The operation to occupy the islands of the Southern Sporades (Dodecanese) was sanctioned somewhat reluctantly by Austria-Hungary after German pressure, and the British were able to tolerate it publicly because they understood that it was only a temporary measure. As an operation of war it was carried out in an efficient manner, with Giovanni Ameglio being able to land his forces, defeat the enemy, and occupy the whole island of Rhodes between 4-17 May 1912.
The other smaller islands were all occupied before the end of the same month with the willing assent of most of their populations, as the Italian invasion was initially viewed as liberation from Ottoman rule by the majority, who wished to be united with Greek State. This view was soon to change when it became apparent that the Italians were going to stay, and it must have been heartbreaking for the Orthodox population to observe the genuine liberation of other Aegean islands when the Greek Navy easily took them following the outbreak of the First Balkan War in October 1912. This conflict had become general, with offensive military action by Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia, on the same day that Italy and the Ottoman Empire had made their peace with the signing of the Treaty of Ouchy on 18 October.
To claim that the relationship between the Italo-Ottoman and First Balkan War was one of cause and effect is stretching the available evidence beyond what it can bear. Conversely, it would probably be going too far to argue that it had no effect at all. Certainly, the military operations in North Africa did not absorb much in the way of Ottoman military strength, though the logistics and support activities of the Teskilat-i-Mahsusa (Special Organisation) must have absorbed a great deal of resources. There were also several hundred officers, including the most able, in action in Tripoli by the middle of 1912 (though they were recalled once the peace treaty was signed and the Balkan conflict erupted). This was a commitment that would not have been impossible to maintain had the political will been there, but the events of July 1912, and the formation of the new government with its ‘Great Cabinet’ changed this. The new foreign minister, Gabriel Noradungiyan (Gabriel Effendi), was of the opinion that, because of the trouble now looming following the formation of the Balkan League, the war with Italy must be brought to an end. Agreeing a peace treaty was though difficult for the new government, as the CUP and the Ottoman army were reluctant to concede territory to a foe that could not conquer it.
Eventually, as we have seen, a formula was arrived at which allowed something to both sides; in other words rather a fudge. As the Italian author of works on law, politics and government, Aldobrandino Malvezzi, explained it in 1913: ‘It is clear that the state of affairs created by the arrangements between Italy and Turkey creates uncertainty concerning our governing of Libya.’26 Giolitti ignored any dubiety in the Ouchy Treaty and proclaimed a clear victory. Others were not so sure, and these included the unfortunate populations of the former Tripoli vilayet, who were to find that Italian occupation meant that ‘the gallows flourished everywhere in Libya.’27 This was of course under the rule of so-called ‘Liberal Italy.’ The reaction caused by Italy’s methods, combined with Italian participation in the First World War and subsequent withdrawal of most forces to the Alpine Front, led to the Great Arab Revolt. When the reconquest, or, more accurately the conquest of the peoples of the interior of Libya (as it became in 1934) began following the defeat of the Central Powers in 1918, technology had advanced to an extent that the desert no longer provided the same degree of protection to its peoples as had previously applied. Using a devastating combination of motor vehicles, aeroplanes, and radio communications, the Italian army was able to penetrate the forbidding terrain. However, to quote Angelo Del Boca again: ‘With the advent of Fascism and the elimination of an opposition capable of criticizing the excesses of colonialism, the reconquest of Libya took on a more intense pace and an unprecedented scale.’ It was thus that the peoples of Libya, much more so than those of the Dodecanese, paid the greatest price for the war started by Giolitti and San Giuliano.
The Italo-Ottoman War was above all else an unnecessary war, only entered into to satisfy the nationalist and jingo right wing that had become a powerful force in Italian domestic politics. Italy could have had effective control of the Tripoli vilayet, in much the same style as Britain and France were effective rulers of Egypt and Tunisia respectively, up to the point of the invasion. Whether this would have resulted in the local population being more accepting of the Italian presence is unknown. But had the local Ottoman forces been withdrawn peacefully, and had the logistical support furnished by the Ottoman government never been forthcoming, and had the Italians attempted to rule with the same light-touch that the Ottoman Empire had employed, then it is conceivable that the outcome might have been considerably more peaceful than it turned out to be. Italy had long coveted the territory as has been shown, and had taken pains diplomatically to try to ensure that it would eventually get it. It was though not enough for Giolitti and San Giuliano to satisfy this long-standing territorial ambition by diplomacy. It had to be done by force of arms with famous victories reflecting the glory of Italy. That the Italian army in particular had made no plans to do anything other than what it eventually did do and occupy strategic locations on the coast, and that political and military intelligence concerning the nature of what was likely to be the reception offered were not factors that seemed to figure in the political calculation.
Neither did the virtual worthlessness of the territory being conquered. McCullagh might have been heavily biased against the Italian venture, but the title of his 1913 book on the conflict, Italy’s War for a Desert, was nevertheless accurate. The Italo-Ottoman War was entirely a conflict of choice on Italy’s part and may be reasonably viewed as a strategic blunder of massive proportions. This was recognised by at least one of Giolitti’s successors. Francesco Nitti, who served as the 36th Prime Minister of Italy between 1919 and 1920, opined thus in 1921:
The Libyan adventure, now considered serenely, cannot be looked on as anything but an aberration. Libya is an immense box of sand which never had any value, nor has it now. Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan cover more than one million one hundred thousand square kilometres and have less than nine hundred thousand inhabitants, of whom even now, after ten years, less than a third are under the effective control of Italy.28
That the Italo-Ottoman War in general, and the Tripoli campaign in particular, ended as favourably as it did from the Italian perspective was entirely due to circumstances outside its control. No advice as to local conditions seems to have been solicited and no intelligence sought as to what conditions would be encountered in the theatre. No assessment as to the likely response of the enemy was carried out. Consequently the venture was launched with the invaders having little or no idea of what they were getting themselves into, and no idea of how to bring it to an end once their initial strategy collapsed.
From a distance of 100 years it should seem incredible that any responsible government would launch itself and its armed forces into such an ill-conceived campaign. However, the early years of the 21st century have surely demonstrated that the Giolitti government was by no means unique in this regard.
APPENDIX A
ULTIMATUM FROM ITALY TO TURKEY REGARDING TRIPOLI, 28 SEPTEMBER 1911
Throughout a long series of years the Italian Government has never ceased to represent to the Porte the absolute necessity that the state of disorder and neglect in which Tripoli and Cyrenaica are left by Turkey should come to an end, and that these regions should be allowed to enjoy the same progress as that attained by other parts of Northern Africa. This transformation, which is required by the general exigencies of civilization, constitutes, so far as Italy is concerned, a vital interest of the very first order, by reason of the small distance separating these countries from the coasts of Italy.
Notwithstanding the attitude maintained by the Italian Government, which has always loyally accorded its support to the Imperial Government on the different political questions of recent times, notwithstanding the mod
eration and patience displayed by the Italian Government hitherto, not only have its views in regard to Tripoli been misunderstood by the Imperial Government, but what is more, all enterprises on the part of Italians, in the aforesaid regions, constantly encounter a systematic opposition of the most obstinate and unwarranted kind.
The Imperial Government, which has thus up to now displayed constant hostility towards all legitimate Italian activity in Tripoli and Cyrenaica, quite recently, at the eleventh hour, proposed to the Royal Government to come to an understanding, declaring itself disposed to grant any economic concession compatible with the treaties in force and with the higher dignity and interests of Turks; but the Royal Government does not now feel itself in a position to enter upon such negotiations, the uselessness of which is demonstrated by past experience, and which, far from constituting a guarantee for the future, could but afford a permanent cause of friction and conflict.
On the other hand, information received by the Royal Government from its consular agents in Tripoli and Cyrenaica represents the situation there as extremely dangerous on account of the agitation prevailing against Italian subjects, which is very obviously fomented by officers and other organs of the authorities. This agitation constitutes an imminent danger not only to Italian subjects but also to foreigners of any nationality who, justly perturbed and anxious for their safety, have commenced to embark and are leaving Tripoli without delay. The arrival at Tripoli of Ottoman military transports, the serious consequences of the sending of which the Royal Government had not failed to point out previously to the Ottoman Government, cannot but aggravate the situation and impress on the Royal Government the strict and absolute obligation of providing against the perils resulting therefrom.
The Italian Government, therefore, finding itself forced to think of the guardianship of its dignity and its interests, has decided to proceed to the military occupation of Tripoli and Cyrenaica. This solution is the only one Italy can decide upon, and the Royal Government expects that the Imperial Government will in consequence give orders so that it may meet with no opposition from the present Ottoman representatives, and that the measures which will be the necessary consequence may be effected without difficulty. Subsequent agreements would be made between the two governments to settle the definitive situation arising therefrom. The Royal Ambassador in Constantinople has orders to ask for a peremptory reply on this matter from the Ottoman Government within twenty-four hours from the presentation of the present document, in default of which the Italian Government will be obliged to proceed to the immediate execution of the measures destined to ensure the occupation.
Pray add that the reply of the Porte within the aforesaid limit of twenty-four hours must be communicated to us through the intermediary of the Turkish Embassy in Rome also.
San Giuliano.1
THE TURKISH REPLY TO ITALIAN ULTIMATUM REGARDING TRIPOLI, 29 SEPTEMBER 1911
The Royal Embassy understands the many difficulties of the circumstances which made it impossible for Tripoli and Cyrenaica to share in the benefit of progress. An impartial examination of conditions does, in effect, suffice to establish that the constitutional Ottoman Government could not be held responsible for the existence of a situation created by the former regime. This being accepted, the Sublime Porte, in reviewing the course of events of the past three years seeks, but without avail, those circumstances in which it is claimed she has shown herself hostile to Italian enterprises relating to Tripoli and Cyrenaica. On the contrary it has always appeared to her normal and reasonable that Italy should cooperate with her capital and industrial activity to the regeneration of that part of the Empire. The Imperial Government is conscious of having shown favourable disposition each time it was confronted by propositions conceived in that spirit.
The Ottoman Government also has examined and generally settled in the most friendly way every claim and all other questions laid before it by the Royal Embassy. Is it necessary to add that in doing this it obeyed dictates so often manifested to cultivate and maintain relations of trust and of friendship with the Italian Government? In short, it was this sentiment alone which again inspired it, when it proposed most recently to the Royal Embassy an arrangement based upon economic concessions likely to furnish to Italian activity a vast field for operation in said provinces; in setting as the only limitation to these concessions the dignity and the superior interests of the Empire, as well as the treaties actually in force, the Ottoman Government gave expression to its sentiments of conciliation without, however, losing sight of the treaties and conventions that pledge the Ottoman Government to other Powers, and whose international worth would be forfeited by the will of one party.
Regarding the question of order and of security, both in Tripoli and in Cyrenaica, the Ottoman Government, well posted to appreciate the situation, can only prove, as it has already had the honour to do, all lack of reason which might justify apprehension regarding the fate of Italian subjects and of other foreigners therein established. Not only is there at this time no agitation in these countries and even less of inflaming propaganda, but the officers and other agencies of Ottoman authority have as their mission the safeguarding of order, a mission which they perform conscientiously.
As regards the presence in Tripoli of Ottoman military transports, which the Royal Embassy takes for its text to deduce from it the possibility of ominous consequences, the Sublime Porte believes it necessary to observe that it is question of a single transport whose expedition antedates by several days the note of September 26, independent of the fact that this expedition had no troops on board, could have had no other but a reassuring effect upon the people.
Reduced to its essential terms the actual disagreement resides in the absence of guarantee likely to reassure the Italian Government regarding the economic expansion of interests in Tripoli and in Cyrenaica. By not resorting to an act so grave as a military occupation, the Royal Government will find the Sublime Porte quite agreeable to the removal of the disagreement.
Therefore, in an impartial spirit, the Imperial Government requests that the Royal Government be good enough to make known to it the nature of these guarantees, to which it will readily consent if they are not to affect its territorial integrity. To this end it will refrain, during the parleys from modifying in any manner whatever the present situation of Tripoli and of Cyrenaica in military matters; and it is to be hoped that, yielding to the sincere disposition of the Sublime Porte, the Royal Government will acquiesce in this proposition.2
1 Translation taken from: ‘Ultimatum from Italy to Turkey Regarding Tripoli’ in The American Journal of International Law, Volume 6, No. 1. Supplement: Official Documents (January 1912). pp. 11-12.
2 Translation taken from: ‘The Turkish Reply to Italian Ultimatum Regarding Tripoli’ in The American Journal of International Law, Volume 6, No. 1. Supplement: Official Documents (January 1912). pp. 12-14.
APPENDIX B
THE CURIOUS CASE OF OSMAN MAHDI
On Tuesday, 7 May 1912 an account of a minor skirmish that had occurred outside Derna appeared in the Italian Gazzetta Ufficiale. It related how a nocturnal patrol of Alpini under Lieutenant Vialini had encountered a group of Bedouin under the command of a Turkish officer in some caves in no man’s land between the Ottoman and Italian lines. Fire had been exchanged, causing the death of one of the Arabs and the wounding of the officer whilst the remainder of the group fled. According to the report the wounded officer then shouted for help in Italian but, as Vialini approached to offer this, the Turk produced a revolver and fired at the lieutenant who responded, mortally wounding his opponent. The dead Bedouin and the wounded officer were then carried inside the defences where the latter expired after being identified as one Mahdi Osman.1
This episode was later used by Tullio Irace as evidence of inherent Arab and Turkish treachery:
Underneath the Arab bravery lies a substratum of cowardice. When fanaticism dies down, their habitual deceit and lying come again to the top. Treachery
seems an essential part of their nature. […] The Turks are not much better, as the following incident will prove. An Italian patrol was suddenly fired on from an ambush, by Bedouins under a Turkish officer, who discharged a revolver at the Italian lieutenant (Violini) who was in command. The Italians returned the fire, wounding the officer and killing a few Arabs. The wounded officer begged for assistance, but when the Italian lieutenant advanced towards him to give him help, the Turk fired two more shots at him, but without effect. The Italian was obliged to use his own revolver in self-defence. The Turk, who expired shortly afterwards, was identified as an officer named Osman Mahdi.2
That there was a little more to the story was shortly revealed. For example the weekly La Domenica del Corriere informed its readership in the 19-26 May edition that the enemy protagonist in the incident was not what he seemed. Osman Mahdi, it had been discovered, was ‘in fact British journalist John Warren Stuart Smallwood of The Daily Chronicle in disguise.’3 The same information had been released to the foreign press on 14 May and many newspapers worldwide carried accounts, which also indicated that there was more to Smallwood than had at first been thought:
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