In order to maintain secrecy as to the destination of the expeditionary force, misinformation was disseminated to the effect that a landing was planned at Bomba, a village on the Gulf of Bomba some 60 kilometres from Derna. Secrecy was maintained to the extent that Ameglio forbade any reconnaissance of the target and strict censorship was imposed on all communications, particularly with respect to those of journalists. This led to the force being tagged as the Bomba detachment.
Rhodes. The Italian decision to expand and extend the campaign against the Ottoman Empire to the Southern Sporades (Dodecanese) was prompted by the wish to increase pressure on the Ottoman government. Opening another theatre of operations was fraught with diplomatic dangers, but the way was eventually cleared for a ‘temporary’ occupation of the islands of Rhodes, Karpathos and Stampalia. Once again utilising their command of the sea and expertise in amphibious warfare, the navy successfully landed a large force at the Bay of Kalithea (Baia di Catilla) on the east coast on 4 May 1912. This force advanced on Rhodes City and occupied it with little resistance, and after a short campaign of some twelve days the Ottomans throughout the island were forced to surrender. It had been a dramatic victory made possible by Italian naval supremacy, and it was followed by the occupation of the several other islands of the Southern Sporades. However, whilst an operational success the venture was a strategic failure as it did little or nothing to force the Ottoman government to terms. It also threatened a diplomatic rupture with Austria-Hungary as Italy occupied many more islands than the agreed three. (© Charles Blackwood).
The 1st Division of the 1st Squadron left Taranto on 30 April for Stampalia en route to Rhodes, whilst destroyers and torpedo-boats began to patrol the seas around the island and seize any Ottoman shipping found there. Ameglio, who it may be remembered had commanded the amphibious operation that seized Benghazi, had been granted complete tactical freedom by Pollio, though the Bay of Trianda, an area on the north-west coast near to the village of Trianda (Trianta, Ialyssos), which had a level shingle beach some two kilometres in length, had been suggested as the best area to land the troops. Furthermore it was also only around two or three kilometres from Rhodes City, the key objective of the invasion.
The Ottoman garrison on Rhodes was estimated to be somewhere between 2,000-5,000 strong and equipped with artillery. Should this force be in the right place at the right time then it could cause severe difficulties to the landing operation. Since the Trianda Bay area was obviously the most likely candidate for an amphibious attack Ameglio had decided to land elsewhere. Instead he chose to put his force ashore at the Bay of Kalithea (Baia di Catilla) on the east coast, which was about ten kilometres from Rhodes City and just north of the modern resort of Faliraki.5 On 1 May the cable between Rhodes City and the Anatolian mainland was dredged up and cut whilst the expeditionary force left the following day aboard the steamships. Escorted by the warships and accompanied by a hospital ship the Re d’Italia the fleet first steamed eastward at around ten knots. Even the crews were not aware of the true destination and only once it was out of sight of land was the course altered northwards.
This force was off Kalithea early on the morning of 4 May whilst diversionary tactics were employed by vessels off Trianda and several other places. The Italian navy had no specialist amphibious equipment, and the troops and their equipment had to be ferried to the landing beach aboard ships boats. After initial reconnaissance parties had landed and verified that there were no Ottoman forces in the vicinity the landing of the main force began at 04:00 hours. It was some ten hours later that Ameglio had his main body ashore, and so at 14:00 hours the north-eastern advance from the landing beach towards Rhodes City began, protected by the guns of the fleet.
There was to be very little opposition, and the only resistance encountered was from a small Ottoman detachment, estimated to be 400 strong, some five kilometres from the beachhead on high ground around the villages of Koskinou (Koskino) and Sgourou (Asguru, Arguru) The former village was deemed to be inhabited by ‘Greeks’ whilst the latter was ‘Turkish.’ This resistance only slowed the advance slightly, and by nightfall the main Italian body was about two kilometres from its objective where it camped for the night.
The advance resumed the next morning and Ameglio sent a deputation under his Chief of Staff, Major Ernesto Mombelli of the Alpini battalion, into Rhodes City to arrange terms of surrender with Ali Subhi (Subhy, Soubhy) Bey, the vali (governor) of the island. The terms were simple; capitulate immediately or the city would be bombarded. The navy was making similar demands. Captain Gustavo Nicastro took his destroyer Alpino into the harbour and also demanded that the governor surrender.
Subhi Bey had fled however, and his deputy prevaricated, arguing that he could not surrender the Ottoman military component as all the troops had left the city, leaving it undefended. Accordingly there was no resistance when both Italian army and navy detachments entered and took possession; at about 14:00 hours the Italian flag was raised above the old fortifications. Unnoticed by the invaders, the Ottoman vali escaped by boat and made his way along the coast. He was captured at Lindos whilst waiting to be transported to the Anatolian mainland on 28 May.
The Ottoman forces, the strength of which the Italians had greatly overestimated, had meanwhile concentrated around the village of Psinthos (Psithos, Psindos, Psitos) on a plateau some twenty kilometres south-west of Rhodes under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel (bimbashi) Abdullah Bey. According to Italian sources they numbered 1,300 in total, whilst Ottoman records indicate about 950, though this figure may only include regular fighting troops. In any event, they were greatly outnumbered, had very little artillery, and no hope of escape.
Ameglio moved to deal with them on 15 May, dividing his force into three. Under his personal command the main body, Column A, consisting of the two infantry regiments with artillery support, would advance toward the enemy position overland. This advance would be supported by two amphibious operations in order to cut off any attempt at retreat. The Bersaglieri formed Column B and would embark on the Sannio landing on the beach at Kalavarda on the north-west of the island before moving southeast towards Kalopteri. Column C, the Alpini, would use the Bulgaria to land at Malona Bay on the south-east and then advance north-west. In order to preserve security rumours were spread to the effect that the two steamers were conveying troops to the other islands, and both left the harbour at Rhodes City at around 19:00 hours.
Both columns were safely ashore some two to three hours later, and guided by local people, they began to move towards their objectives along roads that were little better than mule tracks. At about 02:00 hours on 16 May the main body under Ameglio, which had advanced over half the distance between Rhodes City and Psinthos on the previous day, resumed its forward movement, arriving at Afandou to the east of the objective at 05:00 hours. The column then split, one of the regiments moving west to Archipoli whilst the other advanced directly towards Psinthos. By 09:00 hours the enemy were effectively surrounded and appeared to have been taken by surprise, though the barren and rocky terrain made any rapid movement difficult.
The defenders, once they observed the advancing Italians, began to fire upon them from around 09:30 hours, to which the Italian artillery replied. Under cover of the bombardment the infantry advanced towards the Ottoman positions, and the defenders began to slowly fall back. The broken nature of the ground made it difficult for the various attacking units to keep in proper contact with each other, but given the disparity in strength there could be little doubt of the outcome of the struggle. As the Italians gained ground they began to occupy the higher features of the terrain, and consequently were able to make the Ottoman positions increasingly untenable. Some of them began to withdraw north-east along the track to Maritsa, whilst attempts to suppress the Italian artillery with counter battery work was hopeless in the face of the much heavier rate of fire.
By 15:00 hours the Ottoman force had been largely driven from its positions and was attempting to retire i
n some disorder towards Maritsa along the only route not completely blocked by Italian units. A large number were able to shelter from the Italian fire in the broken ground, though could make little progress towards their goal because the Bersaglieri were positioned to interdict the track. Ameglio had already decided that he would deploy an entire regiment across this line of retreat the following day, which would have completely surrounded the Ottoman force. However, at 23:00 hours he despatched an officer under a flag of truce to call for surrender. Realising that his position was ultimately hopeless Abdullah sent a representative to Ameglio to negotiate terms. These were simple and straightforward; the entire Ottoman force would give itself and its weapons up at 08:00 hours the next morning, the only exceptions being the officers who would keep their swords as a mark of respect for them having fought bravely and with honour. This was accepted and the emissary returned.
Though Ameglio remained suspicious that some of the enemy would try to escape or even continue to fight, and so made his dispositions for resuming operations accordingly, the enemy did indeed lay down their arms as agreed. The Ottoman commander-in-chief, accompanied by the commander of the gendarmerie, called on Ameglio to observe the formalities and their forces accordingly handed over their arms. Also captured was a section of mountain artillery, together with an ammunition train complete with draft animals and much other equipment was also taken after being found abandoned. The total number of prisoners amounted to about 1,300 including 38 officers and they were sent to Rhodes City. The Italians estimated that around 200 of the enemy had been killed or wounded, whilst their own casualties amounted to one officer and seven soldiers killed, and 26 soldiers wounded. This casualty list demonstrates that although the fighting had been somewhat lengthy, it had certainly not been hard.
It had though, by any standards, been a dramatic military victory made possible, of course, by Italian naval supremacy, and it was this that allowed the occupation of several other islands of the Southern Sporades. On 12 May the islands of Karpathos (Scarpanto), Kasos (Caso), Tilos (Piscopi), Nisyros (Nisiro), Kalymnos (Calino), Leros (Lero), and Patmos (Patmo) were seized by landing parties from individual ships. There was no resistance and having left small garrisons the vessels departed. The island of Kos (Coo) was likewise taken on 21 May and the islands of Leipsoi (Lisso), Symi (Simi), and Halki (Calchi) soon followed.
This was, of course, going well beyond the occupation of Rhodes, Karpathos and Stampalia that had been reluctantly accepted by Austria-Hungary. That Berchtold was becoming somewhat exasperated by Italian actions in the Aegean, or at least by requests concerning them, is made plain in his communication with the Austro-Hungarian ambassador at Rome, Kajetan von Merey, dated 23 May 1912.
The question of occupation of islands in the Aegean Sea has repeatedly been the subject of conversations between me and the Italian Ambassador in the last few days.
The Duke of Avarna resumed the discussion yesterday. He especially expressed the apprehension that the decision we had promised in respect of the occupation of several unimportant islands (he referred to Chios and the isles whence the Turkish officials had first been removed) might be such as to arouse profound ill-feeling in Italy.
He further observed that it impressed him strangely to see that of all Europe, including Germany, it was Austria-Hungary, Italy’s ally, who caused her the greatest difficulties in the attainment of her aim, which consisted in a speedy conclusion of the war.
I pointed out, that in this case we were in a peculiar situation in two respects: Firstly, because we had entered into bilateral agreements with Italy concerning the matter in question; secondly, because we were directly adjacent neighbours of Turkey, and consequently were the most closely concerned of all. Besides, I failed to understand his apprehension, inasmuch as there never had been a question of a ‘protest’ against the occupation of the islands referred to. Yet, we were compelled to specify our legitimate claim at this time in order to avoid possible future misunderstandings.
I finally specified our standpoint on this question as follows: We have been painfully impressed by the news of the occupation of additional islands by Italian troops. Because of the consequences to be feared from such operations, we are compelled to express our most serious misgivings. At the same time it is our duty to point out that in our opinion the occupations in question are contrary to the provisions of Article VII of the Treaty of Triple Alliance, and give us the right to demand compensation on our part.
True, for the time being we do not wish to make use of this right, out of a desire to avoid complicating Italy’s position. However, we must declare emphatically that if Italy perseveres in this policy the responsibility for it will rest with her, while we would be constrained to reserve the right to compensation which we are at liberty to use according to our own judgment.6
The ‘right to compensation’ as enshrined in Article VII of the Triple Alliance, was probably the motive force behind Austro-Hungarian concerns. Indeed, Austria-Hungary was the only Great Power to raise protests at Italian actions. As Giolitti recalled:
The occupation of the islands did not rise to any comments from the Powers, except Austria-Hungary. Berchtold renewed his complaints over our occupation, because it was not limited to those islands over which he had reluctantly expressed consent. […] He intended, however, that the occupations carried marked the final limit that he would accept.7
Austro-Hungarian forbearance was being prompted by the senior partner in the Triple-Alliance, who was accordingly grateful, as is revealed by messages passed between Austria-Hungary’s Ambassador to Berlin and Berchtold in Vienna. For example:
Von Kiderlen-Waechter assured me that he gratefully acknowledged our conciliatory attitude in the matter of Italian action in the Archipelago. He still entertained hopes that the occupation of several islands in the Aegean Sea by Italy would not provoke a dangerous reaction in the Balkans.8
Austro-Hungarian concerns were the only ones expressed directly, if in somewhat muted form, but the British Admiralty was certainly exercised by the Italian actions and their potential. Rear-Admiral Ernest Troubridge, the chief of the Admiralty War Staff, had the responsibility at the time for drawing up plans for naval strategy in the event of war. On 29 June 1912 he authored a memorandum entitled ‘Italian occupation of Aegean Islands and its effect on naval policy,’ which he circulated to the foreign office and other interested government departments. His analysis and conclusions were clear:
A cardinal factor of [of British policy] has naturally been that no strong Naval Power should be in effective permanent occupation of any territory or harbour East of Malta, if such harbour be capable of transformation into a fortified Naval base. […] None can foresee the developments of material in warfare, and the occupation of the apparently most useless island should be resisted equally with the occupation of the best. The geographical situation of these islands enables the Sovereign Power, if enjoying the possession of a Navy, to exercise a control over the Levant and Black Sea trade and to threaten our position in Egypt in an unprecedented degree. It may be confidently asserted that the possession by Italy of naval bases in the Aegean Sea would imperil our position in Egypt, would cause us to lose our control over our Black Sea and Levant trade at its source, and would in war expose our route to the East via the Suez Canal to the operations of Italy and her allies.9
A naval base in the area would be even more significant if, as the Admiralty suspected they might, the other members of the Triple Alliance were to have access to it. A combined Austro-Hungarian and Italian fleet would be ‘a much more formidable opponent than the feeble Italy’ and could have profound effects on British interests.10 Winston Churchill, the political head of the Royal Navy noted on 15 June that Britain’s rivals in the Mediterranean ‘may be said to be Italy and Austria, separately or together.’11 This was all the more so as many units of the Royal Navy’s Mediterranean fleet were being withdrawn to counteract the increasing German threat in the North Sea. It is then no s
urprise that the Admiralty were disquieted, or that Sir Edward Grey made it his unstated policy to prevent Italy gaining a permanent hold on the islands. The policy was tacit at that time because of the repeated Italian assurances that the occupation was temporary. For example, Giolitti declared in Parliament on 5 December 1912 that the occupation was temporary and had been undertaken for ‘purely military purposes.’12 Nevertheless, just over a year later on 12 August 1913, after Italy proved somewhat reluctant to quit, Grey stated the policy, as agreed between the Great Powers, concerning the islands in an official statement to the UK Parliament:
The destiny of these Aegean Islands – all of them including those in the temporary occupation of Italy – is a matter which concerns all the Great Powers, and must be settled eventually by them and no Great Power is to retain one of these islands for itself.13
Italy was to have different ideas of course, but there is no evidence to suggest that Giolitti, San Giuliano, or indeed anyone else in a position of influence or power in Italy was being deliberately insincere in 1912 when they stated that the islands would be returned. There was however one complicating factor; the people of the occupied islands. In 1912 the population was around 143,000 of whom some 45,000 lived on Rhodes, whilst Halki, Astypalea, Tilos, Patmos and Kasos averaged under 3,000. It was not however a homogenous population. According to a study published in 1912 the population of Rhodes was mainly Greek (37,777) with a smaller number of Muslims (4,854), and the rest (2,445) categorised as Jews and ‘others.’ Over half of these lived in Rhodes City and its environs, whilst the rest were divided amongst 44 rural villages.14 This preponderance of Greeks, or rather those who thought of themselves as Greek, was more or less replicated amongst the other islands.
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