action […] imbued his fellow countrymen with confidence in his ability and determination to conduct the foreign relations of France with a greater degree of vigour and dignity than his predecessors in office. […] The Caillaux administration was turned out of office the other day in the most ignominious manner conceivable, on account of its foreign policy, which was held by Frenchman of every party to have impaired the self respect of the nation and its dignity abroad.37
Italian sensibilities were further outraged by the reception given to the two mail ships when they arrived at Tunis. Large crowds and military bands were on the quayside as if welcoming them home from some great victory. Newspapers reported that sections of the crowd chanted ‘down with Italy’ and ‘long live Turkey,’ as well as ‘viva le aeroplane.’ Nevertheless, and despite the frothing of the press in both countries, San Guiliano and Barrère managed to defuse the situation at governmental level by finding a formula whereby the matter was referred to the Permanent Court of Arbitration. This was arrived at despite San Guiliano taking the position that the French insistence on handing over what the Italian’s considered prisoners of war amounted to a surrender of Italian rights and was a blow to their prestige. The agreement was published as a note commune on 26 January 1912 and amongst its provisions the Ottoman passengers were to be delivered to the French consul in Cagliari. Under his care and responsibility they would then be sent back to Marseilles. France also agreed to verify their identity as Red Crescent personnel and take all necessary measures to prevent any Ottoman military personnel from entering Tunisia.38
In retrospect it seems surprising that the note was published at all. On 25 January the Italian destroyer Fulmine accompanied by the torpedo-boat Canopo seized another Compagnie de Navigation Mixte vessel, the Tavignano, some 14 kilometres to the east of Zarzis, Tunisia. Based at Tunis, the Tavignano was a coaster used for carrying mail between its home port and other Tunisian towns. In proximity to the steamer at the time were two Tunisian mahones, large sailing vessels approximating to galleasses, that the Italians believed were preparing to carry material to shore. These vessels, the Camouna and Gaulois, were fired on by the Canopo, though not seemingly damaged, and driven off. The Tavignano was then escorted to Tripoli under suspicion of containing contraband of war, though this suspicion was proven unfounded after a search and she was released the next day.
When news of the incidents, particularly the detention of the Tavignano, reached the French Government, Poincaré fired off a ‘stiff telegram’ to Barrère demanding that he seek an ‘immediate’ resolution of the matter. The reply came on 26 January stating that the ship had been searched and released, which earned Barrère a ‘stinging rebuke’ from Poincaré:
I ask myself how you could accept the suspicions of the Italian Government. I also ask myself why you did not protest against the clear violation of the Franco-Italian Convention of 1875, the Tavignano being a mail-boat. You seem entirely to misconceive the state of French opinion. If these incidents recur, we cannot guarantee order at Marseilles or in Tunis. It appears, moreover, that the Tavignano was stopped in territorial waters. Finally it is strange that she was taken to Tripoli, which Europe has not yet recognised as an Italian port and where there is no Prize Court. For all these reasons I beg you to make to the Italian Government the most express reserves on the consequences of this new and annoying incident.39
Poincaré’s mention of the ship being a mail-boat under the 1875 Convention had some political significance. According to the terms of the Convention a mail-boat enjoyed the same honours and privileges as a national ship, which was considered to be a part of the territory of the state to which it belonged. In other words, the taking of the Tavignano could be considered an assault on a portion of French sovereign territory, which was an act of war. Poincaré hardly wanted conflict, but he was concerned at the pro-Italian slant that he perceived Barrère had with regards to Franco-Italian relations. This he wished to discourage, for the reason that, in adopting it, he perceived that Barrère was formulating his own foreign policy and attempting to extract Italy from the Triple Alliance.40 This was not Poincaré’s policy; he later claimed his ‘philosophy’ on the matter was that of Sir Edward Grey, who put it thus in his memoirs: ‘If we intrigued to break up the Triple Alliance, our contention that the Entente was defensive and was not directed against Germany would cease to be true.’41
Public opinion in Italy, which Barrère reported as viewing ‘the surrender of the [Manouba] Turks as a national humiliation,’ continued to be outraged at the apparent disregard of Italy’s ‘greatness.’ The same could be said about Tunisia, and such was the anger directed at Italian residents that a large number were forced to leave the country.42 High politics trumped the low version, and once again, the matter was defused. The French Government’s claim for indemnity, on the grounds that the vessels when encountered were within Tunisian territorial waters and were not thus liable to be attacked or captured, was, like the Carthage and Manouba incidents, referred to the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
The affair of the mail-boats coincided with a visit to Rome of the German Foreign Minister, Alfred von Kiderlen, who arrived on Friday, 20 January. Rumours abounded among the diplomatic community that the visit was arranged so that the Triple Alliance could be renewed a year early. The British Ambassador believed, as did a wide section of the press, that the rift that had occurred in the formerly cordial Franco-Italian relationship would encourage Kiderlen, with Austro-Hungarian approval, to press for an early renewal. It was not to be. According to Rennell Rodd:
Giolitti, while expressing his cordial appreciation of the offer, insisted that recognition of the annexation of Libya must be a condition of signature. As Germany and Austria had proclaimed their neutrality on the outbreak of the war, they could not, while it was still in progress, recognize as already determined the very issue which stood in the way of peace.43
Childs points out that Italy refused all attempts to discuss specifics relating to the renewal of the alliance, wanting to wait until after the war had been decided, from the Italian point of view, satisfactorily.44 Kiderlen-Waechter did however propose to San Guiliano that the only reasonable basis for negotiations leading to a settlement of the conflict was to split the vilayet. The Ottoman Empire would retain Cyrenaica whilst Italy would take Tripolitania. San Guiliano replied that the only basis for settlement was the annexation decree of the previous November.45
Italy’s refusal to compromise meant that a negotiated peace was unobtainable. Therefore, in an attempt to impose terms upon the Ottoman Empire, Italy was left with no choice but to broaden the war. It became a cardinal belief amongst the Italian leadership that once the Ottomans had been removed from the scene, then peace could be achieved in Tripoli. If the resistance there had no outside source upon which it could rely for support, then it would come to terms. This thinking was encapsulated by Irace:
The opposition of the Turks and Arabs to the Italian occupation of Tripoli would speedily be at an end if the trade in contraband of war were effectually stopped on the Tunisian and Egyptian frontiers, by means of which our enemies receive fresh supplies of arms, ammunition, and provisions.46
The difficulties of identifying and attempting to interdict contraband travelling via Tunisia have been seen. That which travelled via Egypt was discouraged by the authorities there, but given the nature of the terrain and the sympathies of many of the Egyptians it was impossible to stop completely wh
ilst the Ottoman Empire remained in the war.
This was the crux of the Italian problem. Since the forces in Tripoli could not be defeated, or at least not quickly, then an attack had to be made at some other point. The problem was where? Any attack on Ottoman European possessions, or in Anatolia (Asia Minor), would incur horrendous international complications. It would also involve large scale warfare with the Ottoman Army in strength. Thus, attacks in these places were not realistic prospects. There remained only those places that were vulnerable to naval attack and were not in particularly sensitive areas. There were few locations that fell within such parameters, and these obviously had the disadvantage of not being areas the loss of, or damage to, which would compel the Ottoman government to sue for peace. Nevertheless one such had already been earmarked by Italy, and it was announced that, from 22 January, a blockade would be established off Yemen on the Ottoman Red Sea coast.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
Navalism
‘Unforgettable the thunder of the guns shaking the golden blue of sky and sea while not a breath stirred the palm-trees, not a cloud moved on the swanlike snows of Lebanon.’
James Elroy Flecker and Sir John Squire (Ed.), The Collected Poems of James Elroy Flecker, 19471
THE Italian naval contingent in the Red Sea was reinforced in early January with four modern destroyers of the ‘Soldati Artigliere’ class; the Artigliere (1907), Granatiere, (1906) Bersagliere (1906) and Garibaldino (1910). These vessels were attached because of intelligence reports that the Ottoman Navy was attempting to redeploy a number of its ships from the Persian Gulf into the area. The Italians were seemingly concerned that these might be used to transport Ottoman troops across the Red Sea to attack Eritrea. In retrospect this seems rather far-fetched. Though mainly modern, the Ottoman ships hardly constituted a formidable force. They were: the 240-tonne German-built gunboat, Kastamonu (1905) the name-ship of its class, and the French constructed 315-tonne ‘Taskopru’ class Gokcedag (1908), Refahiye (1908), Ayintab (1908), Ordu (1908), and Bafra (1908). Their largest calibre weapon was one 75 mm gun on the Kastamonu, whilst the rest mounted nothing heavier than 47 mm but were possessed of one 450 mm torpedo tube apiece. Accompanying these were two British-built vessels; the steam yacht ipka (constructed as the Fauvette in 1892) and the tug Muha of unknown age. None of this heterogeneous flotilla could steam at more than 12 knots. The Italians believed that these vessels had arrived in the Red Sea and had secreted themselves in and around the Farsan (Farasan) Islands (Jaza’ir Farasan). Accordingly they began searching the area and the adjacent littoral zone.
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