Should, however, the status quo in the regions of the Balkans, or of the Turkish coasts and islands in the Adriatic and Aegean Seas, in the course of events become impossible; and should Austria-Hungary or Italy be placed under the necessity, either by the action of a third Power or otherwise, to modify that status quo by a temporary or permanent occupation on their part, such occupation shall take place only after a previous agreement has been made between the two Powers, based on the principle of reciprocal compensation for all advantages, territorial or otherwise, which either of them may obtain beyond the present status quo, a compensation which shall satisfy the legitimate interests and aspirations of both Parties.26
This Article had been clarified further by an agreement reached between Austria-Hungary and Italy ‘explaining and supplementing Article VII of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance of 1887.’ Signed on 30 November 1909 at Vienna and on 15 December at Rome this agreement rendered Article VII, which remained in force in its entirety, ‘more specific and complete’
Each of the two Cabinets binds itself not to conclude with a third Power any agreement whatsoever concerning Balkan questions without the participation of the other Cabinet on a footing of absolute equality; likewise, the two Cabinets bind themselves to communicate to each other every proposition which may be made to the one or to the other by a third Power, running contrary to the principle of nonintervention and tending to a modification of the status quo in the regions of the Balkans or of the Ottoman coasts and islands in the Adriatic and of the Aegean Sea.27
Thus by withholding agreement to any modification of the status quo Austria-Hungary was, under the terms of Article VII and its subsequent clarification, virtually granted a power of veto over any Italian move to widen the war. Whether or not this extended to an attack on the Dardanelles was another matter, but in order to bring diplomatic pressure to bear on Austria-Hungary to allow Italy to extend hostilities into the area concerned, Giolitti’s government invoked the assistance of the senior partner in the Triple Alliance.
Kaiser Wilhelm II habitually reserved the last half of March and the whole of April each year for trips to Italy and the Mediterranean, including his Aechilleion estate on Corfu which he had purchased in 1907. During his 1912 visit he stopped off at Venice for two days on 24-25 March, and whilst there he was visited by Victor Emmanuel III.28 The Kaiser was personally sympathetic to the Ottomans, although these sentiments were not fully shared by his Foreign Minister who wanted an end to the conflict. Generally, the two monarchs did not get on, but nevertheless the King was able to persuade the Emperor that Austro-Hungarian opposition to an extension of the conflict was harming the prospects of renewal of the Triple Alliance. Kaiser Wilhelm had never been averse to intervening in foreign affairs or indeed any aspect of the governance of Imperial Germany, though his influence had been severely curtailed following the embarrassing ‘Daily Telegraph Affair’ of 1908. However, on this occasion his inclinations were in line with those of Kiderlen, who began to apply diplomatic pressure on Berchtold.29 This was revealed in a telegraph message from Berchtold to Kajetan von Mérey, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Rome, of 6 April. In this he related that Heinrich von Tschirschky, the German Ambassador, acting on instructions had ‘made to me the following declaration:’
In consequence of the long duration of the Italo-Turkish conflict, the situation is beginning to become serious for Italy, and both military circles and public opinion urge that a decisive blow be delivered. It is not a question of action in the Aegean Sea, but in the Dardanelles.
The Ambassador added in strict confidence that the King of Italy had approached Emperor William on the subject at Venice. The question now arising for Germany is, what attitude the Allies [i.e. Austria-Hungary and Germany] will take toward these intentions of Italy. You will please seek an occasion to converse with the Marchese di San Giuliano and tell him that you have perceived, from information received from Vienna, that it was a matter of great surprise to me to learn that von Tschirschky had been instructed by his Government to make the aforesaid intimation.
In consideration of our alliance, as well as of the friendly manner in which I have met Italy heretofore, I would have thought a direct discussion more natural and more expedient. At the same time you will hint that for conspicuous reasons I was obliged to adhere in principle to the standpoint which my predecessor had taken up in respect of an eventual extension of the hostilities.
Von Tschirschky explicitly designated an Italian action in the Dardanelles; the apprehension is easy to understand, that such action might find its echo in Constantinople and in the Balkans, the consequence of which may not be gauged to-day, but which would be diametrically opposed to the maintenance of the status quo—the policy pursued by both Italy and Austria-Hungary.
Should, nevertheless, the Italian Government find an extension of the region of her warlike operations indispensable, then I would certainly consider a direct discussion of the matter the most natural course to take. Without obtaining a decided consent from me, which would to a certain extent imply our participation in the responsibilities for the consequences, Italy may secure our tacit passivity in the event of an intended temporary warlike action, confined to such territories as would not involve the danger of a reaction in the Balkans.
If the Marchese di San Giuliano enters upon a discussion of any specific Italian operation, you will lead the conversation into other channels with the intimation that you consider such discussion inopportune. In fact, we must positively avoid every appearance that any specific warlike action had received our previous consent.30
Giuseppe, Duc d’Avama, the Italian Ambassador to Vienna, pursued this theme with Berchtold following von Tschirschky’s approach. The foreign minister related the course of this meeting to von Mérey on 15 April:
The Duke of Avama again broached the subject of a possible extension of the Italian naval operation, though pointing out with emphasis that he spoke without instructions.
I pointed out in the first place that, to my mind, an action by the Italian Navy outside of the North-African war theatre could accomplish its purpose only if it caused a strong enough impression in Constantinople to be felt in the Balkans. Such reaction, however, could not leave us, Italy’s allies, indifferent. A minor operation and a less extensive reaction would bring Italy no nearer to her aim, while it would still create a feeling of uneasiness with us if the scene of action comprised the territories referred to in Article VII of the Alliance Treaty.
Under these circumstances I could not give my express consent to any similar action whatsoever. The Duke of Avarna had not asked me to give such consent; but I, on my part, was determined to leave the responsibility for the consequences upon Italy’s shoulders.
Concerning the islands of Rhodos, Karpathos and Stampalia, I expressed my willingness to consider it disputable whether or not they pertain to the islands of the Aegean Sea. The Duke of Avarna replied that he felt convinced that his Government would give us its express assurances, in the event of their occupation, that such occupation would be only temporary.31
Indeed Stampalia (Astipalea, Astypalaia), whether or not it was diplomatically ‘removed’ from its normal geographic position, had been earmarked by the Italian navy as a forward base for any operations in the Aegean or Eastern Mediterranean. The fleet now had a new commander in Vice-Admiral Luigi Faravelli. He had succeeded to the post following the death through illness of the former C-in-C Vice-Admiral Augusto Aubry. Aubry had died aboard his flagship at Taranto on 4 March.
Faravelli was not long in position, for on 7 April he asked to be relieved on medical grounds as he was suffering from a ‘severe nervous ailment.’ He was succeeded on 9 April by Vice-Admiral Leone Viale and so it was under his auspices that, on 13 April, the Italian fleet sailed from Taranto. It arrived off Stampalia on 15 April and, with the arrival of additional vessels, concentrated there over the next two days. When Viale steamed eastwards on 17 April he had under his command the 1st Squadron – th
e battleships Vittorio Emanuele III (flag), Roma and Napoli (1st Division) and the armoured cruisers Pisa (flag), Amalfi, and San Marco (2nd Division). Also in hand was the 4th Division of the 2nd Squadron – the armoured cruisers Giuseppe Garibaldi (flag), Francesco Ferruccio, Varese and Marco Polo.
The battleship Roma of the Regina Elena (sometimes categorised as Vittorio Emanuele) class. The four ships of this class, Regina Elena, Vittorio Emanuele, Napoli, and Roma, were commissioned between 1901 and 1903 and were considered extremely fast. They were somewhat lightly armed, however, with a main battery of only two 305 mm guns each in single turrets. Because the Ottoman Navy refused battle, none of the Italian heavy ships saw any major action during the conflict. (Author’s Collection).
The fleet was accompanied by the destroyers Aquilone, Borea, Nembo, and Turbine, and the torpedo-boats, Calipso, Climene, Pegaso, Perseo, and Procione, under the command of the Duke of Abruzzia. The Duke flew his flag aboard the Vettor Pisani, and also had in his command two auxiliary cruisers and a cable ship. This latter vessel, the British-constructed Citta di Milano, was the first into action. During the night of the 17th/18th it grappled for, and then cut, the cable between the Dardanelles and Imbros (Gökçeada), the Ottoman island some 25 kilometres west of the southern tip of the Dardanelles. Also dredged up and severed were the cables that connected Lemnos with Tenedos (Bozcaada) and Salonica (Thessalonica), thus effectively disrupting Ottoman communications.
The main body of the fleet, less the torpedo boats which had been forced to seek shelter during the night because of rough seas, remained well out of range, whilst the armoured cruisers of Rear-Admiral Ernesto Presbitero’s 2nd Division approached the entrance to the strait at sunrise. If he was trying to lure out the Ottoman fleet then the manoeuvre failed, and at 09:00 hours, the whole fleet concentrated and steamed towards the Dardanelles in line ahead. An Ottoman destroyer was spotted near the entrance and Viale signalled the armoured cruisers of the 4th Division under Rear-Admiral Paolo Thaon di Revel to move ahead and engage it. Unsurprisingly, the destroyer rapidly withdrew and the Italian ships were fired on by Fort Ertogrul (Ertrogrul, Ertugrul), situated at Cape Helles on the the south-westernmost tip of the Gallipoli peninsula and Fort Orhaniye (Orchanie) on the Asian shore. These two positions commanded the approaches and entrance to the strait, though what ordnance they were equipped with is the subject of much disagreement. Probably the most authoritative source for the defences of the Turkish Straits is that provided by the British Lieutenant J K L Fitzwillams, who translated an article that had appeared in the Russian Artillery Journal for August 1912. The translation appeared in the Journal of the Royal Artillery in January 1913 and the January-June edition of the Journal of the United States Artillery in 1915. In between these times it was used extensively by Commodore William H. Beehler, U.S.N. (retired) for his 1913 history. According to Fitzwilliams, the coastal defence artillery were nearly all made by Krupp and ‘did not need to be of particularly long range.’ He stated that Fort Ertogrul and Fort Orhaniye were armed with eight and seven 238 mm guns respectively.32 Further forts and batteries were arranged over the whole length of the Dardanelles, but since they do not figure in the story they may be ignored for the moment. Indeed, the defences in general had been greatly boosted as an attack was expected. These measures included some 350 guns relocated from the forts on the Bosphorus, strengthened and improved minefields, and the deployment of some 40,000 troops in the Dardanelles district. Because of the dangers from the mines the passage of merchant ships at night was prohibited, and during the day all had to be navigated by pilots.
Undoubtedly aware of these hazards, Viale made no attempt to send any of his ships into the entrance and upon being fired upon he moved the fleet around to the western side of Cape Helles. At about 10:30 hours the heavy units began a bombardment of the forts on the Asiatic side of the strait, firing over the tip of the Gallipoli peninsula. Fire was returned with ‘great accuracy’ according to the Italian official account, but despite this no serious hits were recorded on any of the ships. In any event, the fleet did not venture any closer than about nine kilometres, which was at the outer range of the coastal artillery. This long-range duel continued until about 13:30 hours when, after discharging 180 shells, the fleet withdrew. Though claims and counter-claims about the amount of damage inflicted on both sides were made, there is little doubt that no significant injury was inflicted on either ships or defences.
It is difficult to see what military objective was served by this action. It is almost certainly the case that what had been originally contemplated by the Italians was an attack on the Ottoman fleet. This was anchored at Nagara Point (Nara Burnu, Abydos) some 30 kilometres north of the entrance and just above the narrows at Çanakkale. Indeed Giolitti claimed at the time that the Ottoman fleet was the objective, and in his memoirs revealed that the Italians had picked up a ‘secret agent’ at Stampalia who was to act as a pilot during any action in the Dardanelles.33 The presence of the Duke of Abruzzi’s command, the ‘Division of the Torpedo Boat Inspector,’ lends credence to this conclusion, though why the operation was not delayed when the weather proved too heavy for the torpedo boats to operate is something of a mystery. The objective may not have been military at all. Luigi Albertini, editor of the influential Milanese paper Corriere della Sera, posited that the operation was a feint, and mounted in order to distract attention from the Southern Sporades where Italy planned her next naval moves.34 Whatever the aim of the attack might have been it brought immediate political consequences when the Ottoman government proclaimed a blockade of the Dardanelles.
This caused instantaneous protests from the Austro-Hungarian, the British, and the Russian governments. On 19 April the Italian chargé d’affaires, Gaetano Manzoni, visited the Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Sir Arthur Nicolson, at the Foreign Office in London. He explained that the action the previous day had been caused when the Italian squadron, which had been cruising off the entrance to the Dardanelles in an effort to entice out the Ottoman fleet, had been fired on by the defences. Manzoni was told that Britain took the view that it was Italian actions that had compelled the closure of the Dardanelles, and that the Ottoman government could not be blamed. He reiterated that the blockade was a most serious matter for Britain and would cause much discontent. This was restated the next day to the Ottoman government by Sir Edward Grey, who telegraphed to the British Ambassador in Istanbul, Sir Gerard Lowther, pointing out that he recognised the rights of the Ottoman Government to ‘adopt such legitimate means of defence as they may consider necessary.’35
Also on 22 April Nicolson had a further meeting this time with the Italian Ambassador, Marquis Guglielmo Imperiali, and told him that the closure of the waterway was causing grave injury to British commercial and shipping interests. Around 150 merchant vessels manned by about 4,000 British personnel were being held up by the closure and it was costing the shipowners some £9,000 per day. When the Ambassador suggested that such protests would better be directed towards the Ottoman Government, Nicolson demurred. British policy, as he explained personally and as was stated publicly in Parliament by Viscount Morley the same day, was to express the ‘hope’ that, whilst the British recognised the right of the Ottoman Empire ‘to adopt measures of self-defence,’ they would nevertheless ‘open a passage through the straits to foreign commerce as soon as possible.’ Imperiali replied that he ‘trusted’ the Italian Government would not be asked for assurances that they would abstain from hostilities near the Straits. The answer came that whilst Britain did not wish to contemplate anything ‘disagreeable’ to Italy, there could be no pledges as to what measures the British might be compelled to take in the interests of maintaining their trade.36 Though these exchanges were couched in exquisite diplomatese, the Italians were left in absolutely no doubt that Britain blamed them for the whole affair.
Conversely, Russia held the Ottoman Government responsible. Count Alexander Benckendorf, the Russian Ambassador to Britain, info
rmed Nicolson on 22 April, that ‘very strong pressure had been put upon the Russian Government to take strong measures for opening the Dardanelles, as their closure was causing the greatest injury to Russian commerce.’ A note had therefore been delivered in Istanbul to ‘the following effect:’
The Russian Government were unaware how the Turkish Government could reconcile the free passage of the Straits accorded to merchant vessels by Treaty with the present measures of closing the Straits. They, therefore, expressed the ‘firm hope’ that, as soon as the imminent danger of hostile attack had passed by, the Turkish Government would open the Straits to foreign commerce. Otherwise the Russian Government would have to consider the question of indemnities for the losses incurred.37
The Austro-Hungarian government, though not affected as directly as Britain and Russia, was at one with the former in respect of attributing blame. Called to explain, d’Avama argued that the action had been a demonstration to illustrate Italian naval superiority and freedom of action to the Ottoman Government. Berchtold expressed his displeasure and warned that if any similar operation were attempted in future, it would carry with it ‘grave consequences.’ This warning took place within the context of, as it was perceived by Berchtold, the rights conferred by the Triple Alliance treaty. He was later to reiterate his previously stated argument that although Austria-Hungary made representations in an ‘unequivocal manner’ this in no way hindered Italy’s actions: ‘We refused our expressed consent to actions, from which we apprehended dangerous consequences for the Balkans, and because we would not share the responsibility for these, but all we did, was to warn Italy with regard to the threatening consequences.’38 In any event, Giolitti himself had ensured that the ‘grave consequences’ would not come to pass when he ordered the fleet to suspend any further operations in the upper Aegean on the day that they took place.
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